2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
151 tls1_setup_key_block,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 tls1_export_keying_material,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
169 tls1_setup_key_block,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 s->version = s->method->version;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
217 int nid; /* Curve NID */
218 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
219 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
222 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
223 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
225 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
226 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
256 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
262 /* The default curves */
263 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
264 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
265 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
266 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
267 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
268 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
272 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
273 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
279 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
283 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
286 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
287 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
288 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
289 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
290 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
291 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
293 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
294 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
295 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
296 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
297 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
298 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
300 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
301 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
303 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
306 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
307 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
308 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
309 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
310 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
311 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
312 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
313 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
315 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
316 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
321 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
322 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
323 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
326 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
328 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
329 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
331 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
334 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
336 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
340 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
342 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
344 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
346 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
348 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
350 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
352 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
354 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
356 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
358 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
360 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
362 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
364 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
366 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
368 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
370 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
372 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
374 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
376 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
378 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
380 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
382 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
384 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
386 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
388 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
400 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
402 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
403 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
404 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
405 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
406 * lists in the first place.
407 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
408 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
409 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
411 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
412 const unsigned char **pcurves,
415 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
417 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
418 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
421 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
422 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
423 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
437 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
438 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
441 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
442 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
446 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
447 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
457 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
458 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
460 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
463 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
465 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
466 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
467 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
470 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
473 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
474 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
476 const unsigned char *curves;
477 size_t num_curves, i;
478 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
479 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
481 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
483 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
486 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
487 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
490 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
492 } else /* Should never happen */
495 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
497 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
498 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
499 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
505 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
506 * if there is no match.
507 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
508 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
509 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
511 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
513 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
514 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
516 /* Can't do anything on client side */
520 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
522 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
523 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
525 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
526 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
527 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
528 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
529 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
530 /* Should never happen */
533 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
537 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
538 * but s->options is a long...
540 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
541 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
543 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
544 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
545 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
546 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
548 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
551 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
554 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
556 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
557 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
558 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
560 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
564 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
565 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
566 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
567 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
568 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
571 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
572 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
580 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
584 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
585 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
587 unsigned char *clist, *p;
590 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
593 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
594 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
597 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
598 unsigned long idmask;
600 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
602 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
611 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
615 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
619 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
622 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
624 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
630 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
632 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
634 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
636 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
637 if (nid == NID_undef)
638 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
639 if (nid == NID_undef)
640 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
641 if (nid == NID_undef)
643 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
644 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
646 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
650 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
651 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
656 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
660 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
663 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
664 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
669 const EC_METHOD *meth;
672 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
673 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
676 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
679 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
683 /* Determine curve ID */
684 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
685 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
686 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
689 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
698 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
700 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
702 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
704 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
706 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
711 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
712 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
713 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
715 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
716 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
719 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
720 * supported (see RFC4492).
722 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
723 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
724 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
725 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
726 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
729 if (i == num_formats)
734 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
735 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
736 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
738 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
740 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
741 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
742 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
743 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
744 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
748 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
749 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
754 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
761 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
765 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
767 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
768 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
769 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
771 *pformats = ecformats_default;
772 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
774 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
776 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
781 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
782 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
784 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
786 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
789 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
792 /* If not EC nothing to do */
793 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
797 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
802 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
805 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
809 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
810 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
812 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
818 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
819 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
820 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
821 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
822 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
824 return 0; /* Should never happen */
825 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
826 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
828 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
830 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
831 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
832 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
834 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
840 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
842 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
844 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
846 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
847 * is compatible with the client extensions.
849 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
851 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
863 unsigned char curve_id[2];
864 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
865 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
866 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
867 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
868 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
872 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
873 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
882 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
886 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
891 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
894 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
895 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
898 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
899 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
901 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
904 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
905 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
907 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
911 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
913 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
916 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
917 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
918 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
921 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
924 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
926 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
928 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
929 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
930 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
937 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
940 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
943 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
947 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
948 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
949 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
950 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
952 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
953 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
956 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
957 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
961 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
962 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
963 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
964 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
965 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
966 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
967 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
969 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
970 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
975 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
976 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
978 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
979 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
981 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
982 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
983 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
984 /* Should never happen */
987 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
988 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
993 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
994 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
995 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
996 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
998 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1002 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1003 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1006 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1007 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1009 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1012 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1013 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1015 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1021 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1025 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1026 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1027 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1028 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1031 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1032 if (i == sent_sigslen
1033 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1034 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1038 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1043 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1044 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1045 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1051 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1053 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1058 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1059 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1060 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1063 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1065 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1066 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1067 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1068 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1069 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1071 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1072 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1073 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1074 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1075 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1077 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1080 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1081 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
1082 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1083 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1084 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1085 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1086 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1087 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1093 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1094 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1099 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1101 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1102 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1103 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1105 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1108 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1110 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1112 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1115 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1116 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1126 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1127 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1129 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1130 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1132 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1133 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1134 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1135 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1146 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1148 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1149 if (s->renegotiate) {
1152 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1160 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1163 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1171 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1174 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1175 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1176 unsigned long size_str;
1180 * check for enough space.
