2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "internal/packet.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl->packet_length = 0;
49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
92 return curr_rec < num_recs;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
114 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
119 if (sc->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
122 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&sc->rlayer); i++) {
123 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&sc->rlayer.rrec[i])
124 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
126 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&sc->rlayer.rrec[i]);
132 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
134 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
137 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
139 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
144 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&sc->rlayer), len);
147 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
149 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
154 switch (sc->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
156 return "read header";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
166 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
168 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
173 switch (sc->rlayer.rstate) {
174 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
176 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
178 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
186 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
188 int ssl3_read_n(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend,
189 int clearold, size_t *readbytes)
192 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
193 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
194 * s->rlayer.rbuf.buf specified by s->rlayer.packet and
195 * s->rlayer.packet_length. (If s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may
196 * be stored in rbuf [plus s->rlayer.packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
197 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
198 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
200 size_t len, left, align = 0;
207 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
209 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
210 /* SSLfatal() already called */
215 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
216 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
217 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
221 /* start with empty packet ... */
224 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
226 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
229 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
230 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
231 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
233 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
234 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
235 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
236 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
237 * overrun can be triggered.
239 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
243 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
244 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
245 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
248 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
249 pkt = rb->buf + align;
251 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
252 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
254 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
255 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
256 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
257 rb->offset = len + align;
261 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
262 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
265 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
266 if (left == 0 && extend)
268 if (left > 0 && n > left)
272 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
274 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
281 /* else we need to read more data */
283 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
284 /* does not happen */
285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
290 * Ktls always reads full records.
291 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
293 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead
294 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
295 /* ignore max parameter */
300 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
301 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
309 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
310 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
315 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
316 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
317 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
321 && !BIO_should_retry(s->rbio)
322 && BIO_eof(s->rbio)) {
323 if (s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) {
324 SSL_set_shutdown(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
325 SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
326 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
329 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING);
333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
339 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
340 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
342 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
347 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
348 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
349 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
351 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
353 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
357 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
360 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
361 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
367 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
368 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
370 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
373 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
375 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
376 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
382 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
387 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
388 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
389 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
391 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
392 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
393 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
394 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
395 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
396 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
397 * report the error in a way the user will notice
399 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
400 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
405 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
406 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
414 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
415 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
418 if (wb->left == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
419 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
420 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
423 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
424 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
427 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
428 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
429 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
430 /* SSLfatal() already called */
439 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
440 * will happen with non blocking IO
443 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
444 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
447 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
448 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
451 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
453 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
455 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
456 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
457 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
458 * compromise is considered worthy.
460 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
461 && len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s))
462 && s->compress == NULL
463 && s->msg_callback == NULL
465 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
466 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
467 && (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
468 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) != 0) {
469 unsigned char aad[13];
470 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
474 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
475 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
476 max_send_fragment -= 512;
478 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
479 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
481 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
482 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
483 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
485 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
490 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
494 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
495 /* free jumbo buffer */
496 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
503 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
504 /* free jumbo buffer */
505 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
509 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
510 i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
512 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
513 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
518 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
519 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
521 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
523 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
525 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
526 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
533 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
534 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
535 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
536 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
537 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
538 /* free jumbo buffer */
539 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
543 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
544 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
547 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
548 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
549 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
552 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
553 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
555 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
561 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
562 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
563 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
564 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
566 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
568 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
569 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
570 /* free jumbo buffer */
571 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
573 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
577 /* free jumbo buffer */
578 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
579 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
586 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
587 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
588 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
589 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
597 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
598 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
600 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
601 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
602 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
605 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
606 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
608 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
615 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
616 || (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
617 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0
618 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
620 if (max_send_fragment == 0
621 || split_send_fragment == 0
622 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
624 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
625 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
632 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
638 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
639 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
642 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
644 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
647 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
648 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
651 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
652 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
653 remain = n % numpipes;
654 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
655 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
661 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
664 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
665 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
666 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
671 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
672 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
674 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
675 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
677 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0;
680 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
681 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
682 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
684 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
693 int do_ssl3_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
694 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
695 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
697 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
698 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
701 unsigned char *recordstart;
702 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
703 size_t prefix_len = 0;
708 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
711 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
713 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
714 totlen += pipelens[j];
716 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
717 * will happen with non blocking IO
719 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
720 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
721 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
724 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
725 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
726 i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
728 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
731 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
734 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
735 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
736 /* SSLfatal() already called */
741 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
747 || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
748 || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
749 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
752 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
760 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
762 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) {
764 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
765 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
768 if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
770 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
771 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
772 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
775 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
778 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
780 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
785 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
786 /* insufficient space */
787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
792 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1;
795 using_ktls = BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio);
798 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
799 * discard the const qualifier.
