+ /*
+ * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
+ * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
+ * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
+ * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
+ * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
+ * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
+ * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
+ * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
+ * X509_policy_check() call.
+ */
+ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }