ensure that ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" match the SSL 2.0

ciphersuite as well

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 18eb27eebe819e8569cdd47ca672b93dede35713..054c6a7a7f0b2d6098e34e1e86f442eadcbadf57 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.9  [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.9  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
   *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
      Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
@@ -379,6 +379,32 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
+     match only those.  Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
+     as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too since we currently only
+     have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
+     That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
+     "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
+     namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones
+     from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
+
+     So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit
+     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar
+     ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions.
+     Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0
+     ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
+
+     Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the
+     128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now.
+     The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
+     AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
+     however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
+     (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
+     definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
+     multiple values to extend the available space.
+
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
  Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c  [05 Sep 2006]
 
   *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index c85ea030fe820dc41fc39083d89f337c626180cb..87aa83a314daf76d444a1580bdd9cae8e8657028 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
        *ca_curr = NULL;        /* end of list */
        }
 
-static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id, unsigned long ssl_version,
                unsigned long algorithms, unsigned long mask,
                unsigned long algo_strength, unsigned long mask_strength,
                int rule, int strength_bits,
@@ -665,9 +665,10 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
 
                cp = curr->cipher;
 
-               /* If explicit cipher suite match that one only */
+               /* If explicit cipher suite, match only that one for its own protocol version.
+                * Usual selection criteria will be used for similar ciphersuites from other version! */
 
-               if (cipher_id)
+               if (cipher_id && (cp->algorithms & SSL_SSL_MASK) == ssl_version)
                        {
                        if (cp->id != cipher_id)
                                continue;
@@ -789,7 +790,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
         */
        for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
                if (number_uses[i] > 0)
-                       ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i,
+                       ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i,
                                        head_p, tail_p);
 
        OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
@@ -803,7 +804,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
        unsigned long algorithms, mask, algo_strength, mask_strength;
        const char *l, *start, *buf;
        int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
-       unsigned long cipher_id = 0;
+       unsigned long cipher_id = 0, ssl_version = 0;
        char ch;
 
        retval = 1;
@@ -894,6 +895,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
                         */
                         j = found = 0;
                         cipher_id = 0;
+                        ssl_version = 0;
                         while (ca_list[j])
                                {
                                if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
@@ -908,12 +910,6 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
                        if (!found)
                                break;  /* ignore this entry */
 
-                       if (ca_list[j]->valid)
-                               {
-                               cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
-                               break;
-                               }
-
                        /* New algorithms:
                         *  1 - any old restrictions apply outside new mask
                         *  2 - any new restrictions apply outside old mask
@@ -928,6 +924,14 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
                                        (algo_strength & ca_list[j]->algo_strength);
                        mask_strength |= ca_list[j]->mask_strength;
 
+                       /* explicit ciphersuite found */
+                       if (ca_list[j]->valid)
+                               {
+                               cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
+                               ssl_version = ca_list[j]->algorithms & SSL_SSL_MASK;
+                               break;
+                               }
+
                        if (!multi) break;
                        }
 
@@ -956,7 +960,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
                        }
                else if (found)
                        {
-                       ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, algorithms, mask,
+                       ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, ssl_version, algorithms, mask,
                                algo_strength, mask_strength, rule, -1,
                                head_p, tail_p);
                        }