2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 s->version = s->method->version;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
145 {NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
146 {NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
147 {NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
148 {NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
149 {NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
150 {NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
151 {NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
152 {NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
153 {NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
154 {NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
155 {NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
156 {NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
157 {NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
158 {NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
159 {NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
160 {NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
161 {NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
163 {NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
164 {NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
165 {NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
167 {NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
168 {NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
188 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 /* The default curves */
195 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
196 29, /* X25519 (29) */
197 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
199 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
200 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
201 34, /* GC256A (34) */
202 35, /* GC256B (35) */
203 36, /* GC256C (36) */
204 37, /* GC256D (37) */
205 38, /* GC512A (38) */
206 39, /* GC512B (39) */
207 40, /* GC512C (40) */
208 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
209 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
210 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
211 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
212 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
215 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
220 struct provider_group_data_st {
222 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
225 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
226 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
227 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
229 struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
230 SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
231 OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
233 TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
234 EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
236 unsigned int is_kem = 0;
239 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
240 TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
242 if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
243 tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
244 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
246 tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
247 (ctx->group_list_max_len
248 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
249 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
251 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
254 ctx->group_list = tmp;
255 memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
257 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
258 ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
261 ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
263 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
264 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
265 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
268 ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
269 if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
274 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
275 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
279 ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
280 if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
281 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
285 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
286 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) || gid > UINT16_MAX) {
287 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
290 ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
292 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
293 if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
297 ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
298 if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
299 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
304 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
305 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
309 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
310 if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) || is_kem > 1)) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
314 ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
316 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
317 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
318 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
322 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
323 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
324 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
328 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
329 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
330 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
334 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
335 if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
340 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
341 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
342 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
346 keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
347 if (keymgmt != NULL) {
349 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
350 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
352 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
353 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
354 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
355 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
356 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
357 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
360 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
361 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
362 ctx->group_list_len++;
365 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
371 OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
372 ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
377 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *vctx)
379 struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
382 pgd.provider = provider;
383 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
384 add_provider_groups, &pgd);
387 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
389 size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
390 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
392 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
395 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
396 for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
397 if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
398 tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
404 if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
407 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
408 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
410 if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
411 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
415 memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
417 num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
418 ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
423 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
427 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
428 if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
429 || strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
430 return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
436 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t group_id)
440 for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
441 if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
442 return &ctx->group_list[i];
448 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
456 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
457 * work for groups we don't know about.
459 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
461 if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
462 return nid_to_group[i].nid;
464 if (!include_unknown)
466 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown | (int)group_id;
469 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
474 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
475 * work for groups we don't know about.
477 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
479 if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
480 return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
487 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
488 * the number of groups supported.
490 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
493 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
494 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
495 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
496 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
497 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
500 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
501 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
505 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
506 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
511 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
512 *pgroups = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
513 *pgroupslen = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
515 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
516 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
522 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion,
523 int isec, int *okfortls13)
525 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
528 if (okfortls13 != NULL)
534 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
535 if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 || ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
537 if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
540 ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
541 if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
542 ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
544 if (ginfo->mintls < 0 || ginfo->maxtls < 0)
546 if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
549 ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
550 if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
551 ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
552 if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
553 *okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
554 || (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
557 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
558 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
559 || strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
564 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
565 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
567 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
568 unsigned char gtmp[2];
573 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
574 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
575 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
576 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
579 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
580 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
583 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
590 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
591 * if there is no match.
592 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
593 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
594 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
596 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
598 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
599 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
602 /* Can't do anything on client side */
606 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
608 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
609 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
611 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
613 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
614 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
615 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
616 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
617 /* Should never happen */
620 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
624 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
625 * otherwise peer decides.
627 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
628 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
629 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
631 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
632 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
635 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
636 uint16_t id = pref[i];
638 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
639 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
647 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
651 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
652 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
657 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
658 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
660 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
661 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
662 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
665 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
668 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
669 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
672 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
673 unsigned long idmask;
675 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
676 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
678 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
679 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
680 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
694 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
695 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
703 static int gid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
705 gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
708 char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
712 if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
714 OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
717 garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
720 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
722 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
725 gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
728 for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
729 if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
731 garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
735 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
736 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
744 gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
745 gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
746 if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
749 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
757 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
760 tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
764 *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
767 OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
771 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
772 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
774 const uint16_t *groups;
780 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
781 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
782 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
784 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
785 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
787 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
788 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
791 /* Should never happen */
796 if (check_own_groups) {
797 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
798 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
799 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
803 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
806 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
810 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
811 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
814 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
815 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
816 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
817 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
821 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
824 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
828 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
830 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
831 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
832 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
834 *pformats = ecformats_default;
835 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
837 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
839 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
843 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
844 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
846 unsigned char comp_id;
850 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
851 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
855 /* Get required compression id */
856 point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
859 if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
860 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
861 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
863 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
868 int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
870 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
871 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
872 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
873 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
878 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
879 * supported (see RFC4492).
