2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
819 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
828 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
829 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
835 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
841 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
850 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
853 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
855 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
862 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
865 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
868 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
872 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
873 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
877 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
879 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
883 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
887 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
889 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
890 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
893 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
894 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
898 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
899 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
901 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
902 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
904 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
906 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
907 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
911 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
913 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
915 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
918 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
921 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
922 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
924 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
925 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
927 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
928 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
929 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
930 /* Should never happen */
933 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
934 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
942 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
943 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
944 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
946 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
951 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
956 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
965 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
967 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
970 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
978 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
982 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
983 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
984 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
986 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
989 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
990 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
995 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1001 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1004 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1005 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1008 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1009 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1010 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1011 * session and not global settings.
1014 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1017 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1018 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1019 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1022 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1023 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1024 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1027 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1028 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1031 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1032 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1042 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1047 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1053 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1054 * signature algorithms.
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1072 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1079 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1080 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1090 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1092 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1093 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1102 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1105 unsigned char *ret = p;
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1107 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1109 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1112 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1113 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1115 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1117 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1119 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1120 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1121 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1122 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1131 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1132 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1133 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1138 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1140 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1142 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1143 unsigned long size_str;
1146 /* check for enough space.
1147 4 for the servername type and entension length
1148 2 for servernamelist length
1149 1 for the hostname type
1150 2 for hostname length
1154 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1155 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1158 /* extension type and length */
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1160 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1162 /* length of servername list */
1163 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1165 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1166 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1168 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1172 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1185 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1188 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1198 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1199 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1200 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1202 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1203 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1209 /* check for enough space.
1210 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1211 1 for the srp user identity
1212 + srp user identity length
1214 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1218 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1230 const unsigned char *plist;
1233 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1235 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1236 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1244 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1246 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1249 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1250 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1251 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1253 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1255 if (plistlen > 65532)
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1262 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1264 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1265 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1266 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1267 * resolves this to two bytes.
1270 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1273 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1275 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1278 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1279 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1280 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1281 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1283 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1284 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1285 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1287 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1288 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1290 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1294 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1295 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1297 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1300 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1305 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1311 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1314 const unsigned char *salg;
1315 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1316 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1319 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1321 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1325 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1326 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1328 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1330 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1332 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1343 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1346 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1350 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1352 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1353 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1361 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1368 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1370 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1372 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1373 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1377 /* save position of id len */
1378 unsigned char *q = ret;
1379 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1380 /* skip over id len */
1382 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1388 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1408 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1409 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1410 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1417 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1425 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1426 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1429 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1433 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1435 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1440 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1448 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1449 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1450 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1451 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1452 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1453 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1455 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1456 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1458 if (limit < ret + 6)
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1462 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1464 *(ret++) = list_len;
1465 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1468 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1469 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1472 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1474 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1476 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1477 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1479 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1480 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1481 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1485 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1489 return NULL; /* error */
1490 if (cb_retval == -1)
1491 continue; /* skip this extension */
1493 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1495 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1497 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1502 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1509 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1512 unsigned char *ret = p;
1513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1514 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1517 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1518 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1519 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1520 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1522 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1523 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1527 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1529 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1531 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1533 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1537 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1541 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1552 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1564 const unsigned char *plist;
1566 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1569 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1571 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1572 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1580 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1581 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1582 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1586 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1587 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1589 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1590 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1592 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1597 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1599 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1604 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1605 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1607 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1611 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1617 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1626 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1628 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1630 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1633 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1641 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1642 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1643 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1644 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1645 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1646 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1647 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1648 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1649 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1650 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1651 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1657 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1658 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1663 * 1: peer may send requests
1664 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1666 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1667 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1669 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1675 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1676 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1677 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1679 const unsigned char *npa;
1680 unsigned int npalen;
1683 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1684 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1686 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1689 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1691 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1696 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1698 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1700 size_t authz_length;
1701 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1702 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1703 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1704 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1705 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1707 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1709 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1710 * uint8_t authz_type
1712 * uint8_t data[length]
1714 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1715 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1717 unsigned short length;
1721 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1723 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1727 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1735 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1736 * 2 bytes for extension type
1737 * 2 bytes for extension length
1738 * 1 byte for the list length
1739 * n bytes for the list */
1740 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1742 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1743 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1745 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1746 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1750 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1752 unsigned short length;
1757 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1759 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1762 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1769 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1770 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1774 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1777 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1779 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1781 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1782 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1784 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1785 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1788 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1791 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1795 return NULL; /* error */
1796 if (cb_retval == -1)
1797 break; /* skip this extension */
1798 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1800 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1802 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1810 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1812 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1813 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1815 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1817 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1821 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1825 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1833 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1834 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1835 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1840 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1841 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1842 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1843 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1845 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1846 unsigned short type, size;
1847 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1848 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1849 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1850 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1851 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1852 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1853 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1855 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1856 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1857 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1858 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1861 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1862 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1863 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1864 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1865 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1866 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1867 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1868 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1869 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1870 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1873 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1882 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1885 if (data+size > d+n)
