2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
347 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
355 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
358 unsigned char *orig = buf;
359 unsigned char *ret = buf;
361 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
362 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
363 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
368 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
370 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
372 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
373 unsigned long size_str;
376 /* check for enough space.
377 4 for the servername type and entension length
378 2 for servernamelist length
379 1 for the hostname type
380 2 for hostname length
384 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
385 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
388 /* extension type and length */
389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
392 /* length of servername list */
395 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
396 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
398 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
402 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
407 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
418 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
428 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
429 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
430 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
432 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
433 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
439 /* check for enough space.
440 4 for the srp type type and entension length
441 1 for the srp user identity
442 + srp user identity length
444 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
446 /* fill in the extension */
447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
448 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
449 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
450 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
456 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
457 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
459 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
462 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
464 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
470 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
471 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
472 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
473 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
474 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
476 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
477 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
479 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
482 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
484 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
491 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
493 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
494 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
495 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
496 * resolves this to two bytes.
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
499 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
500 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
502 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
504 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
507 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
508 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
509 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
510 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
512 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
513 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
514 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
516 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
519 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
523 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
526 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
529 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
530 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
534 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
540 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
542 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
544 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
545 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
546 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
547 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
548 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
551 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
552 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
553 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
555 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
557 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
559 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
565 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
570 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
571 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
574 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
578 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
580 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
581 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
587 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
589 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
596 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
598 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
600 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
601 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
603 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
605 /* save position of id len */
606 unsigned char *q = ret;
607 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
608 /* skip over id len */
610 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
616 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
620 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
621 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
626 * 1: peer may send requests
627 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
629 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
630 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
632 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
636 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
638 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
639 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
640 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
648 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
652 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
654 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
656 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
659 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
667 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
668 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
670 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
671 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
673 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
675 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
676 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
677 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
678 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
680 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
682 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
692 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
697 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
700 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
704 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
707 unsigned char *orig = buf;
708 unsigned char *ret = buf;
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
710 int next_proto_neg_seen;
713 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
714 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
718 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
720 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
722 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
728 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
732 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
738 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
740 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
743 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
753 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
754 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
756 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
759 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
760 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
761 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
767 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
768 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
769 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
770 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
771 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
774 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
775 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
777 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
778 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
780 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
781 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
785 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
787 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
788 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
792 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
793 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
794 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
796 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
798 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
800 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
803 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
806 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
816 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
818 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
820 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
823 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
832 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
833 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
834 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
835 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
836 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
837 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
838 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
839 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
840 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
841 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
842 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
848 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
849 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
851 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
853 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
856 * 1: peer may send requests
857 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
859 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
860 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
862 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
868 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
869 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
870 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
872 const unsigned char *npa;
876 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
877 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
879 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
880 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
882 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
884 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
889 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
892 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
898 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
899 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
904 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
905 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
906 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
907 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
909 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
910 unsigned short type, size;
911 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
912 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
913 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
914 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
915 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
916 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
917 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
919 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
920 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
921 0x01, /* 1 point format */
922 0x00, /* uncompressed */
925 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
926 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
927 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
928 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
929 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
930 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
931 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
932 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
933 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
934 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
946 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
953 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
955 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
956 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
958 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
960 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
962 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
967 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
969 if (data + len != d+n)
971 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
975 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
977 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
979 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
984 unsigned char *data = *p;
985 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
988 s->servername_done = 0;
989 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
991 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
995 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
996 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1000 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1001 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1002 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1004 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1008 if (data > (d+n-len))
1011 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1016 if (data+size > (d+n))
1019 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1021 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1022 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1023 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1024 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1026 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1027 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1028 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1029 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1030 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1031 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1032 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1033 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1034 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1035 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1036 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1037 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1038 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1039 the value of the Host: field.
