crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

   1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58
  59 #include <stdio.h>
  60 #include <time.h>
  61 #include <errno.h>
  62
  63 #include "cryptlib.h"
  64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
  65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
  66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
  68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
  70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
  72 #include "x509_lcl.h"
  73
  74 /* CRL score values */
  75
  76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
  77
  78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
  79
  80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
  81
  82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
  83
  84 /* CRL times valid */
  85
  86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
  87
  88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
  89
  90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
  91
  92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
  93
  94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
  95
  96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
  97
  98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
  99
 100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
 101
 102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
 103
 104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
 105
 106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
 107
 108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
 109
 110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
 111
 112 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 122 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 123
 124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 125                         unsigned int *preasons,
 126                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
 127 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 128                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
 129 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
 130                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
 131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
 132                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
 133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
 134                                 unsigned int *preasons);
 135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 137                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
 138                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
 139
 140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 141 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 142
 143
 144 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
 145         {
 146         return ok;
 147         }
 148
 149 #if 0
 150 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
 151         {
 152         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
 153         }
 154 #endif
 155 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
 156 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
 157         {
 158         X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
 159         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
 160                 return 1;
 161         else
 162                 return 0;
 163         }
 164
 165 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
 166
 167 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 168         {
 169         STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
 170         X509 *xtmp = NULL;
 171         int i;
 172         /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
 173         certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
 174         if (certs == NULL)
 175                 return NULL;
 176         /* Look for exact match */
 177         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
 178                 {
 179                 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
 180                 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
 181                         break;
 182                 }
 183         if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
 184                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 185         else
 186                 xtmp = NULL;
 187         sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
 188         return xtmp;
 189         }
 190
 191 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 192         {
 193         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
 194         int bad_chain = 0;
 195         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
 196         int depth,i,ok=0;
 197         int num;
 198         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 199         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
 200         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
 201                 {
 202                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
 203                 return -1;
 204                 }
 205
 206         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 207
 208         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
 209          * present and that the first entry is in place */
 210         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
 211                 {
 212                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
 213                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
 214                         {
 215                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 216                         goto end;
 217                         }
 218                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 219                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
 220                 }
 221
 222         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
 223         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
 224             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
 225                 {
 226                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 227                 goto end;
 228                 }
 229
 230         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 231         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 232         depth=param->depth;
 233
 234
 235         for (;;)
 236                 {
 237                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 238                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
 239                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
 240                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
 241                                          * code later.
 242                                          */
 243
 244                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 245                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
 246                         break;
 247                 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
 248                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
 249                         {
 250                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 251                         if (ok < 0)
 252                                 return ok;
 253                         /* If successful for now free up cert so it
 254                          * will be picked up again later.
 255                          */
 256                         if (ok > 0)
 257                                 {
 258                                 X509_free(xtmp);
 259                                 break;
 260                                 }
 261                         }
 262
 263                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
 264                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
 265                         {
 266                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
 267                         if (xtmp != NULL)
 268                                 {
 269                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
 270                                         {
 271                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 272                                         goto end;
 273                                         }
 274                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 275                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
 276                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
 277                                 x=xtmp;
 278                                 num++;
 279                                 /* reparse the full chain for
 280                                  * the next one */
 281                                 continue;
 282                                 }
 283                         }
 284                 break;
 285                 }
 286
 287         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
 288          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
 289          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
 290
 291         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
 292          * is self signed.
 293          */
 294
 295         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 296         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
 297         if (cert_self_signed(x))
 298                 {
 299                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
 300                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
 301                         {
 302                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
 303                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
 304                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
 305                          */
 306                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 307                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
 308                                 {
 309                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
 310                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
 311                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
 312                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
 313                                 bad_chain = 1;
 314                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 315                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 316                                 }
 317                         else
 318                                 {
 319                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
 320                                  * so we get any trust settings.
