2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
151 tls1_setup_key_block,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 tls1_export_keying_material,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
169 tls1_setup_key_block,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 s->version = s->method->version;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
217 int nid; /* Curve NID */
218 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
219 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
222 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
223 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
225 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
226 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
256 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
262 /* The default curves */
263 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
264 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
265 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
266 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
267 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
268 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
272 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
273 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
279 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
283 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
286 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
287 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
288 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
289 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
290 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
291 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
293 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
294 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
295 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
296 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
297 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
298 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
300 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
301 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
303 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
306 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
307 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
308 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
309 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
310 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
311 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
312 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
313 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
315 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
316 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
321 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
322 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
323 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
326 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
328 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
329 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
331 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
334 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
336 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
340 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
342 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
344 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
346 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
348 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
350 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
352 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
354 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
356 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
358 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
360 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
362 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
364 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
366 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
368 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
370 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
372 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
374 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
376 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
378 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
380 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
382 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
384 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
386 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
388 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
400 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
402 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
403 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
404 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
405 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
406 * lists in the first place.
407 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
408 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
409 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
411 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
412 const unsigned char **pcurves,
415 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
417 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
418 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
421 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
422 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
423 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
437 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
438 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
441 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
442 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
446 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
447 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
457 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
458 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
460 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
463 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
465 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
466 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
467 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
470 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
473 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
474 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
476 const unsigned char *curves;
477 size_t num_curves, i;
478 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
479 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
481 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
483 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
486 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
487 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
490 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
492 } else /* Should never happen */
495 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
497 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
498 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
499 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
505 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
506 * if there is no match.
507 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
508 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
509 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
511 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
513 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
514 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
516 /* Can't do anything on client side */
520 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
522 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
523 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
525 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
526 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
527 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
528 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
529 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
530 /* Should never happen */
533 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
537 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
538 * but s->options is a long...
540 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
541 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
543 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
544 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
545 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
546 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
548 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
551 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
554 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
556 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
557 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
558 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
560 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
564 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
565 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
566 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
567 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
568 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
571 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
572 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
580 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
584 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
585 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
587 unsigned char *clist, *p;
590 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
593 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
594 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
597 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
598 unsigned long idmask;
600 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
602 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
611 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
615 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
619 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
622 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
624 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
630 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
632 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
634 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
636 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
637 if (nid == NID_undef)
638 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
639 if (nid == NID_undef)
640 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
641 if (nid == NID_undef)
643 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
644 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
646 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
650 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
651 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
656 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
660 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
663 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
664 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
669 const EC_METHOD *meth;
672 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
673 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
676 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
679 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
683 /* Determine curve ID */
684 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
685 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
686 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
689 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
698 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
700 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
702 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
704 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
706 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
711 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
712 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
713 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
715 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
716 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
719 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
720 * supported (see RFC4492).
722 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
723 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
724 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
725 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
726 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
729 if (i == num_formats)
734 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
735 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
736 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
738 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
740 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
741 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
742 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
743 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
744 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
748 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
749 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
754 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
761 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
765 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
767 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
768 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
769 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
771 *pformats = ecformats_default;
772 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
774 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
776 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
781 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
782 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
784 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
786 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
789 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
792 /* If not EC nothing to do */
793 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
795 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
799 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
802 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
806 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
807 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
809 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
815 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
816 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
817 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
818 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
819 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
821 return 0; /* Should never happen */
822 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
823 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
825 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
827 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
828 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
829 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
831 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
837 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
839 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
841 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
843 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
844 * is compatible with the client extensions.
