2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
12 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
13 #include <openssl/objects.h>
14 #include <openssl/x509.h>
15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
16 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
17 #include "crypto/x509.h"
19 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
22 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
30 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
32 return i < 0 ? -1 : 1;
33 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
36 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
37 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
39 unsigned long ret = 0;
40 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
46 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
47 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
49 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
53 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
54 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
56 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
58 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
59 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
67 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
69 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
72 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
74 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
77 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
79 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
82 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
84 int rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
86 return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
89 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
91 return a->cert_info.issuer;
94 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
96 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer);
99 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
100 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
102 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
106 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
108 return a->cert_info.subject;
111 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
113 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
116 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
118 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
121 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
123 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject);
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
127 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
129 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
134 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
135 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
136 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
137 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
138 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
139 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
141 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
145 /* ensure hash is valid */
146 if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1)
148 if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0) != 1)
151 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
153 return rv < 0 ? -1 : 1;
154 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
155 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
156 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
158 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
160 rv = memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc,
161 b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len);
163 return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
166 int X509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
169 && (*sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
170 X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
173 return X509_add_cert(*sk, cert, flags);
176 int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
179 X509err(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
182 if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) {
184 * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
185 * because this re-orders the certs on the stack
189 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
190 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
194 if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0 && X509_self_signed(cert, 0))
196 if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert,
197 (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) {
198 X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
201 if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0)
202 (void)X509_up_ref(cert);
206 int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags)
207 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the list of certs, yet they are up-ref'ed */
209 int n = sk_X509_num(certs); /* certs may be NULL */
212 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
213 int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i;
214 /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */
216 if (!X509_add_cert(sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags))
222 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
231 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
232 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
233 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
238 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
239 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
244 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
245 if (ret == 0 && a->canon_enclen != 0)
246 ret = memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
248 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret > 0;
251 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(const X509_NAME *x)
253 unsigned long ret = 0;
254 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
256 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
257 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
258 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
262 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
263 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
270 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
271 * this is reasonably efficient.
274 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x)
276 EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips");
277 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
278 unsigned long ret = 0;
279 unsigned char md[16];
281 if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL)
284 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
285 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
286 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL)
287 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
288 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
289 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
290 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
294 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
301 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
302 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
303 const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
306 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
311 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
312 x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */
314 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
315 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
316 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
322 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name)
327 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
328 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
329 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
335 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
339 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
342 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
346 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
349 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
354 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
357 ret = EVP_PKEY_eq(xk, k);
365 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
368 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
371 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
379 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
380 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
381 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
386 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
388 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
390 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
391 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
393 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
394 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
395 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
396 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
398 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
400 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
401 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
402 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
403 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
404 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
405 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
406 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
407 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
408 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
409 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
410 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
412 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
417 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
422 unsigned long tflags = flags;
424 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
427 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
429 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
434 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
437 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
438 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
439 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
440 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
443 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
445 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
446 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
447 /* Correct error depth */
452 /* Check EE key only */
453 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
454 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
455 /* Correct error depth */
459 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
460 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
461 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
462 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
463 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
466 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
467 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
472 /* Final check: root CA signature */
473 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
475 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
476 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
477 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
478 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
481 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
482 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
484 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
485 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
492 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
495 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
497 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
498 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
502 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
508 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
515 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
516 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
517 * each X509 structure.
519 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
523 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
526 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
527 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
534 X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret, i));