1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #include <openssl/objects.h>
113 #include <openssl/evp.h>
114 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
115 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
116 #include <openssl/rand.h>
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
118 # include <openssl/dh.h>
119 # include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
129 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
143 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
147 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
150 tls1_setup_key_block,
151 tls1_generate_master_secret,
152 tls1_change_cipher_state,
153 tls1_final_finish_mac,
154 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 tls1_export_keying_material,
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
179 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
180 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
188 * http, the cache would over fill
190 return (60 * 60 * 2);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
210 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
211 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
213 s->version = s->method->version;
216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219 int nid; /* Curve NID */
220 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
221 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
224 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
225 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
228 * Table of curve information.
229 * NB: do not delete entries or reorder this array. It is used as a lookup
230 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
233 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
234 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
235 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
236 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
237 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
238 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
239 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
240 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
241 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
242 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
243 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
244 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
245 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
246 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
247 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
248 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
249 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
250 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
251 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
253 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
254 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
255 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
256 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
257 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
258 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
259 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
264 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
265 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
270 /* The default curves */
271 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
272 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
273 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
274 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
275 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
276 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
277 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
278 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
279 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
280 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
281 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
282 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
283 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
284 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
285 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
286 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
287 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
290 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
291 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
292 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
293 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
294 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
295 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
296 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
297 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
298 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
299 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
300 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
301 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
302 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
303 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
304 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
305 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
306 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
308 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
309 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
311 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
312 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
313 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
314 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
315 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
316 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
317 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
329 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
334 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
336 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
337 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
339 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
342 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
345 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
346 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
353 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
355 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
356 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
357 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
358 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
359 * lists in the first place.
360 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
361 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
362 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
364 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
368 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
373 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
374 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
375 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
376 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
377 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
380 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
381 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
385 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
386 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
390 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
391 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
394 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
395 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
399 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
400 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
405 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
410 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
411 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
413 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
416 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
418 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
419 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
420 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
423 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
426 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
427 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
429 const unsigned char *curves;
430 size_t num_curves, i;
431 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
432 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
434 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
436 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
439 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
440 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
442 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
443 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
445 } else /* Should never happen */
448 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
450 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
451 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
452 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
458 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
459 * if there is no match.
460 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
461 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
462 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
464 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
466 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
467 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
469 /* Can't do anything on client side */
473 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
475 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
476 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
478 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
479 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
480 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
481 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
482 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
483 /* Should never happen */
486 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
490 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
491 * but s->options is a long...
493 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
494 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
496 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
497 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
498 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
499 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
501 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
504 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
507 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
509 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
510 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
511 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
513 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
517 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
520 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
521 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
524 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
525 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
533 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
537 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
538 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
540 unsigned char *clist, *p;
543 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
546 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
547 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
550 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
551 unsigned long idmask;
553 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
555 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
564 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
568 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
572 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
575 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
577 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
583 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
585 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
587 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
589 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
590 if (nid == NID_undef)
591 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
592 if (nid == NID_undef)
593 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
594 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
597 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
599 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
603 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
604 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
609 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
613 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
616 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
617 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
622 const EC_METHOD *meth;
625 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
626 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
629 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
632 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
636 /* Determine curve ID */
637 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
638 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
639 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
642 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
651 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
653 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
655 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
657 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
659 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
664 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
665 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
666 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
668 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
669 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
672 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
673 * supported (see RFC4492).
675 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
676 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
677 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
678 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
679 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
682 if (i == num_formats)
687 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
688 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
689 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
691 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
693 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
694 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
695 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
696 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
697 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
701 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
702 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
707 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
714 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
718 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
720 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
721 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
722 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
734 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
735 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
737 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
739 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
742 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
745 /* If not EC nothing to do */
746 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
748 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
752 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
755 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
759 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
760 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
762 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
768 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
769 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
770 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
771 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
774 return 0; /* Should never happen */
775 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
776 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
778 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
780 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
781 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
782 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
784 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
790 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
792 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
794 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
796 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
797 * is compatible with the client extensions.
