2 * Copyright 2005-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include "../ssl_local.h"
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
15 #include "record_local.h"
16 #include "internal/packet.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
23 if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) {
24 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
30 d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
32 if (d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) {
41 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
46 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
47 pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
52 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
57 pqueue *buffered_app_data;
61 while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
62 rec = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data;
63 if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
64 OPENSSL_cleanse(rec->data, rec->length);
65 OPENSSL_free(rec->data);
66 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
70 buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
71 memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
72 d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
75 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
77 if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
78 memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
79 rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
80 memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
81 rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
82 } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
83 memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
84 rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
85 memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
86 rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
91 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
93 memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
96 int dtls_buffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rec)
100 record_pqueue *queue = &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data);
102 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
103 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
106 /* We don't buffer partially read records */
107 if (!ossl_assert(rec->off == 0))
110 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
111 item = pitem_new(rec->seq_num, rdata);
112 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
121 * We will release the record from the record layer soon, so we take a copy
122 * now. Copying data isn't good - but this should be infrequent so we
125 rdata->data = OPENSSL_memdup(rec->data, rec->length);
126 if (rdata->data == NULL) {
129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
133 * We use a NULL rechandle to indicate that the data field has been
136 rdata->rechandle = NULL;
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
141 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
142 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(ssl)) &&
143 (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
144 || SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
145 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
146 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
150 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
151 /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
152 OPENSSL_free(rdata->data);
160 /* Unbuffer a previously buffered TLS_RECORD structure if any */
161 static void dtls_unbuffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
166 /* If we already have records to handle then do nothing */
167 if (s->rlayer.curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs)
170 item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
172 rdata = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data;
174 s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0] = *rdata;
175 s->rlayer.num_recs = 1;
176 s->rlayer.curr_rec = 0;
178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
179 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
180 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
181 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
182 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
186 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
192 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
193 * 'type' is one of the following:
195 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
196 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
197 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
199 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
200 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
202 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
203 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
204 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
205 * argument is non NULL.
206 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
207 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
208 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
209 * Change cipher spec protocol
210 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
212 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
214 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
215 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
216 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
217 * Application data protocol
218 * none of our business
220 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
221 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
226 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
227 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
232 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
233 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
234 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
235 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
239 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
240 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
241 i = sc->handshake_func(s);
242 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
250 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
253 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
254 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
256 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s))
257 dtls_unbuffer_record(sc);
259 /* Check for timeout */
260 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(sc) > 0) {
262 } else if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) {
263 /* dtls1_handle_timeout() has failed with a fatal error */
267 /* get new packet if necessary */
268 if (sc->rlayer.curr_rec >= sc->rlayer.num_recs) {
269 sc->rlayer.curr_rec = sc->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
271 rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.num_recs];
273 ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_RETURN(sc,
274 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(sc->rlayer.rrl,
276 &rr->version, &rr->type,
277 &rr->data, &rr->length,
278 &rr->epoch, rr->seq_num));
280 ret = dtls1_read_failed(sc, ret);
282 * Anything other than a timeout is an error. SSLfatal() already
283 * called if appropriate.
291 sc->rlayer.num_recs++;
292 } while (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)
293 && sc->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
295 rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.curr_rec];
298 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
299 * record that isn't an alert.
301 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
302 sc->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
304 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
306 if (sc->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
307 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
308 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
310 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
311 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
312 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
314 if (dtls_buffer_record(sc, rr) < 0) {
315 /* SSLfatal() already called */
318 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
323 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
326 if (sc->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
327 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
328 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
333 || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
334 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
336 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
337 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
338 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
341 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
342 * doing a handshake for the first time
344 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
345 (sc->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
346 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
347 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
351 if (recvd_type != NULL)
352 *recvd_type = rr->type;
356 * Release a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
357 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
358 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
361 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
365 if (len > rr->length)
370 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
373 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
375 if (sc->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
376 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
380 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
384 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
385 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
386 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
388 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
389 sc->d1->shutdown_received
390 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) <= 0) {
391 sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
400 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
401 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
404 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
405 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
406 unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off;
409 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
410 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
411 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
412 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
413 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
417 if (sc->msg_callback)
418 sc->msg_callback(0, sc->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
419 sc->msg_callback_arg);
421 if (sc->info_callback != NULL)
422 cb = sc->info_callback;
423 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
424 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
427 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
428 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
431 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
432 sc->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
433 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
435 sc->rlayer.alert_count++;
436 if (sc->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
437 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
438 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
442 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
445 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
446 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
447 * that nothing gets discarded.
449 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
450 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) > 0) {
451 sc->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
452 sc->rwstate = SSL_READING;
453 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
454 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
458 sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
461 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
462 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
463 sc->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
464 SSLfatal_data(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
465 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
466 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
467 sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
468 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
469 SSL_CTX_remove_session(sc->session_ctx, sc->session);
472 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
479 if (sc->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
481 sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
482 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
486 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
488 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
489 * are still missing, so just drop it.
