2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
182 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
183 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
187 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
189 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
190 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
204 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
206 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
212 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
215 s->version = s->method->version;
218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 static int nid_list[] =
222 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
225 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
226 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
227 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
229 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
230 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
231 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
232 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
233 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
234 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
235 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
236 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
237 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
238 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
239 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
240 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
241 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
242 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
243 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
245 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
246 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
250 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
252 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
257 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
259 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
260 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
261 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
263 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
264 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
265 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
268 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
270 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
272 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
273 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
274 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
275 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
276 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
277 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
278 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
279 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
280 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
281 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
282 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
283 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
286 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
288 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
292 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
294 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
295 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
296 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
298 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
301 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
303 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
306 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
308 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
310 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
312 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
316 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
318 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
320 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
322 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
324 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
326 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
328 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
330 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
332 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
334 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
336 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
338 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
340 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
342 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
344 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
346 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
348 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
350 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
352 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
354 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
360 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
363 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
364 const unsigned char **pcurves,
369 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
370 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
373 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
374 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
382 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
386 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
387 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
391 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
392 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
396 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
397 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
400 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
401 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
403 const unsigned char *curves;
405 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
406 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
408 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
411 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
414 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
416 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
419 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
421 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
424 else /* Should never happen */
427 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
428 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
430 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
436 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
437 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
441 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
443 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
444 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
446 /* Can't do anything on client side */
453 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
454 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
457 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
458 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
459 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
460 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
462 /* Should never happen */
465 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
470 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
475 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
477 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
478 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
480 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
484 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
485 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
496 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
497 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
499 unsigned char *clist, *p;
501 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
502 * while curve ids < 32
504 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
505 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
508 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
510 unsigned long idmask;
512 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
514 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
525 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
529 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
534 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
537 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
539 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
543 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
545 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
547 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
549 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
550 if (nid == NID_undef)
551 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
552 if (nid == NID_undef)
553 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
554 if (nid == NID_undef)
556 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
557 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
559 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
562 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
563 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
568 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
572 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
574 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
575 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
581 const EC_METHOD *meth;
584 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
585 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
586 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
589 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
592 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
596 /* Determine curve ID */
597 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
598 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
599 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
603 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
615 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
618 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
620 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
623 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
627 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
628 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
629 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
631 const unsigned char *p;
634 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
635 * is supported (see RFC4492).
637 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
639 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
640 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
641 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
651 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
652 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
654 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
655 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
657 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
662 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
669 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
672 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
674 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
676 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
677 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
681 *pformats = ecformats_default;
682 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
684 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
686 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
690 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
691 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
693 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
695 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
698 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
701 /* If not EC nothing to do */
702 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
707 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
711 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
712 * supported curves extension.
714 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
717 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
718 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
720 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
727 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
728 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
729 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
730 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
731 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
733 return 0; /* Should never happen */
734 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
735 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
737 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
741 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
749 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
750 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
752 unsigned char curve_id[2];
753 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
754 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
755 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
756 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
759 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
760 * no other curves permitted.
764 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
765 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
766 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
767 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
768 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
772 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
773 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
775 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
776 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
778 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
781 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
784 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
786 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
792 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
794 /* Need a shared curve */
795 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
801 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
806 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
808 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
812 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
818 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
823 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
827 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
828 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
832 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
834 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
838 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
840 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
843 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
844 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
846 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
849 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
850 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
854 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
856 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
860 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
864 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
867 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
871 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
872 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
873 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
876 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
878 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
882 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
886 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
888 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
889 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
892 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
893 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
897 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
898 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
900 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
901 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
903 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
905 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
906 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
910 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
912 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
914 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
917 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
920 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
921 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
923 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
924 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
926 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
927 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
928 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
929 /* Should never happen */
932 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
933 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
939 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
941 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
942 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
945 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
950 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
955 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
957 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
960 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
964 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
966 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
969 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
977 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
981 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
982 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
983 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
985 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
988 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
989 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
994 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1000 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1003 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1004 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1007 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1008 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1009 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1010 * session and not global settings.
1013 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1016 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1017 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1018 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1021 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
1022 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1023 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1026 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1027 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1030 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1031 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1036 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1041 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1046 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1052 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1053 * signature algorithms.
1057 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1058 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1062 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1063 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1067 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1068 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1071 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1073 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1074 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1078 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1079 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1081 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1082 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1084 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1088 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1089 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1091 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1092 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1101 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1104 unsigned char *ret = p;
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1106 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1108 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1111 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1112 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1114 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1116 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1118 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1119 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1120 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1121 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1130 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1131 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1132 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1137 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1139 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1141 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1142 unsigned long size_str;
1145 /* check for enough space.
1146 4 for the servername type and entension length
1147 2 for servernamelist length
1148 1 for the hostname type
1149 2 for hostname length
1153 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1154 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1157 /* extension type and length */
1158 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1159 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1161 /* length of servername list */
1162 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1164 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1165 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1167 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1171 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1176 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1187 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1199 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1201 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1202 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 /* check for enough space.
1209 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1210 1 for the srp user identity
1211 + srp user identity length
1213 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1215 /* fill in the extension */
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1217 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1218 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1219 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1227 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1229 const unsigned char *plist;
1232 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1234 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1235 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1243 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1244 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1245 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1248 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1249 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1250 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > 65532)
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1263 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1264 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1265 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1266 * resolves this to two bytes.
1269 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1272 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1274 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1277 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1278 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1279 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1280 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1282 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1283 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1284 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1286 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1287 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1289 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1293 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1294 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1296 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1299 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1300 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1304 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1310 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1313 const unsigned char *salg;
1314 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1315 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1317 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1318 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1320 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1324 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1325 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1326 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1328 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1330 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1332 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1343 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1344 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1347 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1351 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1353 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1354 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1360 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1362 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1369 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1371 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1373 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1374 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1376 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1378 /* save position of id len */
1379 unsigned char *q = ret;
1380 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1381 /* skip over id len */
1383 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1389 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1393 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1394 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1397 * 1: peer may send requests
1398 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1400 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1401 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1407 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1410 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1411 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1418 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1422 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1424 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1426 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1429 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1438 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1439 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1440 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1441 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1442 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1444 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1445 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1447 if (limit < ret + 6)
1450 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1451 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1453 *(ret++) = list_len;
1454 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1457 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1458 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1461 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1463 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1465 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1466 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1468 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1469 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1470 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1474 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1478 return NULL; /* error */
1479 if (cb_retval == -1)
1480 continue; /* skip this extension */
1482 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1484 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1486 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1491 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1498 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1501 unsigned char *ret = p;
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1503 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1506 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1507 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1508 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1509 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1511 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1512 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1516 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1518 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1520 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1522 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1526 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1530 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1541 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1551 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1553 const unsigned char *plist;
1555 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1558 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1560 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1561 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1569 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1570 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1571 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1575 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1579 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1581 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1586 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1588 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1593 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1594 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1595 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1597 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1599 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1601 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1607 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1616 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1618 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1623 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1632 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1633 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1634 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1635 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1636 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1637 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1638 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1639 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1640 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1641 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1647 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1648 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1653 * 1: peer may send requests
1654 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1656 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1657 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1659 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1665 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1666 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1667 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1669 const unsigned char *npa;
1670 unsigned int npalen;
1673 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1674 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1676 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1677 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1679 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1686 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1688 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1690 size_t authz_length;
1691 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1692 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1693 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1694 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1695 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1697 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1699 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1700 * uint8_t authz_type
1702 * uint8_t data[length]
1704 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1705 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1707 unsigned short length;
1711 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1713 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1717 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1725 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1726 * 2 bytes for extension type
1727 * 2 bytes for extension length
1728 * 1 byte for the list length
1729 * n bytes for the list */
1730 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1732 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1733 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1735 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1736 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1740 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1742 unsigned short length;
1747 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1749 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1752 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1759 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1760 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1764 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1767 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1769 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1771 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1772 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1774 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1775 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1778 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1781 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1785 return NULL; /* error */
1786 if (cb_retval == -1)
1787 break; /* skip this extension */
1788 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1790 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1792 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1800 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1808 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1809 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1810 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1815 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1816 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1817 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1818 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1820 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1821 unsigned short type, size;
1822 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1823 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1824 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1825 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1826 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1827 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1828 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1830 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1831 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1832 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1833 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1836 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1837 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1838 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1839 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1840 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1841 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1842 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1843 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1844 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1845 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1848 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1857 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1860 if (data+size > d+n)
1864 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1866 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1867 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1869 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1871 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1873 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1878 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1880 if (data + len != d+n)
1882 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1886 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1888 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1890 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1892 unsigned short type;
1893 unsigned short size;
1895 unsigned char *data = *p;
1896 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1899 s->servername_done = 0;
1900 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1902 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1905 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1906 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1907 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1910 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1914 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1915 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1919 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1920 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1921 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1923 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1924 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1926 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1927 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1929 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1930 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1932 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1933 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1935 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1936 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1938 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1939 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1942 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1946 if (data > (d+n-len))
1949 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1954 if (data+size > (d+n))
1957 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1959 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1960 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1961 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1962 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1964 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1965 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1966 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1967 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1968 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1969 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1970 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1971 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1972 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1973 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1974 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1975 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1976 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1977 the value of the Host: field.
1978 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1979 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1980 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1981 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1985 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1987 unsigned char *sdata;
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2013 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2016 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2017 switch (servname_type)
2019 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2022 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2029 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2032 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2034 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2037 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2038 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2039 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2040 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2041 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2042 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2045 s->servername_done = 1;
2049 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2050 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2051 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2063 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2069 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2071 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2083 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2084 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2086 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2095 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2096 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2098 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2099 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2101 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2102 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2111 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2112 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2114 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2115 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2117 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2121 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2124 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2125 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2126 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2127 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2128 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
2132 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2134 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2135 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2136 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2138 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2139 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2141 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2148 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2152 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2154 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2157 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2158 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2161 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2162 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2163 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2164 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2165 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2168 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2169 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2171 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2173 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2177 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2181 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2183 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2187 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2188 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2189 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2190 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2192 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2193 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2195 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2200 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2202 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2203 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2205 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2209 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2211 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2213 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2215 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2218 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2220 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2235 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2238 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2241 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2242 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2246 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2247 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2258 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2260 const unsigned char *sdata;
2262 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2293 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2302 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2303 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2304 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2306 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2307 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2310 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2311 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2313 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2314 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2319 /* Read in request_extensions */
2322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2337 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2338 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2341 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2342 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2344 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2345 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2356 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2359 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2363 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2364 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2366 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2367 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2368 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2370 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2376 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2377 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2379 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2382 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2383 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2384 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2385 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2386 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2387 * anything like that, but this might change).
2389 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2390 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2391 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2392 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2393 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2394 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2398 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2399 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2401 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2408 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2409 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2413 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2417 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2419 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2421 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2426 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2427 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2430 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2431 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2432 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2433 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2434 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2440 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2441 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2442 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2444 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2446 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2447 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2448 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2449 1 /* element size */,
2452 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2455 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2456 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2465 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2466 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2467 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2468 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2469 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2471 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2473 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2475 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2477 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2478 if (type == record->ext_type)
2482 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2483 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2485 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2487 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2492 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2493 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2496 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2497 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2498 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2499 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2500 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2501 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2503 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2504 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2507 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2508 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2520 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2522 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2523 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2525 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2527 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2530 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2531 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2532 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2537 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2540 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2542 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2546 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2555 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2556 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2557 * the length of the block. */
2558 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2560 unsigned int off = 0;
2574 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2576 unsigned short length;
2577 unsigned short type;
2578 unsigned short size;
2579 unsigned char *data = *p;
2580 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2581 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2584 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2588 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2589 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2592 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2596 if (data+length != d+n)
2598 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2602 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2607 if (data+size > (d+n))
2610 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2611 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2612 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2614 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2616 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2621 tlsext_servername = 1;
2624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2625 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2626 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2628 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2629 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2631 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2633 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2636 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2637 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2638 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2640 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2643 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2644 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2646 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2647 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2648 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2649 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2650 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2653 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2655 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2657 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2658 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2660 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2666 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2669 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2671 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2672 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2673 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2675 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2679 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2682 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2683 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2685 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2689 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2690 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2691 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2692 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2694 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2696 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2698 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2703 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2704 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2706 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2707 * a status request message.
2709 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2711 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2714 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2715 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2718 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2719 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2721 unsigned char *selected;
2722 unsigned char selected_len;
2724 /* We must have requested it. */
2725 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2727 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2730 /* The data must be valid */
2731 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2733 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2736 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2738 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2741 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2742 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2747 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2748 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2749 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2752 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2754 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2756 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2759 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2763 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2764 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2766 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2767 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2768 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2770 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2775 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2777 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2782 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2784 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2785 * an authz hello extension if the client
2786 * didn't request a proof. */
2787 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2788 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2790 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2792 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2798 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2802 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2803 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2805 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2809 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2810 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2811 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2812 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2814 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2818 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2821 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2822 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2824 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2827 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2829 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2831 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2832 if (record->ext_type == type)
2834 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2846 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2850 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2852 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2854 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2856 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2857 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2859 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2875 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2876 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2877 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2878 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2879 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2880 * absence on initial connect only.