846 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
848 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
850 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
851 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
852 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
856 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
859 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
860 unsigned char curve_id[2];
861 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
862 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
863 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
864 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
865 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
869 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
870 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
874 /* Need a shared curve */
875 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
879 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
883 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
888 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
891 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
892 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
895 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
896 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
901 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
902 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
908 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
910 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
913 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
914 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
915 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
916 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
918 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
919 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
920 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
921 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
925 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
926 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
927 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
932 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
933 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
934 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
937 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
940 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
944 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
945 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
946 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
947 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
949 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
950 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
953 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
954 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
958 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
959 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
960 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
961 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
962 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
963 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
964 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
966 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
967 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
972 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
973 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
975 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
976 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
978 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
979 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
980 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
981 /* Should never happen */
984 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
985 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
990 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
991 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
992 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
993 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
995 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
999 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1000 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1003 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1004 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1006 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1009 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1010 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1012 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1018 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1022 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1023 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1024 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1025 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1028 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1029 if (i == sent_sigslen
1030 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1031 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1035 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1040 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1041 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1042 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1048 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1050 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1055 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1056 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1057 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1060 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1062 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1063 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1064 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1065 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1066 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1068 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1069 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1070 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1071 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1072 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1074 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1077 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1078 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
1079 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1080 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1081 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1084 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1085 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1087 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1089 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1090 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1091 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1096 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1098 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1099 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1100 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1102 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1105 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1107 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1109 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1112 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1113 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1116 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1117 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1121 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1123 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1124 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1126 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1127 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1129 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1130 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1131 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1132 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1143 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1145 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1146 if (s->renegotiate) {
1149 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1157 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1160 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1168 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1171 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1172 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1173 unsigned long size_str;
1177 * check for enough space.
1178 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1179 * 2 for servernamelist length
1180 * 1 for the hostname type
1181 * 2 for hostname length
1185 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1187 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1190 /* extension type and length */
1191 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1192 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1194 /* length of servername list */
1195 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1197 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1198 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1200 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1204 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1205 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1206 * Client Hello message */
1208 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1209 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 * check for enough space.
1216 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1217 * 1 for the srp user identity
1218 * + srp user identity length
1220 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1223 /* fill in the extension */
1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1225 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1226 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1235 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1238 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1239 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1241 unsigned char *etmp;
1243 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1245 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1247 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1249 if (num_formats > 255) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1254 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1255 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1256 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1257 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1258 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1262 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1264 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1265 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1268 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1270 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1272 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1277 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1279 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1280 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1281 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1282 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1283 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1287 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1289 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1290 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1291 ret += curves_list_len;
1293 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1295 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1297 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1298 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1299 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1300 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1301 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1302 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1303 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1305 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1306 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1307 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1310 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1311 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1314 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1317 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1319 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1322 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1330 const unsigned char *salg;
1331 unsigned char *etmp;
1332 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1333 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1337 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1339 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1340 /* Fill in lengths */
1341 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1346 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1348 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1352 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1353 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1354 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1360 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1361 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1370 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1372 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1373 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1376 /* save position of id len */
1377 unsigned char *q = ret;
1378 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1379 /* skip over id len */
1381 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1387 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1390 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1391 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1397 * 1: peer may send requests
1398 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1400 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1401 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1407 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1409 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1410 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1412 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1419 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1420 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1423 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1424 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1425 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1426 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1429 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1432 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1433 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1444 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1452 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1453 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1455 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1456 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1463 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1464 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1465 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1468 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1469 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1471 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1472 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1478 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1480 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1487 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1490 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1494 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1495 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1498 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1499 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1501 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1504 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1505 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1506 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1507 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1508 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1513 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1515 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1518 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1523 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1526 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1529 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1538 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1541 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1542 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1543 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1546 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1551 const unsigned char *plist;
1554 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1558 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1560 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1562 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1564 if (plistlen > 255) {
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1570 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1571 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1572 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1577 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1580 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1582 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1583 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1585 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1589 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1590 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1597 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1600 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1601 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1611 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1620 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1621 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1622 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1623 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1624 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1625 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1626 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1627 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1628 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1630 if (limit - ret < 36)
1632 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1637 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1638 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1639 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1641 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1645 * 1: peer may send requests
1646 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1648 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1649 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1651 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1657 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1658 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1659 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1660 const unsigned char *npa;
1661 unsigned int npalen;
1664 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1666 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1667 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1668 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1672 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1674 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1678 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1680 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1681 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1683 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1684 * for other cases too.