799 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
801 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
803 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
804 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
805 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
809 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
812 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
813 unsigned char curve_id[2];
814 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
815 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
816 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
817 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
818 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
822 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
823 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
827 /* Need a shared curve */
828 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
832 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
836 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
841 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
844 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
845 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
848 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
849 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
851 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
854 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
855 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
857 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
861 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
863 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
866 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
867 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
868 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
869 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
871 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
872 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
875 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
878 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
879 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
880 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
885 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
886 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
887 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
890 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
893 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
900 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
906 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
907 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
911 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
912 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
913 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
914 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
915 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
916 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
917 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
919 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
920 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
925 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
926 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
928 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
929 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
931 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
932 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
933 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
934 /* Should never happen */
937 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
938 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
944 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
945 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
946 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
948 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
952 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
953 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
956 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
957 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
959 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
962 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
963 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
965 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
971 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
975 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
976 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
977 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
978 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
981 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
982 if (i == sent_sigslen
983 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
984 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
988 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
993 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
994 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
995 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1001 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1003 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1008 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1009 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1010 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1013 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1015 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1016 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1017 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1018 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1019 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1021 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1022 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1023 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1024 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1025 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1026 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1027 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1028 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1029 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1030 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1032 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1034 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1035 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1036 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1041 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1043 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1044 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1045 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1047 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1050 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1052 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1054 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1057 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1058 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1061 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1062 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1064 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1066 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1068 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1069 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1071 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1072 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1074 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1075 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1076 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1077 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1088 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1090 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1091 if (s->renegotiate) {
1094 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1102 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1105 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1112 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1113 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1116 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1117 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1118 unsigned long size_str;
1122 * check for enough space.
1123 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1124 * 2 for servernamelist length
1125 * 1 for the hostname type
1126 * 2 for hostname length
1130 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1132 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1135 /* extension type and length */
1136 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1137 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1139 /* length of servername list */
1140 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1142 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1143 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1145 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1149 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1150 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1151 * Client Hello message */
1153 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1154 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 * check for enough space.
1161 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1162 * 1 for the srp user identity
1163 * + srp user identity length
1165 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1168 /* fill in the extension */
1169 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1170 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1171 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1172 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1180 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1183 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1184 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1186 unsigned char *etmp;
1188 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1190 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1192 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1194 if (num_formats > 255) {
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1200 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1201 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1202 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1203 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1207 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1209 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1210 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1213 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1215 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1217 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1222 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1224 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1225 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1226 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1227 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1228 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1232 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1234 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1235 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1236 ret += curves_list_len;
1238 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1240 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1242 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1243 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1244 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1245 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1246 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1247 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1248 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1250 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1251 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1252 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1255 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1256 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1259 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1262 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1264 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1267 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1273 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1275 const unsigned char *salg;
1276 unsigned char *etmp;
1277 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1278 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1280 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1282 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1284 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1285 /* Fill in lengths */
1286 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1291 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1293 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1297 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1298 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1299 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1305 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1306 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1312 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1315 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1317 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1318 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1320 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1321 /* save position of id len */
1322 unsigned char *q = ret;
1323 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1324 /* skip over id len */
1326 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1332 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1335 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1336 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1337 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1339 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1343 * 1: peer may send requests
1344 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1346 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1347 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1349 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1354 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1356 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1357 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1359 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1366 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1367 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1370 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1371 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1373 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1379 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1380 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1391 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1398 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1399 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1400 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1402 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1406 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1410 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1411 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1412 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1415 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1416 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1418 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1419 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1425 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1427 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1434 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1437 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1441 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1442 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1445 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1446 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1448 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1451 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1452 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1453 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1454 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1459 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1461 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1464 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1469 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1475 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1484 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1487 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1488 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1489 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1492 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1497 const unsigned char *plist;
1500 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1504 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1506 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1508 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1510 if (plistlen > 255) {
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1516 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1517 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1518 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1523 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1526 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1528 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1529 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1531 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1535 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1546 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1547 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1551 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1557 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1565 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1566 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1567 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1568 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1569 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1570 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1571 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1572 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1573 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1574 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1576 if (limit - ret < 36)
1578 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1583 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1584 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1585 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1591 * 1: peer may send requests
1592 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1594 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1595 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1597 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1603 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1604 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1605 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1606 const unsigned char *npa;
1607 unsigned int npalen;
1610 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1612 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1613 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1618 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1620 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1624 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1626 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1627 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1629 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1630 * for other cases too.
1632 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1633 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1634 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1635 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1636 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1643 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1648 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1649 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1650 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1652 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1658 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1664 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1667 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1672 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1673 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1674 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1675 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1678 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1680 unsigned int data_len;
1681 unsigned int proto_len;
1682 const unsigned char *selected;
1683 const unsigned char *data;
1684 unsigned char selected_len;
1687 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1691 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1692 * length-prefixed strings.
1694 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1695 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1696 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1700 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1702 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1704 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1706 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1707 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1708 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1709 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1710 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1711 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1712 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1715 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1716 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1721 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1727 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1728 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1729 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1734 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1735 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1736 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1737 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1739 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1741 unsigned int type, size;
1742 const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1745 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1746 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1747 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1748 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1749 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1750 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1751 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1753 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1754 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1755 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1756 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1759 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1760 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1761 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1762 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1763 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1764 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1765 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1766 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1767 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1768 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1773 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1774 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1775 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1776 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1779 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1782 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1783 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1784 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1786 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1787 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1788 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1790 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1792 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1795 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1797 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1798 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1800 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1804 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1806 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1808 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1813 const unsigned char *data;
1814 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1816 s->servername_done = 0;
1817 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1819 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1822 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1823 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1825 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1826 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1830 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1831 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1832 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1834 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1835 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1836 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1837 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1838 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1843 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1846 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1848 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1851 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1854 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1857 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1860 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1863 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1864 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1866 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1869 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1870 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1872 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1873 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1876 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1878 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1879 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1880 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1881 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1882 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1883 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1884 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1885 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1886 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1887 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1888 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1889 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1890 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1891 * the value of the Host: field.
1892 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1893 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1894 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1896 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1900 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1901 const unsigned char *sdata;
1902 unsigned int servname_type;
1906 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1907 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1910 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1911 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1912 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1913 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1916 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1917 switch (servname_type) {
1918 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1920 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1923 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1924 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1927 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1928 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1929 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1932 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1933 (unsigned char *)s->session
1936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1939 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1940 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1941 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1942 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1943 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1946 s->servername_done = 1;
1949 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
1950 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1953 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1954 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1955 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1956 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1965 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
1966 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1971 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1972 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
1973 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1976 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
1978 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
1981 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
1983 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
1984 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
1989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1990 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1991 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
1993 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
1994 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1999 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2000 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2001 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2002 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2003 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2007 ecpointformatlist_length;
2008 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2009 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2010 ecpointformatlist_length))
2012 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2015 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2016 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2017 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2020 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2021 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2023 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2024 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2025 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2026 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2030 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2033 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2034 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2035 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2036 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2039 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2040 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2041 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2042 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2043 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2045 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2048 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2049 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2053 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2054 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2055 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2056 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2057 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2058 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2059 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2062 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2065 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2066 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2069 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2070 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2071 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2074 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2077 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2078 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2081 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2082 const unsigned char *sdata;
2084 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2085 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2086 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2089 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2091 unsigned int idsize;
2093 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2094 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2095 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2100 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2103 if (data != sdata) {
2104 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2107 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2108 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2109 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2110 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2111 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2114 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2115 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2116 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2121 /* Read in request_extensions */
2122 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2123 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2124 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2129 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2130 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2131 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2132 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2133 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2138 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2141 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2144 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2145 unsigned int hbtype;
2147 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2148 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2153 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2154 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2156 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2157 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2158 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2161 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2168 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2169 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2171 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2174 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2175 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2176 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2177 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2178 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2179 * anything like that, but this might change).
2181 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2182 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2183 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2184 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2185 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2187 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2191 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2192 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2193 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2196 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2197 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2201 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2203 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2204 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2205 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2209 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2210 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2211 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2214 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2215 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2219 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2220 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2221 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2222 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2223 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2226 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2231 /* Spurious data on the end */
2232 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2237 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2239 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2240 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2241 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2243 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2249 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2256 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2257 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2258 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2262 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2271 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2272 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2273 * fill the length of the block.
2275 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2279 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2280 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2281 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2289 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2291 unsigned int length, type, size;
2292 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2293 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2296 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2298 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2300 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2301 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2303 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2304 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2307 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2308 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2311 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2313 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2316 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2322 const unsigned char *data;
2325 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2326 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2329 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2330 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2332 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2333 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2335 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2336 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2337 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2338 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2339 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2342 tlsext_servername = 1;
2344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2345 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2346 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2347 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2348 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2349 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2354 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2355 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2356 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2357 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2360 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2361 ecpointformatlist_length;
2362 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2363 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2364 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2365 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2371 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2373 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2374 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2375 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2376 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2378 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2381 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2382 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2385 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2387 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2389 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2392 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2393 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2396 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2397 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2401 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2402 unsigned char *selected;
2403 unsigned char selected_len;
2404 /* We must have requested it. */
2405 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2406 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2409 /* The data must be valid */
2410 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2411 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2415 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2417 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2418 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2422 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2423 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2424 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2427 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2428 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2429 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2433 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2435 /* We must have requested it. */
2436 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2437 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2441 * The extension data consists of:
2442 * uint16 list_length
2443 * uint8 proto_length;
2444 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2446 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2447 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2448 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2449 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2453 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2454 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2455 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2459 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2463 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2466 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2467 unsigned int hbtype;
2468 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2469 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2473 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2474 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2476 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2477 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2478 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2481 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2487 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2488 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2492 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2493 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2494 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2495 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2496 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2497 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2500 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2501 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2503 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2506 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2507 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2509 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2513 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2514 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2518 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2519 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2520 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2521 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2522 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2523 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2537 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2538 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2539 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2540 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2541 * initial connect only.
