2 * Copyright 2003-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
11 #include "internal/numbers.h"
12 #include "internal/safe_math.h"
14 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
15 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "crypto/x509.h"
21 #include "crypto/punycode.h"
24 OSSL_SAFE_MATH_SIGNED(int, int)
26 static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
28 STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
29 static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
31 static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
32 STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp,
33 int ind, const char *name);
34 static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
36 static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
37 static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
38 static int nc_dn(const X509_NAME *sub, const X509_NAME *nm);
39 static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
40 static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
41 static int nc_email_eai(ASN1_TYPE *emltype, ASN1_IA5STRING *base);
42 static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base);
43 static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base);
45 const X509V3_EXT_METHOD ossl_v3_name_constraints = {
46 NID_name_constraints, 0,
47 ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS),
50 0, v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
51 i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0,
55 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = {
56 ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME),
57 ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
58 ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1)
59 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
61 ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
62 ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees,
64 ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees,
66 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
69 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
70 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
73 #define IA5_OFFSET_LEN(ia5base, offset) \
74 ((ia5base)->length - ((unsigned char *)(offset) - (ia5base)->data))
76 /* Like memchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING. Additionally you can specify the
77 * starting point to search from
79 # define ia5memchr(str, start, c) memchr(start, c, IA5_OFFSET_LEN(str, start))
81 /* Like memrrchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING */
82 static char *ia5memrchr(ASN1_IA5STRING *str, int c)
86 for (i = str->length; i > 0 && str->data[i - 1] != c; i--);
91 return (char *)&str->data[i - 1];
95 * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules. It
96 * also doesn't work with ASN1_STRINGs that may have embedded NUL characters.
97 * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to
98 * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use
99 * numeric constants below).
101 static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
103 for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) {
105 unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2;
107 /* Convert to lower case */
108 if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
110 if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */)
127 static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
128 X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
131 CONF_VALUE tval, *val;
132 STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = NULL;
133 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = NULL;
134 GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub = NULL;
136 ncons = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new();
139 for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
140 val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
141 if (strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) == 0 && val->name[9]) {
142 ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees;
143 tval.name = val->name + 10;
144 } else if (strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) == 0 && val->name[8]) {
145 ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees;
146 tval.name = val->name + 9;
148 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX);
151 tval.value = val->value;
152 sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
155 if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
158 *ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null();
159 if (*ptree == NULL || !sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_push(*ptree, sub))
167 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
169 NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ncons);
170 GENERAL_SUBTREE_free(sub);
175 static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
178 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = a;
179 do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees,
180 bp, ind, "Permitted");
181 if (ncons->permittedSubtrees && ncons->excludedSubtrees)
183 do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees,
184 bp, ind, "Excluded");
188 static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
189 STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees,
190 BIO *bp, int ind, const char *name)
192 GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree;
194 if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0)
195 BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name);
196 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees); i++) {
199 tree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(trees, i);
200 BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, "");
201 if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD)
202 print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip);
204 GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base);
209 static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip)
211 /* ip->length should be 8 or 32 and len1 == len2 == 4 or len1 == len2 == 16 */
212 int len1 = ip->length >= 16 ? 16 : ip->length >= 4 ? 4 : ip->length;
213 int len2 = ip->length - len1;
214 char *ip1 = ossl_ipaddr_to_asc(ip->data, len1);
215 char *ip2 = ossl_ipaddr_to_asc(ip->data + len1, len2);
216 int ret = ip1 != NULL && ip2 != NULL
217 && BIO_printf(bp, "IP:%s/%s", ip1, ip2) > 0;
224 #define NAME_CHECK_MAX (1 << 20)
226 static int add_lengths(int *out, int a, int b)
230 /* sk_FOO_num(NULL) returns -1 but is effectively 0 when iterating. */
236 *out = safe_add_int(a, b, &err);
241 * Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints.
243 * X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed.
244 * X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation.
245 * X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation.
246 * X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type.
247 * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type.
248 * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax.
249 * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name
252 int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
254 int r, i, name_count, constraint_count;
257 nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
260 * Guard against certificates with an excessive number of names or
261 * constraints causing a computationally expensive name constraints check.
263 if (!add_lengths(&name_count, X509_NAME_entry_count(nm),
264 sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname))
265 || !add_lengths(&constraint_count,
266 sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees),
267 sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees))
268 || (name_count > 0 && constraint_count > NAME_CHECK_MAX / name_count))
269 return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
271 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) {
273 gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME;
274 gntmp.d.directoryName = nm;
276 r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
281 gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL;
283 /* Process any email address attributes in subject name */
286 const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
288 i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i);
291 ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
292 gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
293 if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
294 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
296 r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
304 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname); i++) {
305 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(x->altname, i);
306 r = nc_match(gen, nc);
315 static int cn2dnsid(ASN1_STRING *cn, unsigned char **dnsid, size_t *idlen)
318 unsigned char *utf8_value;
322 /* Don't leave outputs uninitialized */
327 * Per RFC 6125, DNS-IDs representing internationalized domain names appear
328 * in certificates in A-label encoded form:
330 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.2
332 * The same applies to CNs which are intended to represent DNS names.