1181 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1182 * 2 for servernamelist length
1183 * 1 for the hostname type
1184 * 2 for hostname length
1188 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1190 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1193 /* extension type and length */
1194 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1195 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1197 /* length of servername list */
1198 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1200 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1201 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1203 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1207 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1208 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1209 * Client Hello message */
1211 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1212 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 * check for enough space.
1219 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1220 * 1 for the srp user identity
1221 * + srp user identity length
1223 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1226 /* fill in the extension */
1227 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1228 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1229 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1230 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1238 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1241 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1242 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1244 unsigned char *etmp;
1246 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1248 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1250 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1252 if (num_formats > 255) {
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1258 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1259 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1260 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1261 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1265 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1267 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1271 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1273 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1275 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1282 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1283 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1285 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1286 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1290 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1292 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1293 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1294 ret += curves_list_len;
1296 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1298 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1300 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1301 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1302 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1303 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1304 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1305 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1306 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1308 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1310 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1313 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1314 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1317 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1325 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1331 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1333 const unsigned char *salg;
1334 unsigned char *etmp;
1335 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1336 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1340 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1342 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1343 /* Fill in lengths */
1344 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1349 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1351 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1355 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1356 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1357 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1363 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1364 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1370 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1373 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1375 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1376 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1378 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1379 /* save position of id len */
1380 unsigned char *q = ret;
1381 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1382 /* skip over id len */
1384 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1390 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1393 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1394 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1400 * 1: peer may send requests
1401 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1403 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1404 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1406 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1410 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1412 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1413 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1415 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1417 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1422 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1423 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1425 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1426 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1427 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1428 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1429 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1432 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1435 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1436 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1447 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1455 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1456 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1458 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1462 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1466 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1467 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1468 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1471 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1472 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1474 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1475 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1481 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1483 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1490 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1493 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1497 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1498 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1501 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1502 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1504 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1507 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1508 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1509 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1510 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1511 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1516 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1518 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1521 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1532 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1541 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1544 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1545 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1546 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1554 const unsigned char *plist;
1557 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1561 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1563 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1565 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1567 if (plistlen > 255) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1573 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1574 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1575 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1580 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1583 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1585 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1586 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1603 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1604 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1614 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1623 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1624 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1625 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1626 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1627 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1628 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1629 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1630 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1631 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1633 if (limit - ret < 36)
1635 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1640 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1641 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1642 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1648 * 1: peer may send requests
1649 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1651 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1652 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1654 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1660 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1661 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1662 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1663 const unsigned char *npa;
1664 unsigned int npalen;
1667 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1669 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1670 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1671 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1673 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1675 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1681 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1683 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1684 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1686 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1687 * for other cases too.
1689 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1690 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1691 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1692 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1693 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1700 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1705 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1706 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1707 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1715 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1721 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1724 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1729 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1730 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1731 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1732 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1735 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1737 unsigned int data_len;
1738 unsigned int proto_len;
1739 const unsigned char *selected;
1740 unsigned char *data;
1741 unsigned char selected_len;
1744 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1748 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1749 * length-prefixed strings.
1751 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1752 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1753 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1757 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1759 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1761 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1763 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1764 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1765 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1768 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1769 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1773 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1784 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1785 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1786 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1791 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1792 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1793 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1794 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1796 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1798 unsigned int type, size;
1799 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1802 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1803 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1804 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1805 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1806 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1807 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1808 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1810 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1811 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1812 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1813 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1816 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1817 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1818 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1819 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1820 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1821 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1822 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1823 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1824 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1825 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1830 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1831 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1832 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1833 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1836 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1839 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1840 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1841 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1843 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1844 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1845 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1847 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1849 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1852 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1854 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1855 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1857 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1861 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1863 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1865 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1870 unsigned char *data;
1871 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1873 s->servername_done = 0;
1874 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1876 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1879 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1880 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1882 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1883 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1887 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1888 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1889 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1891 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1892 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1893 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1894 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1895 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1899 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1900 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1903 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1905 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1908 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1911 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1914 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1917 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1920 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1921 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1923 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1926 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1927 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1929 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1930 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1933 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1935 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1936 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1937 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1938 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1939 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1940 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1941 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1942 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1943 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1944 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1945 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1946 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1947 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1948 * the value of the Host: field.