2543 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2544 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2545 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2547 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2553 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2556 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2557 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2558 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2567 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2573 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2578 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2580 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2581 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2585 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2586 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2589 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2590 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2594 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2596 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2597 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2598 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2599 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2601 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2603 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2606 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2607 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2610 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2611 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2614 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2615 s->servername_done = 0;
2620 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2621 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2623 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2625 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2628 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2629 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2631 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2632 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2635 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2638 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2639 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2640 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2644 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2648 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2649 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2650 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2651 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2652 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2653 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2654 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2655 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2658 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2659 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2660 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2662 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2666 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2668 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2669 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2673 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2677 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2681 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2683 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2684 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2687 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2688 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2689 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2690 * influence which certificate is sent
2692 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2694 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2695 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2696 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2697 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2698 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2702 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2703 * et al can pick it up.
2705 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2706 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2708 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2709 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2710 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2712 /* status request response should be sent */
2713 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2714 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2715 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2717 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2719 /* something bad happened */
2720 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2721 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2722 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2730 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2731 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2734 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2743 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2745 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2746 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2750 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2751 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2752 * must contain uncompressed.
2754 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2755 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2756 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2757 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2758 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2759 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2760 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2761 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2763 unsigned char *list;
2764 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2765 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2766 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2767 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2768 found_uncompressed = 1;
2772 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2774 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2778 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2779 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2781 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2783 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2784 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2785 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2786 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2788 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2790 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2793 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2794 * that we don't receive a status message
2796 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2797 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2798 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2801 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2802 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2805 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2806 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2809 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2810 s->servername_done = 0;
2816 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2819 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2821 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2822 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2826 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2834 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2835 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2836 * need to be handled at the same time.
2838 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2841 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2842 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2843 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2844 * point to the resulting session.
2846 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2847 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2848 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2851 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2852 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2853 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2854 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2855 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2856 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2857 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2860 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2861 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2862 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2863 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2864 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2865 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2867 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2870 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2871 const PACKET *session_id,
2875 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2878 int have_ticket = 0;
2879 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2882 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2883 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2886 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2889 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2892 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2896 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2897 unsigned int type, size;
2899 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2900 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2901 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2905 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2909 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2911 const unsigned char *etick;
2913 /* Duplicate extension */
2914 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2922 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2925 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2929 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2931 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2932 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2933 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2934 * calculate the master secret later.
2939 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2940 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2944 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2945 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2947 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2948 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2951 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2954 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2955 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2958 default: /* fatal error */
2964 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2965 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2966 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2972 if (have_ticket == 0)
2979 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2981 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2982 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2983 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2984 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2985 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2986 * point to the resulting session.
2989 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2990 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2991 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2992 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2993 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2995 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2996 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2997 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3000 unsigned char *sdec;
3001 const unsigned char *p;
3002 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3003 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3004 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3005 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3006 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3007 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3010 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3011 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3014 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3015 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3016 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3017 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3026 /* Check key name matches */
3027 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3029 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3030 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3031 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3032 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3038 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3041 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3046 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3047 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3048 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3051 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3052 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3053 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3056 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3057 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3058 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3059 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3060 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3062 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3063 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3066 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3072 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3076 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3080 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3081 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3082 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3086 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3087 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3096 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3100 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3101 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3105 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3112 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3113 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3114 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3115 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3116 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3117 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3118 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3119 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3120 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3121 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3124 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3125 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3126 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3127 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3128 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3129 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3130 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3133 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3136 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3137 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3143 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3146 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3147 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3148 return table[i].nid;
3153 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3159 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3162 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3165 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3166 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3170 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3172 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3179 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3182 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3183 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3184 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3185 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3186 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3187 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3188 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3189 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3190 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3191 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3194 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3200 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3202 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3203 return tls12_md_info + i;
3209 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3211 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3212 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3214 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3217 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3220 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3224 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3225 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3228 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3229 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3232 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3233 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3235 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3236 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3237 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3239 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3240 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3249 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3250 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3251 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3253 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3254 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3256 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3257 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3259 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3261 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3262 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3264 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3266 if (psignhash_nid) {
3267 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3268 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3270 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3274 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3275 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3277 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3278 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3279 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3281 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3282 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3284 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3285 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3289 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3290 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3294 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3296 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3297 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3298 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3300 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3301 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3302 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3304 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3305 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3306 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3308 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3309 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3314 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3315 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3320 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3321 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3328 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3330 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3332 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3335 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3336 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3338 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3340 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3341 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3342 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3343 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3346 return tmpout - out;
3349 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3350 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3351 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3352 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3354 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3355 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3356 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3357 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3358 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3360 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3361 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3364 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3365 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3366 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3368 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3378 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3379 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3381 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3382 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3384 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3386 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3388 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3389 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3390 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3391 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3392 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3393 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3394 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3395 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3396 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3397 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3399 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3400 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3403 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3404 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3408 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3409 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3411 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3413 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3416 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3420 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3421 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3425 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3427 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3430 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3431 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3433 /* Should never happen */
3437 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3438 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3439 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3441 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3442 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3446 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3451 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3452 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3454 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3455 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3458 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3459 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3461 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3462 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3464 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3466 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3468 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3470 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3471 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3473 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3474 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3475 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3476 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3482 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3483 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3484 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3485 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3486 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3488 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3489 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3490 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3491 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3497 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3498 * the certificate for signing.
