- STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
- {
- /* If only one ID to match then do it */
- if(cid)
- {
- const EVP_MD *dgst;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- X509_NAME *iname;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
- int mdlen;
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)))
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return -1;
- }
-
- mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
- if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
- (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
- return 0;
- iname = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
- if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
- return -1;
- if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
- return 0;
- ikey = cert->cert_info->key->public_key;
-
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx,dgst);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,ikey->data, ikey->length);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,md,NULL);
- if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- }
- else
- {
- /* We have to match the whole lot */
- int i, ret;
- OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++)
- {
- tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
- ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
- if (ret <= 0) return ret;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- }
-
-static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
- {
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) &&
- (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
- return 1;
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
- return 0;
- }
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
+{
+ /* If only one ID to match then do it */
+ if (cid) {
+ const EVP_MD *dgst;
+ X509_NAME *iname;
+ int mdlen;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
+ == NULL) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
+ OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) ||
+ (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen))
+ return 0;
+ iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
+ if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
+ return -1;
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen))
+ return 0;
+ X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ } else {
+ /* We have to match the whole lot */
+ int i, ret;
+ OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
+ tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+ ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
+{
+ if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
+ && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
+ return 1;
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
+ * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
+ * trust value.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509 *signer;
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!req->optionalSignature) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
+ if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
+ OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ nm = gen->d.directoryName;
+ ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
+ OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+ flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
+ EVP_PKEY *skey;
+ skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
+ ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
+ int init_res;
+ if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
+ init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL);
+ else
+ init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer,
+ req->optionalSignature->certs);
+ if (!init_res) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
+ OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+
+err:
+ ret = 0;
+end:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509 *signer;
+ if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
+ signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
+ if (signer) {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
+ if (signer) {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}