2882 if (!renegotiate_seen
2883 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2884 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2886 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2888 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2896 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2899 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2903 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2905 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2910 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2912 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2913 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2915 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2916 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2918 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2919 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2924 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2928 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2929 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2936 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2941 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2943 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2944 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2947 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2948 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2950 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2951 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2955 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2956 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2957 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2958 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2960 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2962 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2963 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2964 * so this has to happen here in
2965 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2969 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2971 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2974 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2975 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2980 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2981 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2982 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2984 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2986 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2987 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2989 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2990 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2992 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2993 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2995 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2996 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2998 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2999 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3006 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3008 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3009 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3010 * abort the handshake.
3012 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3013 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3021 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3022 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3026 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3029 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3030 s->servername_done=0;
3036 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3038 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3041 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3042 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3043 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3044 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3046 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3049 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3050 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3051 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3052 if (certpkey == NULL)
3054 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3057 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3058 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3060 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3061 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3064 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3065 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3066 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3068 /* status request response should be sent */
3069 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3070 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3071 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3073 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3075 /* something bad happened */
3076 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3077 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3078 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3083 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3101 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3103 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3104 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3107 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3108 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3109 * it must contain uncompressed.
3111 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3112 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3113 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3114 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3115 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3117 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3119 unsigned char *list;
3120 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3121 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3122 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3124 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3126 found_uncompressed = 1;
3130 if (!found_uncompressed)
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3136 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3137 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3139 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3140 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3141 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3142 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3144 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3145 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3147 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3148 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3150 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3152 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3153 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3156 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3157 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3158 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3159 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3161 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3162 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3167 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3170 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3171 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3174 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3175 * there is no response.
3177 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3179 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3180 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3182 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3183 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3186 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3187 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3191 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3192 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3198 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3199 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3202 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3203 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3206 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3207 s->servername_done=0;
3213 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3216 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3218 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3220 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3224 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3232 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3233 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3234 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3236 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3237 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3238 * extension, if any.
3239 * len: the length of the session ID.
3240 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3241 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3242 * point to the resulting session.
3244 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3245 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3246 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3249 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3250 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3251 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3252 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3253 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3254 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3255 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3258 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3259 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3260 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3261 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3262 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3263 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3265 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3266 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3268 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3269 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3273 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3275 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3276 * to permit stateful resumption.
3278 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3280 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3284 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3292 /* Skip past cipher list */
3297 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3302 /* Now at start of extensions */
3303 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3306 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3308 unsigned short type, size;
3311 if (p + size > limit)
3313 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3318 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3319 * currently have one. */
3320 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3323 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3325 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3326 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3327 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3328 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3329 * calculate the master secret later. */
3332 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3335 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3336 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3338 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3340 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3341 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3343 default: /* fatal error */
3352 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3354 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3355 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3356 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3357 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3358 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3359 * point to the resulting session.
3362 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3363 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3364 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3365 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3367 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3368 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3369 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3372 unsigned char *sdec;
3373 const unsigned char *p;
3374 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3375 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3378 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3379 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3382 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3383 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3384 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3385 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3387 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3388 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3399 /* Check key name matches */
3400 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3402 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3403 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3404 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3405 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3407 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3408 * integrity checks on ticket.
3410 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3417 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3418 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3419 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3420 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3421 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3423 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3424 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3425 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3426 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3427 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3430 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3433 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3434 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3437 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3440 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3444 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3445 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3446 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3447 * as required by standard.