1949 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1950 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1951 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1953 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1957 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1958 unsigned char *sdata;
1959 unsigned int servname_type;
1963 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1964 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1967 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1968 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1969 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1970 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1973 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1974 switch (servname_type) {
1975 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1977 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1980 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1981 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1984 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1985 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1986 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1989 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1990 (unsigned char *)s->session
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1996 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1997 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1999 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2003 s->servername_done = 1;
2006 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2007 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2010 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2011 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2012 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2013 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2022 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2023 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2028 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2029 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2030 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2033 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2035 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2038 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2040 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2041 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2047 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2048 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2050 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2051 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2055 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2057 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2058 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2059 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2063 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2064 ecpointformatlist_length;
2065 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2067 ecpointformatlist_length))
2069 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2072 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2073 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2074 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2078 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2080 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2081 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2082 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2083 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2087 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2090 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2091 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2092 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2096 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2097 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2098 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2099 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2100 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2102 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2105 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2106 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2110 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2111 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2112 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2113 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2114 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2115 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2116 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2119 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2122 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2123 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2126 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2127 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2128 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2131 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2134 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2135 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2138 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2139 const unsigned char *sdata;
2141 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2142 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2143 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2146 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2148 unsigned int idsize;
2150 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2151 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2152 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2157 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2160 if (data != sdata) {
2161 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2164 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2165 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2166 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2167 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2168 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2171 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2172 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2173 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 /* Read in request_extensions */
2179 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2180 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2181 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2186 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2187 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2188 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2189 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2190 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2195 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2198 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2201 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2202 unsigned int hbtype;
2204 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2205 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2206 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2211 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2213 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2214 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2215 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2218 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2224 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2225 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2226 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2228 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2231 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2232 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2233 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2234 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2235 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2236 * anything like that, but this might change).
2238 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2239 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2240 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2241 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2242 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2244 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2249 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2250 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2253 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2254 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2258 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2260 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2261 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2262 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2266 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2267 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2268 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2271 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2272 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2276 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2277 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2278 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2279 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2280 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2283 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2288 /* Spurious data on the end */
2289 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2294 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2296 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2297 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2298 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2300 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2310 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2313 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2314 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2315 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2319 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2328 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2329 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2330 * fill the length of the block.
2332 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2336 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2337 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2338 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2346 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2348 unsigned int length, type, size;
2349 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2350 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2353 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2357 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2358 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2360 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2361 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2364 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2365 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2368 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2370 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2378 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2379 unsigned char *data;
2382 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2383 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2386 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2387 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2389 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2390 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2392 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2393 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2394 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2395 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2396 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2399 tlsext_servername = 1;
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2402 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2403 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2404 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2405 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2406 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2411 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2412 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2413 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2417 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2418 ecpointformatlist_length;
2419 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2420 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2421 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2430 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2431 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2432 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2433 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2442 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2446 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2449 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2453 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2454 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2458 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2459 unsigned char *selected;
2460 unsigned char selected_len;
2461 /* We must have requested it. */
2462 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2463 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2466 /* The data must be valid */
2467 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2468 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2472 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2474 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2475 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2476 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2479 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2480 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2484 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2485 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2486 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2490 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2492 /* We must have requested it. */
2493 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2498 * The extension data consists of:
2499 * uint16 list_length
2500 * uint8 proto_length;
2501 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2503 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2504 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2505 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2506 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2510 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2511 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2512 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2523 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2524 unsigned int hbtype;
2525 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2526 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2531 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2533 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2534 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2535 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2538 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2544 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2545 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2549 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2551 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2552 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2553 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2554 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2557 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2558 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2560 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2563 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2564 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2566 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2570 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2571 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2576 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2577 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2578 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2579 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2580 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2584 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2593 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2594 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2595 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2596 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2597 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2598 * initial connect only.
2600 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2601 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2602 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2604 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2610 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2613 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2614 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2615 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2624 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2630 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2635 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2637 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2638 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2642 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2643 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2646 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2647 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2651 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2653 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2654 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2655 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2656 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2658 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2660 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2663 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2664 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2667 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2668 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2672 s->servername_done = 0;
2677 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2678 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2680 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2682 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2685 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2686 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2688 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2689 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2692 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2695 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2696 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2697 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2701 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2705 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2706 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2707 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2708 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2709 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2710 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2711 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2712 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2715 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2716 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2717 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2719 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2722 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2723 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2725 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2726 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2730 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2734 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2738 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2740 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2741 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2744 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2745 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2746 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2747 * influence which certificate is sent
2749 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2751 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2752 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2753 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2754 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2755 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2759 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2760 * et al can pick it up.
