2 * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/rand.h>
16 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
17 # include <sys/timeb.h>
18 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
19 # include <sys/times.h>
20 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
21 # include <sys/time.h>
24 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
25 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
26 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
27 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
29 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
30 static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
32 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
40 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
41 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
43 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
45 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
46 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
50 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = {
54 tls1_generate_master_secret,
55 tls1_change_cipher_state,
56 tls1_final_finish_mac,
57 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
58 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
61 tls1_export_keying_material,
62 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
63 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
64 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
65 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
69 long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
72 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
73 * http, the cache would over fill
82 if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
88 if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
93 d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
94 d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
97 d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
103 if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) {
104 pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
105 pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
119 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
121 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
122 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
123 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
127 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
128 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
129 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
134 void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
136 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
140 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
142 pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
143 pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
149 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
151 pqueue *buffered_messages;
152 pqueue *sent_messages;
154 unsigned int link_mtu;
156 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
159 buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
160 sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
162 link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
164 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
166 memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
169 s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
172 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
174 s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
177 s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
178 s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
183 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
184 s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD
186 else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
187 s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
190 s->version = s->method->version;
193 long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
198 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
199 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
203 case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
204 ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
206 case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
207 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
209 s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
211 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
212 return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
213 case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
215 * We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
216 * We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
218 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
223 ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
229 void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
232 /* Disable timer for SCTP */
233 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
234 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
239 /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
240 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
241 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
244 /* Set timeout to current time */
245 get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
247 /* Add duration to current time */
248 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
249 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
250 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
253 struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
255 struct timeval timenow;
257 /* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
258 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
262 /* Get current time */
263 get_current_time(&timenow);
265 /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
266 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
267 (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
268 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
269 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
273 /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
274 memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
275 timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
276 timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
277 if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
279 timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
283 * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
284 * because of small divergences with socket timeouts.
286 if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
287 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
293 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
295 struct timeval timeleft;
297 /* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
298 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
302 /* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
303 if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
307 /* Timer expired, so return true */
311 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
313 s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
314 if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
315 s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
316 dtls1_start_timer(s);
319 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
321 /* Reset everything */
322 memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
323 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
324 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
325 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
326 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
327 /* Clear retransmission buffer */
328 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
331 int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
335 s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
337 /* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
338 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
339 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
341 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
342 if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
346 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
347 /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
348 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
355 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
357 /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
358 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
362 dtls1_double_timeout(s);
364 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
367 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
368 if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
369 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
372 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
373 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
374 return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
378 dtls1_start_timer(s);
379 return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
382 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
392 SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
393 /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
395 now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
398 now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64;
401 t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
402 t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
403 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
406 t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
407 t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
409 gettimeofday(t, NULL);
413 #define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2
414 #define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1
416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
417 int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
419 int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
420 unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
421 unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
422 const unsigned char *data;
423 unsigned char *p, *buf;
424 unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
425 unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
428 BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL;
429 PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
431 /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
437 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
438 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
440 if (!rbio || !wbio) {
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
446 * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to
447 * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid
448 * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for accept to handle.
450 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
453 * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
454 * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
455 * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be
456 * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via
459 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
464 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
465 if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
470 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
477 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
484 * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
485 * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store
486 * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to
487 * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever
488 * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped
489 * in the record length check below.
491 n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
494 if (BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
495 /* Non-blocking IO */
501 /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */
504 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
505 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
510 * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just
511 * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is
512 * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting,
513 * length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently
514 * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be
515 * logged for diagnostic purposes."
518 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
519 if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
520 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
525 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
526 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
528 /* Get the record header */
529 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
530 || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
531 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
535 if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
536 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
541 * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is
544 if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
549 if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
550 /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
551 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
552 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) {
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
557 * We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could
558 * be a second record (but we ignore it)
561 /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
562 if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
563 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
567 /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */
568 data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt);
570 /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
571 if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
572 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
573 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
574 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
575 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
576 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
577 || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
578 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
582 if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
583 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
587 /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
589 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
594 * We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst
595 * listening because that would require server side state (which is
596 * against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest
597 * mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment
598 * and require that the cookie must be contained within it.
600 if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) {
601 /* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */
602 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
607 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
608 fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
609 s->msg_callback_arg);
611 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
612 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
617 * Verify client version is supported
619 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) &&
620 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
621 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
625 if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
626 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
627 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
629 * Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial
630 * ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it.
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
637 * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a
638 * HelloVerifyRequest.
640 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) {
641 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
644 * We have a cookie, so lets check it.
646 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
647 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
651 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
652 PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
655 * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
658 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
660 /* Cookie verification succeeded */
661 next = LISTEN_SUCCESS;
665 if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
667 * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
668 * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
669 * to resend, we just drop it.
673 * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return
676 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
677 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
678 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
680 /* Generate the cookie */
681 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
682 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
684 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
689 p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
690 msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
693 *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
698 /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
702 * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
703 * and fragment length is message length
708 /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
709 reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
711 /* Add the record header */
714 *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
716 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
717 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
718 * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
720 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
721 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
722 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
724 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
725 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
729 * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
732 memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
739 * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
742 reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
745 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
746 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
748 if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
749 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
754 * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
755 * maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
758 if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
759 (void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient);
761 BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
764 if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
765 if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
767 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
768 * going to drop this packet.
775 if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
776 if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
778 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
779 * going to drop this packet.
786 } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS);
789 * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
791 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1;
792 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
793 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
794 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq);
797 * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the
800 SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
803 * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify
806 ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
809 * Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address
811 if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0)
812 BIO_ADDR_clear(client);
817 BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
818 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
820 /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */
821 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
827 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
829 dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len);
830 s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
832 /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
834 if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0))
840 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
842 return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
847 # define HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding) ( \
848 1 /* heartbeat type */ + \
849 2 /* heartbeat length */ + \
850 (payload) + (padding))
852 # define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16)
854 int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
857 unsigned short hbtype;
858 unsigned int payload;
859 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
862 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
863 p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
865 /* Read type and payload length */
866 if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(0) > length)
867 return 0; /* silently discard */
868 if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
869 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
873 if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) > length)
874 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
877 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
878 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
879 unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
882 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
885 /* Allocate memory for the response. */
886 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
891 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
892 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
894 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
897 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
898 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
902 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
904 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
905 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
906 buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
908 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
912 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
916 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
917 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
921 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
924 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
931 int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
933 unsigned char *buf, *p;
935 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
936 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
939 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
940 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
941 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
946 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
947 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
952 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
953 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
959 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
960 * as payload to distinguish different messages and add
963 size = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
964 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
971 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
972 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
974 /* Sequence number */
975 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
976 /* 16 random bytes */
977 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
983 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
988 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size);
991 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
992 buf, size, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
994 dtls1_start_timer(s);
995 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
1005 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1011 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
1012 if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
1013 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
1014 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
1019 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
1023 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1025 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1030 int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
1032 if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
1034 s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1035 s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
1038 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
1039 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1040 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
1042 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
1045 * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
1046 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
1048 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1049 /* Set to min mtu */
1050 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
1051 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
1060 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
1062 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1063 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1066 unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
1068 return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));