491 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
496 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
498 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc)) {
499 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
502 * This may just be a stale retransmit. Also sanity check that we have
503 * at least enough record bytes for a message header
505 if (rr->epoch != sc->rlayer.d->r_epoch
506 || rr->length < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
507 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
511 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
514 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
515 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
517 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
518 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(sc) < 0) {
519 /* SSLfatal) already called */
523 if (dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(sc) <= 0) {
524 /* Fail if we encountered a fatal error */
525 if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc))
528 ssl_release_record(sc, rr);
529 if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
530 if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) {
531 /* no read-ahead left? */
534 sc->rwstate = SSL_READING;
535 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
536 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
537 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
545 * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
546 * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
547 * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
550 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s))) {
551 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
555 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
556 ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc, 1);
558 i = sc->handshake_func(s);
559 /* SSLfatal() called if appropriate */
565 if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
566 if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) {
567 /* no read-ahead left? */
570 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
571 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
572 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
573 * problems in the blocking world
575 sc->rwstate = SSL_READING;
576 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
577 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
578 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
587 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
589 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
591 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
593 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
594 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
595 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
597 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
599 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
601 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
602 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
603 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
604 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
605 * started), we will indulge it.
607 if (sc->s3.in_read_app_data &&
608 (sc->s3.total_renegotiations != 0) &&
609 ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(sc)) {
610 sc->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
613 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
621 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
622 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
624 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type, const void *buf,
625 size_t len, size_t *written)
629 if (!ossl_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
633 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
634 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0, written);
639 * TODO(RECLAYER): Temporary copy of the old ssl3_write_pending() function now
640 * replaced by tls_retry_write_records(). Needs to be removed when the DTLS code
643 /* if SSL3_BUFFER_get_left() != 0, we need to call this
645 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
647 static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type,
648 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
652 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
656 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
657 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
658 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
659 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
666 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
667 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
670 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
671 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
673 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
674 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
677 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type);
679 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
680 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
681 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
682 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
691 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS,
692 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte
693 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value.
694 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte
695 * writes to permit this case.
697 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
698 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
699 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
700 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
701 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
704 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
706 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
707 * using a datagram service
709 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
713 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
714 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
718 int do_dtls1_write(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
719 size_t len, int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
721 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
722 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
723 size_t prefix_len = 0;
728 SSL *s = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
730 wb = &sc->rlayer.wbuf[0];
733 * DTLS writes whole datagrams, so there can't be anything left in
736 if (!ossl_assert(SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) == 0)) {
737 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
741 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
742 if (sc->s3.alert_dispatch) {
743 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
746 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
749 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
752 if (len > ssl_get_max_send_fragment(sc)) {
753 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE);
760 || (sc->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
761 || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(sc->write_hash) == NULL))
767 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(sc->write_hash);
769 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
770 SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE);
775 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
777 /* write the header */
779 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
780 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type);
782 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
783 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
784 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
786 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
787 sc->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
788 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
789 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
791 *(p++) = sc->version >> 8;
792 *(p++) = sc->version & 0xff;
795 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
799 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
800 if (sc->enc_write_ctx) {
801 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(sc->enc_write_ctx);
802 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
803 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(sc->enc_write_ctx);
805 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
811 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
812 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
813 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
814 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
815 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
821 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
822 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
823 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, len);
824 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
827 * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data
830 /* first we compress */
831 if (sc->compress != NULL) {
832 if (!ssl3_do_compress(sc, &wr)) {
833 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
837 memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr),
838 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
839 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
843 * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from
844 * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the
848 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(sc) && mac_size != 0) {
849 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(sc, &wr,
850 &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]),
852 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
855 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
858 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
859 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p);
860 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
863 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen);
865 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(sc, &wr, 1, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) {
866 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) {
867 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
872 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(sc) && mac_size != 0) {
873 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(sc, &wr,
874 &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)]), 1)) {
875 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
878 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
881 /* record length after mac and block padding */
883 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
885 s2n(sc->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
887 memcpy(pseq, &(sc->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
889 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq);
891 if (sc->msg_callback)
892 sc->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
893 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, sc->msg_callback_arg);
896 * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
899 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
900 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
902 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(sc->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
904 if (create_empty_fragment) {
906 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
909 *written = wr.length;
913 /* now let's set up wb */
914 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
915 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
918 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
921 sc->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
922 sc->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
923 sc->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
924 sc->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
926 /* we now just need to write the buffer. Calls SSLfatal() as required. */
927 return ssl3_write_pending(sc, type, buf, len, written);
930 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int rw)
934 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
935 s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
938 * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
941 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
943 seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
944 memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
945 sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
946 s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
947 memset(seq, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));