QUIC: Prohibit post-handshake auth

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20061)

diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
index 9d4abac30eba5385a05769e78b728e0edf621889..3af040385430ff5dd18423b51b1a5d41987b8f78 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
@@ -215,6 +215,8 @@ Only one certificate request may be outstanding at any time.
 When post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket
 message is sent to the client.
 
+Post-handshake authentication cannot be used with QUIC.
+
 =head1 BUGS
 
 In client mode, it is not checked whether the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag

diff --git a/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c b/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c
index 68f3c21cd50cab9c52bfc16dd09781591e1b04e1..3374045c37ef64103de8060a6d20779d7412d3f3 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c
+++ b/ssl/quic/quic_impl.c
@@ -331,7 +331,8 @@ SSL *ossl_quic_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     sc->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_QUIC;
 
     /* Restrict options derived from the SSL_CTX. */
-    sc->options &= OSSL_QUIC_PERMITTED_OPTIONS;
+    sc->options     &= OSSL_QUIC_PERMITTED_OPTIONS;
+    sc->pha_enabled  = 0;
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
     if ((qc->mutex = ossl_crypto_mutex_new()) == NULL)