 321                                  */
 322                                 X509_free(x);
 323                                 x = xtmp;
 324                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
 325                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
 326                                 }
 327                         }
 328                 else
 329                         {
 330                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
 331                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
 332                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
 333                         num--;
 334                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 335                         }
 336                 }
 337
 338         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
 339         for (;;)
 340                 {
 341                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 342                 if (depth < num) break;
 343
 344                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 345                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
 346                         break;
 347
 348                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 349
 350                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
 351                 if (ok == 0) break;
 352
 353                 x = xtmp;
 354                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
 355                         {
 356                         X509_free(xtmp);
 357                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 358                         return 0;
 359                         }
 360                 num++;
 361                 }
 362
 363         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
 364
 365         i = check_trust(ctx);
 366
 367         /* If explicitly rejected error */
 368         if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 369                 goto end;
 370         /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
 371          * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
 372          * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
 373          */
 374         if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
 375                 {
 376                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
 377                         {
 378                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
 379                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
 380                         else
 381                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
 382                         ctx->current_cert=x;
 383                         }
 384                 else
 385                         {
 386
 387                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
 388                         num++;
 389                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
 390                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
 391                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
 392                         chain_ss=NULL;
 393                         }
 394
 395                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
 396                 bad_chain = 1;
 397                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 398                 if (!ok) goto end;
 399                 }
 400
 401         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
 402         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
 403
 404         if (!ok) goto end;
 405
 406         /* Check name constraints */
 407
 408         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
 409
 410         if (!ok) goto end;
 411
 412         ok = check_id(ctx);
 413
 414         if (!ok) goto end;
 415
 416         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
 417         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 418
 419         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
 420          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
 421          */
 422
 423         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
 424         if(!ok) goto end;
 425
 426         i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
 427                                                         ctx->param->flags);
 428         if (i != X509_V_OK)
 429                 {
 430                 ctx->error = i;
 431                 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
 432                 ok = cb(0, ctx);
 433                 if (!ok)
 434                         goto end;
 435                 }
 436
 437         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
 438         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
 439                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
 440         else
 441                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
 442         if(!ok) goto end;
 443
 444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
 445         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
 446         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
 447         if (!ok) goto end;
 448         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
 449         if (!ok) goto end;
 450 #endif
 451
 452         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
 453         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
 454                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
 455         if(!ok) goto end;
 456         if (0)
 457                 {
 458 end:
 459                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 460                 }
 461         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
 462         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
 463         return ok;
 464         }
 465
 466
 467 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 468  */
 469
 470 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 471 {
 472         int i;
 473         X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
 474         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
 475                 {
 476                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 477                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
 478                         {
 479                         rv = issuer;
 480                         if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
 481                                 break;
 482                         }
 483                 }
 484         return rv;
 485 }
 486
 487 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
 488
 489 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 490 {
 491         int ret;
 492         if (x == issuer)
 493                 return cert_self_signed(x);
 494         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
 495         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 496                 {
 497                 int i;
 498                 X509 *ch;
 499                 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
 500                 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
 501                         return 1;
 502                 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
 503                         {
 504                         ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 505                         if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
 506                                 {
 507                                 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
 508                                 break;
 509                                 }
 510                         }
 511                 }
 512
 513         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 514                 return 1;
 515         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
 516         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
 517                 return 0;
 518
 519         ctx->error = ret;
 520         ctx->current_cert = x;
 521         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
 522         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 523 }
 524
 525 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
 526
 527 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 528 {
 529         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
 530         if (*issuer)
 531                 {
 532                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 533                 return 1;
 534                 }
 535         else
 536                 return 0;
 537 }
 538
 539
 540 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
 541  * with the supplied purpose
 542  */
 543
 544 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 545 {
 546 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 547         return 1;
 548 #else
 549         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
 550         X509 *x;
 551         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 552         int proxy_path_length = 0;
 553         int purpose;
 554         int allow_proxy_certs;
 555         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 556
 557         /*-
 558          *  must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
 559          * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
 560          *     use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
 561          * 0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
 562          *     used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
 563          * 1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
 564          *     all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
 565          */
 566         must_be_ca = -1;
 567
 568         /* CRL path validation */
 569         if (ctx->parent)
 570                 {
 571                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
 572                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
 573                 }
 574         else
 575                 {
 576                 allow_proxy_certs =
 577                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 578                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
 579                    software happy */
 580                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
 581                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
 582                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
 583                 }
 584
 585         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
 586         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 587                 {
 588                 int ret;
 589                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 590                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
 591                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
 592                         {
 593                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
 594                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 595                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 596                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 597                         if (!ok) goto end;
 598                         }
 599                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
 600                         {
 601                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
 602                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 603                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 604                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 605                         if (!ok) goto end;
 606                         }
 607                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
 608                 switch(must_be_ca)
 609                         {
 610                 case -1:
 611                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 612                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
 613                                 {
 614                                 ret = 0;
 615                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 616                                 }
 617                         else
 618                                 ret = 1;
 619                         break;
 620                 case 0:
 621                         if (ret != 0)
 622                                 {
 623                                 ret = 0;
 624                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
 625                                 }
 626                         else
 627                                 ret = 1;
 628                         break;
 629                 default:
 630                         if ((ret == 0)
 631                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 632                                         && (ret != 1)))
 633                                 {
 634                                 ret = 0;
 635                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 636                                 }
 637                         else