881 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
884 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
885 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
891 /* Return group id of a key */
892 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
894 int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
896 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
898 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
902 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
903 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
905 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
909 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
912 /* If not EC nothing to do */
913 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
915 /* Check compression */
916 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
918 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
920 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
923 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
926 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
929 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
933 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
934 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
935 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
936 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
937 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
939 return 0; /* Should never happen */
940 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
941 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
950 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
952 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
954 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
955 * is compatible with the client extensions.
957 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
959 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
961 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
963 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
965 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
968 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
969 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
970 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
971 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
976 /* Default sigalg schemes */
977 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
979 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
980 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
984 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
986 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1012 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1013 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1018 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1019 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1020 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1023 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1024 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1025 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1026 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1027 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1028 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1029 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1030 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1031 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1032 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1033 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1034 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1035 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1036 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1037 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1038 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1039 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1040 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1041 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1042 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1043 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1044 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1045 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1046 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1047 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1048 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1049 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1050 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1051 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1052 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1053 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1054 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1055 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1056 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1057 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1058 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1059 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1060 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1061 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1062 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1063 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1064 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1065 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1066 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1067 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1068 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1069 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1070 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1071 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1072 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1073 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1074 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1075 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1076 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1077 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1078 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1079 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1080 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1081 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1082 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1083 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1084 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1085 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1086 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1087 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1088 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1089 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1090 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1091 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1092 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1094 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1095 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1096 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1097 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1098 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1099 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1100 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1101 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1102 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1103 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1104 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1105 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1106 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1107 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1108 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1109 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1110 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1111 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1112 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1113 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1116 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1117 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1118 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1119 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1120 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1121 NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1125 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1126 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1128 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1129 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1130 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1131 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1132 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1133 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1134 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1135 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1136 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1137 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1140 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1143 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1144 SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1145 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1146 EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1149 if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
1153 for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1154 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1160 * Check hash is available.
1161 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1162 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1163 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1164 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1165 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1167 if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1168 && ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1169 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1173 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1174 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1177 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1178 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1180 cache[i].enabled = 0;
1181 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1184 ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1189 OPENSSL_free(cache);
1190 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1194 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1195 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL *s, uint16_t sigalg)
1198 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1200 for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1201 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1202 i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1204 if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1212 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1213 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1218 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1219 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1222 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1232 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1234 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1235 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1236 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1238 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1239 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
1240 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1246 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
1248 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1254 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1255 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1256 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1257 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1258 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1260 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
1266 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1267 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1268 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1272 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1279 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1281 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1284 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1286 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1293 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1294 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1296 else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1299 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1301 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1308 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1311 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1313 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1314 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1318 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1320 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1324 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1326 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1328 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1329 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1332 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1334 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1336 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1339 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1343 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1346 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1349 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1350 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1351 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1352 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1354 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1355 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1358 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1359 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1363 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1364 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1365 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1367 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1368 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1369 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1370 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1371 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1372 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1374 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1375 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1380 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1381 * specified EC curve.
1383 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1385 const uint16_t *sigs;
1388 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1389 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1390 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1392 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1393 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1396 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1397 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1401 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1402 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1403 && curve == lu->curve)
1411 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1414 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1416 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1419 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1423 int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1425 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1426 secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1428 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1429 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1430 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1432 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1433 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1434 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1435 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1437 if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1439 else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1441 else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1444 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1445 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1447 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1454 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1455 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1458 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1460 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1461 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1463 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1465 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1468 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1469 /* Should never happen */
1472 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1473 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1474 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1478 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1479 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1480 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1482 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1484 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1485 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1488 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1489 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1490 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1494 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1495 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1496 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1501 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1503 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1504 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1506 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1510 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1511 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1512 int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1514 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1519 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1520 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1521 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1525 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1526 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1527 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1528 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1530 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1535 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1540 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1541 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1542 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1543 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1546 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1547 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1548 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1552 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1557 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1558 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1560 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1561 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1562 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1564 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1565 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1566 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1570 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1571 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1575 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1577 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1579 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1583 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1585 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1587 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1592 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1593 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1594 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1596 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1599 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1601 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1603 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1604 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1605 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1606 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1607 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1610 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1611 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1612 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1613 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1615 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1617 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1618 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1619 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1626 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1627 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1628 * @c: cipher to check
1629 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1630 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1632 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1634 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1636 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1637 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1639 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1641 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1642 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1645 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1646 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1648 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1649 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1650 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1652 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1656 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1659 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1662 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1664 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1666 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1669 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1673 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1674 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1675 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1676 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1677 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1678 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1679 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1681 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1682 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1684 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1685 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1686 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1687 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1689 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1690 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1695 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1696 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1697 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1698 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1706 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1710 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1713 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1715 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1720 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1722 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1723 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1724 * point to the resulting session.
