Fix bug in aes-586.pl.

diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
index 4401cee9e353d5c92c515788de80a5176cf20843..7b75685025410170315bf13fadcbf4444f6d08eb 100755 (executable)
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
 # to process in one stroke.
 #
 # Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
-# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collect
+# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
 # timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
 # malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES,
 # instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data.
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
 # CBC, do masks the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
 # is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
 # would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
-# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount possible key
+# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
 # combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised
 # AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk
 # of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of
@@ -2595,7 +2595,6 @@ my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp");      # copy of aes_key->rounds
                &mov    ($acc,$_inp);           # load inp
                &lea    ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));   # advance inp
                &mov    ($_inp,$acc);           # save inp
-               &mov    ($_len,$s2);            # save len
        &jnz    (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
        &mov    ("esp",$_esp);
        &popf   ();