DTLS fixes from 0.9.8-stable.
authorAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Sat, 13 Oct 2007 10:57:02 +0000 (10:57 +0000)
committerAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Sat, 13 Oct 2007 10:57:02 +0000 (10:57 +0000)
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_err.c

index c8e3e47..219244d 100644 (file)
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *     the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *     distribution.
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
  *
  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *     software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *     "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *     for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  *
  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *     endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *     prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *     openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
  *
  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *     nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *     permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
  *
  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *     acknowledgment:
- *     "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *     for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *     documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *     must display the following acknowledgement:
- *     "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *      Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *     The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *     being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *     the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *     "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  * 
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
 static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
 static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, 
        long max, int *ok);
-static void dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len);
 
 static hm_fragment *
 dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
@@ -151,14 +150,17 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
        if ( frag == NULL)
                return NULL;
 
-       buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len 
-               + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-       if ( buf == NULL)
+       if (frag_len)
                {
-               OPENSSL_free(frag);
-               return NULL;
+               buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+               if ( buf == NULL)
+                       {
+                       OPENSSL_free(frag);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
                }
 
+       /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
        frag->fragment = buf;
 
        return frag;
@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
 static void
 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
        {
-       OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+       if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
        OPENSSL_free(frag);
        }
 
@@ -289,15 +291,37 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 
                        /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
                         * message got sent.  but why would this happen? */
-                       OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); 
+                       OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
 
                        if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
+                               {
                                /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
                                 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
-                               ssl3_finish_mac(s, 
-                                       (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off + 
-                                               DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-                       
+                               unsigned char *p = &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+                               const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+                               int len;
+
+                               if (frag_off == 0)
+                                       {
+                                       /* reconstruct message header is if it
+                                        * is being sent in single fragment */
+                                       *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+                                       l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+                                       s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+                                       l2n3(0,p);
+                                       l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+                                       p  -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                                       len = ret;
+                                       }
+                               else
+                                       {
+                                       p  += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                                       len = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                                       }
+
+                               ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, len);
+                               }
+
                        if (ret == s->init_num)
                                {
                                if (s->msg_callback)
@@ -307,7 +331,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 
                                s->init_off = 0;  /* done writing this message */
                                s->init_num = 0;
-                               
+
                                return(1);
                                }
                        s->init_off+=ret;
@@ -327,6 +351,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
        {
        int i, al;
+       struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
 
        /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
         * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
@@ -345,12 +370,13 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
                return s->init_num;
                }
 
+       msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
        do
                {
-               if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
+               if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0)
                        {
                        /* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */
-                       memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+                       memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
                        }
 
                i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
@@ -360,9 +386,38 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
                else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
                        return i;
 
-               if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+               /* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing
+                * up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to
+                * handshake packet length, we assume we have got all
+                * the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause
+                * premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps.
+                * Well, handling overlaps would require something more
+                * drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to
+                * tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was
+                * the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control
+                * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
+               if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
                        {
-                       memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+                       unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data;
+                       unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+                       /* reconstruct message header as if it was
+                        * sent in single fragment */
+                       *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+                       l2n3(msg_len,p);
+                       s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+                       l2n3(0,p);
+                       l2n3(msg_len,p);
+                       p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                       msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+                       ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+                       if (s->msg_callback)
+                               s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                                       p, msg_len,
+                                       s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+                       memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
 
                        s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
                        /* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
@@ -380,10 +435,10 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
                        dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
 
                        s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-                       return s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                       return s->init_num;
                        }
                else
-                       s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off = i;
+                       msg_hdr->frag_off = i;
                } while(1) ;
 
 f_err:
@@ -393,8 +448,57 @@ f_err:
        }
 
 
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
+       {
+       size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
+
+       msg_len  = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+       frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+       frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+       /* sanity checking */
+       if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+               return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               }
+
+       if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+               return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               }
+
+       if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
+               {
+               /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
+                * against max above */
+               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                       return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                       }
+
+               s->s3->tmp.message_size  = msg_len;
+               s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+               s->s3->tmp.message_type  = msg_hdr->type;
+               s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type    = msg_hdr->type;
+               s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq     = msg_hdr->seq;
+               }
+       else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
+               {
+               /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
+                * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+               return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               }
+
+       return 0; /* no error */
+       }
+
+
 static int
-dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied)
+dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
        {
        /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
         * if so:
@@ -403,34 +507,41 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied)
         */
        pitem *item;
        hm_fragment *frag;
-       unsigned long overlap;
-       unsigned char *p;
+       int al;
 
+       *ok = 0;
        item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
        if ( item == NULL)
                return 0;
 
        frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
 
-       if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq &&
-               frag->msg_header.frag_off <= (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+       if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
                {
                pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-               overlap = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 
-                       - frag->msg_header.frag_off;
 
-               p = frag->fragment;
+               al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
 
-               memcpy(&s->init_buf->data[s->init_num],
-                       p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap,
-                       frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap);
-       
-               OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-               OPENSSL_free(frag);
+               if (al==0) /* no alert */
+                       {
+                       unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                       memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
+                               frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+                       }
+
+               dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
                pitem_free(item);
 
-               *copied = frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap;
-               return *copied;
+               if (al==0)
+                       {
+                       *ok = 1;
+                       return frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+                       }
+
+               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+               s->init_num = 0;
+               *ok = 0;
+               return -1;
                }
        else
                return 0;
@@ -438,21 +549,46 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied)
 
 
 static int
-dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 {
+       int i=-1;
        hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
        pitem *item = NULL;
        unsigned char seq64be[8];
+       unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
 
-       frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->frag_len);
-       if ( frag == NULL)
+       if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
                goto err;
 
-       memcpy(frag->fragment, &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
-               msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+       if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
+               {
+               unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+               while (frag_len)
+                       {
+                       i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                               devnull,
+                               frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+                       if (i<=0) goto err;
+                       frag_len -= i;
+                       }
+               }
+
+       frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+       if ( frag == NULL)
+               goto err;
 
        memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
 
+       if (frag_len)
+               {
+               /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+               i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                       frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+               if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+                       goto err;
+               }
+
        memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
        seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
        seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
@@ -462,91 +598,33 @@ dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr)
                goto err;
 
        pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
-       return 1;
+       return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
        if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
        if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
-       return 0;
-}
-
-
-static void
-dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len)
-       {
-       unsigned char *p;
-
-       p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-       ssl3_finish_mac(s, &p[s->init_num - frag_len], frag_len);
-       }
-
-
-static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
-       {
-       int i;
-       unsigned char *p;
-
-       /* make sure there's enough room to read this fragment */
-       if ( (int)msg_hdr->frag_len && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 
-                        (int)msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-               goto err;
-               }
-
-       p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
-       /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
-       if ( msg_hdr->frag_len > 0)
-               {
-               i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-                       &p[s->init_num], 
-                       msg_hdr->frag_len,0);
-               if (i <= 0)
-                       {
-                       *ok = 0;
-                       return i;
-                       }
-               }
-
-       if ( msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
-               dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, msg_hdr);
-       else
-               OPENSSL_assert(msg_hdr->seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq);
-
-       return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-err:
        *ok = 0;
-       return -1;
+       return i;
        }
 
 
 static long
 dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
        {
-       unsigned char *p;
+       unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
        unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len;
        int i,al;
        struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
-       unsigned long overlap;
 
        /* see if we have the required fragment already */
-       if (dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &l))
-       {
-               /* compute MAC, remove fragment headers */
-               dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, l);
-               s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-               s->state = stn;
-               return 1;
-       }
-
-       /* get a handshake fragment from the record layer */
-       p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+       if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+               {
+               if (*ok)        s->init_num += frag_len;
+               return frag_len;
+               }
 
        /* read handshake message header */
-       i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],
+       i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
                DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
        if (i <= 0)     /* nbio, or an error */
                {
@@ -554,13 +632,10 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
                *ok = 0;
                return i;
                }
-
        OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
 
-       p += s->init_num;
        /* parse the message fragment header */
-
-       dtls1_get_message_header(p, &msg_hdr);
+       dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
 
        /* 
         * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
@@ -573,26 +648,18 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
        frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
        frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
 
-       /* sanity checking */
-       if ( frag_off + frag_len > l)
-               {
-               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-               goto f_err;
-               }
-
        if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
-               p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+               wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
                {
                /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
                 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
                 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
                 * 'Finished' MAC. */
-               if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
+               if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
                        {
                        if (s->msg_callback)
                                s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 
-                                       p, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 
+                                       wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 
                                        s->msg_callback_arg);
                        
                        s->init_num = 0;
@@ -607,76 +674,18 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
                        }
                }
 
