3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
124 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
125 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
128 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
129 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
132 if (is_endian.little) break;
133 /* not reached on little-endians */
134 /* following test is redundant, because input is
135 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
136 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
140 if (l>128) return 128;
141 else if (l<-128) return -128;
145 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
147 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
150 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
157 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
162 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
164 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
165 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
168 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
170 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
171 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
173 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
175 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
176 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
178 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
179 unsigned char *priority);
180 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
181 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
183 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
185 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
187 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
191 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
194 s->packet = rdata->packet;
195 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
204 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
206 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
209 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
210 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
211 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
213 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
214 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
216 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 rdata->packet = s->packet;
221 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
222 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
223 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
227 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
228 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
236 s->packet_length = 0;
237 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
238 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
240 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
253 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
257 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
260 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
262 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
272 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
274 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
275 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
276 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
278 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
279 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
280 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
281 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
284 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
288 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
291 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
292 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
294 /* Check if epoch is current. */
295 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
296 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
298 /* Process all the records. */
299 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
301 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
302 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
304 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
305 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
309 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
310 * have been processed */
311 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
312 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
321 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
325 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
326 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
328 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
333 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
334 if (item && item->priority == priority)
336 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
337 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
339 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
340 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
341 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
343 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
344 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
346 s->packet = rdata->packet;
347 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
348 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
349 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
351 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
354 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
364 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
371 unsigned int mac_size;
372 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
378 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
379 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
381 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
383 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
384 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
385 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
386 * the decryption or by the decompression
387 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
388 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
390 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
391 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
393 /* check is not needed I believe */
394 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
396 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
401 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
404 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
408 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
411 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
412 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
416 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
417 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
421 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
422 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
423 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
424 (s->read_hash == NULL))
429 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
431 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
433 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
434 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
438 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
441 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
442 if (rr->length < mac_size)
444 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
445 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
449 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
452 rr->length-=mac_size;
453 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
454 if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
456 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
460 /* r->length is now just compressed */
461 if (s->expand != NULL)
463 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
465 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
469 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
471 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
477 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
479 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
485 /* So at this point the following is true
486 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
487 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
488 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
489 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
493 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
495 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
498 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
499 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
500 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
501 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
502 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
503 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
504 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
505 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
507 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
513 /* Call this to get a new input record.
514 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
515 * or non-blocking IO.
516 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
517 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
518 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
519 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
521 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
522 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
524 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
530 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
531 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
536 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
537 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
538 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
541 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
542 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
545 /* get something from the wire */
547 /* check if we have the header */
548 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
549 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
551 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
552 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
553 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
555 OPENSSL_assert(s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
557 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
561 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
565 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
567 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
570 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
575 /* Lets check version */
582 if (version != s->version)
584 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
585 /* Send back error using their
586 * version number :-) */
588 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
593 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
595 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
599 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
601 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
602 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
606 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
609 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
611 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
613 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
615 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
616 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
618 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
621 s->packet_length = 0;
625 /* now n == rr->length,
626 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
628 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
630 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
631 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
634 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
635 goto again; /* get another record */
638 /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
639 if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
641 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
642 goto again; /* get another record */
645 /* just read a 0 length packet */
646 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
648 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
649 * buffer it since it cannot be processed at this time. Records
650 * from the next epoch are marked as received even though they
651 * are not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource
655 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
656 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
657 s->packet_length = 0;
661 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
664 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
668 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
673 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
674 * 'type' is one of the following:
676 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
677 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
678 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
680 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
681 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
683 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
684 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
685 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
686 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
687 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
688 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
689 * Change cipher spec protocol
690 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
692 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
694 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
695 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
696 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
697 * Application data protocol
698 * none of our business
700 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
705 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
707 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
708 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
711 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
712 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
713 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
714 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
716 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
720 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
721 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
724 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
726 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
728 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
729 i=s->handshake_func(s);
730 if (i < 0) return(i);
733 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
739 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
741 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
742 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
743 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
744 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
747 /* get new packet if necessary */
748 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
750 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
753 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
754 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
762 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
764 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
765 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
766 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
768 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
769 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
773 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
774 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
775 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
778 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
783 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
785 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
786 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
787 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
788 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
790 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
795 if (len <= 0) return(len);
797 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
800 n = (unsigned int)len;
802 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
809 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
817 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
818 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
820 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
821 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
824 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
825 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
826 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
828 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
830 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
831 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
832 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
834 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
836 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
837 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
838 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
840 /* else it's a CCS message, or it's wrong */
841 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
843 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
844 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
852 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
853 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
854 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
856 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
861 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
862 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
864 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
867 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
871 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
872 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
873 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
875 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
877 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
878 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
879 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
881 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
883 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
884 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
885 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
887 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
892 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
895 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
896 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
898 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
899 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
903 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
905 i=s->handshake_func(s);
906 if (i < 0) return(i);
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
913 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
915 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
918 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
919 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
920 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
921 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
922 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
924 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
925 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
931 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
932 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
936 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
938 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
939 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
941 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
944 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
945 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
947 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
949 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
950 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
954 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
955 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
958 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
960 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
961 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
963 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
967 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
968 /* now check if it's a missing record */
969 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
972 unsigned int frag_off;
973 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
978 dtls1_retransmit_message(s, seq, frag_off, &found);
979 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
981 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
982 /* requested a message not yet sent,
983 send an alert ourselves */
984 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
985 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
990 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
994 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
995 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
997 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
998 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
999 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1000 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1005 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1013 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1015 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1020 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1022 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1024 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1026 if ( ccs_hdr.seq == s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1028 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1029 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1030 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1031 if ( (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
1032 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1034 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1041 if (s->msg_callback)
1042 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1043 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1045 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1046 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1049 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1050 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1052 /* handshake read seq is reset upon handshake completion */
1053 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1064 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1065 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1068 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1070 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1071 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1072 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1078 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1079 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1081 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1082 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1083 * protocol violations): */
1084 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1088 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1092 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1093 if (i < 0) return(i);
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1100 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1102 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1105 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1106 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1107 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1108 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1109 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1110 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1111 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1112 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1123 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1124 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1130 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1133 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1135 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1136 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1137 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1138 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1139 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1143 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1144 * but have application data. If the library was
1145 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1146 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1147 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1148 * we will indulge it.