1889 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1891 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1892 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1894 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1896 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1898 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1903 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1905 if (data + len != d+n)
1907 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1911 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1914 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1916 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1917 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1918 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1921 * returns: 0 on success. */
1922 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1923 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1927 const unsigned char *selected;
1928 unsigned char selected_len;
1931 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1937 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1938 * length-prefixed strings. */
1939 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1940 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1949 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1951 proto_len = data[i];
1957 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1963 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1964 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1965 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1966 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1967 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1968 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1969 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1971 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1974 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1975 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1984 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1986 unsigned short type;
1987 unsigned short size;
1989 unsigned char *data = *p;
1990 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1993 s->servername_done = 0;
1994 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1996 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1999 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
2000 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
2001 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
2003 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
2004 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
2007 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2009 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2010 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2014 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2015 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2019 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2020 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2021 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2023 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2024 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2026 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2027 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2029 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2030 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2032 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2033 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2035 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2036 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2038 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2039 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2042 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2046 if (data > (d+n-len))
2049 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2054 if (data+size > (d+n))
2057 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2059 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2060 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2061 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2062 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2064 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2065 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2066 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2067 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2068 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2069 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2070 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2071 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2072 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2073 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2074 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2075 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2076 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2077 the value of the Host: field.
2078 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2079 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2080 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2081 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2085 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2087 unsigned char *sdata;
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2113 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2117 switch (servname_type)
2119 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2122 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2127 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2129 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2132 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2137 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2138 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2139 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2140 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2141 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2142 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2145 s->servername_done = 1;
2149 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2150 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2151 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2163 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2169 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2171 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2178 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2183 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2184 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2186 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2195 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2197 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2198 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2200 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2201 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2203 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2208 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2210 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2211 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2213 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2214 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2216 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2219 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2220 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2223 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2224 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2225 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2226 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2227 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2230 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2232 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2233 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2234 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2236 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2237 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2244 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2246 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2250 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2252 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2255 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2256 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2259 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2260 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2261 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2262 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2263 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2266 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2267 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2270 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2274 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2278 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2285 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2286 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2287 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2289 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2290 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2292 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2299 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2300 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2302 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2306 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2308 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2310 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2312 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2315 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2324 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2335 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2338 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2339 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2343 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2344 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2355 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2357 const unsigned char *sdata;
2359 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2364 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2373 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2381 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2386 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2395 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2396 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2400 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2401 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2403 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2404 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2407 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2408 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2410 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2411 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2416 /* Read in request_extensions */
2419 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2426 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2432 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2434 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2435 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2438 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2439 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2441 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2442 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2444 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2449 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2453 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2456 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2460 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2461 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2463 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2464 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2465 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2467 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2474 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2475 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2477 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2480 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2481 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2482 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2483 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2484 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2485 * anything like that, but this might change).
2487 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2488 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2489 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2490 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2491 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2492 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2496 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2497 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2498 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2500 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2502 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2503 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2506 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2509 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2514 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2516 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2517 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2525 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2527 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2533 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2534 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2535 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2538 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2539 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2540 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2541 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2542 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2544 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2548 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2549 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2550 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2552 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2554 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2555 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2556 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2557 1 /* element size */,
2560 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2563 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2564 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2566 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2573 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2574 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2575 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2576 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2577 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2579 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2581 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2583 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2585 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2586 if (type == record->ext_type)
2590 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2591 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2593 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2600 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2601 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2604 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2605 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2606 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2607 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2608 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2609 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2611 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2612 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2616 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2628 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2630 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2631 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2633 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2635 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2638 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2639 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2640 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2645 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2648 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2650 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2654 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2663 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2664 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2665 * the length of the block. */
2666 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2668 unsigned int off = 0;
2682 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2684 unsigned short length;
2685 unsigned short type;
2686 unsigned short size;
2687 unsigned char *data = *p;
2688 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2689 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2692 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2695 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2697 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2698 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2702 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2703 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2706 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2710 if (data+length != d+n)
2712 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2721 if (data+size > (d+n))
2724 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2725 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2726 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2728 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2730 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2732 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2735 tlsext_servername = 1;
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2739 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2741 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2742 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2744 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2746 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2749 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2750 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2751 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2756 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2757 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2759 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2760 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2761 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2762 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2763 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2766 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2768 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2770 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2771 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2773 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2776 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2779 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2782 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2784 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2785 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2787 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2791 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2794 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2795 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2797 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2801 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2803 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2804 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2806 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2808 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2810 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2817 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2818 * a status request message.