1726 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1730 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1733 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1736 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1737 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1740 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1741 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1743 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1744 if (!ticketext->present)
1745 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1747 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1749 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1750 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1754 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1756 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1757 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1758 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1759 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1762 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1763 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1764 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1765 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1766 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1767 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1769 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1770 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1771 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1772 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1773 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1774 * point to the resulting session.
1776 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1777 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1778 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1780 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1781 unsigned char *sdec;
1782 const unsigned char *p;
1783 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1784 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1786 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1787 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1788 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1789 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1791 if (eticklen == 0) {
1793 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1794 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1796 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1799 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1801 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1802 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1803 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1804 * calculate the master secret later.
1806 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1810 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1811 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1812 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1816 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1817 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1819 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1822 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1824 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1828 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1830 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1833 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1836 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1837 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1838 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1840 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1843 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1844 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1845 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1846 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1847 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1850 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1854 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1860 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1862 /* Check key name matches */
1863 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1864 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1865 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1869 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1871 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1872 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1873 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1875 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1876 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1877 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1878 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1879 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1882 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1883 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1887 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1890 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1892 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1896 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1898 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1899 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1903 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1904 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1905 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1906 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1910 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1911 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1914 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1915 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1916 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1917 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1918 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1919 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1920 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1922 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1925 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1927 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1933 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1937 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1939 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1941 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1945 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1946 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1947 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1951 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1952 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1955 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1957 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1962 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1964 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1967 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1968 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1971 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1972 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1973 * performs any action
1975 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1976 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1977 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1978 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1979 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1980 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1983 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1984 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1985 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1987 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1989 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1990 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1993 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1994 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1995 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1999 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2000 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2001 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2002 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2003 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2007 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2008 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2009 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2010 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2011 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2012 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2013 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2015 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2019 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2023 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2025 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2026 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2027 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2028 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2037 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2038 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2040 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2043 if (lu == NULL || !lu->enabled)
2045 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2046 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2049 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2052 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2053 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2054 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2055 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2058 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2059 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
2062 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2063 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2064 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2065 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2066 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2069 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2070 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2072 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2075 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2076 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2077 * ciphersuites enabled.
2080 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2083 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2084 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2085 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2086 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2088 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2089 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2090 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2093 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2101 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2102 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2103 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2104 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2105 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2109 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2110 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2114 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2116 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2117 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2118 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
2120 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2123 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2124 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2125 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *sigalgs);
2126 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2131 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2135 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2136 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2137 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2138 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2140 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
2143 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2144 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2149 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2150 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2153 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2155 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2158 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2159 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2161 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2162 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2163 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
2164 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2168 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2172 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2173 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
2174 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2175 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2177 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
2178 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2179 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2180 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *ptmp);
2182 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2184 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2186 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2187 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
2198 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2199 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2201 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
2202 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2204 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2206 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2208 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2209 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2210 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2211 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2212 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2213 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2214 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2215 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2216 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2217 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2219 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2220 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2223 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2224 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2228 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2229 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2231 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2233 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2234 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2237 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2241 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2242 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2246 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
2252 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2254 /* Invalid data length */
2255 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
2260 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2261 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2272 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2279 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
2281 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2282 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2284 /* Should never happen */
2285 if (s->cert == NULL)
2289 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2290 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2292 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2293 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2297 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2299 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2302 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2304 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2307 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2310 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2311 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2312 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2314 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2315 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2317 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2318 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
2319 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2324 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2325 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2326 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2328 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2329 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2330 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2333 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2335 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2339 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2341 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2342 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2344 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2346 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2347 if (psignhash != NULL)
2348 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2350 return (int)numsigalgs;
2353 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2354 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2355 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2357 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2358 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2360 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2361 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2363 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2365 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2367 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2368 if (psignhash != NULL)
2369 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2371 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2373 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2374 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2377 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2378 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2382 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2383 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2386 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2388 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2389 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2390 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2391 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2392 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2393 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2394 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2395 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2397 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2398 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2399 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2402 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2403 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2405 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2407 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2409 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2410 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2411 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2414 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2416 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2418 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2420 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2422 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2423 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2424 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2425 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2426 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2427 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2431 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2433 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2434 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2438 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2445 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2446 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2447 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2449 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2451 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2452 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2456 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2460 /* Reject duplicates */
2461 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2462 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2471 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2472 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2474 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2478 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2482 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2485 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2490 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2491 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2494 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2497 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2498 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2499 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2501 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2502 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2503 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2509 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2511 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2516 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2517 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2520 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2522 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2523 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2524 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2526 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2528 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2529 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2534 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2539 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2540 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2541 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2543 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2544 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2545 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2551 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2555 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2557 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2559 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2561 if (default_nid == -1)
2563 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2565 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2567 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2569 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2570 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2571 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2573 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2576 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2578 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2579 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2580 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2581 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2582 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2588 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2589 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2591 const X509_NAME *nm;
2593 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2594 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2595 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2602 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2603 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2604 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2605 * attempting to use them.
