/*
- * Written by Rob Stradling (rob@comodo.com), Stephen Henson (steve@openssl.org)
- * and Adam Eijdenberg (adam.eijdenberg@gmail.com) for the OpenSSL project 2016.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
#include <openssl/tls1.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "ct_locl.h"
+#include "ct_local.h"
SCT *SCT_new(void)
{
SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct));
- if (sct == NULL) {
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (sct == NULL)
return NULL;
- }
sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET;
sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET;
OPENSSL_free(sct);
}
+void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a)
+{
+ sk_SCT_pop_free(a, SCT_free);
+}
+
int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version)
{
if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
return 0;
}
sct->version = version;
case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT:
sct->entry_type = entry_type;
return 1;
- default:
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE);
- return 0;
+ case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET:
+ break;
}
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE);
+ return 0;
}
int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
{
if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
{
if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) {
sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len);
- if (sct->log_id == NULL) {
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (sct->log_id == NULL)
return 0;
- }
sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
}
return 1;
int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid)
{
- switch (nid) {
+ switch (nid) {
case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
return 1;
default:
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
return 0;
}
}
if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) {
sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len);
- if (sct->ext == NULL) {
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (sct->ext == NULL)
return 0;
- }
sct->ext_len = ext_len;
}
return 1;
if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) {
sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len);
- if (sct->sig == NULL) {
- CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (sct->sig == NULL)
return 0;
- }
sct->sig_len = sig_len;
}
return 1;
return sct->log_id_len;
}
-const char *SCT_get0_log_name(const SCT *sct)
-{
- return CTLOG_get0_name(sct->log);
-}
-
uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct)
{
return sct->timestamp;
int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
{
sct->source = source;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
switch (source) {
case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION:
case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE:
return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509);
case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION:
return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT);
- default: /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
- return 1;
+ case SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN:
+ break;
}
-}
-
-const CTLOG *SCT_get0_log(const SCT *sct)
-{
- return sct->log;
-}
-
-int SCT_set0_log(SCT *sct, const CTLOG_STORE *ct_logs)
-{
- sct->log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ct_logs, sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
-
- return sct->log != NULL;
+ /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
+ return 1;
}
sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
int is_sct_valid = -1;
SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
+ const CTLOG *log;
- switch (sct->version) {
- case SCT_VERSION_V1:
- if (sct->log == NULL)
- sct->log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
- sct->log_id,
- CT_V1_HASHLEN);
- break;
- default:
+ /*
+ * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
+ * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0).
+ */
+ if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
- goto end;
+ return 0;
}
- if (sct->log == NULL) {
+ log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
+ sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
+
+ /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
+ if (log == NULL) {
sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
- goto end;
+ return 0;
}
- sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
+ sctx = SCT_CTX_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
if (sctx == NULL)
goto err;
- if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(sct->log)) != 1)
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
goto err;
if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
goto err;
goto err;
}
+ SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy
+ * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
+ * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
+ * processed. So it may make more sense to do this just once, perhaps
+ * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
+ *
+ * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
+ * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
+ * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
+ * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
+ * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
+ * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
+ * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
+ * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
+ * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
+ * application decide what to do.
+ */
if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
- goto err;
-
- sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+ else
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
end:
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff