A general spring-cleaning (in autumn) to fix up signed/unsigned warnings.

I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.

diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index 780868a9f0a896fe6c82977d1a9d24d676b58105..15211b84436e265e0308e53e465235d499c04246 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -3005,7 +3005,8 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold, ASN1_G
        char *tmp = NULL;
        char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p;
        int reason_code = -1;
-       int i, ret = 0;
+       int ret = 0;
+       unsigned int i;
        ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
        tmp = BUF_strdup(str);

diff --git a/apps/enc.c b/apps/enc.c
index 0a9f7310bf51db47160428126592c551af60e625..ae18452e86338e6bb5a8928e47a91670c08493f9 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/enc.c
+++ b/apps/enc.c
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ bad:
                        if (!nosalt)
                                {
                                printf("salt=");
-                               for (i=0; i<sizeof salt; i++)
+                               for (i=0; i<(int)sizeof(salt); i++)
                                        printf("%02X",salt[i]);
                                printf("\n");
                                }

diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c
index 3ad91d89d6a51f3647d3212e294fdc2b809e35b4..b9d9d7a36ad7d20a9b444e1e65d7ce56ad34d146 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/passwd.c
+++ b/apps/passwd.c
@@ -312,7 +312,8 @@ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
        static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2]; /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */
        unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
        char *salt_out;
-       int n, i;
+       int n;
+       unsigned int i;
        EVP_MD_CTX md,md2;
        size_t passwd_len, salt_len;
 

diff --git a/apps/rand.c b/apps/rand.c
index 63724bc730250236200d08d06b95ab124863acac..a893896033a8c4422a9c6138ae31deb17602e4e1 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/rand.c
+++ b/apps/rand.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
                int chunk;
 
                chunk = num;
-               if (chunk > sizeof buf)
+               if (chunk > (int)sizeof(buf))
                        chunk = sizeof buf;
                r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk);
                if (r <= 0)

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
index 68a525fb128f164159576bd5dd51ab54db4aad51..d9db53f01d39de2a495d1bcca3b77f7cf4c815b7 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
@@ -67,12 +67,13 @@
 
 int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
        {
-       int i,j,k;
+       int j,k;
+       unsigned int i;
        unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
        long d;
 
        a->type=V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
-       if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
+       if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
                {
                if (a->data != NULL)
                        OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
        else if (i != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
                return -1;
        
-       if (a->length > sizeof(long))
+       if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
                {
                /* hmm... a bit ugly */
                return(0xffffffffL);

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index 78402cd9855a16662fe3008772b60ccb7d48a0ae..4bb300c20b91c4a8e84232218719075652cf2fac 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -313,12 +313,13 @@ err:
 
 int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v)
        {
-       int i,j,k;
+       int j,k;
+       unsigned int i;
        unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
        long d;
 
        a->type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
-       if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
+       if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
                {
                if (a->data != NULL)
                        OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(ASN1_INTEGER *a)
        else if (i != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
                return -1;
        
-       if (a->length > sizeof(long))
+       if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
                {
                /* hmm... a bit ugly */
                return(0xffffffffL);

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index 0a8e6c287cc383a1b67afe71598d924198dec6ad..124451d7a623c8de0c98e37d92b11f08efa39384 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *a)
        if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
                return(BIO_write(bp,"NULL",4));
        i=i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf,sizeof buf,a);
-       if (i > sizeof buf) i=sizeof buf;
+       if (i > (int)sizeof(buf)) i=sizeof buf;
        BIO_write(bp,buf,i);
        return(i);
        }

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
index c035cc0f5ddc0175e5e75638fbd268c2739ebd55..277726cd504946b7ac0416738a86ef95e021179c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class, int exp_cons
 
 static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len)
        {
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
        static struct tag_name_st *tntmp, tnst [] = {
                ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOL", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
                ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOLEAN", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index e100e93bed7a39c8c9cf6fb2e3bafad2b1eb0fb9..1905b090ed5b464d539272cd66b39a9ad7e253b3 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int asn1_get_length(unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, int max)
        {
        unsigned char *p= *pp;
        unsigned long ret=0;
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
 
        if (max-- < 1) return(0);
        if (*p == 0x80)

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_long.c b/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
index c04b192794f115cfe27385c64f8a5ae26e2f7aa9..954d1839751cc96b364953ecd0c83c050eee2bb8 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype,
        int neg, i;
        long ltmp;
        unsigned long utmp = 0;
-       if(len > sizeof(long)) {
+       if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
                ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
                return 0;
        }