1040 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1041 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1042 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1043 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1047 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1049 unsigned char *sdata;
1055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1062 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1078 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1079 switch (servname_type)
1081 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1084 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1089 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1091 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1094 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1096 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1099 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1100 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1101 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1102 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1103 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1104 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1107 s->servername_done = 1;
1111 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1112 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1113 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1133 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1138 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1143 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1145 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1146 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1148 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1157 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1158 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1160 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1161 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1163 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1165 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1170 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1172 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1175 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1176 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1178 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1181 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1182 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1185 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1186 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1187 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1188 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1189 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1192 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1193 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1195 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1196 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1197 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1199 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1200 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1202 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1209 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1212 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1213 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1215 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1218 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1219 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1222 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1223 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1224 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1225 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1226 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1229 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1230 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1231 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1232 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1234 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1238 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1241 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1242 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1248 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1249 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1250 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1251 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1253 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1254 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1256 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1261 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1263 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1264 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1266 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1272 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1274 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1276 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1279 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1281 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1287 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1292 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1298 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1299 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1304 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1308 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1310 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1312 const unsigned char *sdata;
1314 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1319 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1328 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1332 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1341 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1351 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1354 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1355 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1356 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1358 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1359 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1362 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1363 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1365 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1366 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1371 /* Read in request_extensions */
1374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1381 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1387 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1389 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1390 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1393 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1394 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1396 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1397 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1399 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1404 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1408 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1411 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1415 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1416 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1418 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1419 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1420 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1422 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1429 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1431 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1434 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1435 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1436 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1437 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1438 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1439 * anything like that, but this might change).
1441 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1442 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1443 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1444 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1445 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1446 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1450 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1452 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1454 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1467 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1469 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1470 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1472 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1474 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1482 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1483 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1484 * the length of the block. */
1485 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1487 unsigned int off = 0;
1501 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1503 unsigned short length;
1504 unsigned short type;
1505 unsigned short size;
1506 unsigned char *data = *p;
1507 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1508 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1511 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1515 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1516 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1519 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1523 if (data+length != d+n)
1525 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1529 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1534 if (data+size > (d+n))
1537 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1538 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1539 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1541 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1543 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1545 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1548 tlsext_servername = 1;
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1552 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1553 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1555 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1556 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1558 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1559 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1561 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1564 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1565 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1566 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1568 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1571 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1572 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1574 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1575 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1576 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1577 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1578 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1581 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1583 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1585 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1586 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1588 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1591 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1594 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1597 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1599 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1600 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1601 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1603 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1607 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1610 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1611 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1617 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1618 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1619 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1620 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1622 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1624 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1626 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1631 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1632 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1634 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1635 * a status request message.
1637 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1639 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1642 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1643 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1646 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1647 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1649 unsigned char *selected;
1650 unsigned char selected_len;
1652 /* We must have requested it. */
1653 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1655 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1658 /* The data must be valid */
1659 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1661 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1664 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1666 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1669 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1670 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1672 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1675 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1676 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1680 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1682 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1684 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1687 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1691 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1692 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1694 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1695 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1696 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1698 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1704 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1706 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1717 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1721 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1723 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1725 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1727 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1728 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1730 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1736 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1746 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1747 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1748 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1749 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1750 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1751 * absence on initial connect only.
1753 if (!renegotiate_seen
1754 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1755 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1757 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1759 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1767 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1770 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1771 * and elliptic curves we support.
1776 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1777 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1779 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1781 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1783 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1784 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1785 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1791 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1794 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1795 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1800 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1801 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1802 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1803 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1805 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1806 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1807 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1808 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1810 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1814 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1815 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1817 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1821 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1823 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1827 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1829 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1834 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1836 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1837 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1839 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1840 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1842 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1843 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1848 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1852 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1853 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1860 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1863 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1864 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1865 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1868 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1869 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1870 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1871 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1875 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1876 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1881 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1882 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1883 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1884 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1886 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1891 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1893 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1894 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1897 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1898 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1900 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1901 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1905 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1906 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1907 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1908 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1910 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1912 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1913 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1914 * so this has to happen here in
1915 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1919 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1921 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1924 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1925 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1930 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1932 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1934 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1936 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1937 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1939 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1940 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1942 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1943 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1945 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1946 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1948 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1949 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1956 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1958 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1959 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1960 * abort the handshake.
1962 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1963 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1971 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1972 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1975 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1976 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1979 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1980 s->servername_done=0;
1986 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1988 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1991 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1992 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1993 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1994 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1996 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1999 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2000 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2001 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2002 if (certpkey == NULL)
2004 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2007 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2008 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2010 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2011 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2014 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2016 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2018 /* status request response should be sent */
2019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2020 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2023 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2025 /* something bad happened */
2026 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2027 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2028 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2033 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2038 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2039 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2042 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2043 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2051 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2053 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2054 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2057 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2058 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2059 * it must contain uncompressed.
2061 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2062 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2063 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2064 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2065 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2067 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2069 unsigned char *list;
2070 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2071 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2072 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2074 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2076 found_uncompressed = 1;
2080 if (!found_uncompressed)
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2086 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2087 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2089 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2090 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2091 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2092 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2094 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2095 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2097 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2098 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2100 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2102 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2103 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2106 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2107 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2108 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2109 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2111 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2112 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2117 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2120 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2121 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2124 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2125 * there is no response.
2127 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2129 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2130 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2132 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2133 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2136 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2137 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2141 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2142 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2148 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2149 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2152 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2153 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2156 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2157 s->servername_done=0;
2163 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2164 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2165 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2167 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2168 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2169 * extension, if any.
2170 * len: the length of the session ID.
2171 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2172 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2173 * point to the resulting session.
2175 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2176 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2177 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2180 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2181 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2182 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2183 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2184 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2185 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2186 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2189 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2190 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2191 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2192 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2193 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2194 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2196 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2197 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2199 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2200 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2204 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2206 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2207 * to permit stateful resumption.
2209 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2211 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2215 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2216 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2223 /* Skip past cipher list */
2228 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2233 /* Now at start of extensions */
2234 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2237 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2239 unsigned short type, size;
2242 if (p + size > limit)
2244 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2249 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2250 * currently have one. */
2251 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2254 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2256 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2257 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2258 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2259 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2260 * calculate the master secret later. */
2263 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2266 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2267 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2269 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2271 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2272 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2274 default: /* fatal error */
2283 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2285 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2286 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2287 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2288 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2289 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2290 * point to the resulting session.
2293 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2294 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2295 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2296 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2298 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2299 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2300 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2303 unsigned char *sdec;
2304 const unsigned char *p;
2305 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2306 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2309 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2310 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2313 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2314 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2315 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2316 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2318 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2319 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2330 /* Check key name matches */
2331 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2333 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2334 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2335 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2336 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2338 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2339 * integrity checks on ticket.
2341 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2348 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2349 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2350 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2351 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2352 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2354 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2355 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2356 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2357 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2358 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2361 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2364 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2365 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2367 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2375 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2379 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2380 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2381 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2382 * as required by standard.
2385 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2386 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2394 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2399 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2407 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2409 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2412 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2415 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2416 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2419 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2420 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2424 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2426 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2429 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2432 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2436 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2439 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2441 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2447 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2450 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2452 if (table[i].id == id)
2453 return table[i].nid;
2459 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2464 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2465 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2468 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2471 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2472 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2476 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2478 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2479 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2482 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2487 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2491 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2492 return EVP_sha224();
2494 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2495 return EVP_sha256();
2497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2498 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2499 return EVP_sha384();
2501 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2502 return EVP_sha512();
2510 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2512 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2517 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2518 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2520 /* Should never happen */
2524 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2525 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2526 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2527 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2529 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2531 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2536 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2537 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2541 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2542 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2546 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2554 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2556 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2559 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2560 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2561 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2568 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2569 * supported it stays as NULL.
2571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2572 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2573 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2576 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2578 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2579 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2583 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2584 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2593 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2595 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2596 unsigned short hbtype;
2597 unsigned int payload;
2598 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2600 if (s->msg_callback)
2601 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2602 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2603 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2605 /* Read type and payload length first */
2606 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2607 return 0; /* silently discard */
2610 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2611 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2614 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2616 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2619 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2620 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2621 * payload, plus padding
2623 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2626 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2627 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2629 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2631 /* Random padding */
2632 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2634 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2636 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2637 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2638 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2639 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2641 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2646 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2650 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2651 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2652 * sequence number */
2655 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2658 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2666 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2668 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2670 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2671 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2673 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2674 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2675 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2681 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2682 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2688 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2689 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2695 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2696 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2698 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2700 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2701 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2702 * some random stuff.
2703 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2704 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2705 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2706 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2709 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2712 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2713 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2715 /* Sequence number */
2716 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2717 /* 16 random bytes */
2718 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2720 /* Random padding */
2721 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2723 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2726 if (s->msg_callback)
2727 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2728 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2729 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2731 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;