2 * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
16 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 # include <openssl/engine.h>
21 #include <openssl/evp.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
24 #include "internal/refcount.h"
25 #include "crypto/bn.h"
26 #include "crypto/evp.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "crypto/security_bits.h"
29 #include "rsa_local.h"
31 static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
36 return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL);
39 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
44 int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
47 * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
48 * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
50 const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
54 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
55 ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
64 RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
66 return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL);
70 RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
72 return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx);
75 static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
77 RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
82 ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
83 if (ret->lock == NULL) {
84 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
89 if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) {
90 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ret->lock);
96 ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
97 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
98 ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
100 if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
101 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
104 ret->engine = engine;
106 ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
109 ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
110 if (ret->meth == NULL) {
111 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
117 ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
119 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
124 if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
125 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
136 void RSA_free(RSA *r)
143 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i);
144 REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
147 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
149 if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
151 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
152 ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
156 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
159 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
160 CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&r->references);
167 BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
168 BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
169 BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
171 #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
172 ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
176 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
177 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
179 BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
180 BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
184 int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
188 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i) <= 0)
191 REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
192 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
193 return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
196 OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r)
201 void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
207 int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
209 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
212 void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
214 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
219 * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic.
220 * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code
221 * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so
222 * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor
223 * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers
224 * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer.
226 static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18;
227 static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3);
229 /* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */
230 static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */
231 static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */
232 static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */
233 static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */
236 * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result.
238 static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)
240 return a * b / scale;
244 * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer.
245 * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned
246 * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a
247 * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some
248 * algebraic simplifications.
250 static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x)
256 for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) {
258 b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1;
264 return r * cbrt_scale;
268 * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer.
269 * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling.
270 * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so
271 * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be
272 * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results.
274 static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v)
279 * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2.
281 * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs
282 * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and
283 * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed.
285 while (v >= 2 * scale) {
289 for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) {
291 if (v >= 2 * scale) {
296 r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e;
301 * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC
304 * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D:
305 * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe.
306 * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to
307 * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in
308 * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight
313 * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)}
314 * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)}
315 * The two cube roots are merged together here.
317 uint16_t ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n)
324 * Look for common values as listed in standards.
325 * These values are not exactly equal to the results from the formulae in
326 * the standards but are defined to be canonical.
329 case 2048: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
331 case 3072: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
333 case 4096: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
335 case 6144: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
337 case 7680: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
339 case 8192: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
341 case 15360: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
346 * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs
347 * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n
348 * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is
349 * 1200 is used instead.
357 * To ensure that the output is non-decreasing with respect to n,
358 * a cap needs to be applied to the two values where the function over
359 * estimates the strength (according to the above fast path).
368 x = n * (uint64_t)log_2;
370 y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690)
380 int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
382 int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
385 if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
386 /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
387 int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
389 if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits))
393 return ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits);
396 int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
398 /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
399 * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
400 * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
402 if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
403 || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
417 BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
424 int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
426 /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
427 * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
429 if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
430 || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
436 BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
441 BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
448 int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
450 /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
451 * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
453 if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
454 || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
455 || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
459 BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
461 BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
464 BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
466 BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
469 BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
471 BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
480 * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
481 * and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
483 int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
484 BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
486 STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
487 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
490 if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
493 prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
494 if (prime_infos == NULL)
497 if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
498 old = r->prime_infos;
500 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
501 pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new();
504 if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
505 BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
506 BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
507 BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
508 pinfo->r = primes[i];
510 pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
511 BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
512 BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
513 BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
515 ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
518 (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
521 r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
523 if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
524 r->prime_infos = old;
530 * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
531 * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
532 * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
533 * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
535 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
538 r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
543 /* r, d, t should not be freed */
544 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
549 void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
550 const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
560 void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
569 int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
573 pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
579 int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
582 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
584 if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
588 * return other primes
589 * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
591 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
592 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
593 primes[i] = pinfo->r;
600 void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
601 const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
613 int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
614 const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
618 if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
621 /* return other primes */
622 if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
623 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
626 /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
627 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
628 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
632 coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
640 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r)
645 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r)
650 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r)
655 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r)
660 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r)
665 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r)
670 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r)
675 const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r)
680 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r)
690 int ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(RSA *r, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss)
695 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
702 RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r)
704 return &r->pss_params;
707 void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
712 int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags)
714 return r->flags & flags;
717 void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
722 int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
724 /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
729 ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
734 int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
736 /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
737 if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
738 && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
739 && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
741 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
745 DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
748 * Note: This function deletes values from the parameter
749 * stack values as they are consumed and set in the RSA key.
751 int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
752 STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
753 STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
756 STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL;
760 if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
763 pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes);
765 /* we need at least 2 primes */
769 if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0),
770 sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)))
774 * if we managed to set everything above, remove those elements from the
776 * Note, we do this after the above all to ensure that we have taken
777 * ownership of all the elements in the RSA key to avoid memory leaks
778 * we also use delete 0 here as we are grabbing items from the end of the
779 * stack rather than the start, otherwise we could use pop
781 sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
782 sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
784 if (pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)
785 && pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) {
787 if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0),
788 sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1),
789 sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0)))
792 /* as above, once we consume the above params, delete them from the list */
793 sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
794 sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
795 sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
799 old_infos = r->prime_infos;
806 prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
807 if (prime_infos == NULL)
810 for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) {
811 BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_pop(primes);
812 BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_pop(exps);
813 BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_pop(coeffs);
814 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
816 if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
819 /* Using ossl_rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
820 if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL)
826 BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
827 BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
828 BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
829 (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
832 r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
834 if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
835 r->prime_infos = old_infos;
844 if (old_infos != NULL) {
846 * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
847 * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
848 * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
849 * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
851 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
855 r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT;
861 /* r, d, t should not be freed */
862 sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
867 DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
869 int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
870 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
871 STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs)
874 RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
881 /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */
882 if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL)
885 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r));
886 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r));
887 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r));
888 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r));
889 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r));
892 pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r);
893 for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
894 pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
895 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r);
896 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d);
897 sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t);
905 /* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
906 static int int_set_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
908 int keytype, int optype,
909 /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */
910 const char *mdkey, const char *mdname,
911 const char *propkey, const char *mdprops)
913 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
915 if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
916 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
917 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
921 /* If key type not RSA return error */
924 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
925 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
929 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
934 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
935 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, 0);
936 if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx) && mdprops != NULL) {
937 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
938 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(propkey, (char *)mdprops, 0);
940 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
942 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
945 /* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
946 static int int_get_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
948 int keytype, int optype,
949 /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() */
951 char *mdname, size_t mdnamesize)
953 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
955 if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
956 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
957 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
961 /* If key type not RSA return error */
964 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
965 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
969 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
974 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
975 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, mdnamesize);
976 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
978 return evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
982 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
983 * simply because that's easier.
985 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode)
987 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
992 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
993 * simply because that's easier.
995 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode)
997 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING,
1002 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1003 * simply because that's easier.
1005 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
1007 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1008 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
1011 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
1013 const char *mdprops)
1015 return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1016 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST, mdname,
1017 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
1021 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1022 * simply because that's easier.
1024 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
1026 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1027 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
1030 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1031 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
1034 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
1035 const char *mdprops)
1038 int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1039 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, mdname,
1040 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
1043 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
1046 return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1047 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST,
1052 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1053 * simply because that's easier.
1055 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
1057 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1058 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
1061 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1062 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
1066 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1067 * simply because that's easier.
1069 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
1071 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1072 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
1075 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
1076 const char *mdprops)
1078 return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
1079 EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
1080 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
1081 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, mdprops);
1084 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
1087 return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
1088 EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
1089 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, name, namesize);
1093 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1094 * simply because that's easier.
1096 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
1098 return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1099 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
1102 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
1105 return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1106 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
1111 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1112 * simply because that's easier.
1114 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
1116 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
1117 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
1120 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen)
1122 OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
1123 const char *empty = "";
1125 * Needed as we swap label with empty if it is NULL, and label is
1126 * freed at the end of this function.
1128 void *plabel = label;
1131 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
1132 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1133 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1137 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1138 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
1141 /* Accept NULL for backward compatibility */
1142 if (label == NULL && llen == 0)
1143 plabel = (void *)empty;
1145 /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
1146 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
1147 (void *)plabel, (size_t)llen);
1148 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1150 ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, rsa_params);
1154 /* Ownership is supposed to be transferred to the callee. */
1155 OPENSSL_free(label);
1159 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label)
1161 OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
1164 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
1165 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1166 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1170 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1171 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
1174 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
1176 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1178 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params))
1181 labellen = rsa_params[0].return_size;
1182 if (labellen > INT_MAX)
1185 return (int)labellen;
1189 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1190 * simply because that's easier.
1192 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
1195 * For some reason, the optype was set to this:
1197 * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
1199 * However, we do use RSA-PSS with the whole gamut of diverse signature
1200 * and verification operations, so the optype gets upgraded to this:
1202 * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
1204 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
1205 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen, NULL);
1209 * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
1210 * simply because that's easier.
1212 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen)
1215 * Because of circumstances, the optype is updated from:
1217 * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
1221 * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
1223 return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
1224 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, saltlen);
1227 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
1229 OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
1231 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
1232 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1233 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1237 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
1240 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN,
1242 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1244 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, pad_params);
1247 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits)
1249 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
1250 size_t bits2 = bits;
1252 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
1253 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1254 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1258 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1259 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
1260 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
1263 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2);
1264 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1266 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
1269 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
1271 int ret = RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1272 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
1275 * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of
1276 * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input
1277 * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success.
1279 if (ret > 0 && evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx)) {
1280 BN_free(ctx->rsa_pubexp);
1281 ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp;
1287 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
1292 * When we're dealing with a provider, there's no need to duplicate
1293 * pubexp, as it gets copied when transforming to an OSSL_PARAM anyway.
1295 if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx)) {
1296 pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp);
1300 ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
1301 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
1302 if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx) && ret <= 0)
1307 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes)
1309 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
1310 size_t primes2 = primes;
1312 if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
1313 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
1314 /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
1318 /* If key type not RSA return error */
1319 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
1320 && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
1323 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2);
1324 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1326 return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);