size_t tls_mac_out_size;
};
-/* Defined in ssl/s3_cbc.c */
+/* Defined in ssl/record/methods/ssl3_cbc.c */
int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
unsigned char *md_out,
size_t *md_out_size,
bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c ssl_err_legacy.c tls_srp.c t1_trce.c ssl_utst.c \
statem/statem.c \
tls_depr.c $KTLSSRC
-# For shared builds we need to include the libcrypto packet.c and sources
-# needed in providers (s3_cbc.c) in libssl as well.
+
+# For shared builds we need to include the libcrypto packet.c and quic_vlint.c
+# in libssl as well.
SHARED_SOURCE[../libssl]=../crypto/packet.c ../crypto/quic_vlint.c
+
IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-3.0'} -}]
- SHARED_SOURCE[../libssl]=s3_cbc.c
SOURCE[../libssl]=ssl_rsa_legacy.c
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{quic} -}]
SOURCE[../libssl]=priority_queue.c event_queue.c
ENDIF
-
-SOURCE[../providers/libdefault.a ../providers/libfips.a]=s3_cbc.c
-LIBS=../libssl
-
SOURCE[../../../libssl]=\
- tlsrecord.c
+ tls_common.c ssl3_meth.c tls1_meth.c tls13_meth.c tlsany_meth.c
+
+# For shared builds we need to include the sources needed in providers
+# (ssl3_cbc.c) in libssl as well.
+IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-3.0'} -}]
+ SHARED_SOURCE[../../../libssl]=ssl3_cbc.c
+ENDIF
+
+SOURCE[../../../providers/libdefault.a ../../../providers/libfips.a]=ssl3_cbc.c
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+
+/* Protocol version specific function pointers */
+struct record_functions_st
+{
+ int (*set_crypto_state)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ size_t taglen,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+ int mactype,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ const SSL_COMP *comp,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+ int (*cipher)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
+ int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+ int (*mac)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
+ int sending, /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */SSL_CONNECTION *ssl);
+};
+
+struct ossl_record_layer_st
+{
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+ const char *propq;
+ int isdtls;
+ int version;
+ int role;
+ int direction;
+ BIO *bio;
+ /* Types match the equivalent structures in the SSL object */
+ uint64_t options;
+ /*
+ * TODO(RECLAYER): Should we take the opportunity to make this uint64_t
+ * even though upper layer continue to use uint32_t?
+ */
+ uint32_t mode;
+
+ /* read IO goes into here */
+ SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
+ /* each decoded record goes in here */
+ SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+
+ /* How many records have we got available in the rrec bufer */
+ size_t num_recs;
+
+ /* The record number in the rrec buffer that can be read next */
+ size_t curr_rec;
+
+ /* The number of records that have been released via tls_release_record */
+ size_t num_released;
+
+ /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */
+ unsigned int is_first_record;
+
+ /* where we are when reading */
+ int rstate;
+
+ /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
+ unsigned char *packet;
+ size_t packet_length;
+
+ int alert;
+
+ /*
+ * Read as many input bytes as possible (for
+ * non-blocking reads)
+ * TODO(RECLAYER): Why isn't this just an option?
+ */
+ int read_ahead;
+
+ /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */
+ size_t empty_record_count;
+
+ /* cryptographic state */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx;
+ /* TLSv1.3 static read IV */
+ unsigned char read_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ /* used for mac generation */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash;
+ /* uncompress */
+ COMP_CTX *expand;
+
+ /* Only used by SSLv3 */
+ unsigned char mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ /* TLSv1.3 static IV */
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+ size_t taglen;
+
+ /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
+ /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
+ struct record_functions_st *funcs;
+};
+
+extern struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs;
+extern struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs;
+extern struct record_functions_st tls_1_3_funcs;
+extern struct record_functions_st tls_any_funcs;
+
+void ossl_rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason,
+ const char *fmt, ...);
+
+# define RLAYERfatal(rl, al, r) RLAYERfatal_data((rl), (al), (r), NULL)
+# define RLAYERfatal_data \
+ (ERR_new(), \
+ ERR_set_debug(OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE, OPENSSL_FUNC), \
+ ossl_rlayer_fatal)
+
+int ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s);
+/* ssl3_cbc.c */
+__owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#endif
#include <openssl/sha.h>
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
- unsigned char *md_out,
- size_t *md_out_size,
- const unsigned char *header,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_size,
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
- const unsigned char *mac_secret,
- size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
-
# define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
+static int ssl3_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ size_t taglen,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+ int mactype,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ const SSL_COMP *comp,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
+
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+
+ rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (rl->expand == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
+ && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
+ /* RLAYERfatal already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (mackeylen > sizeof(rl->mac_secret)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rl->mac_secret, mackey, mackeylen);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls RLAYERfatal
+ * on internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller
+ * to report a bad_record_mac
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
+ * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
+ */
+static int ssl3_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs,
+ int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ size_t l, i;
+ size_t bs;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+ int provided;
+
+ rec = inrecs;
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
+ */
+ if (n_recs != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (sending) {
+ ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ } else {
+ ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+ if (rl->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+ provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
+
+ l = rec->length;
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);
+
+ /* COMPRESS */
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
+ /*
+ * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
+ * padding on the provider side.
+ */
+ i = bs - (l % bs);
+
+ /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
+ l += i;
+ /*
+ * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
+ * padding length.
+ */
+ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
+ rec->length += i;
+ rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (!sending) {
+ if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
+ /* Publicly invalid */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
+ }
+
+ if (provided) {
+ int outlen;
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
+ (unsigned int)l))
+ return 0;
+ rec->length = outlen;
+
+ if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
+ /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+
+ /* Get the MAC */
+ mac->alloced = 0;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
+ (void **)&mac->mac,
+ macsize);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
+ /* Shouldn't normally happen */
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!sending)
+ return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
+ rec->orig_len,
+ rec->data,
+ (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
+ (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
+ bs,
+ macsize,
+ rl->libctx);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+static int ssl3_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
+ int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
+{
+ unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
+ const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ unsigned char *p, rec_char;
+ size_t md_size;
+ size_t npad;
+ int t;
+
+ if (sending) {
+ mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+ hash = ssl->write_hash;
+ } else {
+ mac_sec = &(rl->mac_secret[0]);
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+ hash = rl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
+ if (t < 0)
+ return 0;
+ md_size = t;
+ npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
+
+ if (!sending
+ && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
+ && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ return 0;
+#else
+ /*
+ * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+ * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+ */
+
+ /*-
+ * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+ * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+ *
+ * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+ * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+ * total size.
+ */
+ unsigned char header[75];
+ size_t j = 0;
+ memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
+ j += md_size;
+ memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+ j += npad;
+ memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
+ j += 8;
+ header[j++] = rec->type;
+ header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+ header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
+
+ /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
+ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length, rec->orig_len,
+ mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ } else {
+ unsigned int md_size_u;
+ /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+ if (md_ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ rec_char = rec->type;
+ p = md;
+ s2n(rec->length, p);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ }
+
+ ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs = {
+ ssl3_set_crypto_state,
+ ssl3_cipher,
+ ssl3_mac
+};
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+static int tls13_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ size_t taglen,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+ int mactype,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ const SSL_COMP *comp,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
+ int mode;
+
+ if (ivlen > sizeof(rl->iv)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rl->iv, iv, ivlen);
+
+ ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ciph_ctx == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ rl->taglen = taglen;
+
+ mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
+
+ if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) <= 0
+ || (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
+ && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls13_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
+ int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ size_t ivlen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
+ unsigned char *staticiv;
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ int lenu, lenf;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
+ WPACKET wpkt;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+ int mode;
+
+ if (n_recs != 1) {
+ /* Should not happen */
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sending) {
+ ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ staticiv = s->write_iv;
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ } else {
+ ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+ staticiv = rl->iv;
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ }
+
+ cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(cipher);
+
+ /*
+ * If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
+ * plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
+ * plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
+ * far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
+ */
+ if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+ rec->input = rec->data;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ if (!sending) {
+ /*
+ * Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
+ * well as the tag
+ */
+ if (rec->length < rl->taglen + 1)
+ return 0;
+ rec->length -= rl->taglen;
+ }
+
+ /* Set up IV */
+ if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
+ /* Should not happen */
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
+ for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
+ iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
+
+ /* Increment the sequence counter */
+ for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
+ ++seq[loop - 1];
+ if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (loop == 0) {
+ /* Sequence has wrapped */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
+ || (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+ rl->taglen,
+ rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Set up the AAD */
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + rl->taglen)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
+ || hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
+ * any AAD.