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index bbcc62d831a47108e5a9f0ebd565d4177067f1cb..8207bce23061fe395a0800ffe9d536e905b39424 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -91,28 +91,28 @@ void BN_set_params(int mult, int high, int low, int mont)
        {
        if (mult >= 0)
                {
-               if (mult > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+               if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
                        mult=sizeof(int)*8-1;
                bn_limit_bits=mult;
                bn_limit_num=1<<mult;
                }
        if (high >= 0)
                {
-               if (high > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+               if (high > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
                        high=sizeof(int)*8-1;
                bn_limit_bits_high=high;
                bn_limit_num_high=1<<high;
                }
        if (low >= 0)
                {
-               if (low > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+               if (low > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
                        low=sizeof(int)*8-1;
                bn_limit_bits_low=low;
                bn_limit_num_low=1<<low;
                }
        if (mont >= 0)
                {
-               if (mont > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+               if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
                        mont=sizeof(int)*8-1;
                bn_limit_bits_mont=mont;
                bn_limit_num_mont=1<<mont;
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
        BN_ULONG ret=0;
 
        n=BN_num_bytes(a);
-       if (n > sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+       if (n > (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG))
                return(BN_MASK2);
        for (i=a->top-1; i>=0; i--)
                {
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_get_word(const BIGNUM *a)
 int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
        {
        int i,n;
-       if (bn_expand(a,sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
+       if (bn_expand(a,(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
 
        n=sizeof(BN_ULONG)/BN_BYTES;
        a->neg=0;

diff --git a/crypto/des/destest.c b/crypto/des/destest.c
index 3983ac8e5f1a1fb0c727ecbe7fd7ee44dee75ab2..788f552c88c573ab5e916344388906ae67a23228 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/destest.c
+++ b/crypto/des/destest.c
@@ -333,7 +333,8 @@ static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
 static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        {
-       int i,j,err=0;
+       int j,err=0;
+       unsigned int i;
        des_cblock in,out,outin,iv3,iv2;
        des_key_schedule ks,ks2,ks3;
        unsigned char cbc_in[40];
@@ -391,7 +392,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,&ks,&ks2,&ks3,&iv3,&iv2,DES_DECRYPT);
        if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
                {
-               int n;
+               unsigned int n;
 
                printf("des_ede3_cbcm_encrypt decrypt error\n");
                for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@@ -540,7 +541,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
                (unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
                {
-               int n;
+               unsigned int n;
 
                printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
                for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,ks,ks2,ks3,&iv3,DES_DECRYPT);
        if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
                {
-               int n;
+               unsigned int n;
 
                printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
                for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)

diff --git a/crypto/des/set_key.c b/crypto/des/set_key.c
index 143008ed9c50098d753e89f09a48b6d504348b7e..55efe03f4233c34e74faf4ee304fa008cd985c83 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/set_key.c
+++ b/crypto/des/set_key.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static const unsigned char odd_parity[256]={
 
 void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
        {
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
 
        for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
                (*key)[i]=odd_parity[(*key)[i]];
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
 
 int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key)
        {
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
 
        for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
                {

diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index 33349c2f9892a3df6229c5b3e01bf0f8954a19f1..fa5cbc7eb1ffc68fa212a102856e092c55b6512e 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
                {
                i=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
                if (i > outl) i=outl;
-               OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < sizeof ctx->buf);
+               OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
                memcpy(out,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),i);
                ret=i;
                out+=i;

diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
index 3932f60e59c7ad4211443b973b5a6fef66ced64a..d37726ffae4b26e45abdb2de24ab88014d7fb5c6 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
@@ -168,16 +168,17 @@ static int rc2_magic_to_meth(int i)
 static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
        {
        long num=0;
-       int i=0,l;
+       int i=0;
        int key_bits;
+       unsigned int l;
        unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
 
        if (type != NULL)
                {
                l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
-               OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof iv);
+               OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(iv));
                i=ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(type,&num,iv,l);
-               if (i != l)
+               if (i != (int)l)
                        return(-1);
                key_bits =rc2_magic_to_meth((int)num);
                if (!key_bits)

diff --git a/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/evp/encode.c
index 08209357ce0a3230b5aad4b38ee11be22c1e4ffb..32744ca686e1905382100b20869c06cc456201c7 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/encode.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
 
