2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
176 /* The default curves */
177 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
178 29, /* X25519 (29) */
179 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
180 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
181 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
184 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
189 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t curve_id)
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
194 return &nid_list[curve_id - 1];
197 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
200 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
201 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
208 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
210 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
211 * the length of |pcurves| is num_curves.
212 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
213 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
214 * lists in the first place.
216 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const uint16_t **pcurves,
219 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
222 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
223 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
225 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
226 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
227 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
228 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
229 pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
232 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
233 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
237 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
238 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 1;
242 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
243 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
246 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
247 pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
251 *num_curves = pcurveslen;
255 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
256 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
258 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo;
259 unsigned char ctmp[2];
262 if (curve < 1 || curve > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
264 cinfo = &nid_list[curve - 1];
265 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
266 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
269 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
270 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
271 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
274 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
275 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
277 const uint16_t *curves;
279 size_t num_curves, i;
280 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
281 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
283 curve_id = (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
284 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
286 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
287 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
288 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
290 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
291 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
293 } else /* Should never happen */
296 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
298 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
299 if (curve_id == curves[i])
300 return tls_curve_allowed(s, curve_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
306 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
307 * if there is no match.
308 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
309 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
310 * an tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
312 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
314 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
315 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
318 /* Can't do anything on client side */
322 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
324 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
325 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
327 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
329 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
330 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
332 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
333 /* Should never happen */
336 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
340 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
341 * but s->options is a long...
343 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
344 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
347 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
348 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
352 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
353 uint16_t id = pref[i];
355 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++) {
357 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
367 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
371 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
372 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
377 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
380 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
381 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist));
384 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
385 unsigned long idmask;
387 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
388 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
390 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
403 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
407 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
410 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
412 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
418 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
420 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
422 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
424 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
425 if (nid == NID_undef)
426 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
427 if (nid == NID_undef)
428 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
429 if (nid == NID_undef)
431 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
432 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
434 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
438 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
439 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
443 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
447 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
449 /* Return group id of a key */
450 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
452 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
457 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
458 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
461 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
462 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
466 unsigned char comp_id;
469 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
470 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
472 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
473 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
475 /* Get required compression id */
476 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
477 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
478 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
479 /* Compression not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
482 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
484 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
485 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
486 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
487 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
492 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
493 * supported (see RFC4492).
495 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
498 for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
499 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
504 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
505 static int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id)
507 const uint16_t *groups;
508 size_t i, groups_len;
513 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
514 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &groups, &groups_len))
516 for (i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) {
517 if (groups[i] == group_id)
523 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
527 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
528 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &groups, &groups_len))
532 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
533 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
534 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
535 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
540 for (i = 0; i < groups_len; i++) {
541 if (groups[i] == group_id)
547 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
551 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
553 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
554 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
555 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
557 *pformats = ecformats_default;
558 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
560 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
562 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
567 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
568 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
570 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
574 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
577 /* If not EC nothing to do */
578 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
580 /* Check compression */
581 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
583 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
584 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id))
587 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
590 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
595 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
596 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
597 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
598 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
599 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
601 return 0; /* Should never happen */
602 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
603 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
612 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
614 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
616 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
617 * is compatible with the client extensions.
619 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
621 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
623 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
625 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
627 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
630 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
631 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256);
632 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
633 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384);
640 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
645 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
647 /* Default sigalg schemes */
648 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
651 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
658 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
661 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
671 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
672 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
681 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
683 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
687 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
690 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
691 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
692 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
693 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
694 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
695 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
696 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
697 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
698 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
699 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
700 NID_undef, NID_undef},
701 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
702 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
703 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
704 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
705 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
706 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
708 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
709 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
710 NID_undef, NID_undef},
711 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
712 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
713 NID_undef, NID_undef},
714 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
715 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
716 NID_undef, NID_undef},
717 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
718 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
719 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
720 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
721 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
722 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
724 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
725 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
726 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
727 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
728 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
730 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
731 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
733 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
734 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
735 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
736 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
737 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
738 NID_undef, NID_undef},
739 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
740 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
741 NID_undef, NID_undef},
742 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
743 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
744 NID_undef, NID_undef},
745 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
746 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
747 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
751 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
752 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef},
754 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
755 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
756 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
757 NID_undef, NID_undef},
758 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
759 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
760 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
761 NID_undef, NID_undef}
764 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
765 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
766 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
767 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
768 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
773 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
774 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
776 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
777 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
778 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
779 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
780 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
781 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
782 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
783 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
784 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
787 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
788 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
791 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
793 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
795 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
800 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
801 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
806 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
807 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
810 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
820 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
821 * is fixed by the certificate type.