+ */
+ if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
+ && EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
+ (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
+ || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
+ sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
+ || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
+ (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
+ || (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (sending) {
+ /* Add the tag */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, rl->taglen,
+ rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rec->length += rl->taglen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+struct record_functions_st tls_1_3_funcs = {
+ tls13_set_crypto_state,
+ tls13_cipher,
+ NULL
+};
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
+static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ size_t taglen,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+ int mactype,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ const SSL_COMP *comp,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+
+ if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+ else
+ s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
+
+ if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+
+ rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (rl->expand == NULL) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
+ */
+ if (!rl->isdtls)
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
+ * setting up the MAC key.
+ */
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
+ if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
+ rl->propq, mackey,
+ mackeylen);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
+ * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
+ * a MAC key.
+ */
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
+ (int)mackeylen);
+ }
+ if (mac_key == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->read_hash, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
+ rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
+ NULL) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL)
+ || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
+ (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL)
+ || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
+ NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+ (int)taglen, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
+ (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0
+ /*
+ * TODO(RECLAYER): Why do we defer setting the key until here?
+ * why not in the initial EVP_DecryptInit_ex() call?
+ */
+ || !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
+ && mackeylen != 0
+ && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ (int)mackeylen, mackey) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
+ && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
+ /* RLAYERfatal already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define MAX_PADDING 256
+/*-
+ * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
+ * error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to report
+ * a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
+ * decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
+ * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
+ */
+static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
+ int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+ unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
+ int i, pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
+ size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
+ unsigned char padval;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+ int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
+ : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ if (n_recs == 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sending) {
+ int ivlen;
+
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
+ int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->enc_write_ctx)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+ && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
+ else
+ ivlen = 0;
+ if (ivlen > 1) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
+ /*
+ * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+ * happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
+ ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->read_hash)) {
+ int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->read_hash);
+ if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
+ if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_read_ctx)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
+
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
+
+ if (n_recs > 1) {
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
+ * cipher doesn't support pipelining
+ */
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
+
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
+ unsigned char *seq;
+
+ seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+ : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+ memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
+ buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
+ buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
+ buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
+ buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
+ pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+ EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
+ if (pad <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sending) {
+ reclen[ctr] += pad;
+ recs[ctr].length += pad;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
+ /*
+ * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
+ * padding on the provider side.
+ */
+ padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
+
+ /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
+
+ if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
+ padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
+ for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
+ recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
+ reclen[ctr] += padnum;
+ recs[ctr].length += padnum;
+ }
+
+ if (!sending) {
+ if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
+ /* Publicly invalid */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (n_recs > 1) {
+ unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+
+ /* Set the output buffers */
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
+ (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Set the input buffers */
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
+ (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
+ || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
+ (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && tlstree_enc) {
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ int decrement_seq = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
+ * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
+ * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
+ */
+ if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
+ decrement_seq = 1;
+
+ seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+ : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (provided) {
+ int outlen;
+
+ /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
+ if (n_recs > 1) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
+ (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
+ return 0;
+ recs[0].length = outlen;
+
+ /*
+ * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
+ * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
+ * any explicit IV
+ */
+ if (!sending) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+ recs[0].data += bs;
+ recs[0].input += bs;
+ recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
+ }
+
+ /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
+ if (macs != NULL) {
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+
+ /* Get the MAC */
+ macs[0].alloced = 0;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
+ (void **)&macs[0].mac,
+ macsize);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
+ /* Shouldn't normally happen */
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Legacy cipher */
+
+ tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
+ (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
+ ? (tmpr < 0)
+ : (tmpr == 0)) {
+ /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!sending) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+ if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
+ return 0;
+ recs[ctr].data += bs;
+ recs[ctr].input += bs;
+ recs[ctr].length -= bs;
+ recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
+ * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
+ */
+ if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
+ recs[ctr].orig_len,
+ recs[ctr].data,
+ (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