-       /* XDTLS: do a sanity check on the fragment */
-
-       s->init_num += i;
-
-       if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
-               {
-               /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
-               if (l > (INT_MAX-DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
-                       {
-                       al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-                       goto f_err;
-                       }
-               if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l
-                       + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-                       goto err;
-                       }
-               /* Only do this test when we're reading the expected message.
-                * Stale messages will be dropped and future messages will be buffered */
-               if ( l > (unsigned long)max)
-                       {
-                       al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-                       goto f_err;
-                       }
-
-               s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
-               }
-
-       if ( frag_len > (unsigned long)max)
-               {
-               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+       if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
                goto f_err;
-               }
-       if ( frag_len + s->init_num > (INT_MAX - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
-               {
-               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-               goto f_err;
-               }
-
-       if ( frag_len & !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len 
-                        + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-               goto err;
-               }
-
-       if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
-               {
-               s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr.type;
-               s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr.type;
-               s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = l;
-               /* s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = seq_num; */
-               }
 
        /* XDTLS:  ressurect this when restart is in place */
        s->state=stn;
 
-       /* next state (stn) */
-       p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
        if ( frag_len > 0)
                {
+               unsigned char *p=s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
                i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-                       &p[s->init_num], 
-                       frag_len,0);
+                       &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
                /* XDTLS:  fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
                if (i <= 0)
                        {
@@ -692,66 +701,19 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
         * handshake to fail */
        OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
 
-#if 0
-       /* Successfully read a fragment.
-        * It may be (1) out of order, or
-        *                 (2) it's a repeat, in which case we dump it
-        *                 (3) the one we are expecting next (maybe with overlap)
-        * If it is next one, it may overlap with previously read bytes
-        */
-
-       /* case (1): buffer the future fragment 
-        * (we can treat fragments from a future message the same
-        * as future fragments from the message being currently read, since
-        * they are sematically simply out of order.
-        */
-       if ( msg_hdr.seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
-               frag_off > s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
-       {
-               dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, &msg_hdr);
-               return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-       }
-
-       /* case (2):  drop the entire fragment, and try again */
-       if ( msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
-               frag_off + frag_len < s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
-               {
-               s->init_num -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-               return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-               }
-#endif
-
-       /* case (3): received a immediately useful fragment.  Determine the 
-        * possible overlap and copy the fragment.
-        */
-       overlap = (s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - frag_off;
+       *ok = 1;
 
-       /* retain the header for the first fragment */
-       if ( s->init_num > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
-               {
-               memmove(&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
-                       &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap]),
-                       frag_len - overlap);
-
-               s->init_num += frag_len - overlap;
-               }
-       else
-               s->init_num += frag_len;
-
-       dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, frag_len - overlap);
-
-       if (s->msg_callback)
-               s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, 
-                       (size_t)s->init_num, s, 
-                       s->msg_callback_arg);
-       *ok=1;
-
-       return s->init_num;
+       /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
+        * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
+        * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
+        * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
+       s->init_num += frag_len;
+       return frag_len;
 
 f_err:
        ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
        s->init_num = 0;
-err:
+
        *ok=0;
        return(-1);
        }
@@ -857,7 +819,7 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
                for (;;)
                        {
                        n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
-                       if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
+                       if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
                                {
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
                                return(0);
@@ -887,7 +849,7 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
                {
                x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
                n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
-               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
+               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
                        return(0);
@@ -997,43 +959,6 @@ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
        return 1;
        }
 
-#if 0
-static dtls1_message_buffer *
-dtls1_message_buffer_new(unsigned int len)
-       {
-       dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf;
-
-       msg_buf = (dtls1_message_buffer *) 
-               OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer)); 
-       if ( msg_buf == NULL)
-               return NULL;
-
-       memset(msg_buf, 0x00, sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
-
-       msg_buf->data = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
-       if ( msg_buf->data == NULL)
-               {
-               OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
-               return NULL;
-               }
-
-       memset(msg_buf->data, 0x00, len);
-       return msg_buf;
-       }
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-static void
-dtls1_message_buffer_free(dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf)
-       {
-       if (msg_buf != NULL)
-               {
-               OPENSSL_free(msg_buf->data);
-               OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
-               }
-       }
-#endif
-
 int
 dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
        {
index 32f572c..5781072 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1739,6 +1739,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT                253
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD                          254
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN                   255
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT                         288
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE          256
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD                      257
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES                          258
index d9c0e35..6439625 100644 (file)
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT),   "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD),     "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN),      "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT),    "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),     "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES),     "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"},