2762 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2763 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2765 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2767 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2769 /* status request response should be sent */
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2771 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2772 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2774 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2776 /* something bad happened */
2777 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2778 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2779 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2787 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2788 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2791 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2800 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2802 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2803 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2807 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2808 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2809 * must contain uncompressed.
2811 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2812 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2813 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2814 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2815 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2816 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2817 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2818 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2819 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2821 unsigned char *list;
2822 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2823 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2824 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2825 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2826 found_uncompressed = 1;
2830 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2832 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2836 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2837 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2839 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2841 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2842 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2843 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2844 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2846 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2848 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2851 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2854 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2855 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2858 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2861 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2862 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2863 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2864 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2866 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2867 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2870 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2871 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2876 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2877 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2880 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2884 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2885 s->servername_done = 0;
2891 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2894 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2896 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2901 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2909 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2910 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2911 * need to be handled at the same time.
2913 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2916 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2917 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2918 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2919 * point to the resulting session.
2921 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2922 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2923 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2926 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2927 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2928 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2929 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2930 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2931 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2932 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2935 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2936 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2937 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2938 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2939 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2940 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2942 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2945 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2946 const PACKET *session_id,
2950 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2953 int have_ticket = 0;
2954 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2957 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2958 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2961 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2964 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2967 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2971 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2972 unsigned int type, size;
2974 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2975 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2976 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2980 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2984 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2986 unsigned char *etick;
2988 /* Duplicate extension */
2989 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2997 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3000 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3004 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3006 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3007 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3008 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3009 * calculate the master secret later.
3014 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3015 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3019 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3020 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3022 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3023 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3026 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3029 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3030 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3033 default: /* fatal error */
3039 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3040 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3041 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3047 if (have_ticket == 0)
3054 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3056 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3057 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3058 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3059 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3060 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3061 * point to the resulting session.
3064 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3065 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3066 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3067 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3068 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3070 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3071 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3072 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3075 unsigned char *sdec;
3076 const unsigned char *p;
3077 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3078 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3079 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3081 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3082 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3085 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3086 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3089 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3090 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3091 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3092 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3101 /* Check key name matches */
3102 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3104 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3105 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3106 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3107 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3113 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3116 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3121 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3122 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3123 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3126 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3127 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3128 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3131 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3132 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3133 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3134 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3135 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3137 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3138 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3141 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3142 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3147 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3150 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3154 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3155 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3156 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3160 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3161 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3170 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3174 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3175 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3179 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3186 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3187 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3188 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3189 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3190 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3191 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3192 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3193 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3194 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3195 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3198 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3199 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3200 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3201 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3202 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3203 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3204 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3207 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3210 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3211 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3217 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3220 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3221 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3222 return table[i].nid;
3227 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3233 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3236 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3239 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3240 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3244 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3246 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3253 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3256 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3257 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3258 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3259 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3260 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3261 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3262 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3263 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3264 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3265 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3268 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3274 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3276 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3277 return tls12_md_info + i;
3283 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3285 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3286 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3288 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3291 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3294 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3298 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3299 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3302 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3303 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3306 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3307 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3309 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3310 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3311 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3313 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3314 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3316 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3317 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3323 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3324 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3325 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3327 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3328 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3330 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3331 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3333 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3335 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3336 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3338 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3340 if (psignhash_nid) {
3341 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3342 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3344 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3348 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3349 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3351 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3352 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3353 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3355 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3356 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3358 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3359 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3363 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3364 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3368 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3370 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3371 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3372 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3374 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3375 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3376 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3378 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3379 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3380 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3382 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3383 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3388 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3389 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3394 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3395 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3402 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3404 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3406 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3409 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3410 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3412 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3414 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3415 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3416 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3417 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3420 return tmpout - out;
3423 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3424 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3425 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3426 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3428 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3429 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3430 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3431 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3432 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3434 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3435 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3438 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3439 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3440 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3442 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3452 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3453 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3455 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3456 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3458 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3460 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3462 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3463 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3464 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3465 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3466 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3467 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3468 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3469 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3470 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3471 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3473 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3474 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3477 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3478 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3482 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3483 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3485 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3487 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3490 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3494 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3495 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3499 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3501 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3504 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3505 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3507 /* Should never happen */
3511 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3512 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3513 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3515 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3516 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3520 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3525 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3526 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3528 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3529 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3532 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3533 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3535 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3536 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3538 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3540 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3542 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3544 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3545 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3547 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3548 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3549 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3550 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3556 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3557 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3558 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3559 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3560 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3562 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3563 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3564 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3565 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3571 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3572 * the certificate for signing.
3574 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3576 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3577 * supported it stays as NULL.
3579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3580 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3581 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3584 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3585 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3586 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3590 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3591 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3593 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3594 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3596 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3597 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3598 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3599 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3605 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3606 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3607 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3609 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3614 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3621 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3623 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3626 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3627 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3628 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3630 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3631 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3635 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3637 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3639 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3641 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3643 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3644 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3648 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3651 unsigned short hbtype;
3652 unsigned int payload;
3653 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3655 if (s->msg_callback)
3656 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3658 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3660 /* Read type and payload length first */
3661 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3662 return 0; /* silently discard */
3665 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3666 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3669 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3670 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3674 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3675 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3677 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3678 if (buffer == NULL) {
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3684 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3685 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3687 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3689 /* Random padding */
3690 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3691 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3695 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3696 3 + payload + padding);
3698 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3699 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3700 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3701 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3703 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3707 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3711 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3712 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3716 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3718 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3725 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3727 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3729 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3730 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3732 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3733 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3734 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3739 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3740 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3745 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3746 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3752 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3753 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3754 * some random stuff.
3755 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3756 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3757 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3758 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3761 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3768 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3769 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3771 /* Sequence number */
3772 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3773 /* 16 random bytes */
3774 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3779 /* Random padding */
3780 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3785 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3787 if (s->msg_callback)
3788 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3789 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3790 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3792 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3801 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3805 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3808 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3810 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3811 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3812 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3813 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3814 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3815 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3817 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3818 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3819 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3823 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3825 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3828 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3831 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3833 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3835 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3837 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3845 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3846 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3848 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3851 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3852 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3855 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3856 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3861 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3862 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3864 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3868 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3872 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3875 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3878 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3883 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3884 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3886 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3887 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3888 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3890 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3897 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3898 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3899 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3901 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3902 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3903 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3909 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3913 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3917 if (default_nid == -1)
3919 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3921 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3922 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3923 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3928 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3929 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3933 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3934 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3935 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3942 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3943 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3944 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3945 * attempting to use them.
3948 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3950 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3951 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3952 /* Strict mode flags */
3953 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3954 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3955 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3957 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3962 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3963 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3966 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3967 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3969 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3972 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3974 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3975 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3977 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3979 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3980 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3983 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3984 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3985 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3986 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3987 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3995 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3998 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4000 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4001 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4003 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4010 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4011 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4012 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4014 else if (!check_flags)
4019 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4020 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4022 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4024 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4025 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4027 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4030 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4031 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4032 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4033 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4036 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4037 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4038 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4042 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4043 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4046 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4047 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4048 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4051 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4052 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4053 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4056 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4057 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4058 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4067 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4068 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4070 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4072 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4073 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4074 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4077 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4084 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4085 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4089 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4090 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4091 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4092 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4094 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4101 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4102 else if (check_flags)
4103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4105 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4106 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4108 else if (!check_flags)
4111 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4112 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4113 else if (strict_mode) {
4114 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4115 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4116 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4117 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4119 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4126 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4127 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4131 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4134 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4137 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4141 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4145 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4147 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4148 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4150 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4151 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4156 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4161 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4163 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4166 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4167 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4170 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4171 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4172 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4173 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4174 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4179 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4182 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4184 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4185 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4189 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4190 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4191 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4192 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4193 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4195 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4198 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4202 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4205 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4206 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4213 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4214 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4216 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4217 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4218 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4219 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4220 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4221 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4222 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4225 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4226 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4228 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4233 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4235 int dh_secbits = 80;
4236 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4237 return DH_get_1024_160();
4238 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4239 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4244 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4245 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4248 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4254 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4255 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4256 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4258 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4259 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4265 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4266 return DH_get_2048_224();
4267 return DH_get_1024_160();
4271 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4274 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4276 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4277 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4281 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4283 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4286 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4288 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4289 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4290 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4291 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4293 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4294 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4297 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4299 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4302 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4305 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4307 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4308 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4310 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4311 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4313 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4314 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4319 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4320 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4321 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4324 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4326 int rv, start_idx, i;
4328 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4333 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4337 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4338 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4339 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);