+ (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
+ : NULL,
+ bs,
+ pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
+ (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
+ sctx->libctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
+ int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
+{
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ size_t md_size;
+ int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
+ unsigned char header[13];
+ int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
+ : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
+ int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
+ : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
+ int t;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (sending) {
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+ hash = ssl->write_hash;
+ } else {
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
+ hash = rl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
+ if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
+ return 0;
+ md_size = t;
+
+ /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
+ if (stream_mac) {
+ mac_ctx = hash;
+ } else {
+ hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ mac_ctx = hmac;
+ }
+
+ if (!rl->isdtls
+ && tlstree_mac
+ && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (rl->isdtls) {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+
+ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
+ } else
+ memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+ header[8] = rec->type;
+ header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
+ header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+ header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
+
+ if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl)
+ && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
+ && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
+ OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
+ &rec->orig_len);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
+ tls_hmac_params)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
+ } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
+ } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
+ ret = 1;
+ end:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */
+struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = {
+ tls1_set_crypto_state,
+ tls1_cipher,
+ tls1_mac
+};
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/e_os.h"
#include "internal/packet.h"
#include "../../ssl_local.h"
#include "../record_local.h"
-
-/* Protocol version specific function pointers */
-struct record_functions_st
-{
- int (*set_crypto_state)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
- unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- size_t taglen,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
- int mactype,
- const EVP_MD *md,
- const SSL_COMP *comp,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
- SSL_CONNECTION *s);
- int (*cipher)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
- int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s);
- int (*mac)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
- int sending, /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */SSL_CONNECTION *ssl);
-};
-
-struct ossl_record_layer_st
-{
- OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
- const char *propq;
- int isdtls;
- int version;
- int role;
- int direction;
- BIO *bio;
- /* Types match the equivalent structures in the SSL object */
- uint64_t options;
- /*
- * TODO(RECLAYER): Should we take the opportunity to make this uint64_t
- * even though upper layer continue to use uint32_t?
- */
- uint32_t mode;
-
- /* read IO goes into here */
- SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
- /* each decoded record goes in here */
- SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
-
- /* How many records have we got available in the rrec bufer */
- size_t num_recs;
-
- /* The record number in the rrec buffer that can be read next */
- size_t curr_rec;
-
- /* The number of records that have been released via tls_release_record */
- size_t num_released;
-
- /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */
- unsigned int is_first_record;
-
- /* where we are when reading */
- int rstate;
-
- /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
- unsigned char *packet;
- size_t packet_length;
-
- int alert;
-
- /*
- * Read as many input bytes as possible (for
- * non-blocking reads)
- * TODO(RECLAYER): Why isn't this just an option?
- */
- int read_ahead;
-
- /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */
- size_t empty_record_count;
-
- /* cryptographic state */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx;
- /* TLSv1.3 static read IV */
- unsigned char read_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- /* used for mac generation */
- EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash;
- /* uncompress */
- COMP_CTX *expand;
-
- /* Only used by SSLv3 */
- unsigned char mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
- /* TLSv1.3 static IV */
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-
- size_t taglen;
-
- /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
- /* Function pointers for version specific functions */
- struct record_functions_st *funcs;
-};
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
# define SSL_AD_NO_ALERT -1
-static void rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason,
- const char *fmt, ...)
+void ossl_rlayer_fatal(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int al, int reason,
+ const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
rl->alert = al;
}
-
-# define RLAYERfatal(rl, al, r) RLAYERfatal_data((rl), (al), (r), NULL)
-# define RLAYERfatal_data \
- (ERR_new(), \
- ERR_set_debug(OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE, OPENSSL_FUNC), \
- rlayer_fatal)
-
-static int tls_provider_set_tls_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- const EVP_MD *md,
- SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+int ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
/*
* Provided cipher, the TLS padding/MAC removal is performed provider
return 1;
}
-static int tls_any_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
- unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- size_t taglen,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
- int mactype,
- const EVP_MD *md,
- const SSL_COMP *comp,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
- SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* No crypto protection at the "NONE" level so nothing to be done */
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
-static int ssl3_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
- unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- size_t taglen,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
- int mactype,
- const EVP_MD *md,
- const SSL_COMP *comp,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
- SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
-
- if (md == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
-
- rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (comp != NULL) {
- rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (rl->expand == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
- && !tls_provider_set_tls_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
- /* RLAYERfatal already called */
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (mackeylen > sizeof(rl->mac_secret)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(rl->mac_secret, mackey, mackeylen);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
-static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
- unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- size_t taglen,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
- int mactype,
- const EVP_MD *md,
- const SSL_COMP *comp,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
- SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-
- if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
- return 0;
-
- if (s->ext.use_etm)
- s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
- else
- s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ;
-
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
- if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE;
-
- if ((rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
-
- rl->read_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (rl->read_hash == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (comp != NULL) {
- rl->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (rl->expand == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS
- */
- if (!rl->isdtls)
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-
- /*
- * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
- * setting up the MAC key.
- */
- if (!(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
- if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
- rl->propq, mackey,
- mackeylen);
- } else {
- /*
- * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
- * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
- * a MAC key.
- */
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
- (int)mackeylen);
- }
- if (mac_key == NULL
- || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->read_hash, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
- rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
- NULL) <= 0) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- }
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL)
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
- (int)ivlen, iv)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL)
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
- NULL)
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
- (int)taglen, NULL)
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
- (int)ivlen, iv)
- /*
- * TODO(RECLAYER): Why do we defer setting the key until here?
- * why not in the initial EVP_DecryptInit_ex() call?
- */
- || !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
- && mackeylen != 0
- && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- (int)mackeylen, mackey)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
- && !tls_provider_set_tls_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md, s)) {
- /* RLAYERfatal already called */
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls13_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
- unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- size_t taglen,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
- int mactype,
- const EVP_MD *md,
- const SSL_COMP *comp,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
- SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
- int mode;
-
- if (ivlen > sizeof(rl->iv)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(rl->iv, iv, ivlen);
-
- ciph_ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (ciph_ctx == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- rl->taglen = taglen;
-
- mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
-
- if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
- || (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
- && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL))
- || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls_any_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
- int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- size_t ctr;
-
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
- recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls SSLfatal on
- * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
- * report a bad_record_mac
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
- * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
- */
-static int ssl3_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs,
- int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- size_t l, i;
- size_t bs;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
- int provided;
-
- rec = inrecs;
- /*
- * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
- */
- if (n_recs != 1)
- return 0;
- if (sending) {
- ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- } else {
- ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
- if (rl->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
- }
-
- provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
-
- l = rec->length;
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);
-
- /* COMPRESS */
-
- if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
- /*
- * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
- * padding on the provider side.
- */
- i = bs - (l % bs);
-
- /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
- l += i;
- /*
- * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
- * padding length.
- */
- memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
- rec->length += i;
- rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
- }
-
- if (!sending) {
- if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
- /* Publicly invalid */
- return 0;
- }
- /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
- }
-
- if (provided) {
- int outlen;
-
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
- (unsigned int)l))
- return 0;
- rec->length = outlen;
-
- if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
- /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
- OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
-
- /* Get the MAC */
- mac->alloced = 0;
-
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
- (void **)&mac->mac,
- macsize);
- *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
- /* Shouldn't normally happen */
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- } else {
- if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!sending)
- return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
- rec->orig_len,
- rec->data,
- (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
- (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
- bs,
- macsize,
- rl->libctx);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define MAX_PADDING 256
-/*-
- * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
- * error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to report
- * a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
- * decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
- * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
+/*
+ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
*/
-static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
- int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
- unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
- int i, pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
- size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
- unsigned char padval;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
- int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
- : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
-
- if (n_recs == 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (sending) {
- int ivlen;
-
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
- if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (!ossl_assert(s->enc_write_ctx)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
- if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
- && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
- else
- ivlen = 0;
- if (ivlen > 1) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
- /*
- * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
- * happen?? (steve)
- */
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
- ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- } else {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->read_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->read_hash);
- if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- ds = rl->enc_read_ctx;
- if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_read_ctx)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_read_ctx);
- }
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
-
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
-
- if (n_recs > 1) {
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
- /*
- * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
- * cipher doesn't support pipelining
- */
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
-
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
- unsigned char *seq;
-
- seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
- : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
-
- if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
- unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
- memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
- } else {
- memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
-
- buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
- buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
- buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
- buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
- buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
- pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
- EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
- if (pad <= 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (sending) {
- reclen[ctr] += pad;
- recs[ctr].length += pad;
- }
-
- } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
- /*
- * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
- * padding on the provider side.