 638                                 ret = 1;
 639                         break;
 640                         }
 641                 if (ret == 0)
 642                         {
 643                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 644                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 645                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 646                         if (!ok) goto end;
 647                         }
 648                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
 649                         {
 650                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
 651                         if ((ret == 0)
 652                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 653                                         && (ret != 1)))
 654                                 {
 655                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
 656                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 657                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 658                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 659                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 660                                 }
 661                         }
 662                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
 663                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
 664                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
 665                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
 666                         {
 667                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 668                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 669                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 670                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 671                         if (!ok) goto end;
 672                         }
 673                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
 674                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 675                         plen++;
 676                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
 677                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
 678                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
 679                    CA certificate.  */
 680                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
 681                         {
 682                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
 683                                 {
 684                                 ctx->error =
 685                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 686                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 687                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 688                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 689                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 690                                 }
 691                         proxy_path_length++;
 692                         must_be_ca = 0;
 693                         }
 694                 else
 695                         must_be_ca = 1;
 696                 }
 697         ok = 1;
 698  end:
 699         return ok;
 700 #endif
 701 }
 702
 703 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 704         {
 705         X509 *x;
 706         int i, j, rv;
 707         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
 708         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
 709                 {
 710                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 711                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
 712                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 713                         continue;
 714                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
 715                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
 716                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
 717                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
 718                  */
 719                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
 720                         {
 721                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
 722                         if (nc)
 723                                 {
 724                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
 725                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
 726                                         {
 727                                         ctx->error = rv;
 728                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 729                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 730                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
 731                                                 return 0;
 732                                         }
 733                                 }
 734                         }
 735                 }
 736         return 1;
 737         }
 738
 739 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
 740         {
 741         ctx->error = errcode;
 742         ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
 743         ctx->error_depth = 0;
 744         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 745         }
 746
 747 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
 748         {
 749         int i;
 750         int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
 751         char *name;
 752
 753         for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
 754                 {
 755                 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
 756                 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags,
 757                                     &id->peername) > 0)
 758                         return 1;
 759                 }
 760         return n == 0;
 761         }
 762
 763 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 764         {
 765         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
 766         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
 767         X509 *x = ctx->cert;
 768         if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
 769                 {
 770                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
 771                         return 0;
 772                 }
 773         if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
 774                 {
 775                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
 776                         return 0;
 777                 }
 778         if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
 779                 {
 780                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
 781                         return 0;
 782                 }
 783         return 1;
 784         }
 785
 786 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 787 {
 788         int i, ok;
 789         X509 *x = NULL;
 790         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 791         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 792         /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
 793         for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
 794                 {
 795                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 796                 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
 797                 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
 798                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
 799                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
 800                 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
 801                  * not overridden.
 802                  */
 803                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 804                         {
 805                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 806                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 807                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
 808                         ok = cb(0, ctx);
 809                         if (!ok)
 810                                 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
 811                         }
 812                 }
 813         /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
 814          * certificate return success.
 815          */
 816         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
 817                 {
 818                 X509 *mx;
 819                 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
 820                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
 821                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
 822                 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
 823                 if (mx)
 824                         {
 825                         (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
 826                         X509_free(x);
 827                         ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
 828                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
 829                         }
 830                 }
 831
 832         /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
 833          * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
 834          */
 835         return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
 836 }
 837
 838 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 839         {
 840         int i, last, ok;
 841         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
 842                 return 1;
 843         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
 844                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 845         else
 846                 {
 847                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
 848                 if (ctx->parent)
 849                         return 1;
 850                 last = 0;
 851                 }
 852         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
 853                 {
 854                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 855                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
 856                 if (!ok) return ok;
 857                 }
 858         return 1;
 859         }
 860
 861 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 862         {
 863         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
 864         X509 *x;
 865         int ok, cnum;
 866         unsigned int last_reasons;
 867         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
 868         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
 869         ctx->current_cert = x;
 870         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
 871         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
 872         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
 873         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
 874                 {
 875                 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
 876                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
 877                 if (ctx->get_crl)
 878                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
 879                 else
 880                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
 881                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
 882                  * notify callback
 883                  */
 884                 if(!ok)
 885                         {
 886                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
 887                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 888                         goto err;
 889                         }
 890                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 891                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
 892                 if (!ok)
 893                         goto err;
 894
 895                 if (dcrl)
 896                         {
 897                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
 898                         if (!ok)
 899                                 goto err;
 900                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
 901                         if (!ok)
 902                                 goto err;
 903                         }
 904                 else
 905                         ok = 1;
 906
 907                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
 908                 if (ok != 2)
 909                         {
 910                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
 911                         if (!ok)
 912                                 goto err;
 913                         }
 914
 915                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
 916                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 917                 crl = NULL;
 918                 dcrl = NULL;
 919                 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
 920                  * another iteration, so exit loop.