800 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
803 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf);
804 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0);
805 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1);
806 goto wpacket_init_complete;
809 if (create_empty_fragment) {
810 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
811 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
813 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
814 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
815 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
817 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
818 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
820 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
821 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
822 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
823 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
828 } else if (prefix_len) {
829 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
830 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
831 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
832 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
833 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
834 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
840 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
843 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
844 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
845 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
846 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
848 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
849 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
850 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
851 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
859 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
860 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
861 && !SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
862 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
863 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
864 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
867 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
868 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
869 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
870 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
871 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
875 wpacket_init_complete:
878 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
879 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
880 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
881 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
883 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
885 unsigned int rectype;
891 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
894 if (SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
895 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
896 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
897 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
898 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
901 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
904 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
905 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
907 if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
909 && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION
910 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
911 version = TLS1_VERSION;
912 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
914 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
915 if (s->compress != NULL)
916 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
919 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
920 * Otherwise write the header now
923 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
924 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
925 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
927 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
929 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
935 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
936 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
937 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
938 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
939 totlen += pipelens[j];
942 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
946 /* first we compress */
947 if (s->compress != NULL) {
948 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
949 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
955 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]);
957 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
961 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
965 if (SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
967 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
968 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
969 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
970 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
972 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
976 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
978 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
979 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
980 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
981 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
983 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
984 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
985 padding = s->record_padding_cb(ssl, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
986 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
987 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
990 /* optimize for power of 2 */
991 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
992 remainder = rlen & mask;
994 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
995 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
999 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
1002 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
1003 if (padding > max_padding)
1004 padding = max_padding;
1005 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
1006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1007 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
1016 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
1017 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
1021 if (!using_ktls && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1024 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1025 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1032 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
1033 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
1034 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
1037 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt,
1038 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
1041 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1044 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
1045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1050 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
1051 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
1052 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
1053 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
1057 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
1059 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1060 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1062 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) {
1063 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1070 if (ssl->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL,
1072 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
1089 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1090 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
1091 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1092 || origlen > thiswr->length
1093 || (thiswr->length > origlen
1094 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
1095 thiswr->length - origlen,
1097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1103 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1104 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
1111 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
1112 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
1113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 if (s->msg_callback) {
1118 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
1119 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1120 s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
1121 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl,
1122 s->msg_callback_arg);
1124 if (SSL_CONNECTION_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
1125 unsigned char ctype = type;
1127 s->msg_callback(1, thiswr->rec_version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
1128 &ctype, 1, ssl, s->msg_callback_arg);
1132 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1138 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1140 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1142 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1146 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1150 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1156 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1157 * is thiswr->length long
1159 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1162 /* now let's set up wb */
1163 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1164 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1168 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1171 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1172 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1173 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1174 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1176 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1177 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1179 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1180 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1184 /* if SSL3_BUFFER_get_left() != 0, we need to call this
1186 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1188 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1189 size_t len, size_t *written)
1192 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1196 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1197 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
1198 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
1199 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1205 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1206 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1207 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1212 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1213 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1216 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1217 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1219 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1220 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1223 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type);
1225 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1226 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1227 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1228 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1237 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS,
1238 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte
1239 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value.
1240 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte
1241 * writes to permit this case.