1686 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1687 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1688 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1689 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1690 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1697 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1698 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1702 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1703 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1704 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1706 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1708 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1712 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1718 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1721 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1726 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1727 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1728 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1729 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1732 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1734 unsigned int data_len;
1735 unsigned int proto_len;
1736 const unsigned char *selected;
1737 unsigned char *data;
1738 unsigned char selected_len;
1741 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1745 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1746 * length-prefixed strings.
1748 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1749 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1750 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1754 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1756 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1758 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1760 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1761 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1762 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1763 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1764 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1765 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1766 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1769 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1770 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1775 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1781 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1782 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1783 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1788 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1789 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1790 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1791 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1793 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1795 unsigned int type, size;
1796 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1799 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1800 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1801 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1802 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1803 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1804 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1805 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1807 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1808 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1809 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1810 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1813 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1814 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1815 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1816 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1817 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1818 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1819 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1820 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1821 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1822 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1827 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1828 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1829 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1830 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1833 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1836 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1837 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1838 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1840 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1841 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1842 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1844 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1846 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1849 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1851 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1852 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1854 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1858 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1860 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1862 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1867 unsigned char *data;
1868 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1870 s->servername_done = 0;
1871 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1876 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1877 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1879 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1880 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1884 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1885 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1886 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1888 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1889 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1890 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1891 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1892 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1897 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1900 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1902 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1905 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1908 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1911 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1914 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1917 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1918 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1920 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1923 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1924 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1926 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1927 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1930 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1932 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1933 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1934 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1935 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1936 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1937 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1938 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1939 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1940 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1941 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1942 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1943 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1944 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1945 * the value of the Host: field.
1946 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1947 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1948 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1950 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1954 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1955 unsigned char *sdata;
1956 unsigned int servname_type;
1960 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1961 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1964 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1965 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1966 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1967 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1970 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1971 switch (servname_type) {
1972 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1974 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1977 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1978 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1981 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1982 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1983 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1986 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1987 (unsigned char *)s->session
1990 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1993 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1994 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1995 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1996 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1997 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2000 s->servername_done = 1;
2003 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2004 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2008 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2009 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2010 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2019 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2020 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2025 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2026 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2027 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2030 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2032 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2035 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2037 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2038 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2044 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2045 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2047 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2048 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2052 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2053 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2054 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2055 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2056 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2061 ecpointformatlist_length;
2062 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2063 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2064 ecpointformatlist_length))
2066 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2069 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2070 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2071 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2075 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2077 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2078 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2079 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2080 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2084 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2087 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2088 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2089 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2090 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2093 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2094 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2095 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2096 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2097 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2099 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2102 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2103 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2107 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2108 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2109 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2110 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2111 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2112 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2113 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2116 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2119 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2120 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2123 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2124 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2125 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2128 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2131 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2132 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2135 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2136 const unsigned char *sdata;
2138 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2139 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2140 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2143 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2145 unsigned int idsize;
2147 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2148 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2149 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2154 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2157 if (data != sdata) {
2158 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2161 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2162 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2163 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2164 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2165 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2168 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2169 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2170 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 /* Read in request_extensions */
2176 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2177 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2178 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2183 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2184 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2185 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2186 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2187 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2192 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2195 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2198 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2199 unsigned int hbtype;
2201 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2202 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2203 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2207 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2208 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2210 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2211 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2212 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2215 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2221 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2222 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2223 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2225 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2228 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2229 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2230 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2231 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2232 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2233 * anything like that, but this might change).