 921                  */
 922                 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
 923                         {
 924                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
 925                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 926                         goto err;
 927                         }
 928                 }
 929         err:
 930         X509_CRL_free(crl);
 931         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 932
 933         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 934         return ok;
 935
 936         }
 937
 938 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
 939
 940 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
 941         {
 942         time_t *ptime;
 943         int i;
 944         if (notify)
 945                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 946         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
 947                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
 948         else
 949                 ptime = NULL;
 950
 951         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
 952         if (i == 0)
 953                 {
 954                 if (!notify)
 955                         return 0;
 956                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
 957                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 958                         return 0;
 959                 }
 960
 961         if (i > 0)
 962                 {
 963                 if (!notify)
 964                         return 0;
 965                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
 966                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 967                         return 0;
 968                 }
 969
 970         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
 971                 {
 972                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
 973
 974                 if (i == 0)
 975                         {
 976                         if (!notify)
 977                                 return 0;
 978                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
 979                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 980                                 return 0;
 981                         }
 982                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
 983                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
 984                         {
 985                         if (!notify)
 986                                 return 0;
 987                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
 988                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 989                                 return 0;
 990                         }
 991                 }
 992
 993         if (notify)
 994                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 995
 996         return 1;
 997         }
 998
 999 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1000                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1001                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1002         {
1003         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1004         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1005         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1006         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1007         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1008
1009         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1010                 {
1011                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1012                 reasons = *preasons;
1013                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1014
1015                 if (crl_score > best_score)
1016                         {
1017                         best_crl = crl;
1018                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1019                         best_score = crl_score;
1020                         best_reasons = reasons;
1021                         }
1022                 }
1023
1024         if (best_crl)
1025                 {
1026                 if (*pcrl)
1027                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1028                 *pcrl = best_crl;
1029                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1030                 *pscore = best_score;
1031                 *preasons = best_reasons;
1032                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1033                 if (*pdcrl)
1034                         {
1035                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1036                         *pdcrl = NULL;
1037                         }
1038                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1039                 }
1040
1041         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1042                 return 1;
1043
1044         return 0;
1045         }
1046
1047 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1048  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1049  */
1050
1051 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1052         {
1053         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1054         int i;
1055         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1056         if (i >= 0)
1057                 {
1058                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1059                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1060                         return 0;
1061                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1062                 }
1063         else
1064                 exta = NULL;
1065
1066         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1067
1068         if (i >= 0)
1069                 {
1070
1071                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1072                         return 0;
1073                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1074                 }
1075         else
1076                 extb = NULL;
1077
1078         if (!exta && !extb)
1079                 return 1;
1080
1081         if (!exta || !extb)
1082                 return 0;
1083
1084
1085         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1086                 return 0;
1087
1088         return 1;
1089         }
1090
1091 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1092
1093 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1094         {
1095         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1096         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1097                         return 0;
1098         /* Base must have a CRL number */
1099         if (!base->crl_number)
1100                         return 0;
1101         /* Issuer names must match */
1102         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1103                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1104                 return 0;
1105         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1106         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1107                         return 0;
1108         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1109                         return 0;
1110         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1111         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1112                         return 0;
1113         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1114         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1115                         return 1;
1116         return 0;
1117         }
1118
1119 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1120  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1121  */
1122
1123 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1124                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1125         {
1126         X509_CRL *delta;
1127         int i;
1128         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1129                 return;
1130         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1131                 return;
1132         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1133                 {
1134                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1135                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1136                         {
1137                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1138                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1139                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1140                         *dcrl = delta;
1141                         return;
1142                         }
1143                 }
1144         *dcrl = NULL;
1145         }
1146
1147 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1148  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1149  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1150  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1151  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1152  */
1153
1154 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1155                         unsigned int *preasons,
1156                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1157         {
1158
1159         int crl_score = 0;
1160         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1161
1162         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1163
1164         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1165         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1166                 return 0;
1167         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1168         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1169                 {
1170                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1171                         return 0;
1172                 }
1173         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1174                 {
1175                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1176                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1177                         return 0;
1178                 }
1179         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1180         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1181                 return 0;
1182         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1183         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1184                 {
1185                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1186                         return 0;
1187                 }
1188         else
1189                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1190
1191         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1192                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1193
1194         /* Check expiry */
1195         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1196                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1197
1198         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1199         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1200
1201         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1202
1203         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1204                 return 0;
1205
1206         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1207
1208         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1209                 {
1210                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1211                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1212                         return 0;
1213                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1214                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1215                 }
1216
1217         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1218
1219         return crl_score;
1220
1221         }
1222
1223 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1224                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1225         {
1226         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1227         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1228         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1229         int i;
1230
1231         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1232                 cidx++;
1233
1234         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1235
1236         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1237                 {
1238                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1239                         {
1240                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1241                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1242                         return;
1243                         }
1244                 }
1245
1246         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1247                 {
1248                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1249                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1250                         continue;
1251                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1252                         {
1253                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1254                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1255                         return;
1256                         }
1257                 }
1258
1259         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1260
1261         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1262                 return;
1263
1264         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1265          * set of untrusted certificates.