1150 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1151 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1153 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1154 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1155 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1157 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1158 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1159 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1163 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1168 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1176 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1182 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1187 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1189 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1190 if (i < 0) return(i);
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1203 /* dtls1_write_bytes sends one record at a time, sized according to
1204 * the currently known MTU */
1205 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1206 if (i <= 0) return i;
1208 if ((i == (int)n) ||
1209 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1210 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
1212 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
1213 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
1214 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
1226 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1229 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1233 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1234 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1236 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1237 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1242 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1245 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1248 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1249 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1250 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1260 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1261 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1263 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1265 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
1266 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
1270 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1275 /* handshake layer figures out MTU for itself, but data records
1276 * are also sent through this interface, so need to figure out MTU */
1278 mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU, 0, NULL);
1279 mtu += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* HM already inserted */
1283 if (mtu > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1284 mtu = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1291 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
1298 if ( (int)s->s3->wnum + i == len)
1306 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1308 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1309 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1316 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1317 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1318 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1320 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1321 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1324 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1325 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1327 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1330 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1333 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1340 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1341 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1342 (s->write_hash == NULL))
1348 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1350 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1352 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1353 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1354 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION)
1356 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1357 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1360 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1362 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1363 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1364 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1365 * together with the actual payload) */
1366 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1367 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1370 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1372 /* insufficient space */
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1382 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1384 /* write the header */
1389 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1390 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1392 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1396 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1398 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1399 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1401 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1402 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1403 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1407 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1408 wr->length=(int)len;
1409 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1411 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1414 /* first we compress */
1415 if (s->compress != NULL)
1417 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1425 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1429 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1430 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1431 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1435 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
1436 wr->length+=mac_size;
1439 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1444 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1445 wr->length += bs; /* bs != 0 in case of CBC. The enc fn provides
1447 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1449 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1450 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1451 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1453 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1455 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1459 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1461 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1463 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1465 /* we should now have
1466 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1467 * wr->length long */
1468 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1469 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1471 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1472 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1473 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1474 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1475 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1478 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1480 if (create_empty_fragment)
1482 /* we are in a recursive call;
1483 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1488 /* now let's set up wb */
1489 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1492 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1493 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1494 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1495 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1496 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1498 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1499 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1506 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1510 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1512 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1515 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1516 return 1; /* this record in new */
1519 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1520 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1521 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1522 return 0; /* record previously received */
1524 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1529 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1533 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1535 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1539 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1540 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1543 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1547 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1548 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1553 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1556 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1557 unsigned char buf[2 + 2 + 3]; /* alert level + alert desc + message seq +frag_off */
1558 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1560 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1562 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1563 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1564 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1566 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1567 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1569 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1571 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1574 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1578 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1580 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1584 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1587 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1588 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1592 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1593 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1594 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1597 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1599 if (s->msg_callback)
1600 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1601 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1603 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1604 cb=s->info_callback;
1605 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1606 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1610 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1611 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1618 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1619 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1624 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1625 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1626 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1628 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1629 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1630 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1631 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1634 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1642 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1643 unsigned long *offset)
1646 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1647 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1648 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1651 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1652 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1654 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1656 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1657 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1658 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1659 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1661 unsigned short seq_num;
1662 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1663 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1665 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1667 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1668 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1669 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1673 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1674 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1678 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1679 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1680 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1681 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1683 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1684 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1685 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1687 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1688 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1689 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1693 *priority = seq_num;
1697 else /* unknown record type */
1706 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1709 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1711 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1713 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1715 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1716 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1720 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1724 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1729 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1731 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));