1243 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1244 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1245 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1246 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1248 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1249 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1251 } else if (i <= 0) {
1252 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1254 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1255 * using a datagram service
1257 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1261 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1262 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1267 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1268 * 'type' is one of the following:
1270 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1271 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1272 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1274 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1275 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1277 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1278 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1279 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
1280 * argument is non NULL.
1281 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1282 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1283 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1284 * Change cipher spec protocol
1285 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1287 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1288 * Handshake protocol
1289 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1290 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1291 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1292 * Application data protocol
1293 * none of our business
1295 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1296 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1299 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1302 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1304 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
1306 is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
1308 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1310 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1311 /* Not initialized yet */
1312 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
1313 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1318 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1319 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1321 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1327 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1329 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1330 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1335 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1338 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1341 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1342 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1343 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1345 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1346 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1353 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1356 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
1357 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1358 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
1359 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1366 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1369 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1370 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1371 * rr[i].data, - data
1372 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1373 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1375 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1376 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1379 /* get new records if necessary */
1380 if (num_recs == 0) {
1381 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1383 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1386 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1387 if (num_recs == 0) {
1388 /* Shouldn't happen */
1389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1393 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1395 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1397 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1398 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1402 } while (num_recs == 0);
1405 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
1406 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1407 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1409 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
1414 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1415 * record that isn't an alert.
1417 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1418 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1419 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1421 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1423 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1424 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1425 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1427 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1432 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1435 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1436 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1437 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1441 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1442 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1443 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1446 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1447 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1448 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1451 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1452 * doing a handshake for the first time
1454 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
1455 && s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1460 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1461 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1462 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1467 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1468 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1472 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1473 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1474 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1476 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1477 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1483 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1484 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1486 n = len - totalbytes;
1488 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1491 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1492 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1493 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1495 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
1496 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1497 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1498 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1499 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1500 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1501 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1502 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1505 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1506 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1511 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1512 && totalbytes < len);
1513 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1514 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1517 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1518 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1519 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1520 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1521 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1526 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1527 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1528 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1532 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1534 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1536 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1537 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1538 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1539 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1545 if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1546 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1548 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1549 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
1550 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
1551 * if we are a server.
1553 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1559 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1560 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1563 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1564 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1565 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1566 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1569 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1570 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1571 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1572 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1577 if (s->msg_callback)
1578 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl,
1579 s->msg_callback_arg);
1581 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1582 cb = s->info_callback;
1583 else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1584 cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
1587 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1588 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1591 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
1592 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
1593 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
1594 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1596 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1597 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1599 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1605 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1606 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1608 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1610 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1611 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
1612 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1614 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
1615 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1616 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1617 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
1618 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
1619 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
1620 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1621 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1622 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1624 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1626 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1627 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1628 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1629 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1630 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1631 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1635 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1636 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1644 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
1645 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1649 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1650 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1651 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1652 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1653 * sent close_notify.
1655 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1656 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1657 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1659 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
1662 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1663 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
1664 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
1665 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
1670 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1671 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1672 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1674 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1676 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1677 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
1679 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1685 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1686 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1687 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1688 * that we're just going to discard.
1690 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1691 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1692 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1693 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1695 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1696 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1697 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1699 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1700 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1701 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1702 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1703 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1705 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1706 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1708 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1709 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1712 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1718 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1719 * protocol violation)
1721 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1722 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1723 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1725 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1726 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1728 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
1729 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1737 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1738 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1739 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1744 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1745 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1746 /* no read-ahead left? */
1749 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1750 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1751 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1752 * problems in the blocking world
1754 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1755 bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
1756 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1757 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1764 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1767 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1768 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1769 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1770 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1771 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1775 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1777 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1779 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1780 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1781 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1785 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1787 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1788 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1789 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1790 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1791 * started), we will indulge it.
1793 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1794 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
1796 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1798 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1799 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1800 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1801 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1802 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1803 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1806 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1807 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1808 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1811 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1820 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1824 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1832 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1833 * format and false otherwise.
1835 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1837 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1841 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1843 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1845 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);