1266          */
1267         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1268                 {
1269                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1270                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1271                         continue;
1272                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1273                         {
1274                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1275                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1276                         return;
1277                         }
1278                 }
1279         }
1280
1281 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1282  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1283  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1284  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1285  * practice.
1286  */
1287
1288 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1289         {
1290         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1291         int ret;
1292         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1293         if (ctx->parent)
1294                 return 0;
1295         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1296                 return -1;
1297
1298         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1299         /* Copy verify params across */
1300         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1301
1302         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1303         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1304
1305         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1306         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1307
1308         if (ret <= 0)
1309                 goto err;
1310
1311         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1312
1313         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1314         err:
1315         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1316         return ret;
1317         }
1318
1319 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1320  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1321  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1322  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1323  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1324  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1325  */
1326
1327 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1328                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1329                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1330         {
1331         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1332         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1333         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1334         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1335                 return 1;
1336         return 0;
1337         }
1338
1339 /*-
1340  * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1341  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1342  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1343  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1344  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1345  */
1346
1347
1348 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1349         {
1350         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1351         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1352         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1353         int i, j;
1354         if (!a || !b)
1355                 return 1;
1356         if (a->type == 1)
1357                 {
1358                 if (!a->dpname)
1359                         return 0;
1360                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1361                 if (b->type == 1)
1362                         {
1363                         if (!b->dpname)
1364                                 return 0;
1365                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1366                                 return 1;
1367                         else
1368                                 return 0;
1369                         }
1370                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1371                 nm = a->dpname;
1372                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1373                 }
1374         else if (b->type == 1)
1375                 {
1376                 if (!b->dpname)
1377                         return 0;
1378                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1379                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1380                 nm = b->dpname;
1381                 }
1382
1383         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1384         if (nm)
1385                 {
1386                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1387                         {
1388                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1389                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1390                                 continue;
1391                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1392                                 return 1;
1393                         }
1394                 return 0;
1395                 }
1396
1397         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1398
1399         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1400                 {
1401                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1402                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1403                         {
1404                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1405                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1406                                 return 1;
1407                         }
1408                 }
1409
1410         return 0;
1411
1412         }
1413
1414 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1415         {
1416         int i;
1417         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1418         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1419         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1420                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1421         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1422                 {
1423                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1424                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1425                         continue;
1426                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1427                         return 1;
1428                 }
1429         return 0;
1430         }
1431
1432 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1433
1434 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1435                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1436         {
1437         int i;
1438         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1439                 return 0;
1440         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1441                 {
1442                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1443                         return 0;
1444                 }
1445         else
1446                 {
1447                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1448                         return 0;
1449                 }
1450         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1451         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1452                 {
1453                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1454                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1455                         {
1456                         if (!crl->idp ||
1457                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1458                                 {
1459                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1460                                 return 1;
1461                                 }
1462                         }
1463                 }
1464         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1465                 return 1;
1466         return 0;
1467         }
1468
1469 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1470  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1471  */
1472
1473 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1474                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1475         {
1476         int ok;
1477         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1478         int crl_score = 0;
1479         unsigned int reasons;
1480         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1481         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1482         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1483         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1484         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1485                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1486
1487         if (ok)
1488                 goto done;
1489
1490         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1491
1492         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1493
1494         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1495         if (!skcrl && crl)
1496                 goto done;
1497
1498         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1499
1500         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1501
1502         done:
1503
1504         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1505         if (crl)
1506                 {
1507                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1508                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1509                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1510                 *pcrl = crl;
1511                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1512                 return 1;
1513                 }
1514
1515         return 0;
1516         }
1517
1518 /* Check CRL validity */
1519 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1520         {
1521         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1522         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1523         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1524         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1525         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1526         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1527         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1528                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1529
1530         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1531          * is next certificate in chain.
1532          */
1533         else if (cnum < chnum)
1534                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1535         else
1536                 {
1537                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1538                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1539                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1540                         {
1541                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1542                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1543                         if(!ok) goto err;
1544                         }
1545                 }
1546
1547         if(issuer)
1548                 {
1549                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1550                  * been done
1551                  */
1552                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1553                         {
1554                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1555                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1556                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1557                                 {
1558                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1559                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1560                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1561                                 }
1562
1563                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1564                                 {
1565                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1566                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1567                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1568                                 }
1569
1570                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1571                                 {
1572                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1573                                         {
1574                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1575                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1576                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1577                                         }
1578                                 }
1579
1580                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1581                                 {
1582                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1583                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1584                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1585                                 }
1586
1587
1588                         }
1589
1590                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1591                         {
1592                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1593                         if (!ok)
1594                                 goto err;
1595                         }
1596
1597                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1598                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1599
1600                 if(!ikey)
1601                         {
1602                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1603                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1604                         if (!ok) goto err;
1605                         }
1606                 else
1607                         {
1608                         int rv;
1609                         rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1610                         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1611                                 {
1612                                 ctx->error=rv;
1613                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1614                                 if (!ok)
1615                                         goto err;
1616                                 }
1617                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1618                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1619                                 {
1620                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1621                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1622                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1623                                 }
1624                         }
1625                 }
1626
1627         ok = 1;
1628
1629         err:
1630         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1631         return ok;
1632         }
1633
1634 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1635 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1636         {
1637         int ok;
1638         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1639         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1640          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1641          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1642          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1643          */
1644         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1645                 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1646                 {
1647                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1648                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1649                 if(!ok)
1650                         return 0;
1651                 }
1652         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1653          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1654          */
1655         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1656                 {
1657                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1658                         return 2;
1659                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1660                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1661                 if (!ok)
1662                         return 0;
1663                 }
1664
1665         return 1;
1666         }
1667
1668 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1669         {
1670         int ret;
1671         if (ctx->parent)
1672                 return 1;
1673         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1674                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1675         if (ret == 0)
1676                 {
1677                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1678                 return 0;
1679                 }
1680         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1681         if (ret == -1)
1682                 {
1683                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1684                  * callback.
1685                  */
1686                 X509 *x;
1687                 int i;
1688                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1689                         {
1690                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1691                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1692                                 continue;
1693                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1694                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1695                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1696                                 return 0;
1697                         }
1698                 return 1;
1699                 }
1700         if (ret == -2)
1701                 {
1702                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1703                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1704                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1705                 }
1706
1707         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1708                 {
1709                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1710                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1711                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1712                         return 0;
1713                 }
1714
1715         return 1;
1716         }
1717
1718 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1719         {
1720         time_t *ptime;
1721         int i;
1722
1723         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1724                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1725         else
1726                 ptime = NULL;
1727
1728         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1729         if (i == 0)
1730                 {
1731                 if (quiet)
1732                         return 0;
1733                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1734                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1735                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1736                         return 0;
1737                 }
1738
1739         if (i > 0)
1740                 {
1741                 if (quiet)
1742                         return 0;
1743                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1744                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1745                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1746                         return 0;
1747                 }
1748
1749         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1750         if (i == 0)
1751                 {
1752                 if (quiet)
1753                         return 0;
1754                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1755                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1756                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1757                         return 0;
1758                 }
1759
1760         if (i < 0)
1761                 {
1762                 if (quiet)
1763                         return 0;
1764                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1765                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1766                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1767                         return 0;
1768                 }
1769
1770         return 1;
1771         }
1772
1773 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1774         {
1775         int ok=0,n;
1776         X509 *xs,*xi;
1777         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1778         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1779
1780         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1781
1782         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1783         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1784         n--;
1785         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1786
1787         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1788                 xs=xi;
1789         else
1790                 {
1791                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
1792                         {
1793                         xs = xi;
1794                         goto check_cert;
1795                         }
1796                 if (n <= 0)
1797                         {
1798                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1799                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1800                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1801                         goto end;
1802                         }
1803                 else
1804                         {
1805                         n--;
1806                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1807                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1808                         }
1809                 }
1810
1811 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1812         while (n >= 0)
1813                 {
1814                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1815
1816                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1817                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1818                  * just wastes time.
1819                  */
1820                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1821                         {
1822                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1823                                 {
1824                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1825                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1826                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1827                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1828                                 }
1829                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1830                                 {
1831                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1832                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1833                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1834                                 if (!ok)
1835                                         {
1836                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1837                                         goto end;
1838                                         }
1839                                 }
1840                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1841                         pkey=NULL;
1842                         }
1843
1844                 xs->valid = 1;
1845
1846                 check_cert:
1847                 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1848                 if (!ok)
1849                         goto end;
1850
1851                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1852                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1853                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1854                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1855                 if (!ok) goto end;
1856
1857                 n--;
1858                 if (n >= 0)
1859                         {
1860                         xi=xs;
1861                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1862                         }
1863                 }
1864         ok=1;
1865 end:
1866         return ok;
1867         }
1868
1869 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1870 {
1871         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1872 }
1873
1874 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1875         {
1876         char *str;
1877         ASN1_TIME atm;
1878         long offset;
1879         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1880         int i,j;
1881
1882         p=buff1;
1883         i=ctm->length;
1884         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1885         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1886                 {
1887                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1888                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1889                 p+=10;
1890                 str+=10;
1891                 }
1892         else
1893                 {
1894                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1895                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1896                 p+=12;
1897                 str+=12;
1898                 }
1899
1900         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1901                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1902         else
1903                 {
1904                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1905                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1906                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1907                 if (*str == '.')
1908                         {
1909                         str++;
1910                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1911                         }
1912
1913                 }
1914         *(p++)='Z';
1915         *(p++)='\0';
1916
1917         if (*str == 'Z')
1918                 offset=0;
1919         else
1920                 {
1921                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1922                         return 0;
1923                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1924                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1925                 if (*str == '-')
1926                         offset= -offset;
1927                 }
1928         atm.type=ctm->type;
1929         atm.flags = 0;
1930         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1931         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1932
1933         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1934                 return 0;
1935
1936         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1937                 {
1938                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1939                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1940                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1941                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1942
1943                 if (i < j) return -1;
1944                 if (i > j) return 1;
1945                 }
1946         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1947         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1948                 return -1;
1949         else
1950                 return i;
1951         }
1952
1953 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1954 {
1955         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1956 }
1957
1958 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1959         {
1960         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1961         }
1962
1963 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1964                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1965         {
1966         time_t t;
1967
1968         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1969         else time(&t);
1970
1971         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1972                 {
1973                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1974                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1975                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1976                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1977                                                                 offset_sec);
1978                 }
1979         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1980         }
1981
1982 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1983         {
1984         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1985         int i,j;
1986
1987         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1988
1989         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1990                 {
1991                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1992                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1993                         {
1994                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1995                         return 0;
1996                         }
1997                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1998                         break;
1999                 else
2000                         {
2001                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2002                         ktmp=NULL;
2003                         }
2004                 }
2005         if (ktmp == NULL)
2006                 {
2007                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2008                 return 0;
2009                 }
2010
2011         /* first, populate the other certs */
2012         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
2013                 {
2014                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
2015                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
2016                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2017                 }
2018
2019         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
2020         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2021         return 1;
2022         }
2023
2024 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2025
2026 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2027                         EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2028         {
2029         X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2030         int i;
2031         STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2032         /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2033         if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
2034                         {
2035                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2036                         return NULL;
2037                         }
2038         /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2039         if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
2040                         {
2041                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2042                         return NULL;
2043                         }
2044         /* Issuer names must match */
2045         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
2046                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2047                         {
2048                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2049                         return NULL;
2050                         }
2051         /* AKID and IDP must match */
2052         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
2053                         {
2054                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2055                         return NULL;
2056                         }
2057         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
2058                         {
2059                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2060                         return NULL;
2061                         }
2062         /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2063         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2064                         {
2065                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2066                         return NULL;
2067                         }
2068         /* CRLs must verify */
2069         if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2070                         X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2071                 {
2072                 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2073                 return NULL;
2074                 }
2075         /* Create new CRL */
2076         crl = X509_CRL_new();
2077         if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2078                 goto memerr;
2079         /* Set issuer name */
2080         if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2081                 goto memerr;
2082
2083         if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2084                 goto memerr;
2085         if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2086                 goto memerr;
2087
2088         /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2089
2090         if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2091                 goto memerr;
2092
2093         /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2094          * CRL number to correct value too.
2095          */
2096
2097         for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2098                 {
2099                 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2100                 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2101                 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2102                         goto memerr;
2103                 }
2104
2105         /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2106
2107         revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2108
2109         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2110                 {
2111                 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2112                 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2113                 /* Add only if not also in base.