2235 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2236 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2237 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2238 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2239 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2241 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2245 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2246 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2247 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2250 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2251 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2255 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2257 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2258 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2259 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2263 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2264 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2265 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2268 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2269 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2273 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2274 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2275 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2276 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2277 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2280 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2285 /* Spurious data on the end */
2286 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2291 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2293 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2294 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2295 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2297 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2310 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2311 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2316 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2325 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2326 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2327 * fill the length of the block.
2329 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2333 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2334 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2335 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2343 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2345 unsigned int length, type, size;
2346 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2347 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2350 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2352 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2354 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2355 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2357 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2358 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2361 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2362 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2365 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2367 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2370 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2376 unsigned char *data;
2379 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2380 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2383 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2384 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2386 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2387 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2389 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2390 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2391 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2392 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2393 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2396 tlsext_servername = 1;
2398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2399 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2400 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2401 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2402 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2403 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2407 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2408 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2409 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2410 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2411 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2414 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2415 ecpointformatlist_length;
2416 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2417 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2418 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2427 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2428 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2429 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2430 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2432 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2435 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2439 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2443 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2446 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2450 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2451 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2454 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2455 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2456 unsigned char *selected;
2457 unsigned char selected_len;
2458 /* We must have requested it. */
2459 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2463 /* The data must be valid */
2464 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2465 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2469 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2471 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2472 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2473 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2476 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2477 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2478 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2481 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2482 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2483 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2487 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2489 /* We must have requested it. */
2490 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2491 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2495 * The extension data consists of:
2496 * uint16 list_length
2497 * uint8 proto_length;
2498 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2500 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2501 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2502 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2503 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2504 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2507 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2508 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2509 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2513 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2517 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2521 unsigned int hbtype;
2522 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2523 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2527 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2528 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2530 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2531 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2532 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2535 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2541 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2542 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2546 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2547 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2548 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2549 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2550 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2551 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2554 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2555 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2557 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2560 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2561 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2563 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2567 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2568 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2572 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2573 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2574 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2575 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2576 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2577 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2581 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2590 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2591 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2592 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2593 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2594 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2595 * initial connect only.
2597 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2598 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2599 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2601 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2607 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2610 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2611 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2612 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2621 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2627 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2632 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2634 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2635 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2639 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2640 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2643 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2644 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2648 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2650 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2651 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2652 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2653 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2655 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2657 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2660 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2661 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2664 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2665 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2668 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2669 s->servername_done = 0;
2674 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2675 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2677 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2679 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2682 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2683 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2685 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2686 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2689 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2692 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2693 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2694 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2698 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2702 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2703 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2704 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2705 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2706 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2707 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2708 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2709 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2712 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2713 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2714 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2719 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2720 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2722 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2723 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2727 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2731 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2735 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2737 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2738 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2741 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2742 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2743 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2744 * influence which certificate is sent
2746 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2748 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2749 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2750 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2751 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2752 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2756 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2757 * et al can pick it up.
2759 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2760 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2762 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2764 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2766 /* status request response should be sent */
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2768 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2769 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2773 /* something bad happened */
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2775 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2776 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2784 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2785 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2797 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2799 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2800 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2804 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2805 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2806 * must contain uncompressed.
2808 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2809 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2810 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2811 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2812 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2813 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2814 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2815 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2816 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2818 unsigned char *list;
2819 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2820 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2821 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2822 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2823 found_uncompressed = 1;
2827 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2829 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2833 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2834 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2836 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2838 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2839 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2840 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2841 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2843 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2845 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2848 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2849 * that we don't receive a status message
2851 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2852 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2853 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2856 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2857 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2861 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2865 s->servername_done = 0;
2871 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2874 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2876 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2877 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2881 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2889 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2890 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2891 * need to be handled at the same time.
2893 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2896 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2897 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2898 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2899 * point to the resulting session.
