2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
18 #include "record_local.h"
19 #include "internal/packet.h"
21 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s)
26 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
29 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
30 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
36 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
38 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
40 if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL)
41 rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */
42 if (rl->wrlmethod != NULL)
43 rl->wrlmethod->free(rl->wrl); /* Ignore return value */
44 BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
52 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
55 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
57 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
61 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
62 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
64 return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
67 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
68 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
70 return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
71 || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
74 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
76 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me when DTLS is moved to the write record layer */
77 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s))
78 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
79 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
80 return rl->wpend_tot > 0;
83 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
85 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
88 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
91 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
96 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
100 iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
101 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
103 num += rdata->length;
107 for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) {
108 if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
110 num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length;
113 num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl);
118 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
120 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
123 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
125 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
129 sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len;
132 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
134 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
140 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
143 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng);
148 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
150 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
156 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
159 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL);
164 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type,
165 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
167 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0)
170 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
171 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
172 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
173 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
174 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
182 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
183 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
185 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
188 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
190 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
192 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
193 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
194 unsigned int recversion;
199 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
200 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
202 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
203 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
204 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
205 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
206 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
207 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
208 * report the error in a way the user will notice
210 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
211 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot != 0)
212 && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
217 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
218 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
219 /* SSLfatal() already called */
226 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
227 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
230 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
231 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
232 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
235 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
236 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
239 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
240 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
241 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
242 /* SSLfatal() already called */
250 i = tls_write_check_pending(s, type, buf, len);
252 /* SSLfatal() already called */
256 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
257 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->retry_write_records(s->rlayer.wrl));
260 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
261 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
262 } /* else no retry required */
266 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
267 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
269 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
270 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
271 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
272 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
275 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
280 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
281 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
282 i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
284 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
287 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
292 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
293 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
295 if (max_send_fragment == 0
296 || split_send_fragment == 0
297 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
299 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
300 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
307 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
308 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
310 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Does this also need to be in the DTLS equivalent code? */
311 recversion = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
312 if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
314 && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION
315 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
316 recversion = TLS1_VERSION;
319 size_t tmppipelen, remain;
320 size_t j, lensofar = 0;
323 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
324 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
326 maxpipes = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_records(s->rlayer.wrl, type, n,
328 &split_send_fragment);
330 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
331 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
332 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
333 * configured by the user.
335 if (s->max_pipelines > 0 && maxpipes > s->max_pipelines)
336 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
338 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
339 maxpipes = SSL_MAX_PIPELINES;
341 if (split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
346 if (n / maxpipes >= split_send_fragment) {
348 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
351 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
352 tmpls[j].type = type;
353 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
354 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + (j * split_send_fragment);
355 tmpls[j].buflen = split_send_fragment;
357 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
358 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = maxpipes * split_send_fragment;
360 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
361 tmppipelen = n / maxpipes;
362 remain = n % maxpipes;
364 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
369 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
370 tmpls[j].type = type;
371 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
372 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + lensofar;
373 tmpls[j].buflen = tmppipelen;
374 lensofar += tmppipelen;
378 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
379 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = n;
382 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
383 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(s->rlayer.wrl, tmpls, maxpipes));
385 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
386 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
390 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == n
391 || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
392 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE) != 0)) {
393 *written = tot + s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
394 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
398 n -= s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
399 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
403 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int writing, int ret,
404 char *file, int line)
406 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
408 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) {
409 s->rwstate = writing ? SSL_WRITING : SSL_READING;
412 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
413 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) {
416 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
420 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
421 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
422 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, NULL);
423 ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
424 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) != 0) {
425 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
426 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
429 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
430 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
431 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL);
433 } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) {
434 int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl);
436 if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) {
438 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
439 ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL);
442 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
443 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
444 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
445 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
449 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
450 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
451 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
452 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
454 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF)
456 else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR)
463 void ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr)
465 if (rr->rechandle != NULL) {
466 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
467 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl, rr->rechandle);
469 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
470 OPENSSL_free(rr->data);
472 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
476 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
477 * 'type' is one of the following:
479 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
480 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
481 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
483 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
484 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
486 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
487 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
488 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
489 * argument is non NULL.