333 * However, while in the SAN DNS-IDs are IA5Strings, as CNs they may be
334 * needlessly encoded in 16-bit Unicode. We perform a conversion to UTF-8
335 * to ensure that we get an ASCII representation of any CNs that are
336 * representable as ASCII, but just not encoded as ASCII. The UTF-8 form
337 * may contain some non-ASCII octets, and that's fine, such CNs are not
338 * valid legacy DNS names.
340 * Note, 'int' is the return type of ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() so that's what
341 * we must use for 'utf8_length'.
343 if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, cn)) < 0)
344 return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
347 * Some certificates have had names that include a *trailing* NUL byte.
348 * Remove these harmless NUL characters. They would otherwise yield false
349 * alarms with the following embedded NUL check.
351 while (utf8_length > 0 && utf8_value[utf8_length - 1] == '\0')
354 /* Reject *embedded* NULs */
355 if (memchr(utf8_value, 0, utf8_length) != NULL) {
356 OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
357 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
361 * XXX: Deviation from strict DNS name syntax, also check names with '_'
362 * Check DNS name syntax, any '-' or '.' must be internal,
363 * and on either side of each '.' we can't have a '-' or '.'.
365 * If the name has just one label, we don't consider it a DNS name. This
366 * means that "CN=sometld" cannot be precluded by DNS name constraints, but
367 * that is not a problem.
369 for (i = 0; i < utf8_length; ++i) {
370 unsigned char c = utf8_value[i];
372 if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
373 || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
374 || (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
378 /* Dot and hyphen cannot be first or last. */
379 if (i > 0 && i < utf8_length - 1) {
383 * Next to a dot the preceding and following characters must not be
384 * another dot or a hyphen. Otherwise, record that the name is
385 * plausible, since it has two or more labels.
388 && utf8_value[i + 1] != '.'
389 && utf8_value[i - 1] != '-'
390 && utf8_value[i + 1] != '-') {
401 *idlen = (size_t)utf8_length;
404 OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
409 * Check CN against DNS-ID name constraints.
411 int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
414 const X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
419 stmp.type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
420 gntmp.type = GEN_DNS;
421 gntmp.d.dNSName = &stmp;
423 /* Process any commonName attributes in subject name */
428 unsigned char *idval;
431 i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, i);
434 ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
435 cn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
437 /* Only process attributes that look like host names */
438 if ((r = cn2dnsid(cn, &idval, &idlen)) != X509_V_OK)
445 r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
454 * Return nonzero if the GeneralSubtree has valid 'minimum' field
455 * (must be absent or 0) and valid 'maximum' field (must be absent).
457 static int nc_minmax_valid(GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub) {
465 bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(sub->minimum, NULL);
466 if (bn == NULL || !BN_is_zero(bn))
474 static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
476 GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
479 * We need to compare not gen->type field but an "effective" type because
480 * the otherName field may contain EAI email address treated specially
481 * according to RFC 8398, section 6
483 int effective_type = ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) &&
484 (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
485 NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox)) ? GEN_EMAIL : gen->type;
488 * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
489 * least one subtree must match.
492 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
493 sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
494 if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
496 if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
497 return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
498 /* If we already have a match don't bother trying any more */
503 r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
506 else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
511 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
513 /* Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these */
515 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
516 sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
517 if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
519 if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
520 return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
522 r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
524 return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
525 else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
534 static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
539 * We are here only when we have SmtpUTF8 name,
540 * so we match the value of othername with base->d.rfc822Name
542 return nc_email_eai(gen->d.otherName->value, base->d.rfc822Name);
545 return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
548 return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName);
551 return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name);
554 return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier,
555 base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier);
558 return nc_ip(gen->d.iPAddress, base->d.iPAddress);
561 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
567 * directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of
568 * X509_NAME makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the subtree is a
569 * subset of the name.
572 static int nc_dn(const X509_NAME *nm, const X509_NAME *base)
574 /* Ensure canonical encodings are up to date. */
575 if (nm->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) < 0)
576 return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
577 if (base->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(base, NULL) < 0)
578 return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
579 if (base->canon_enclen > nm->canon_enclen)
580 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
581 if (memcmp(base->canon_enc, nm->canon_enc, base->canon_enclen))
582 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
586 static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
588 char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
589 char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data;
591 /* Empty matches everything */
592 if (base->length == 0)
595 if (dns->length < base->length)
596 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
599 * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
600 * and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character.
602 if (dns->length > base->length) {
603 dnsptr += dns->length - base->length;
604 if (*baseptr != '.' && dnsptr[-1] != '.')
605 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
608 if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr, base->length))
609 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
616 * This function implements comparison between ASCII/U-label in emltype
617 * and A-label in base according to RFC 8398, section 6.
618 * Convert base to U-label and ASCII-parts of domain names, for base
619 * Octet-to-octet comparison of `emltype` and `base` hostname parts
620 * (ASCII-parts should be compared in case-insensitive manner)
622 static int nc_email_eai(ASN1_TYPE *emltype, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
624 ASN1_UTF8STRING *eml;
625 char *baseptr = NULL;
629 size_t size = sizeof(ulabel) - 1;
633 /* We do not accept embedded NUL characters */
634 if (base->length > 0 && memchr(base->data, 0, base->length) != NULL)
635 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
637 /* 'base' may not be NUL terminated. Create a copy that is */
638 baseptr = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)base->data, base->length);
640 return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
642 if (emltype->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
643 ret = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
647 eml = emltype->value.utf8string;
648 emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
649 emlat = ia5memrchr(eml, '@');
652 ret = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
656 memset(ulabel, 0, sizeof(ulabel));
657 /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
658 if (*baseptr == '.') {
661 if (ossl_a2ulabel(baseptr, ulabel + 1, &size) <= 0) {
662 ret = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
666 if ((size_t)eml->length > strlen(ulabel)) {
667 emlptr += eml->length - (strlen(ulabel));
669 if (ia5ncasecmp(ulabel, emlptr, strlen(ulabel)) == 0)
672 ret = X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
676 if (ossl_a2ulabel(baseptr, ulabel, &size) <= 0) {
677 ret = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
680 /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
682 emlhostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(eml, emlptr);
683 if (emlhostlen != strlen(ulabel)
684 || ia5ncasecmp(ulabel, emlptr, emlhostlen) != 0) {
685 ret = X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
690 OPENSSL_free(baseptr);
694 static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
696 const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
697 const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
698 const char *baseat = ia5memrchr(base, '@');
699 const char *emlat = ia5memrchr(eml, '@');
700 size_t basehostlen, emlhostlen;
703 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
704 /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
705 if (!baseat && base->length > 0 && (*baseptr == '.')) {
706 if (eml->length > base->length) {
707 emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
708 if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, base->length) == 0)
711 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
714 /* If we have anything before '@' match local part */
717 if (baseat != baseptr) {
718 if ((baseat - baseptr) != (emlat - emlptr))
719 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
720 if (memchr(baseptr, 0, baseat - baseptr) ||
721 memchr(emlptr, 0, emlat - emlptr))
722 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
723 /* Case sensitive match of local part */
724 if (strncmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlat - emlptr))
725 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
727 /* Position base after '@' */
728 baseptr = baseat + 1;
731 basehostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(base, baseptr);
732 emlhostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(eml, emlptr);
733 /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
734 if (basehostlen != emlhostlen || ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlhostlen))
735 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
741 static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
743 const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
744 const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data;
745 const char *p = ia5memchr(uri, (char *)uri->data, ':');
748 /* Check for foo:// and skip past it */
750 || IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, p) < 3
753 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
756 /* Determine length of hostname part of URI */
758 /* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */
760 p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, ':');
761 /* Otherwise look for trailing slash */
763 p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, '/');
766 hostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, hostptr);
768 hostlen = p - hostptr;
771 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
773 /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
774 if (base->length > 0 && *baseptr == '.') {
775 if (hostlen > base->length) {
776 p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
777 if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0)
780 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
783 if ((base->length != (int)hostlen)
784 || ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
785 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
791 static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base)
793 int hostlen, baselen, i;
794 unsigned char *hostptr, *baseptr, *maskptr;
796 hostlen = ip->length;
797 baseptr = base->data;
798 baselen = base->length;
800 /* Invalid if not IPv4 or IPv6 */
801 if (!((hostlen == 4) || (hostlen == 16)))
802 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
803 if (!((baselen == 8) || (baselen == 32)))
804 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
806 /* Do not match IPv4 with IPv6 */
807 if (hostlen * 2 != baselen)
808 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
810 maskptr = base->data + hostlen;
812 /* Considering possible not aligned base ipAddress */
813 /* Not checking for wrong mask definition: i.e.: 255.0.255.0 */
814 for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++)
815 if ((hostptr[i] & maskptr[i]) != (baseptr[i] & maskptr[i]))
816 return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;