2901 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2902 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2903 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2906 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2907 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2908 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2909 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2910 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2911 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2912 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2915 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2916 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2917 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2918 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2919 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2920 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2922 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2925 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2926 const PACKET *session_id,
2930 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2933 int have_ticket = 0;
2934 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2937 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2938 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2941 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2944 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2947 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2951 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2952 unsigned int type, size;
2954 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2955 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2956 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2960 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2964 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2966 unsigned char *etick;
2968 /* Duplicate extension */
2969 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2977 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2980 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2984 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2986 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2987 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2988 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2989 * calculate the master secret later.
2994 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2995 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2999 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3000 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3002 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3003 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3006 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3009 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3010 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3013 default: /* fatal error */
3019 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3020 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3021 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3027 if (have_ticket == 0)
3034 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3036 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3037 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3038 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3039 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3040 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3041 * point to the resulting session.
3044 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3045 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3046 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3047 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3048 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3050 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3051 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3052 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3055 unsigned char *sdec;
3056 const unsigned char *p;
3057 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3058 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3059 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3061 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3062 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3065 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3066 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3069 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3070 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3071 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3072 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3081 /* Check key name matches */
3082 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3084 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3085 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3086 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3087 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3093 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3096 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3101 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3102 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3103 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3106 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3107 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3108 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3111 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3112 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3113 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3114 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3115 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3117 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3118 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3121 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3122 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3127 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3130 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3134 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3135 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3136 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3140 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3141 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3150 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3154 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3155 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3159 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3166 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3167 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3168 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3169 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3170 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3171 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3172 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3173 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3174 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3175 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3178 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3179 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3180 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3181 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3182 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3183 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3184 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3187 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3190 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3191 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3197 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3200 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3201 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3202 return table[i].nid;
3207 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3213 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3216 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3219 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3220 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3224 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3226 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3233 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3236 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3237 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3238 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3239 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3240 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3241 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3242 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3243 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3244 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3245 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3248 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3254 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3256 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3257 return tls12_md_info + i;
3263 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3265 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3266 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3268 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3271 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3274 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3278 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3279 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3283 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3286 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3287 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3289 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3290 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3291 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3293 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3294 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3296 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3297 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3303 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3304 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3305 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3307 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3308 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3310 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3311 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3313 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3315 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3316 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3318 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3320 if (psignhash_nid) {
3321 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3322 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3324 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3328 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3329 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3331 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3332 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3333 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3335 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3336 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3338 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3339 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3343 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3344 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3348 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3350 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3351 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3352 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3354 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3355 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3356 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3358 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3359 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3360 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3362 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3363 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3368 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3369 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3374 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3375 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3382 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3384 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3386 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3389 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3390 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3392 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3394 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3395 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3396 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3397 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3400 return tmpout - out;
3403 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3404 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3405 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3406 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3408 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3409 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3410 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3411 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3412 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3414 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3415 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3418 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3419 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3420 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3422 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3432 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3433 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3435 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3436 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3438 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3440 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3442 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3443 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3444 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3445 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3446 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3447 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3448 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3449 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3450 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3451 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3453 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3454 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3457 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3458 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3462 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3463 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3465 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3467 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3470 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3474 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3475 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3479 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3481 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3484 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3485 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3487 /* Should never happen */
3491 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3492 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3493 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3495 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3496 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3500 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3505 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3506 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3508 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3509 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3512 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3513 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3515 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3516 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3518 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3520 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3522 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3524 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3525 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3527 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3528 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3529 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3530 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3536 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3537 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3538 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3539 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3540 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3542 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3543 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3544 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3545 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3551 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3552 * the certificate for signing.
3554 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3556 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3557 * supported it stays as NULL.