2820 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2822 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2825 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2826 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2829 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2830 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2832 unsigned char *selected;
2833 unsigned char selected_len;
2835 /* We must have requested it. */
2836 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2838 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2841 /* The data must be valid */
2842 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2844 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2847 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2849 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2852 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2853 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2855 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2858 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2859 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2860 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2864 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2868 /* We must have requested it. */
2869 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2871 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2876 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2879 /* The extension data consists of:
2880 * uint16 list_length
2881 * uint8 proto_length;
2882 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2886 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2888 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2892 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2894 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2897 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2898 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2899 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2900 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2902 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2905 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2906 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2909 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2911 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2913 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2916 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2920 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2921 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2923 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2924 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2925 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2927 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2932 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2934 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2939 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2941 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2942 * an authz hello extension if the client
2943 * didn't request a proof. */
2944 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2945 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2947 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2949 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2955 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2959 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2960 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2962 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2966 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2967 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2968 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2969 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2971 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2975 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2978 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2979 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2981 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2984 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2986 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2988 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2989 if (record->ext_type == type)
2991 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
3003 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3007 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
3009 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
3011 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
3013 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
3014 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
3016 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3032 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
3033 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
3034 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
3035 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
3036 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
3037 * absence on initial connect only.
3039 if (!renegotiate_seen
3040 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
3041 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
3043 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3045 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
3053 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3056 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3060 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3062 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3067 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3069 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3070 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
3072 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3073 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3075 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3076 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3081 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3085 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
3086 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3093 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3098 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3100 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3101 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3104 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3105 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3107 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3108 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3112 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3113 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3114 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3115 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3117 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3119 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
3120 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3121 * so this has to happen here in
3122 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3126 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3128 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3131 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3132 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3137 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3138 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3139 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3141 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3143 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3144 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3146 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3147 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3149 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3150 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3152 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3153 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3156 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3159 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3163 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3165 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3166 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3167 * abort the handshake.
3169 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3170 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3178 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3179 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3182 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3183 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3187 s->servername_done=0;
3193 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3195 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3198 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3199 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3200 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3201 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3203 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3206 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3207 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3208 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3209 if (certpkey == NULL)
3211 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3214 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3215 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3217 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3218 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3221 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3222 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3223 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3225 /* status request response should be sent */
3226 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3227 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3228 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3230 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3232 /* something bad happened */
3233 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3234 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3235 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3240 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3245 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3246 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3249 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3250 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3258 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3260 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3261 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3264 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3265 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3266 * it must contain uncompressed.
3268 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3269 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3270 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3271 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3272 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3274 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3276 unsigned char *list;
3277 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3278 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3279 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3281 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3283 found_uncompressed = 1;
3287 if (!found_uncompressed)
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3293 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3294 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3296 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3297 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3298 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3299 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3301 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3302 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3304 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3305 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3307 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3309 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3310 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3313 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3314 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3315 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3316 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3318 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3324 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3327 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3328 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3331 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3332 * there is no response.
3334 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3336 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3337 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3339 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3340 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3343 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3344 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3348 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3349 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3355 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3356 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3359 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3360 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3363 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3364 s->servername_done=0;
3370 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3373 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3375 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3377 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3381 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3389 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3390 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3391 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3393 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3394 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3395 * extension, if any.
3396 * len: the length of the session ID.
3397 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3398 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3399 * point to the resulting session.
3401 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3402 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3403 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3406 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3407 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3408 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3409 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3410 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3411 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3412 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3415 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3416 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3417 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3418 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3419 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3420 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3422 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3423 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3425 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3426 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3430 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3432 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3433 * to permit stateful resumption.
3435 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3437 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3441 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3449 /* Skip past cipher list */
3454 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3459 /* Now at start of extensions */
3460 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3463 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3465 unsigned short type, size;
3468 if (p + size > limit)
3470 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3475 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3476 * currently have one. */
3477 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3480 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3482 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3483 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3484 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3485 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3486 * calculate the master secret later. */
3489 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3492 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3493 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3495 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3497 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3498 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3500 default: /* fatal error */
3509 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3511 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3512 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3513 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3514 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3515 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3516 * point to the resulting session.
3519 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3520 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3521 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3522 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3524 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3525 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3526 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3529 unsigned char *sdec;
3530 const unsigned char *p;
3531 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3532 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3535 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3536 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3539 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3540 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3541 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3542 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3544 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3545 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3556 /* Check key name matches */
3557 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3559 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3560 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3561 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3562 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3564 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3565 * integrity checks on ticket.
3567 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3570 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3574 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3575 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3576 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3577 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3578 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3580 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3581 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3582 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3583 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3584 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3587 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3590 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3591 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3594 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3597 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3601 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3602 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3603 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3604 * as required by standard.