2114                  * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2115                  * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2116                  */
2117                 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2118                         {
2119                         rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2120                         if (!rvtmp)
2121                                 goto memerr;
2122                         if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2123                                 {
2124                                 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2125                                 goto memerr;
2126                                 }
2127                         }
2128                 }
2129         /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2130
2131         if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2132                 goto memerr;
2133
2134         return crl;
2135
2136         memerr:
2137         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2138         if (crl)
2139                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2140         return NULL;
2141         }
2142
2143 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2144              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2145         {
2146         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2147          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2148         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2149                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2150         }
2151
2152 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2153         {
2154         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2155         }
2156
2157 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2158         {
2159         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2160         }
2161
2162 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2163         {
2164         return ctx->error;
2165         }
2166
2167 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2168         {
2169         ctx->error=err;
2170         }
2171
2172 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2173         {
2174         return ctx->error_depth;
2175         }
2176
2177 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2178         {
2179         return ctx->current_cert;
2180         }
2181
2182 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2183         {
2184         return ctx->chain;
2185         }
2186
2187 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2188         {
2189         if (!ctx->chain)
2190                 return NULL;
2191         return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2192         }
2193
2194 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2195         {
2196         return ctx->current_issuer;
2197         }
2198
2199 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2200         {
2201         return ctx->current_crl;
2202         }
2203
2204 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2205         {
2206         return ctx->parent;
2207         }
2208
2209 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2210         {
2211         ctx->cert=x;
2212         }
2213
2214 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2215         {
2216         ctx->untrusted=sk;
2217         }
2218
2219 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2220         {
2221         ctx->crls=sk;
2222         }
2223
2224 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2225         {
2226         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2227         }
2228
2229 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2230         {
2231         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2232         }
2233
2234 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2235  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2236  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2237  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2238  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2239  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2240  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2241  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2242  */
2243
2244 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2245                                 int purpose, int trust)
2246 {
2247         int idx;
2248         /* If purpose not set use default */
2249         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2250         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2251         if (purpose)
2252                 {
2253                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2254                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2255                 if (idx == -1)
2256                         {
2257                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2258                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2259                         return 0;
2260                         }
2261                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2262                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2263                         {
2264                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2265                         if (idx == -1)
2266                                 {
2267                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2268                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2269                                 return 0;
2270                                 }
2271                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2272                         }
2273                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2274                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2275                 }
2276         if (trust)
2277                 {
2278                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2279                 if (idx == -1)
2280                         {
2281                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2282                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2283                         return 0;
2284                         }
2285                 }
2286
2287         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2288         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2289         return 1;
2290 }
2291
2292 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2293 {
2294         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2295         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2296         if (!ctx)
2297                 {
2298                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2299                 return NULL;
2300                 }
2301         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2302         return ctx;
2303 }
2304
2305 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2306 {
2307         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2308         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2309 }
2310
2311 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2312              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2313         {
2314         int ret = 1;
2315         ctx->ctx=store;
2316         ctx->current_method=0;
2317         ctx->cert=x509;
2318         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2319         ctx->crls = NULL;
2320         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2321         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2322         ctx->valid=0;
2323         ctx->chain=NULL;
2324         ctx->error=0;
2325         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2326         ctx->error_depth=0;
2327         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2328         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2329         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2330         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2331         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2332         ctx->tree = NULL;
2333         ctx->parent = NULL;
2334
2335         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2336
2337         if (!ctx->param)
2338                 {
2339                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2340                 return 0;
2341                 }
2342
2343         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2344          * use defaults.
2345          */
2346
2347
2348         if (store)
2349                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2350         else
2351                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2352
2353         if (store)
2354                 {
2355                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2356                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2357                 }
2358         else
2359                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2360
2361         if (ret)
2362                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2363                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2364
2365         if (ret == 0)
2366                 {
2367                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2368                 return 0;
2369                 }
2370
2371         if (store && store->check_issued)
2372                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2373         else
2374                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2375
2376         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2377                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2378         else
2379                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2380
2381         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2382                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2383         else
2384                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2385
2386         if (store && store->verify)
2387                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2388         else
2389                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2390
2391         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2392                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2393         else
2394                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2395
2396         if (store && store->get_crl)
2397                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2398         else
2399                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2400
2401         if (store && store->check_crl)
2402                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2403         else
2404                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2405
2406         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2407                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2408         else
2409                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2410
2411         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2412                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2413         else
2414                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2415
2416         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2417                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2418         else
2419                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2420
2421         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2422
2423
2424         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2425          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2426          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2427         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2428         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2429                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2430                 {
2431                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2432                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2433                 return 0;
2434                 }
2435         return 1;
2436         }
2437
2438 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2439  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2440  */
2441
2442 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2443 {
2444         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2445         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2446 }
2447
2448 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2449         {
2450         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2451         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2452                 {
2453                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2454                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2455                 ctx->param=NULL;
2456                 }
2457         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2458                 {
2459                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2460                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2461                 }
2462         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2463                 {
2464                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2465                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2466                 }
2467         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2468         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2469         }
2470
2471 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2472         {
2473         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2474         }
2475
2476 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2477         {
2478         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2479         }
2480
2481 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2482         {
2483         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2484         }
2485
2486 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2487                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2488         {
2489         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2490         }
2491
2492 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2493         {
2494         return ctx->tree;
2495         }
2496
2497 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2498         {
2499         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2500         }
2501
2502 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2503         {
2504         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2505         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2506         if (!param)
2507                 return 0;
2508         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2509         }
2510
2511 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2512         {
2513         return ctx->param;
2514         }
2515
2516 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2517         {
2518         if (ctx->param)
2519                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2520         ctx->param = param;
2521         }
2522
2523 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2524 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2525
2526 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2527
2528 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2529 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)