3450 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3451 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3459 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3464 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3472 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3473 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3474 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3475 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3476 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3477 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3478 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3481 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3482 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3483 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3484 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3487 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3490 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3492 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3498 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3501 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3503 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3504 return table[i].nid;
3509 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3514 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3515 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3518 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3521 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3522 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3526 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3528 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3529 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3532 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3537 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3545 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3549 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3550 return EVP_sha224();
3552 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3553 return EVP_sha256();
3555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3556 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3557 return EVP_sha384();
3559 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3560 return EVP_sha512();
3568 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3573 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3574 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3577 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3578 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3581 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3582 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3588 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3589 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3590 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3592 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3593 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3595 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3597 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3598 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3600 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3602 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3604 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3605 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3607 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3611 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3612 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3613 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3615 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3618 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3619 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3620 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3621 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3623 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3624 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3625 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3627 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3628 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3630 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3632 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3634 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3639 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3640 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3641 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3643 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3654 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3655 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3657 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3658 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3660 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3662 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3663 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3664 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3666 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3667 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3669 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3671 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3672 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3675 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3676 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3680 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3681 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3687 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3688 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3690 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3693 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3696 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3697 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3698 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3703 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3705 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3711 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3712 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3713 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3715 /* Should never happen */
3719 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3720 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3722 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3723 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3725 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3727 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3728 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3730 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3731 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3733 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3735 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3737 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3740 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3741 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3742 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3743 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3744 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3746 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3747 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3753 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3754 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3756 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3757 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3759 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3760 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3761 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3762 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3764 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3765 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3770 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3771 * use the certificate for signing.
3773 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3775 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3776 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3779 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3780 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3783 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3786 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3790 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3791 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3798 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3799 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3800 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3802 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3808 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3815 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3817 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3820 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3821 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3822 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3824 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3825 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3829 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3831 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3833 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3835 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3837 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3838 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3844 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3846 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3847 unsigned short hbtype;
3848 unsigned int payload;
3849 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3851 /* Read type and payload length first */
3856 if (s->msg_callback)
3857 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3858 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3859 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3861 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3863 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3866 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3867 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3868 * payload, plus padding
3870 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3873 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3874 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3876 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3878 /* Random padding */
3879 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3881 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3883 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3884 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3885 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3886 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3888 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3893 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3897 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3898 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3899 * sequence number */
3902 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3905 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3913 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3915 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3917 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3918 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3920 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3921 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3922 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3928 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3929 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3935 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3936 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3942 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3943 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3945 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3947 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3948 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3949 * some random stuff.
3950 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3951 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3952 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3953 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3956 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3959 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3960 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3962 /* Sequence number */
3963 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3964 /* 16 random bytes */
3965 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3967 /* Random padding */
3968 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3970 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3973 if (s->msg_callback)
3974 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3975 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3976 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3978 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3987 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3992 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3995 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3997 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4000 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4001 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4003 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4005 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4007 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4015 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4016 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4017 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4018 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4019 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4020 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4023 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4024 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4025 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4026 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4029 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4031 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4032 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4035 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4036 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4040 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4041 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4042 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4046 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4050 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4053 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4055 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4060 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4061 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4063 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4065 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4066 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4067 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4068 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4070 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4078 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4079 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4080 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4081 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4085 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4086 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4087 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4088 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4094 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4098 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4102 if (default_nid == -1)
4104 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4106 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4107 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4108 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4112 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4113 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4117 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4118 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4120 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4126 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4127 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4128 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4129 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4132 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4134 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4135 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4136 /* Strict mode flags */
4137 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4138 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4139 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4141 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4146 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4147 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4149 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4150 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4153 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4157 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4160 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4162 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4164 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4165 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4168 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4169 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4170 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4172 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4173 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4182 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4185 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4186 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4187 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4189 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4197 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4198 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4199 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4202 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4208 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4209 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4212 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4215 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4216 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4218 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4223 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4224 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4225 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4226 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4227 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4230 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4231 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4232 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4233 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4237 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4238 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4246 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4247 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4250 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4253 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4254 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4256 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4259 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4267 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4268 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4270 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4273 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4274 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4275 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4277 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4282 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4290 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4291 else if(check_flags)
4292 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4294 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4295 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4296 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4297 else if (!check_flags)
4300 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4301 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4302 else if (strict_mode)
4304 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4305 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4307 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4308 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4312 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4320 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4322 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4327 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4330 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4333 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4338 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4339 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4340 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4341 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4342 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4347 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4352 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4356 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4357 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4359 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4361 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4363 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4367 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4371 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4374 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4376 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4377 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4379 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4381 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4382 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4384 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4386 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4388 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4389 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4391 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4396 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4400 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4402 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4403 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4407 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4409 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4410 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4411 else if (cpk->digest)
4412 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4415 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4417 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4418 * if the chain is invalid.
4422 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4423 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4426 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4427 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4434 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4435 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4437 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4438 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4439 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4440 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4441 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4442 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4444 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4445 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4447 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);