- */
- padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
-
- /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
-
- if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
- padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
- for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
- recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
- reclen[ctr] += padnum;
- recs[ctr].length += padnum;
- }
-
- if (!sending) {
- if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
- /* Publicly invalid */
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- if (n_recs > 1) {
- unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
-
- /* Set the output buffers */
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
- (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Set the input buffers */
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
- (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
- || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
- (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && tlstree_enc) {
- unsigned char *seq;
- int decrement_seq = 0;
-
- /*
- * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
- * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
- * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
- */
- if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
- decrement_seq = 1;
-
- seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
- : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (provided) {
- int outlen;
-
- /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
- if (n_recs > 1) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
- (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
- return 0;
- recs[0].length = outlen;
-
- /*
- * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
- * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
- * any explicit IV
- */
- if (!sending) {
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
- recs[0].data += bs;
- recs[0].input += bs;
- recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
- }
-
- /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
- if (macs != NULL) {
- OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
-
- /* Get the MAC */
- macs[0].alloced = 0;
-
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
- (void **)&macs[0].mac,
- macsize);
- *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
- /* Shouldn't normally happen */
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- } else {
- /* Legacy cipher */
-
- tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
- (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
- ? (tmpr < 0)
- : (tmpr == 0)) {
- /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!sending) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
- if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
- return 0;
- recs[ctr].data += bs;
- recs[ctr].input += bs;
- recs[ctr].length -= bs;
- recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
- }
-
- /*
- * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
- * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
- */
- if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
- recs[ctr].orig_len,
- recs[ctr].data,
- (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
- (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
- : NULL,
- bs,
- pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
- (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
- sctx->libctx))
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls13_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
- int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
- /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
- size_t ivlen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
- unsigned char *staticiv;
- unsigned char *seq;
- int lenu, lenf;
- SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
- WPACKET wpkt;
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- int mode;
-
- if (n_recs != 1) {
- /* Should not happen */
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (sending) {
- ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- staticiv = s->write_iv;
- seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- } else {
- ctx = rl->enc_read_ctx;
- staticiv = rl->iv;
- seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- }
-
- cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
- if (cipher == NULL) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(cipher);
-
- /*
- * If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
- * plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
- * plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
- * far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
- */
- if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
- rec->input = rec->data;
+ switch (EVP_MD_CTX_get_type(ctx)) {
+ case NID_md5:
+ case NID_sha1:
+ case NID_sha224:
+ case NID_sha256:
+ case NID_sha384:
+ case NID_sha512:
return 1;
- }
-
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
-
- if (!sending) {
- /*
- * Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
- * well as the tag
- */
- if (rec->length < rl->taglen + 1)
- return 0;
- rec->length -= rl->taglen;
- }
-
- /* Set up IV */
- if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
- /* Should not happen */
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
- memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
- for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
- iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
-
- /* Increment the sequence counter */
- for (loop = SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop > 0; loop--) {
- ++seq[loop - 1];
- if (seq[loop - 1] != 0)
- break;
- }
- if (loop == 0) {
- /* Sequence has wrapped */
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
- || (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
- rl->taglen,
- rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Set up the AAD */
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + rl->taglen)
- || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
- || hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
- || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
- * any AAD.
- */
- if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
- && EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
- (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
- || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
- sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
- || EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
- (unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
- || EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
- || (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (sending) {
- /* Add the tag */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, rl->taglen,
- rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
- RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- rec->length += rl->taglen;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
-};
-
-static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
-};
-
-static int ssl3_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
- int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
-{
- unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
- const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- unsigned char *p, rec_char;
- size_t md_size;
- size_t npad;
- int t;
-
- if (sending) {
- mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
- seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
- hash = ssl->write_hash;
- } else {
- mac_sec = &(rl->mac_secret[0]);
- seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
- hash = rl->read_hash;
- }
-
- t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
- if (t < 0)
- return 0;
- md_size = t;
- npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
-
- if (!sending
- && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
- && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
- return 0;
-#else
- /*
- * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
- * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
- * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
- */
-
- /*-
- * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
- * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
- *
- * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
- * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
- * total size.
- */
- unsigned char header[75];
- size_t j = 0;
- memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
- j += md_size;
- memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
- j += npad;
- memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
- j += 8;
- header[j++] = rec->type;
- header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
- header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
-
- /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
- if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
- md, &md_size,
- header, rec->input,
- rec->length, rec->orig_len,
- mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
- return 0;
-#endif
- } else {
- unsigned int md_size_u;
- /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
- EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-
- if (md_ctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- rec_char = rec->type;
- p = md;
- s2n(rec->length, p);
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- }
-
- ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
- int sending, SSL_CONNECTION *ssl)
-{
- unsigned char *seq;
- EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- size_t md_size;
- int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
- unsigned char header[13];
- int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
- : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
- int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
- : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
- int t;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (sending) {
- seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
- hash = ssl->write_hash;
- } else {
- seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
- hash = rl->read_hash;
- }
-
- t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
- if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
+ default:
return 0;
- md_size = t;
-
- /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
- if (stream_mac) {
- mac_ctx = hash;
- } else {
- hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
- goto end;
- }
- mac_ctx = hmac;
}
-
- if (!rl->isdtls
- && tlstree_mac
- && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (rl->isdtls) {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-
- memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
- } else
- memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
- header[8] = rec->type;
- header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
- header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
- header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
- header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
-
- if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl)
- && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
- && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
- OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
-
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
- &rec->orig_len);
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
- if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
- tls_hmac_params)) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
- BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
- BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
- BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
- BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
- } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
-
- if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
- OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
- BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
- BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
- } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
- ret = 1;
- end:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
- return ret;
}
-struct record_functions_st tls_any_funcs = {
- tls_any_set_crypto_state,
- tls_any_cipher,
- NULL
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_3_funcs = {
- tls13_set_crypto_state,
- tls13_cipher,
- NULL
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_2_funcs = {
- tls1_set_crypto_state,
- tls1_cipher,
- tls1_mac
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_1_funcs = {
- tls1_set_crypto_state,
- tls1_cipher,
- tls1_mac
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st tls_1_0_funcs = {
- tls1_set_crypto_state,
- tls1_cipher,
- tls1_mac
-};
-
-struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs = {
- ssl3_set_crypto_state,
- ssl3_cipher,
- ssl3_mac
-};
-
static int tls_set1_bio(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, BIO *bio);
static int rlayer_allow_compression(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl)
rl->funcs = &tls_1_3_funcs;
break;
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
- rl->funcs = &tls_1_2_funcs;
- break;
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
- rl->funcs = &tls_1_1_funcs;
- break;
case TLS1_VERSION:
- rl->funcs = &tls_1_0_funcs;
+ rl->funcs = &tls_1_funcs;
break;
case SSL3_VERSION:
rl->funcs = &ssl_3_0_funcs;
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "../../ssl_local.h"
+#include "../record_local.h"
+#include "recmethod_local.h"
+
+static int tls_any_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ size_t taglen,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+ int mactype,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ const SSL_COMP *comp,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* No crypto protection at the "NONE" level so nothing to be done */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_any_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs,
+ size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs,
+ size_t macsize,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+struct record_functions_st tls_any_funcs = {
+ tls_any_set_crypto_state,
+ tls_any_cipher,
+ NULL
+};
}
/*
- * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
- * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
+ * TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me: now declared in
+ * ssl/record/methods/recmethod_local.h
*/
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
- switch (EVP_MD_CTX_get_type(ctx)) {
- case NID_md5:
- case NID_sha1:
- case NID_sha224:
- case NID_sha256:
- case NID_sha384:
- case NID_sha512:
- return 1;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
int n_ssl3_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
int sending)
size_t mac_secret_size);
# endif
-/* s3_cbc.c */
-__owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-__owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
- unsigned char *md_out,
- size_t *md_out_size,
- const unsigned char *header,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_size,
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
- const unsigned char *mac_secret,
- size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
-
__owur int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
__owur int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
__owur int srp_verify_server_param(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff