2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
246 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
247 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
248 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
250 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
253 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
255 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
258 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
260 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
262 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
264 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
266 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
268 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
270 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
272 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
274 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
276 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
278 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
280 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
284 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
286 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
288 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
292 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
294 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
298 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
300 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
302 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
304 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
306 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
312 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
315 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
316 const unsigned char **pcurves,
321 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
322 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
326 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
327 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
329 /* If not set use default: for now static structure */
332 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
333 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
337 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
341 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
343 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
344 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
346 /* Can't do anything on client side */
349 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
351 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
356 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
358 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
359 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
361 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
365 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
366 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
377 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
378 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
380 unsigned char *clist, *p;
382 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
383 * while curve ids < 32
385 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
386 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
389 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
391 unsigned long idmask;
393 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
395 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
406 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
410 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
415 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
418 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
420 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
424 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
426 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
428 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
430 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
431 if (nid == NID_undef)
432 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
435 if (nid == NID_undef)
437 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
438 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
440 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
443 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
444 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
449 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
451 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
453 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
454 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
460 const EC_METHOD *meth;
463 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
464 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
465 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
468 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
471 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
477 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
478 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
482 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
494 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
497 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
499 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
502 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
506 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
507 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
508 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
510 const unsigned char *p;
513 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
514 * is supported (see RFC4492).
516 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
518 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
519 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
520 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
528 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
529 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
531 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
532 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
534 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
543 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
544 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
546 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
548 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
551 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
554 /* If not EC nothing to do */
555 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
560 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
564 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
566 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
567 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
569 unsigned char curve_id[2];
570 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
571 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
573 /* Need a shared curve */
574 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
580 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
585 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
587 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
590 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
594 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
595 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
598 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
599 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
601 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
604 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
605 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
607 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
610 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
611 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
613 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
616 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
617 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
618 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
619 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
621 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
623 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
624 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
627 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
628 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
631 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
634 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
638 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
640 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
641 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
643 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
644 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
646 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
648 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
649 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
653 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
655 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
657 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
660 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
663 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
664 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
665 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
666 * session and not global settings.
669 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
672 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
673 size_t i, sigalgslen;
674 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
677 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
678 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
679 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
682 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
683 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
686 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
687 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
692 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
697 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
702 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
708 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
709 * signature algorithms.
713 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
714 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
718 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
719 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
723 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
724 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
727 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
729 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
730 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
734 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
735 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
737 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
738 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
740 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
744 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
745 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
747 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
748 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
757 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
760 unsigned char *ret = p;
761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
762 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
764 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
767 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
768 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
770 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
772 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
774 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
775 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
776 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
777 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
786 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
787 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
788 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
793 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
795 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
797 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
798 unsigned long size_str;
801 /* check for enough space.
802 4 for the servername type and entension length
803 2 for servernamelist length
804 1 for the hostname type
805 2 for hostname length
809 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
810 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
813 /* extension type and length */
814 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
817 /* length of servername list */
820 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
821 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
823 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
827 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
832 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
838 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
840 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
843 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
853 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
854 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
855 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
857 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
858 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
864 /* check for enough space.
865 4 for the srp type type and entension length
866 1 for the srp user identity
867 + srp user identity length
869 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
871 /* fill in the extension */
872 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
873 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
874 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
875 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
883 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
885 const unsigned char *plist;
887 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
889 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
891 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
894 plist = ecformats_default;
895 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
898 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
899 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
906 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
907 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
908 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
909 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
912 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
913 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
914 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
916 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
917 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
918 if (plistlen > 65532)
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
924 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
925 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
927 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
928 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
929 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
930 * resolves this to two bytes.
933 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
936 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
938 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
941 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
942 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
943 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
944 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
946 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
947 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
948 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
950 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
951 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
953 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
957 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
958 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
960 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
963 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
964 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
968 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
974 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
977 const unsigned char *salg;
978 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
979 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
981 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
982 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
984 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
988 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
989 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
990 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
992 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
994 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
996 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
999 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1002 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1007 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1008 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1011 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1015 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1017 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1018 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1024 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1026 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1033 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1034 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1035 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1037 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1038 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1042 /* save position of id len */
1043 unsigned char *q = ret;
1044 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1045 /* skip over id len */
1047 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1053 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1057 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1058 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1061 * 1: peer may send requests
1062 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1064 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1065 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1067 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1071 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1073 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1074 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1075 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1077 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1082 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1086 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1088 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1090 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1093 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1101 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1102 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1103 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1104 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1105 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1106 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1109 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1110 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1112 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1114 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1115 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1117 *(ret++) = list_len;
1118 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1121 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1128 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1131 unsigned char *ret = p;
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1133 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1136 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1137 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1141 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1143 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1145 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1147 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1151 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1155 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1161 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1163 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1166 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1176 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1177 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1179 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1182 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1183 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1184 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1190 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1191 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1192 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1193 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1194 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1197 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1198 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1200 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1201 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1203 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1208 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1210 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1211 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1215 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1216 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1217 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1219 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1221 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1223 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1226 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1229 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1238 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1240 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1242 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1245 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1254 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1255 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1256 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1257 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1258 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1259 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1260 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1261 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1262 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1263 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1269 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1270 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1272 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1275 * 1: peer may send requests
1276 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1278 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1279 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1281 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1287 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1288 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1289 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1291 const unsigned char *npa;
1292 unsigned int npalen;
1295 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1296 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1298 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1299 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1301 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1303 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1308 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1310 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1312 size_t authz_length;
1313 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1314 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1315 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1316 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1317 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1319 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1321 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1322 * uint8_t authz_type
1324 * uint8_t data[length]
1326 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1327 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1329 unsigned short length;
1333 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1335 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1339 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1347 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1348 * 2 bytes for extension type
1349 * 2 bytes for extension length
1350 * 1 byte for the list length
1351 * n bytes for the list */
1352 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1354 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1355 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1357 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1358 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1362 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1364 unsigned short length;
1369 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1371 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1374 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1381 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1388 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1390 unsigned short type;
1391 unsigned short size;
1393 unsigned char *data = *p;
1394 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1396 s->servername_done = 0;
1397 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1399 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1403 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1404 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1406 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1407 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1409 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1410 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1412 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1413 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1415 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1416 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1419 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1423 if (data > (d+n-len))
1426 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1431 if (data+size > (d+n))
1434 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1436 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1437 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1438 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1439 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1441 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1442 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1443 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1444 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1445 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1446 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1447 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1448 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1449 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1450 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1451 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1452 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1453 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1454 the value of the Host: field.
1455 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1456 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1457 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1458 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1462 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1464 unsigned char *sdata;
1470 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1477 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1484 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1490 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1493 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1494 switch (servname_type)
1496 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1499 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1501 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1504 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1506 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1509 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1511 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1514 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1515 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1516 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1517 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1518 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1519 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1522 s->servername_done = 1;
1526 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1527 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1528 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1540 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1546 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1548 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1550 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1553 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1555 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1558 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1560 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1561 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1563 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1565 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1572 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1573 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1575 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1576 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1578 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1580 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1585 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1587 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1588 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1590 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1591 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1593 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1596 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1597 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1600 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1601 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1602 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1603 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1604 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1607 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1608 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1610 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1611 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1612 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1614 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1615 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1617 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1622 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1624 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1627 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1628 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1630 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1633 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1634 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1637 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1638 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1639 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1640 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1641 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1644 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1645 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1646 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1647 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1649 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1653 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1656 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1657 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1659 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1663 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1664 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1665 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1666 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1668 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1669 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1671 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1676 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1678 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1679 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1681 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1687 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1689 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1691 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1694 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1696 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1701 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1703 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1706 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1708 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1711 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1714 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1717 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1718 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1722 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1723 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1728 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1732 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1734 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1736 const unsigned char *sdata;
1738 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1743 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1752 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1756 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1760 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1765 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1769 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1774 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1775 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1778 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1779 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1780 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1782 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1783 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1786 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1787 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1789 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1795 /* Read in request_extensions */
1798 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1805 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1811 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1813 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1814 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1817 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1818 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1820 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1821 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1828 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1832 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1835 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1839 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1840 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1842 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1843 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1844 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1846 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1852 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1853 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1855 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1858 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1859 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1860 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1861 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1862 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1863 * anything like that, but this might change).
1865 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1866 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1867 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1868 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1869 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1870 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1874 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1875 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1877 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1882 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
1884 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1885 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
1889 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1893 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1895 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
1897 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1901 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
1902 * information as the original session so we ignore this
1903 * in the case of a session resumption. */
1907 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
1908 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
1909 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
1910 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
1911 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
1913 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1917 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
1918 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
1919 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1921 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
1923 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
1924 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1925 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
1926 1 /* element size */,
1929 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
1932 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
1933 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
1935 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1949 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1951 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1952 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1954 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1956 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1959 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
1960 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1961 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
1966 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
1969 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
1971 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1975 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1984 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1985 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1986 * the length of the block. */
1987 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1989 unsigned int off = 0;
2003 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2005 unsigned short length;
2006 unsigned short type;
2007 unsigned short size;
2008 unsigned char *data = *p;
2009 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2010 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2013 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2017 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2018 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2021 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2025 if (data+length != d+n)
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2036 if (data+size > (d+n))
2039 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2040 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2041 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2043 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2045 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2047 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2050 tlsext_servername = 1;
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2054 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2055 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2057 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2058 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2060 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2061 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2063 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2067 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2068 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2073 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2074 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2076 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2077 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2078 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2079 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2080 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2083 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2085 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2087 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2088 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2090 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2093 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2096 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2099 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2101 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2102 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2103 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2105 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2113 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2119 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2120 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2121 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2122 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2124 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2126 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2128 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2133 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2134 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2136 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2137 * a status request message.
2139 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2141 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2144 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2145 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2149 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2151 unsigned char *selected;
2152 unsigned char selected_len;
2154 /* We must have requested it. */
2155 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2157 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2160 /* The data must be valid */
2161 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2163 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2168 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2171 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2172 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2177 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2178 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2179 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2184 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2186 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2189 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2193 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2194 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2196 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2197 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2198 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2200 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2207 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2212 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2214 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2215 * an authz hello extension if the client
2216 * didn't request a proof. */
2217 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2218 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2220 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2222 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2228 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2233 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2240 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2241 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2242 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2244 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2248 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2262 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2264 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2266 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2267 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2269 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2286 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2287 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2288 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2289 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2290 * absence on initial connect only.
2292 if (!renegotiate_seen
2293 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2294 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2296 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2298 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2306 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2309 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2313 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2315 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2320 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2322 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2323 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2325 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2326 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2328 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2329 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2334 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2338 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2339 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2346 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2349 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2350 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2351 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2354 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2355 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2356 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2357 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2361 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2362 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2367 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2368 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2369 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2370 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2372 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2377 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2379 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2380 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2383 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2384 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2386 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2387 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2391 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2392 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2393 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2394 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2396 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2398 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2399 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2400 * so this has to happen here in
2401 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2405 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2407 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2410 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2411 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2416 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2417 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2418 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2420 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2422 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2423 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2425 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2426 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2428 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2429 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2431 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2432 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2434 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2435 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2442 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2444 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2445 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2446 * abort the handshake.
2448 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2449 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2457 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2458 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2461 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2462 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2465 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2466 s->servername_done=0;
2472 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2474 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2477 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2478 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2479 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2480 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2482 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2485 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2486 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2487 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2488 if (certpkey == NULL)
2490 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2493 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2494 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2496 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2497 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2500 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2501 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2502 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2504 /* status request response should be sent */
2505 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2506 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2507 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2509 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2511 /* something bad happened */
2512 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2513 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2514 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2519 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2524 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2525 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2528 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2529 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2537 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2539 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2540 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2543 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2544 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2545 * it must contain uncompressed.
2547 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2548 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2549 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2550 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2551 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2553 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2555 unsigned char *list;
2556 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2557 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2558 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2560 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2562 found_uncompressed = 1;
2566 if (!found_uncompressed)
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2572 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2573 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2575 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2576 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2577 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2578 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2580 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2581 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2583 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2584 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2586 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2588 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2589 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2592 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2593 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2594 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2595 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2597 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2598 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2603 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2606 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2607 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2610 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2611 * there is no response.
2613 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2615 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2616 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2618 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2619 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2622 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2623 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2627 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2628 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2634 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2635 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2638 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2639 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2642 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2643 s->servername_done=0;
2649 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2652 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2654 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2656 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2660 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2668 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2669 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2670 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2672 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2673 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2674 * extension, if any.
2675 * len: the length of the session ID.
2676 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2677 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2678 * point to the resulting session.
2680 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2681 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2682 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2685 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2686 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2687 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2688 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2689 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2690 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2691 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2694 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2695 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2696 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2697 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2698 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2699 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2701 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2702 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2704 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2705 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2709 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2711 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2712 * to permit stateful resumption.
2714 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2716 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2720 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2721 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2728 /* Skip past cipher list */
2733 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2738 /* Now at start of extensions */
2739 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2742 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2744 unsigned short type, size;
2747 if (p + size > limit)
2749 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2754 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2755 * currently have one. */
2756 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2759 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2761 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2762 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2763 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2764 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2765 * calculate the master secret later. */
2768 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2771 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2772 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2774 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2776 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2777 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2779 default: /* fatal error */
2788 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2790 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2791 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2792 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2793 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2794 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2795 * point to the resulting session.
2798 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2799 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2800 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2801 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2803 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2804 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2805 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2808 unsigned char *sdec;
2809 const unsigned char *p;
2810 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2811 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2814 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2815 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2818 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2819 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2820 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2821 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2823 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2824 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2835 /* Check key name matches */
2836 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2838 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2839 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2840 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2841 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2843 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2844 * integrity checks on ticket.
2846 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2849 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2853 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2854 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2855 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2856 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2857 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2859 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2860 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2861 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2862 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2863 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2866 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2869 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2870 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2873 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2876 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2880 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2881 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2882 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2883 * as required by standard.
2886 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2887 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2895 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2900 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2908 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2909 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2910 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2911 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2912 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2913 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2914 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2917 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2918 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2919 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2920 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2923 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2926 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2928 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2934 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2937 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2939 if ((table[i].id) == id)
2940 return table[i].nid;
2945 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2950 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2951 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2954 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2957 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2958 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2962 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2964 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2965 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2968 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2973 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2981 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2985 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2986 return EVP_sha224();
2988 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2989 return EVP_sha256();
2991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2992 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2993 return EVP_sha384();
2995 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2996 return EVP_sha512();
3004 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3009 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3010 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3013 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3014 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3017 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3018 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3024 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3025 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3026 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3028 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3029 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3031 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3033 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3034 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3036 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3038 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3040 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3041 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3043 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3047 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3048 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3049 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3051 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3054 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3055 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3056 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3057 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3059 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3060 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3061 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3063 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3064 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3066 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3068 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3070 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3075 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3076 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3077 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3079 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3090 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3091 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3093 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3094 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3096 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3098 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3099 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
3101 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3102 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3104 else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3106 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3107 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3111 conf = tls12_sigalgs;
3112 conflen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
3118 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
3122 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3123 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3129 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3130 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3132 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3135 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3138 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3139 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3140 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3145 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3147 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3153 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3154 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3155 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3157 /* Should never happen */
3161 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
3162 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
3163 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
3164 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
3166 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3167 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3169 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3170 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3172 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3174 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3175 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3177 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3178 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3180 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3181 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3182 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3183 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3187 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3188 * use the certificate for signing.
3190 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
3192 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3193 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3196 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3197 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3200 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3202 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3203 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3207 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3208 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3215 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3216 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3217 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3219 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3225 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3232 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3234 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3237 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3238 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3239 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3241 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3242 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3246 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3248 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3250 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3252 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3254 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3255 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3261 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3263 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3264 unsigned short hbtype;
3265 unsigned int payload;
3266 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3268 /* Read type and payload length first */
3273 if (s->msg_callback)
3274 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3275 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3276 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3278 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3280 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3283 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3284 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3285 * payload, plus padding
3287 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3290 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3291 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3293 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3295 /* Random padding */
3296 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3298 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3300 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3301 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3302 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3303 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3305 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3310 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3314 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3315 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3316 * sequence number */
3319 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3322 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3330 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3332 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3334 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3335 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3337 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3338 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3339 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3345 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3346 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3352 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3353 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3359 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3360 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3362 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3364 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3365 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3366 * some random stuff.
3367 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3368 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3369 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3370 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3373 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3376 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3377 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3379 /* Sequence number */
3380 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3381 /* 16 random bytes */
3382 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3384 /* Random padding */
3385 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3387 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3390 if (s->msg_callback)
3391 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3392 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3393 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3395 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3404 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3409 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3412 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3414 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3417 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3418 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3420 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3422 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3424 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3432 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3433 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3434 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3435 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3436 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3437 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3440 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3441 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3442 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3443 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3446 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3448 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3449 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3452 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3453 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3457 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3458 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3459 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3463 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3465 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3468 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3470 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3475 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3476 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3478 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3480 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3481 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3482 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3483 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3485 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3493 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3494 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3495 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3496 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3500 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3501 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3502 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3503 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3509 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3513 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3517 if (default_nid == -1)
3519 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3521 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3522 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3523 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3528 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3531 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3535 int rv = CERT_PKEY_INVALID;
3536 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3540 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3542 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3544 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3550 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3555 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3556 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3559 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
3560 && c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
3563 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3564 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3566 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3571 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3572 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3573 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3574 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3575 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3578 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3579 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3580 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3581 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3585 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3586 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3594 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3595 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3598 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3601 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3602 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3604 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3607 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3610 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3611 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3613 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3615 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3621 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3622 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, x))
3624 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3625 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
3627 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3629 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i)))
3633 rv = CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3638 if (rv && cpk->digest)
3639 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3640 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3645 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3646 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3648 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3649 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3650 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3651 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
3652 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
3653 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3655 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3656 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3658 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);