823 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
829 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
830 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
831 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
833 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
839 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
842 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
844 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
845 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
847 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
851 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
853 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
854 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
857 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
859 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
861 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
864 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
868 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
871 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
875 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
876 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
877 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
878 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
880 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
881 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
890 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
891 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
892 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
894 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
895 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
896 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
897 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
898 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
899 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
901 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
902 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
907 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
908 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
911 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
913 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
914 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
916 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
917 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
918 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
920 /* Should never happen */
923 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
924 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
925 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
929 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
930 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
931 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
933 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
935 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
936 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
939 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
940 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
941 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
948 /* Check point compression is permitted */
949 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
951 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
955 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
956 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
957 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
958 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
960 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
965 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
966 /* Check curve matches extensions */
967 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey))) {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
971 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
972 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
973 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
974 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
976 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
981 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
986 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
987 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
988 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
989 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
994 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1005 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1007 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1008 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1009 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1010 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1011 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1016 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1017 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1021 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1023 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1025 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1030 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1031 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1032 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1034 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1037 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1039 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1041 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1042 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1043 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1044 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1046 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1047 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1048 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1049 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1051 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1053 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1054 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1055 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1061 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1062 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1063 * @c: cipher to check
1064 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1065 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1067 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1069 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1071 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1072 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1074 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1076 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1077 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1080 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1081 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1083 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1084 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1085 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1087 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1090 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1091 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1094 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1097 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1099 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1101 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1104 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1109 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1110 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1111 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1112 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1113 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1114 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1115 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1117 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1118 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1120 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1121 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1122 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1124 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1125 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1130 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1131 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1132 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1133 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1141 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1143 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1146 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1148 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1150 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1152 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1157 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1159 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1160 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1161 * point to the resulting session.
1163 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1164 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1165 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1168 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1169 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1170 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1171 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1172 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1173 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1174 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1177 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1178 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1179 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1180 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1181 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1182 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1184 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1189 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1192 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1195 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1196 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1199 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1202 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1203 if (!ticketext->present)
1206 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1209 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1212 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1213 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1215 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1217 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1218 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1219 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1220 * calculate the master secret later.
1222 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1225 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1226 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1228 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1229 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1230 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1232 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1233 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1235 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1236 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1237 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1240 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1245 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1247 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1248 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1249 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1250 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1251 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1252 * point to the resulting session.
1254 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1255 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1256 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1259 unsigned char *sdec;
1260 const unsigned char *p;
1261 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1262 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1264 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1265 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1266 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1267 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1269 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1270 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1272 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1273 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1275 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1278 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1279 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1280 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1285 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1291 /* Check key name matches */
1292 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1293 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1294 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1297 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1298 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1299 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1300 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1301 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1303 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1308 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1311 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1315 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1317 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1318 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1322 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1323 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1324 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1327 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1328 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1329 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1330 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1332 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1333 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1334 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1335 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1336 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1337 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1338 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1339 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1341 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1343 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1346 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1349 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1353 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1357 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1358 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1359 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1360 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1363 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1364 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1365 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1369 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1370 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1373 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1375 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1379 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1381 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1383 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1384 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1388 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1389 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1391 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1394 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1395 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1397 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1398 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1400 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1401 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1402 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1403 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1404 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1406 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1407 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1409 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1411 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1412 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1413 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1414 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1415 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1416 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1420 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1421 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1425 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1427 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1428 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1429 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1431 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1434 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1435 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1436 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1437 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1442 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1444 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1445 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1446 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1447 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1449 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1452 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1453 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1458 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1459 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1461 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1463 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1466 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1467 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1469 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1470 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1471 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1472 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1480 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1481 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1482 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1483 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1485 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1486 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1487 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1488 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1490 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1491 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1493 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1494 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1505 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1506 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1508 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1509 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1511 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1513 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1515 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1516 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1517 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1518 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1519 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1520 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1521 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1522 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1523 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1524 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1526 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1527 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1530 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1531 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1535 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1536 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1538 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1540 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1543 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1547 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1548 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1552 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1558 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1560 /* Invalid data length */
1561 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1566 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf));
1569 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1577 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1584 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1586 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1587 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1589 /* Should never happen */