        *outl=0;
        if (inl == 0) return;
-       OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= sizeof ctx->enc_data);
+       OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
        if ((ctx->num+inl) < ctx->length)
                {
                memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]),in,inl);
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
                /* only save the good data :-) */
                if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v))
                        {
-                       OPENSSL_assert(n < sizeof ctx->enc_data);
+                       OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
                        d[n++]=tmp;
                        ln++;
                        }

diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index be0758a87965feeb7b0c0494c3002213cd5571e9..db621bfc8be780438e24d2f55e62ed66bd454369 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ skip_to_init:
 
                        case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
 
-                       OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= sizeof ctx->iv);
+                       OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <=
+                                       (int)sizeof(ctx->iv));
                        if(iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
                        memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
                        break;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
                }
        i=ctx->buf_len;
        bl=ctx->cipher->block_size;
-       OPENSSL_assert(bl <= sizeof ctx->buf);
+       OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
        if (i != 0)
                {
                if (i+inl < bl)
@@ -320,7 +321,8 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 
 int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
        {
-       int i,n,b,bl,ret;
+       int n,ret;
+       unsigned int i, b, bl;
 
        b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
        OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf);
@@ -356,7 +358,8 @@ int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
             const unsigned char *in, int inl)
        {
-       int b, fix_len;
+       int fix_len;
+       unsigned int b;
 
        if (inl == 0)
                {
@@ -409,8 +412,8 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
 
 int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
        {
-       int i,b;
-       int n;
+       int i,n;
+       unsigned int b;
 
        *outl=0;
        b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
@@ -433,7 +436,7 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
                        }
                OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
                n=ctx->final[b-1];
-               if (n > b)
+               if (n > (int)b)
                        {
                        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
                        return(0);

diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
index 52a3b287bee51aa017b7aaa9853fa7d2ed3c30c8..c97cb9cea64a25d731335df630fd390b89f597c9 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -85,14 +85,15 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
 
 int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
        {
-       int i=0,l;
+       int i=0;
+       unsigned int l;
 
        if (type != NULL) 
                {
                l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
-               OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof c->iv);
+               OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
                i=ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type,c->oiv,l);
-               if (i != l)
+               if (i != (int)l)
                        return(-1);
                else if (i > 0)
                        memcpy(c->iv,c->oiv,l);
@@ -102,12 +103,13 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
 
 int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
        {
-       int i=0,j;
+       int i=0;
+       unsigned int j;
 
        if (type != NULL)
                {
                j=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
-               OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof c->iv);
+               OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv));
                i=ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type,c->oiv,j);
                }
        return(i);

diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
index a1874e83b252ebd719d5f991bb70985b8966ee0e..39306f4564597812463f4f7edfa5e0c57d3c3ae2 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
                EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
        }
        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-       OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= sizeof md_tmp);
+       OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= (int)sizeof(md_tmp));
        memcpy(key, md_tmp, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher));
        OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) <= 16);
        memcpy(iv, md_tmp + (16 - EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)),

diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
index b161d7664afc0fbf7345a772afe0e2d7dec23819..dca05148672d5b96897d3e6f01be3078c80f4013 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
                          int en_de)
 {
        unsigned char *pbuf, *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-       int saltlen, keylen, iter, plen;
+       int saltlen, iter, plen;
+       unsigned int keylen;
        PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
        const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
        PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 
        /* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
 
-       if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != keylen)){
+       if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)){
                EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
                                                EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
                goto err;

diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
index 4c91f919d56d9ac619c6dd2b7572bcb93bc63f65..f7392a0dae96d74a1c0f5e71945fd136d9fcc3bd 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
                {
                reset=1;
                j=EVP_MD_block_size(md);
-               OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof ctx->key);
+               OPENSSL_assert(j <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
                if (j < len)
                        {
                        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx,md, impl);
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ void HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
                        }
                else
                        {
-                       OPENSSL_assert(len <= sizeof ctx->key);
+                       OPENSSL_assert(len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
                        memcpy(ctx->key,key,len);
                        ctx->key_length=len;
                        }

diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index 900af737edca08fda3b2daf980dd00d14793cc5c..d536b523d8264e1065d68f528462ed18010e80f3 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(int (*i2d)(), const char *name, BIO *bp, char *x,
                        kstr=(unsigned char *)buf;
                        }
                RAND_add(data,i,0);/* put in the RSA key. */
-               OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= sizeof iv);
+               OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv));
                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv,enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */
                        goto err;
                /* The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt.  It is