490 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
491 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
492 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
493 * Change cipher spec protocol
494 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
496 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
498 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
499 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
500 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
501 * Application data protocol
502 * none of our business
504 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
505 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
508 size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes;
510 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
512 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
514 is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
517 && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
518 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
519 || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
524 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
525 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
527 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
528 unsigned char *dst = buf;
533 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
536 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
539 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
540 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
541 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
543 if (recvd_type != NULL)
544 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
551 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
554 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
555 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
556 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
564 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
567 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
568 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
570 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
571 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
573 /* get new records if necessary */
574 if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) {
575 s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
577 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs];
579 ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
580 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
582 &rr->version, &rr->type,
583 &rr->data, &rr->length,
586 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
590 s->rlayer.num_recs++;
591 } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl)
592 && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
594 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec];
596 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
597 && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
598 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
600 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
605 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
606 * record that isn't an alert.
608 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
609 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
611 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
613 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
614 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
615 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
617 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
622 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
625 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
626 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
627 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
632 || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
633 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
636 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
637 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
638 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
641 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
642 * doing a handshake for the first time
644 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
645 && s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
650 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
651 && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
652 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
657 if (recvd_type != NULL)
658 *recvd_type = rr->type;
662 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
663 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
664 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
667 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
673 curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec;
675 if (len - totalbytes > rr->length)
678 n = len - totalbytes;
680 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
683 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
685 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
687 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
688 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
692 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
695 || (peek && n == rr->length)) {
700 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
701 && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs
702 && totalbytes < len);
703 if (totalbytes == 0) {
704 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
707 *readbytes = totalbytes;
712 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
713 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
714 * were actually expecting a CCS).
718 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
720 if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
722 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
723 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
724 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
725 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
731 if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
732 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
734 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
735 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
736 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
737 * if we are a server.
739 s->version = rr->version;
740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
745 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
746 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
749 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
750 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
751 unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data
755 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
756 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
757 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
758 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
764 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl,
765 s->msg_callback_arg);
767 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
768 cb = s->info_callback;
769 else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
770 cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
773 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
774 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
777 if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
778 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
779 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
780 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
782 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
783 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
785 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
791 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
792 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
794 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
796 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
797 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
798 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
800 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
801 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
802 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
803 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
804 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
805 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
806 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
807 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
808 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
810 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
812 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
813 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
814 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
815 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
816 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
817 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
821 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
822 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
830 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
831 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
835 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
836 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
837 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
838 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
841 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
842 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
844 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
847 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
848 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
849 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
850 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
855 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
856 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
857 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
859 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
861 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
863 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
869 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
870 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
871 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
872 * that we're just going to discard.
874 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
875 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
876 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
877 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
879 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
881 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
883 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
884 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n);
889 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
891 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
892 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
895 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
901 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
902 * protocol violation)
904 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
905 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
906 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
908 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
909 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
911 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
912 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
920 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
921 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
922 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
927 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
928 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
931 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
932 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
933 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
934 * problems in the blocking world
936 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
937 bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
938 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
939 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
949 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
950 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
951 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
952 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
953 * record types, using up resources processing them.
955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
957 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
959 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
961 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
962 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
963 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
969 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
970 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
971 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
972 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
973 * started), we will indulge it.
975 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
976 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
978 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
980 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
981 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
982 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
983 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
984 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
985 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
988 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
989 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
990 /* SSLfatal() already called */
993 ssl_release_record(s, rr);
996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1002 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1006 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1014 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1015 * format and false otherwise.
1017 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1019 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s))
1021 return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION;
1024 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper;
1025 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version,
1026 int content_type, const void *buf,
1027 size_t len, void *cbarg)
1029 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1030 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1032 if (s->msg_callback != NULL)
1033 s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl,
1034 s->msg_callback_arg);
1037 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper;
1038 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid,
1041 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1043 return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other);
1046 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper;
1047 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg, int type, size_t len)
1049 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1050 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1052 return s->rlayer.record_padding_cb(ssl, type, len,
1053 s->rlayer.record_padding_arg);
1056 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = {
1057 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data },
1058 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper },
1059 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper },
1060 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper },
1064 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1069 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
1070 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1071 return &ossl_dtls_record_method;
1073 return &ossl_tls_record_method;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1077 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1078 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1079 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0
1080 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)))
1081 return &ossl_ktls_record_method;
1084 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1085 return direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ ? s->rlayer.rrlmethod
1086 : s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1089 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int direction)
1091 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *thismethod;
1092 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *thisrl;
1094 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1095 thismethod = s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1096 thisrl = s->rlayer.rrl;
1098 thismethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1099 thisrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1104 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1106 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) {
1107 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1108 SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1112 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && thismethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
1113 thismethod->set_first_handshake(thisrl, 1);
1115 if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && thismethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL)
1116 thismethod->set_max_pipelines(thisrl, s->max_pipelines);
1121 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1122 int direction, int level,
1123 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
1124 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
1125 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
1126 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen,
1127 int mactype, const EVP_MD *md,
1128 const SSL_COMP *comp)
1130 OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options;
1131 OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings;
1132 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD **thismethod;
1133 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **thisrl, *newrl = NULL;
1135 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1136 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth;
1137 int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0;
1138 unsigned int maxfrag = (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE)
1139 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
1140 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1141 int use_early_data = 0;
1142 uint32_t max_early_data;
1143 COMP_METHOD *compm = (comp == NULL) ? NULL : comp->method;
1145 meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, direction, level);
1147 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1148 thismethod = &s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1149 thisrl = &s->rlayer.rrl;
1152 thismethod = &s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1153 thisrl = &s->rlayer.wrl;
1160 if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) {
1161 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1166 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS,
1168 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE,
1170 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1171 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN,
1172 &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len);
1173 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD,
1174 &s->rlayer.read_ahead);
1176 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING,
1177 &s->rlayer.block_padding);
1179 *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1181 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1182 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1183 use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1184 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1187 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1190 use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1191 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1194 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1199 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM,
1203 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC,
1207 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE,
1211 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1212 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1214 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1215 && s->session != NULL
1216 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1217 maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1220 if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1221 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN,
1225 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1226 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1227 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1229 if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1230 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1231 || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE);
1232 } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) {
1233 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY);
1235 if (use_early_data) {
1236 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
1238 if (max_early_data != 0)
1239 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA,
1243 *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1249 unsigned int epoch = 0;
1250 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch)];
1253 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1254 prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext;
1255 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1256 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1257 epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer) + 1; /* new epoch */
1259 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1260 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1262 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 s->rlayer.rrlnext = next;
1271 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1272 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1273 epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) + 1; /* new epoch */
1277 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1278 * callbacks that we don't need.
1280 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch); i++) {
1281 switch (rlayer_dispatch[i].function_id) {
1282 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK:
1283 if (s->msg_callback == NULL)
1286 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING:
1287 if (s->rlayer.record_padding_cb == NULL)
1293 rlayer_dispatch_tmp[j++] = rlayer_dispatch[i];
1296 rlret = meth->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version,
1297 s->server, direction, level, epoch,
1298 key, keylen, iv, ivlen, mackey,
1299 mackeylen, ciph, taglen, mactype, md,
1300 compm, prev, thisbio, next, NULL, NULL,
1301 settings, options, rlayer_dispatch_tmp,
1305 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL:
1306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE);
1309 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR:
1310 if (*thismethod != meth && *thismethod != NULL) {
1312 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1313 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER);
1321 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS:
1325 /* Should not happen */
1326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1333 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1334 * writing. In that case the record layer is still referenced by buffered
1335 * messages for potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get
1336 * freed do we free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1338 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) || direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1339 if (*thismethod != NULL && !(*thismethod)->free(*thisrl)) {
1340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1348 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s, direction);
1351 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers)
1353 if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL)
1354 || !ossl_assert(s->rlayer.wrlmethod != NULL))
1356 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, s->version);
1357 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, s->version);