3500 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3502 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3503 * supported it stays as NULL.
3505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3506 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3507 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3510 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3511 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3512 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3516 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3517 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3519 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3520 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3521 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3522 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3523 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3524 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3525 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3531 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3532 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3533 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3535 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3540 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3547 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3549 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3552 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3553 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3554 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3556 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3557 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3561 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3563 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3565 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3567 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3569 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3570 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3573 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3577 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3580 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3582 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3583 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3584 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3585 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3586 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3587 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3589 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3590 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3591 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3595 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3597 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3600 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3603 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3605 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3607 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3609 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3617 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3618 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3620 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3623 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3624 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3627 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3628 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3633 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3634 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3636 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3640 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3644 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3647 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3650 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3655 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3656 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3658 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3659 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3660 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3662 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3669 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3670 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3671 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3673 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3674 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3675 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3681 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3685 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3689 if (default_nid == -1)
3691 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3693 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3694 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3695 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3700 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3701 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3705 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3706 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3707 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3714 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3715 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3716 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3717 * attempting to use them.
3720 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3722 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3723 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3724 /* Strict mode flags */
3725 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3726 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3727 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3729 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3734 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3735 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3738 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3739 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3741 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3744 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3746 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3747 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3749 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3751 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3752 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3756 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3758 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3759 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3767 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3770 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3772 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3773 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3775 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3782 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3783 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3784 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3785 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3786 else if (!check_flags)
3791 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3792 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3794 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3796 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3797 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3799 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3802 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3803 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3804 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3805 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3808 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3809 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3810 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3814 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3815 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3818 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3819 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3820 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3823 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3824 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3825 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3828 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3829 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3830 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3839 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3840 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3842 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3844 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3845 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3846 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3849 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3856 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3857 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3861 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3862 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3863 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3864 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3866 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3873 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3874 else if (check_flags)
3875 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3877 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3878 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3879 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3880 else if (!check_flags)
3883 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3884 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3885 else if (strict_mode) {
3886 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3887 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3888 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3889 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3891 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3898 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3899 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3901 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3903 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3906 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3909 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3913 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3917 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3919 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3920 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3922 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3923 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3924 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3928 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3933 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3935 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3936 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3938 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3939 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3940 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3942 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3943 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3944 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3945 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3946 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3951 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3954 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3956 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3957 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3961 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3962 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3963 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3964 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3965 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3967 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3970 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3974 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3977 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3978 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3985 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3986 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3988 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3989 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3990 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3991 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3992 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3993 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3994 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3997 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3998 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4000 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4005 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4007 int dh_secbits = 80;
4008 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4009 return DH_get_1024_160();
4010 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4011 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4016 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4017 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4020 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4026 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4027 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4028 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4030 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4031 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4037 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4038 return DH_get_2048_224();
4039 return DH_get_1024_160();
4043 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4046 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4049 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4050 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4051 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4052 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4054 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4057 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4059 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4062 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4064 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4065 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4066 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4067 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4069 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4070 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4072 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4073 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4076 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4078 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4081 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4084 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4086 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4087 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4089 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4090 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4092 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4093 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4098 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4099 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4100 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4103 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4105 int rv, start_idx, i;
4107 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4112 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4116 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4117 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4118 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);