2608 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2610 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2611 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2612 /* Strict mode flags */
2613 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2614 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2615 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2617 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2622 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2623 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2626 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2627 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2629 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2632 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2634 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2635 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2637 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2639 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2640 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2649 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2652 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2654 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2655 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2657 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2664 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2665 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2666 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2667 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2668 else if (!check_flags)
2673 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2674 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2676 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2679 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2680 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2682 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2686 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2687 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2690 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2691 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2692 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2696 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2697 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2700 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2701 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2702 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2705 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2706 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2707 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2710 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2711 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2712 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2721 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2722 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2724 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2726 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2727 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2728 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *p);
2730 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2733 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2740 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2741 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2743 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2744 * so check_flags is always set.
2746 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2747 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2748 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2752 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2753 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2754 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2755 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2757 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2764 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2765 else if (check_flags)
2766 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2768 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2769 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2770 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2771 else if (!check_flags)
2774 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2775 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2776 else if (strict_mode) {
2777 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2778 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2779 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2780 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2782 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2789 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2790 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2793 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2794 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2795 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2796 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2797 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2798 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2801 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2804 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2805 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2806 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2810 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2813 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2816 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2818 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2819 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2821 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2822 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2823 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2825 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2826 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2827 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2828 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2829 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2834 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2837 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2839 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2840 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2844 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2845 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2847 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2850 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2854 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2857 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2858 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2865 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2866 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2868 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2869 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2870 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2871 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2872 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2873 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2874 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2875 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2876 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2879 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2880 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2882 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2885 EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2887 EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2889 int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2890 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2891 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2892 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2894 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2895 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2896 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2901 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2903 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2907 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2908 sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, NULL, NULL);
2909 if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2910 dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2912 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2913 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2914 else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2915 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2916 else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2917 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2918 else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2919 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2921 p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2925 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2927 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2930 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2932 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2933 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2936 params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2938 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
2942 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2943 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2944 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2949 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2952 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2955 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2956 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2957 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2958 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2960 secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
2963 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2965 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2968 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2970 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2971 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2972 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2973 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2975 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2977 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2978 if (nid == NID_undef)
2981 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2983 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2986 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2989 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2991 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2992 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2994 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2995 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2997 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2998 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3003 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3004 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3005 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3008 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3010 int rv, start_idx, i;
3012 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3017 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3021 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3022 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3023 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3031 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3032 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3035 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
3037 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3038 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3040 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3042 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3043 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3044 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3047 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3051 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3052 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3054 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3056 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3059 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3060 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3062 const char *mdname = NULL;
3065 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3066 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3068 if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3069 mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3070 supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, s->ctx->libctx,
3077 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3078 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3080 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3081 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3083 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3084 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3089 * This does not differentiate between the
3090 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3091 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3092 * signing certificate.
3094 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3101 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3102 * a viable public key is permitted.
3108 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3109 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3110 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3111 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3112 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3114 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
3116 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3119 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3122 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3123 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3127 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3128 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3130 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
3135 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3138 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3139 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3142 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3146 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3147 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3148 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3150 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3152 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3157 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3158 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3159 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3161 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3162 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3163 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
3164 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3165 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3167 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3168 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3170 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3171 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3174 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3175 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3177 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3179 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3180 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3182 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3183 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3184 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3190 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3197 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3198 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3200 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3201 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3203 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3204 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3205 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3207 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3209 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3212 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3213 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3215 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3216 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3221 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3225 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3226 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3228 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3231 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3233 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3236 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3238 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3242 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3245 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3246 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3249 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3252 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3254 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3255 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3258 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3259 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3261 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3262 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3263 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3265 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3268 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
3271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3273 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3274 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3275 * we have to assume GOST support.
3277 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
3278 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3282 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3286 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3290 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3294 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3299 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3301 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3302 size_t sent_sigslen;
3304 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3308 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3312 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3313 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3314 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3315 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3316 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3319 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3323 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3328 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3332 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3338 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3339 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3340 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3341 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3345 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3347 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3348 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3349 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3353 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3357 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3359 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3360 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3361 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3365 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3369 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3371 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3375 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3377 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3379 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3380 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3385 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3386 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3387 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3392 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3393 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3398 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3404 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3407 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3409 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3415 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3420 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3422 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3424 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3425 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3426 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3427 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3431 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3432 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3437 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3439 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3440 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3442 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3443 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3448 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3451 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3452 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3454 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3455 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3460 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3462 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3463 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3465 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3466 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3471 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3473 char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3475 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3476 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);