Similarly to the B<RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING> above, since OpenSSL version
3.2.0, the use of B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> will return a randomly generated message
instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
-want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
+want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, or a provider
+that doesn't implement the implicit rejection mechanism, still need to
handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
returned message in a side channel secure manner.
This protection against Bleichenbacher attacks can be disabled by setting
-the OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (an unsigned integer) to 0.
+B<OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION> (an unsigned integer) to 0.
=head2 DSA parameters