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index eeffc0df4cb3e9aaab348e776d249a32c15574eb..66b229c9b9cc5f73c461985577ce912d2edf39a7 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
         * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
         * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as
         * much entropy as fits into md. */
-       for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
+       for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
                {
                md[k] ^= local_md[k];
                }

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 3714b248c456a542fbcde49a68fabf4dd4e1b2b3..024e11b8e750e879ce8433f6093f8d77519bfe0a 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, unsigned long e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, unsigned long e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
        {
        BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
-       int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
+       int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
+       unsigned int i;
        BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
 
        ctx=BN_CTX_new();

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
index 881252608d1ff69ed97da031c2ed8bb250a386f9..9c84a59d523c639dbf59f7353eabc614d4928d60 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
 X509_TRUST * X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
 {
        if(idx < 0) return NULL;
-       if(idx < X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
+       if(idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
        return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
 }
 
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
 
 void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
 {
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
        for(i = 0; i < X509_TRUST_COUNT; i++) trtable_free(trstandard + i);
        sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
        trtable = NULL;

diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index 4d145f71fd036f420d719b9d6e4a23d42a3f4507..b1a6d2632ac96a158cf903466868cd3da8739187 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
 X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
 {
        if(idx < 0) return NULL;
-       if(idx < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
+       if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
        return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
 }
 
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
 
 void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
 {
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
        sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
        for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
        xptable = NULL;

diff --git a/engines/e_4758_cca.c b/engines/e_4758_cca.c
index ee52a3f66f0fbfffb2e065d352e2882bf01db2c5..b006ed876373b933f0eb0c0ad056cf24773cc9f7 100644 (file)
--- a/engines/e_4758_cca.c
+++ b/engines/e_4758_cca.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ibm_4758_load_privkey(ENGINE* e, const char* key_id,
        unsigned char exitData[8];
        unsigned char ruleArray[8];
        unsigned char keyLabel[64];
-       long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
+       unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
        unsigned char modulus[256];
        long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
        long modulusLength = 0;
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ibm_4758_load_pubkey(ENGINE* e, const char* key_id,
        unsigned char exitData[8];
        unsigned char ruleArray[8];
        unsigned char keyLabel[64];
-       long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
+       unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
        unsigned char modulus[512];
        long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
        long modulusLength = 0;
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static int cca_get_random_bytes(unsigned char* buf, int num)
        unsigned char form[] = "RANDOM  ";
        unsigned char rand_buf[8];
 
-       while(num >= sizeof(rand_buf))
+       while(num >= (int)sizeof(rand_buf))
                {
                randomNumberGenerate(&ret_code, &reason_code, &exit_data_length,
                        exit_data, form, rand_buf);

diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index 1d24dedc918b261552f0b9376079dbd124fa2c43..62e83afb3534c20f55e368307db444cdbcc45441 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
                sess->master_key_length=i;
                if (i > 0)
                        {
-                       if (i > sizeof sess->master_key)
+                       if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
                                {
                                ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
                else
                        enc=i;
 
-               if (i < enc)
+               if ((int)i < enc)
                        {
                        ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
                d+=enc;
                karg=sess->key_arg_length;      
                s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
-               if (karg > sizeof sess->key_arg)
+               if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
                        {
                        ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

diff --git a/ssl/s2_enc.c b/ssl/s2_enc.c
index d3b144f1c52cbd6a11b24684ce5f0b93ff5afd3f..12e17bf66880939e639b335e19d0514603963ae4 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s2_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_enc.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client)
        if (ssl2_generate_key_material(s) <= 0)
                return 0;
 
-       OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= sizeof s->session->key_arg);
+       OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(s->session->key_arg));
        EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ws,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]),
                s->session->key_arg);
        EVP_DecryptInit_ex(rs,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]),

diff --git a/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ssl/s2_lib.c
index 910b9fe097d457fb9fdd7b793bf76f76bd4c3aff..a0edfb89602eebb6ffa3843fac51253da4acd79a 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
        static SSL_CIPHER *sorted[SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS];
        SSL_CIPHER c,*cp= &c,**cpp;
        unsigned long id;
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
 
        if (init)
                {
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
        km=s->s2->key_material;
 