1590 if (s->cert == NULL)
1593 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1594 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1599 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1601 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1604 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1607 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1610 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1613 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1614 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1615 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1617 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1618 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1620 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1621 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1622 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1627 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1628 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1629 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1631 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1632 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1633 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1636 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1638 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1642 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1644 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1645 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1647 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1649 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1650 if (psignhash != NULL)
1651 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1653 return (int)numsigalgs;
1656 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1657 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1658 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1660 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1661 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1663 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1664 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1666 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1668 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1670 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1671 if (psignhash != NULL)
1672 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1674 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1676 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1677 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1680 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1681 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1685 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1688 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1690 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1691 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1692 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1693 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1694 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1695 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1696 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1697 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1699 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1700 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1701 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1704 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1705 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1707 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1709 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1711 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1712 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1715 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1717 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1719 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1721 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1722 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1724 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1726 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1728 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1739 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1740 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1743 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || (p != NULL && hash_alg == NID_undef))
1746 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1747 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1750 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1751 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1756 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1757 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1759 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1763 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1767 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1770 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1772 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1777 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1778 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1780 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1782 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1783 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1784 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1786 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1788 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1789 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1794 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1799 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1800 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1801 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1803 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1804 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1805 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1811 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1815 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1819 if (default_nid == -1)
1821 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1823 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1824 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1825 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1830 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1831 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1835 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1836 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1837 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1844 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1845 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1846 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1847 * attempting to use them.
1850 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1852 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1853 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1854 /* Strict mode flags */
1855 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1856 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1857 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1859 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1864 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1865 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1868 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1869 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1871 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1874 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1876 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1877 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1879 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1881 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1882 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1891 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
1894 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1896 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1897 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1899 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1906 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1907 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1908 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1909 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1910 else if (!check_flags)
1915 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1916 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1918 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1921 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1923 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1927 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1928 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1931 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1932 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1933 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1937 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1938 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1941 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1942 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1943 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1946 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1947 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1948 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1951 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1952 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1953 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1962 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1963 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1965 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1967 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1968 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1969 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1971 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1974 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1981 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1982 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
1986 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
1987 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1988 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1989 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
1991 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1998 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
1999 else if (check_flags)
2000 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2002 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2003 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2004 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2005 else if (!check_flags)
2008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2009 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2010 else if (strict_mode) {
2011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2012 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2013 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2014 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2016 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2023 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2024 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2026 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2028 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2031 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2034 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2038 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2041 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2042 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2043 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2047 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2050 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2053 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2055 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2056 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2058 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2059 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2062 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2063 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2064 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2065 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2071 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2076 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2077 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2081 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2082 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2084 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2087 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2091 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2094 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2095 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2102 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2103 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2105 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2106 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2107 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2108 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2109 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2110 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2111 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2112 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2115 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2116 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2118 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2122 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2124 int dh_secbits = 80;
2125 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2126 return DH_get_1024_160();
2127 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2128 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2133 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2135 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2138 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2146 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2147 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2149 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2150 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2158 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2159 return DH_get_2048_224();
2160 return DH_get_1024_160();
2164 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2167 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2170 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2171 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2172 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2173 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2175 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2178 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2180 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2183 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2185 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2186 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2187 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2188 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2190 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2192 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2193 if (nid == NID_undef)
2196 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2198 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2201 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2204 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2206 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2207 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2209 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2210 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2212 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2213 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2218 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2219 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2220 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2223 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2225 int rv, start_idx, i;
2227 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2232 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2236 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2237 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2238 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2246 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2247 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2250 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2252 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2253 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2255 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2256 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2259 /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
2260 if (sig_idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN && !ssl_has_cert(s, sig_idx))
2261 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2263 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2267 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2268 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2270 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2271 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2273 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2274 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2275 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2277 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2279 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2282 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2283 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2285 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2288 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2291 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2292 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2293 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2295 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2296 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2297 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2298 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2299 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2301 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2303 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, lu->sig_idx)) {
2304 if (lu->sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2305 || !ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA))
2307 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2309 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2312 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2314 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2315 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2316 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2319 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2327 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2330 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2332 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2336 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2337 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2339 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2342 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2343 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2348 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2349 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2350 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2351 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2358 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2361 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2362 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2365 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2368 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2370 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2371 if (cc_idx != sig_idx) {
2372 if (sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2373 || cc_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA)
2375 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2379 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2383 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2386 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2392 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2394 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2395 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2397 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2400 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2405 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2406 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2407 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2408 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2411 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2415 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2420 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2423 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2430 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2431 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2432 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2433 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;