3607 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3608 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3616 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3621 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3629 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3630 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3631 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3632 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3633 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3634 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3635 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3638 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3639 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3640 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3641 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3644 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3647 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3649 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3655 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3658 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3660 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3661 return table[i].nid;
3666 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3671 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3672 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3675 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3678 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3679 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3683 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3685 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3686 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3689 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3694 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3702 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3706 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3707 return EVP_sha224();
3709 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3710 return EVP_sha256();
3712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3713 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3714 return EVP_sha384();
3716 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3717 return EVP_sha512();
3725 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3730 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3731 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3734 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3735 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3738 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3739 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3745 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3746 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3747 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3749 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3750 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3752 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3754 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3755 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3757 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3759 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3761 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3762 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3764 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3768 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3769 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3770 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3772 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3775 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3776 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3777 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3778 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3780 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3781 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3782 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3784 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3785 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3787 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3789 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3791 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3796 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3797 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3798 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3800 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3811 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3812 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3814 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3815 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3817 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3819 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3820 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3821 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3823 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3824 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3826 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3828 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3829 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3832 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3833 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3837 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3838 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3844 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3845 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3847 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3850 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3853 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3854 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3855 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3860 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3862 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3868 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3869 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3870 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3872 /* Should never happen */
3876 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3877 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3879 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3880 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3882 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3884 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3885 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3887 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3888 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3890 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3892 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3894 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3897 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3898 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3899 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3900 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3901 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3903 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3904 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3910 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3911 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3913 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3914 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3916 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3917 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3918 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3919 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3921 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3922 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3927 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3928 * use the certificate for signing.
3930 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3932 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3933 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3936 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3937 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3940 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3942 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3943 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3947 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3948 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3955 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3956 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3957 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3959 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3965 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3972 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3974 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3977 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3978 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3979 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3981 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3982 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3986 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3988 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3990 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3992 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3994 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3995 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4001 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4003 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4004 unsigned short hbtype;
4005 unsigned int payload;
4006 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4008 /* Read type and payload length first */
4013 if (s->msg_callback)
4014 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4015 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4016 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4018 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4020 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4023 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4024 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4025 * payload, plus padding
4027 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4030 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4031 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4033 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4035 /* Random padding */
4036 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4038 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4040 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4041 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4042 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4043 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4045 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4050 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4054 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4055 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4056 * sequence number */
4059 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4062 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4070 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4072 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4074 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4075 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4077 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4078 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4079 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4085 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4086 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4092 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4093 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4099 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4100 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4102 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4104 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4105 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4106 * some random stuff.
4107 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4108 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4109 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4110 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4113 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4116 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4117 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4119 /* Sequence number */
4120 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4121 /* 16 random bytes */
4122 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4124 /* Random padding */
4125 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4127 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4130 if (s->msg_callback)
4131 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4132 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4133 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4135 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4144 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4149 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4152 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4154 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4157 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4158 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4160 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4162 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4164 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4172 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4173 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4174 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4175 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4176 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4177 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4180 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4181 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4182 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4183 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4186 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4188 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4189 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4192 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4193 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4197 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4198 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4199 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4203 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4207 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4210 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4212 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4217 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4218 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4220 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4222 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4223 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4224 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4225 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4227 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4235 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4236 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4237 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4238 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4242 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4243 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4244 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4245 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4251 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4255 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4259 if (default_nid == -1)
4261 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4263 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4264 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4265 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4269 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4270 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4274 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4275 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4277 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4283 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4284 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4285 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4286 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4289 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4291 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4292 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4293 /* Strict mode flags */
4294 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4295 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4296 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4298 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4303 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4304 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4306 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4307 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4310 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4314 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4317 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4319 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4321 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4322 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4325 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4326 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4327 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4329 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4330 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4339 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4342 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4343 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4344 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4346 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4354 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4355 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4356 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4359 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4365 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4366 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4369 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4372 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4373 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4375 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4380 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4381 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4382 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4383 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4384 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4387 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4388 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4389 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4390 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4394 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4395 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4403 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4404 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4407 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4410 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4411 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4413 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4416 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4424 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4425 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4427 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4430 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4432 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4434 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4439 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4447 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4448 else if(check_flags)
4449 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4451 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4452 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4453 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4454 else if (!check_flags)
4457 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4458 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4459 else if (strict_mode)
4461 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4462 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4464 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4465 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4469 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4477 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4479 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4484 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4487 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4490 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4495 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4496 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4497 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4498 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4499 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4504 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4509 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4513 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4514 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4516 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4518 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4520 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4524 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4528 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4531 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4533 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4534 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4536 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4538 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4541 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4543 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4545 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4546 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4548 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4553 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4557 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4559 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4560 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4564 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4566 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4567 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4568 else if (cpk->digest)
4569 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4572 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4574 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4575 * if the chain is invalid.
4579 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4580 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4583 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4584 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4591 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4592 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4594 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4595 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4596 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4597 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4598 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4599 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4601 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4602 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4604 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);