3559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3560 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3561 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3564 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3565 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3566 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3570 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3571 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3573 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3574 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3575 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3576 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3577 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3578 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3579 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3585 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3586 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3587 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3589 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3594 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3601 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3603 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3606 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3607 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3608 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3610 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3611 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3615 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3617 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3619 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3621 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3623 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3624 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3628 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3631 unsigned short hbtype;
3632 unsigned int payload;
3633 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3635 if (s->msg_callback)
3636 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3638 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3640 /* Read type and payload length first */
3641 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3642 return 0; /* silently discard */
3645 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3646 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3649 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3650 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3654 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3655 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3657 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3658 if (buffer == NULL) {
3659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3664 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3665 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3667 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3669 /* Random padding */
3670 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3671 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3675 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3676 3 + payload + padding);
3678 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3679 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3680 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3681 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3683 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3687 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3691 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3692 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3696 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3698 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3705 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3707 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3709 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3710 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3712 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3713 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3714 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3719 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3720 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3725 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3726 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3732 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3733 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3734 * some random stuff.
3735 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3736 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3737 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3738 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3741 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3748 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3749 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3751 /* Sequence number */
3752 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3753 /* 16 random bytes */
3754 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3759 /* Random padding */
3760 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3765 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3767 if (s->msg_callback)
3768 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3769 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3770 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3772 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3781 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3785 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3788 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3790 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3791 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3792 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3793 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3794 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3795 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3797 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3798 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3799 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3803 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3805 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3808 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3811 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3813 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3815 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3817 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3825 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3826 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3828 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3831 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3832 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3835 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3836 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3841 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3842 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3844 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3848 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3852 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3855 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3858 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3863 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3864 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3866 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3867 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3868 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3870 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3877 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3878 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3879 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3881 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3882 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3883 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3889 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3893 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3897 if (default_nid == -1)
3899 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3901 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3902 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3903 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3908 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3909 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3913 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3914 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3915 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3922 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3923 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3924 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3925 * attempting to use them.
3928 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3930 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3931 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3932 /* Strict mode flags */
3933 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3934 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3935 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3937 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3942 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3943 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3946 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3947 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3949 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3952 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3954 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3955 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3957 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3959 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3960 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3963 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3964 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3965 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3966 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3967 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3975 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3978 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3980 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3981 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3983 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3990 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3991 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3992 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3993 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3994 else if (!check_flags)
3999 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4000 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4002 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4004 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4005 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4007 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4010 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4011 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4012 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4013 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4016 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4017 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4018 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4022 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4023 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4026 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4027 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4028 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4031 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4032 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4033 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4036 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4037 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4038 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4047 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4048 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4050 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4052 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4053 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4054 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4057 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4064 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4065 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4069 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4070 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4071 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4072 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4074 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4081 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4082 else if (check_flags)
4083 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4085 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4086 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4087 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4088 else if (!check_flags)
4091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4092 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4093 else if (strict_mode) {
4094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4095 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4096 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4097 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4099 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4106 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4107 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4111 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4114 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4117 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4121 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4125 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4127 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4128 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4130 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4131 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4132 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4136 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4139 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4141 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4143 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4144 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4146 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4147 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4148 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4150 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4151 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4152 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4153 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4154 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4159 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4162 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4164 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4165 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4169 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4170 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4171 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4172 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4173 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4175 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4178 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4182 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4185 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4186 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4193 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4194 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4196 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4197 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4198 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4199 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4200 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4201 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4202 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4205 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4206 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4208 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4213 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4215 int dh_secbits = 80;
4216 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4217 return DH_get_1024_160();
4218 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4219 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4224 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4225 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4228 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4234 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4235 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4236 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4238 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4239 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4245 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4246 return DH_get_2048_224();
4247 return DH_get_1024_160();
4251 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4254 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4257 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4258 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4259 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4260 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4262 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4265 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4267 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4270 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4272 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4273 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4274 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4275 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4277 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4278 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4281 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4283 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4286 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4289 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4291 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4292 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4294 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4295 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4297 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4298 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4303 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4304 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4305 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4308 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4310 int rv, start_idx, i;
4312 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4317 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4321 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4322 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4323 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);