Changes between 1.0.x and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+ MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
[Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md)
+
#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, pmd) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, \
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)pmd)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, l, llen) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen, (void *)l)
+
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7)
#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9)
+#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10)
+
#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
#define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
const unsigned char *f,int fl,int rsa_len,
const unsigned char *p,int pl);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
const unsigned char *f,int fl);
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to,int tlen,
#define RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 135
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE 107
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP 121
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1 154
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS 125
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1 152
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1 108
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931 127
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE 111
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP 122
+#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1 153
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1 112
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2 113
#define RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23 114
#define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 123
#define RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID 133
#define RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE 144
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST 157
#define RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH 143
#define RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER 137
#define RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS 145
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2010 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD), "CHECK_PADDING_MD"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT), "DO_RSA_PRINT"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_FIPS_RSA_SIGN_DIGEST), "FIPS_rsa_sign_digest"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_FIPS_RSA_VERIFY), "FIPS_RSA_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_FIPS_RSA_VERIFY), "FIPS_rsa_verify"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_FIPS_RSA_VERIFY_DIGEST), "FIPS_rsa_verify_digest"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY), "INT_RSA_VERIFY"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_MEMORY_LOCK), "MEMORY_LOCK"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931), "RSA_padding_add_X931"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE), "RSA_padding_check_none"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"},
+{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2), "RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"},
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1),"d e not congruent to 1"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID) ,"first octet invalid"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),"illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST) ,"invalid digest"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH) ,"invalid digest length"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER) ,"invalid header"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS) ,"invalid keybits"},
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
- const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
-
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen,
const unsigned char *param, int plen)
{
+ return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,
+ param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+ {
int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
unsigned char *db, *seed;
- unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int mdlen;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ if (mgf1md == NULL)
+ mgf1md = md;
- if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
return 0;
}
- if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+ if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
to[0] = 0;
seed = to + 1;
- db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
+ db = to + mdlen + 1;
- if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))
return 0;
- memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
- emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
- db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
- memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
- if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ memset(db + mdlen, 0,
+ emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);
+ db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int) flen);
+ if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
return 0;
#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
memcpy(seed,
20);
#endif
- dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);
if (dbmask == NULL)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++)
db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
- if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
const unsigned char *param, int plen)
{
+ return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from , flen, num,
+ param, plen,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+ {
int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
const unsigned char *maskeddb;
int lzero;
- unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *padded_from;
int bad = 0;
+ int mdlen;
- if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+ if (md == NULL)
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ if (mgf1md == NULL)
+ mgf1md = md;
+
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ if (--num < 2 * mdlen + 1)
/* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
* particular ciphertext. */
goto decoding_err;
flen = num; /* don't overflow the memcpy to padded_from */
}
- dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ dblen = num - mdlen;
db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen + num);
if (db == NULL)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
memset(padded_from, 0, lzero);
memcpy(padded_from + lzero, from, flen);
- maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ maskeddb = padded_from + mdlen;
- if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
return -1;
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
seed[i] ^= padded_from[i];
- if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
- if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))
return -1;
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen) != 0 || bad)
goto decoding_err;
else
{
- for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
+ for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++)
if (db[i] != 0x00)
break;
if (i == dblen || db[i] != 0x01)
mlen = dblen - ++i;
if (tlen < mlen)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
mlen = -1;
}
else
decoding_err:
/* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
* which kind of decoding error happened */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
return -1;
}
return rv;
}
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
- long seedlen)
- {
- return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
- }
#endif
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#endif
const EVP_MD *md;
/* message digest for MGF1 */
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
- /* PSS/OAEP salt length */
+ /* PSS salt length */
int saltlen;
/* Temp buffer */
unsigned char *tbuf;
+ /* OAEP label */
+ unsigned char *oaep_label;
+ size_t oaep_labellen;
} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
rctx->saltlen = -2;
+ rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
+ rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
+
ctx->data = rctx;
ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
}
dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
dctx->md = sctx->md;
+ dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+ if (sctx->oaep_label)
+ {
+ if (dctx->oaep_label)
+ OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+ dctx->oaep_label = BUF_memdup(sctx->oaep_label,
+ sctx->oaep_labellen);
+ if (!dctx->oaep_label)
+ return 0;
+ dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
+ }
return 1;
}
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
if (rctx->tbuf)
OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
+ if (rctx->oaep_label)
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
OPENSSL_free(rctx);
}
}
return 1;
}
-
static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
+ {
+ int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
+ in, inlen,
+ rctx->oaep_label,
+ rctx->oaep_labellen,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
+ ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ }
+ else
+ ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
rctx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf,
+ ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ for (i = 0; i < ret; i++)
+ {
+ if (rctx->tbuf[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out,ret,rctx->tbuf + i,
+ ret - i, ret,
+ rctx->oaep_label,
+ rctx->oaep_labellen,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
+ }
+ else
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
rctx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
if (!p2)
return -2;
+ BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
return 1;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rctx->md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
return 0;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
+ && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
return -2;
rctx->mgf1md = p2;
return 1;
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+ rctx->oaep_label = p2;
+ rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
+ return 1;
+
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
return ret;
}
+ if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md"))
+ {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR,
+ RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md);
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md"))
+ {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR,
+ RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md);
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label"))
+ {
+ unsigned char *lab;
+ long lablen;
+ int ret;
+ lab = string_to_hex(value, &lablen);
+ if (!lab)
+ return 0;
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ OPENSSL_free(lab);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
return -2;
}
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