-       if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 || s->session->master_key_length > sizeof s->session->master_key)
+       if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 ||
+                       s->session->master_key_length > (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key))
                {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                return 0;
@@ -445,7 +446,8 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
 
        for (i=0; i<s->s2->key_material_length; i += EVP_MD_size(md5))
                {
-               if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + EVP_MD_size(md5)) > sizeof s->s2->key_material)
+               if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + EVP_MD_size(md5)) >
+                               (int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material))
                        {
                        /* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer */
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -456,7 +458,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
 
                OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
                    && s->session->master_key_length
-                   < sizeof s->session->master_key);
+                   < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
                EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
                EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
                c++;
@@ -495,7 +497,7 @@ void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s)
 
        error=s->error; /* number of bytes left to write */
        s->error=0;
-       OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= sizeof buf);
+       OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= (int)sizeof(buf));
        i=ssl2_write(s,&(buf[3-error]),error);
 
 /*     if (i == error) s->rwstate=state; */

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index b27a1deaa77bb9e44b65ea02b8b81184326ecb98..6b29f0470108dfef5b979d6f57aa1c9e63cb0974 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
                *(p++)=i;
                if (i != 0)
                        {
-                       if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+                       if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
                                {
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                                goto err;

diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 559924d3681b1fc8f3ba6fa968fa33ccfbdebd05..56e274fe2ab84a052ad550156cc6f4e9b1ac518d 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
        EVP_MD_CTX s1;
        unsigned char buf[16],smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
        unsigned char c='A';
-       int i,j,k;
+       unsigned int i,j,k;
 
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
        c = os_toascii[c]; /*'A' in ASCII */
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
        k=0;
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
-       for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+       for (i=0; (int)i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
                {
                k++;
                if (k > sizeof buf)
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
                EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,s->session->master_key,
                        s->session->master_key_length);
                EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-               if ((i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
+               if ((int)(i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
                        {
                        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,smd,NULL);
                        memcpy(km,smd,(num-i));

diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 2145385ccdc04af4a5ab8a40125666380121fe8a..6c208ccfc1c3687703cfe1ed294d773f62811bca 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -1914,7 +1914,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
        static SSL_CIPHER *sorted[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS];
        SSL_CIPHER c,*cp= &c,**cpp;
        unsigned long id;
-       int i;
+       unsigned int i;
 
        if (init)
                {

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index bd0624be38b4cca4dd96b0548fdfd956718da9e4..abb03ca585fa2f1312c32d851af9199648a2af3c 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
                        s->session->session_id_length=0;
 
                sl=s->session->session_id_length;
-               if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+               if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return -1;

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index 16bc11b559b151e5640937ac9b8da26b8bb0fd9b..f5d3c135bbb5ffc2453e222f819b1a1d377f3743 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -295,11 +295,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, unsigned char **pp,
 
        if (os.length > i)
                os.length = i;
-       if (os.length > sizeof ret->session_id) /* can't happen */
-               os.length = sizeof ret->session_id;
+       if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
+               os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
 
        ret->session_id_length=os.length;
-       OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= sizeof ret->session_id);
+       OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
        memcpy(ret->session_id,os.data,os.length);
 
        M_ASN1_D2I_get(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 144b90dd17bd3d7da8cee444888d17b042f6ced4..ad56b7bf70cc331ef4f53f067fba60264e3ba026 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
                        }
                
                r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
-               if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
+               if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
                        goto err;
                if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
                        goto err;

diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 82c3b8d89c6b7060e96fe749af7559df6e0b36e5..5aadfa51d0748111ddebc9b24ff3b44fe39a5780 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -1350,8 +1350,8 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
                        {
                        if (c_write)
                                {
-                               j=(cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf))
-                                       ?sizeof(cbuf):(int)cw_num;
+                               j = (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf)) ?
+                                       (int)sizeof(cbuf) : (int)cw_num;
                                i=BIO_write(c_bio,cbuf,j);
                                if (i < 0)
                                        {
@@ -1481,8 +1481,8 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
                                }
                        else
                                {
-                               j=(sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf))?
-                                       sizeof(sbuf):(int)sw_num;
+                               j = (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf)) ?
+                                       (int)sizeof(sbuf) : (int)sw_num;
                                i=BIO_write(s_bio,sbuf,j);
                                if (i < 0)
                                        {