Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source

of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 3ed2e9584dbe3b4fd8380c37fc65cc921f4dde9a..de184e33a329401c51910f721e0e239e9a8f2f44 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ again:
         * would be dropped unnecessarily.
         */
        if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-               *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+               s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+               s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
                !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
                {
                rr->length = 0;