2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1465 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1488 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
1490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1495 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1496 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1498 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1499 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1501 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1503 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1504 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1505 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1506 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1508 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1510 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1512 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1518 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1520 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1525 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1528 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1532 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1535 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1536 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1538 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1541 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1542 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1543 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1544 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1546 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1547 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1551 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1553 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1557 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1561 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1565 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1576 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1588 const unsigned char *plist;
1590 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1593 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1595 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1596 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1604 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1605 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1606 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1610 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1611 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1613 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1620 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1622 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1627 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1628 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1630 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1634 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1637 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1640 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1645 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1649 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1651 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1653 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1656 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1665 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1666 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1667 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1668 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1669 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1670 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1671 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1672 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1673 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1674 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1680 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1681 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1683 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1685 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1688 * 1: peer may send requests
1689 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1691 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1692 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1694 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1700 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1701 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1702 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1704 const unsigned char *npa;
1705 unsigned int npalen;
1708 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1709 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1711 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1712 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1714 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1716 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1720 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1722 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1723 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1725 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD, RC4 or SSL 3.0:
1726 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1729 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1730 || s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1731 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1734 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1740 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1742 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1743 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1745 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1747 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1751 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1755 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1758 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1762 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1764 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1765 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1766 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1769 * returns: 0 on success. */
1770 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1771 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1775 const unsigned char *selected;
1776 unsigned char selected_len;
1779 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1785 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1786 * length-prefixed strings. */
1787 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1788 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1797 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1799 proto_len = data[i];
1805 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1811 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1812 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1813 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1814 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1816 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1817 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1819 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1822 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1823 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1833 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1834 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1835 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1840 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1841 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1842 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1843 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1845 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1846 unsigned short type, size;
1847 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1848 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1849 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1850 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1851 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1852 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1853 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1855 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1856 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1857 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1858 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1861 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1862 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1863 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1864 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1865 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1866 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1867 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1868 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1869 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1870 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1873 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1882 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1885 if (data+size > d+n)
1889 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1891 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1892 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1894 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1896 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1898 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1903 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1905 if (data + len != d+n)
1907 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1911 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1913 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1916 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1918 unsigned short type;
1919 unsigned short size;
1921 unsigned char *data = *p;
1922 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1925 s->servername_done = 0;
1926 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1928 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1931 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1933 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1934 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1938 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1939 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1943 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1944 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1945 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1947 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1948 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1950 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1951 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1953 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1954 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1956 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1957 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1959 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1960 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1962 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1963 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1966 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1967 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1970 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1974 if (data > (d+n-len))
1977 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1982 if (data+size > (d+n))
1985 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1987 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1988 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1989 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1990 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1992 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1993 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1994 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1995 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1996 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1997 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1998 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1999 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2000 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2001 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2002 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2003 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2004 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2005 the value of the Host: field.
2006 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2007 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2008 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2009 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2013 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2015 unsigned char *sdata;
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2045 switch (servname_type)
2047 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2050 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2060 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2066 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2067 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2068 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2069 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2073 s->servername_done = 1;
2077 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2078 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2079 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2097 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2099 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2106 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2111 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2112 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2114 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2123 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2125 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2126 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2128 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2129 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2131 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2138 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2139 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2141 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2142 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2147 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2148 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2151 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2152 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2153 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2154 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2155 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2160 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2161 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2162 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2164 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2165 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2174 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2178 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2180 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2187 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2188 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2189 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2190 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2191 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2194 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2195 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2196 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2198 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2202 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2206 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2213 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2214 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2215 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2217 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2218 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2220 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2227 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2228 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2236 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2238 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2243 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2245 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2255 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2263 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2266 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2267 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2282 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2284 const unsigned char *sdata;
2286 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2291 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2327 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2328 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2330 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2331 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2334 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2335 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2337 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2338 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 /* Read in request_extensions */
2346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2361 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2362 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2365 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2366 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2368 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2369 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2376 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2380 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2383 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2387 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2388 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2390 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2392 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2394 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2401 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2402 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2404 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2407 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2408 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2409 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2410 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2411 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2412 * anything like that, but this might change).
2414 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2415 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2416 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2417 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2418 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2419 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2424 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2425 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2427 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2430 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2431 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2435 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2436 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2437 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2439 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2443 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2446 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2447 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2450 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2451 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2452 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2453 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2454 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2458 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2469 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2471 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2472 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2474 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2476 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2479 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2480 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2481 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2486 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2489 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2490 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2492 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2496 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2505 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2506 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2507 * the length of the block. */
2508 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2510 unsigned int off = 0;
2524 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2526 unsigned short length;
2527 unsigned short type;
2528 unsigned short size;
2529 unsigned char *data = *p;
2530 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2531 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2534 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2537 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2539 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2540 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2544 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2545 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2548 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2549 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2552 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2556 if (data+length != d+n)
2558 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2562 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2567 if (data+size > (d+n))
2570 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2571 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2572 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2574 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2576 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2578 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2581 tlsext_servername = 1;
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2585 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2587 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2588 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2590 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2592 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2597 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2598 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2599 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2604 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2605 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2608 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2609 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2610 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2611 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2612 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2615 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2617 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2619 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2620 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2622 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2625 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2630 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2632 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2642 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2643 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2645 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2649 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2650 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2651 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2652 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2654 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2656 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2658 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2665 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2666 * a status request message.
2668 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2673 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2674 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2677 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2678 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2680 unsigned char *selected;
2681 unsigned char selected_len;
2683 /* We must have requested it. */
2684 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2689 /* The data must be valid */
2690 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2700 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2701 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2707 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2708 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2712 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2716 /* We must have requested it. */
2717 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2727 /* The extension data consists of:
2728 * uint16 list_length
2729 * uint8 proto_length;
2730 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2734 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2740 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2745 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2746 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2747 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2748 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2754 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2759 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2761 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2764 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2768 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2769 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2771 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2772 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2773 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2775 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2780 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2782 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2786 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2787 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2789 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite or SSL 3.0 */
2790 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2791 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
2792 && s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2793 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2796 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2797 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2799 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2807 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2811 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2813 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2815 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2817 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2818 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2820 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2826 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2836 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2837 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2838 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2839 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2840 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2841 * absence on initial connect only.
2843 if (!renegotiate_seen
2844 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2845 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2847 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2849 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2857 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2860 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2864 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2866 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2871 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2873 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2874 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2876 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2877 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2879 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2880 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2885 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2889 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2890 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2897 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2902 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2904 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2905 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2908 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2909 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2911 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2912 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2916 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2917 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2918 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2919 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2921 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2923 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2924 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2925 * so this has to happen here in
2926 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2930 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2932 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2935 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2936 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2942 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2943 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2945 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2947 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2948 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2950 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2951 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2953 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2954 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2956 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2957 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2959 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2960 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2963 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2967 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2969 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2970 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2971 * abort the handshake.
2973 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2974 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2982 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2983 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2986 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2987 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2990 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2991 s->servername_done=0;
2997 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2999 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3002 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3003 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3004 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3005 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3007 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3010 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3011 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3012 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3013 if (certpkey == NULL)
3015 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3018 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3019 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3021 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3022 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3025 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3026 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3027 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3029 /* status request response should be sent */
3030 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3031 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3032 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3034 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3036 /* something bad happened */
3037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3038 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3039 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3044 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3049 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3054 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3062 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3064 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3065 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3068 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3069 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3070 * it must contain uncompressed.
3072 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3073 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3074 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3075 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3076 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3078 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3080 unsigned char *list;
3081 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3082 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3083 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3085 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3087 found_uncompressed = 1;
3091 if (!found_uncompressed)
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3097 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3098 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3100 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3101 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3102 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3103 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3105 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3106 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3108 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3109 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3111 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3113 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3114 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3117 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3118 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3119 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3120 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3122 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3123 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3128 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3131 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3132 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3135 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3136 * there is no response.
3138 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3140 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3141 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3143 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3144 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3147 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3148 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3152 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3153 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3159 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3160 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3163 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3164 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3167 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3168 s->servername_done=0;
3174 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3177 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3179 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3181 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3185 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3193 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3194 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3195 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3197 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3198 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3199 * extension, if any.
3200 * len: the length of the session ID.
3201 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3202 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3203 * point to the resulting session.
3205 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3206 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3207 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3210 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3211 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3212 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3213 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3214 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3215 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3216 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3219 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3220 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3221 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3222 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3223 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3224 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3226 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3227 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3229 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3230 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3234 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3236 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3237 * to permit stateful resumption.
3239 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3241 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3245 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3253 /* Skip past cipher list */
3258 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3263 /* Now at start of extensions */
3264 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3267 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3269 unsigned short type, size;
3272 if (p + size > limit)
3274 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3279 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3280 * currently have one. */
3281 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3284 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3286 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3287 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3288 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3289 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3290 * calculate the master secret later. */
3293 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3296 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3297 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3299 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3301 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3302 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3304 default: /* fatal error */
3313 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3315 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3316 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3317 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3318 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3319 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3320 * point to the resulting session.
3323 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3324 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3325 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3326 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3328 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3329 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3330 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3333 unsigned char *sdec;
3334 const unsigned char *p;
3335 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3336 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3339 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3340 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3343 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3344 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3345 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3346 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3348 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3349 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3360 /* Check key name matches */
3361 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3363 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3364 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3365 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3366 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3368 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3369 * integrity checks on ticket.
3371 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3374 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3378 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3379 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3380 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3381 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3382 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3384 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3385 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3386 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3387 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3388 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3394 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3395 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3397 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3405 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3409 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3410 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3411 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3412 * as required by standard.
3415 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3416 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3424 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3429 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3437 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3438 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3439 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3440 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3441 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3442 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3443 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3446 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3447 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3448 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3449 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3452 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3455 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3457 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3463 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3466 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3468 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3469 return table[i].nid;
3474 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3479 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3480 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3483 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3486 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3487 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3491 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3493 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3494 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3501 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3504 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3505 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3508 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3510 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3513 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3515 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3516 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3517 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3519 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3520 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3522 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3523 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3524 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3526 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3527 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3531 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3535 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3537 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3540 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3542 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3543 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3544 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3547 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3548 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3550 return inf->mfunc();
3553 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3558 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3559 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3562 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3563 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3566 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3567 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3573 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3574 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3575 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3577 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3578 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3580 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3582 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3583 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3585 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3587 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3589 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3590 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3592 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3596 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3597 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3598 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3600 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3603 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3604 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3606 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3607 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3608 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3610 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3611 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3613 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3614 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3617 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3618 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3619 * then RSA is disabled.
3622 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3624 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3625 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3626 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3627 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3628 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3629 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3632 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3633 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3638 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3639 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3644 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3645 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3650 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3651 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3658 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3660 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3662 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3665 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3666 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3668 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3670 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3672 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3674 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3675 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3678 return tmpout - out;
3681 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3682 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3683 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3684 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3686 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3687 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3688 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3690 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3691 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3693 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3695 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3700 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3701 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3702 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3704 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3715 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3716 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3718 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3719 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3721 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3723 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3724 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3726 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3727 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3729 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3730 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3732 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3733 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3735 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3737 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3738 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3741 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3742 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3746 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3747 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3753 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3754 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3756 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3759 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3762 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3763 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3764 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3769 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3771 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3777 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3778 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3779 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3781 /* Should never happen */
3785 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3786 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3787 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3788 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3790 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3791 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3793 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3795 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3796 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3798 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3799 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3801 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3803 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3805 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3808 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3809 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3810 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3811 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3812 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3814 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3815 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3821 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3822 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3824 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3825 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3827 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3828 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3829 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3830 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3832 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3833 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3838 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3839 * use the certificate for signing.
3841 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3843 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3844 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3847 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3848 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3851 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3853 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3854 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3858 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3859 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3866 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3867 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3868 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3870 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3876 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3883 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3885 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3888 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3889 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3890 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3892 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3893 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3897 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3899 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3901 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3903 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3905 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3906 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3912 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3914 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3915 unsigned short hbtype;
3916 unsigned int payload;
3917 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3919 if (s->msg_callback)
3920 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3921 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3922 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3924 /* Read type and payload length first */
3925 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3926 return 0; /* silently discard */
3929 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3930 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3933 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3935 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3938 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3939 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3940 * payload, plus padding
3942 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3945 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3946 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3948 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3950 /* Random padding */
3951 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3953 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3955 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3956 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3957 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3958 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3960 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3965 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3969 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3970 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3971 * sequence number */
3974 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3977 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3985 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3987 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3989 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3990 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3992 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3993 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3994 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4000 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4001 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4007 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4008 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4014 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4015 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4017 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4019 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4020 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4021 * some random stuff.
4022 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4023 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4024 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4025 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4028 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4031 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4032 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4034 /* Sequence number */
4035 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4036 /* 16 random bytes */
4037 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4039 /* Random padding */
4040 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4042 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4045 if (s->msg_callback)
4046 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4047 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4048 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4050 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4059 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4064 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4067 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4069 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4072 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4073 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4075 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4077 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4079 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4087 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4088 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4089 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4090 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4091 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4092 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4095 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4096 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4097 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4098 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4101 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4103 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4104 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4107 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4108 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4112 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4113 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4114 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4118 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4122 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4125 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4127 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4132 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4133 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4135 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4137 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4138 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4139 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4140 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4142 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4150 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4151 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4152 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4153 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4157 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4158 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4159 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4160 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4166 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4170 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4174 if (default_nid == -1)
4176 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4178 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4179 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4180 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4184 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4185 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4189 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4190 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4192 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4198 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4199 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4200 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4201 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4204 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4206 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4207 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4208 /* Strict mode flags */
4209 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4210 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4211 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4213 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4218 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4219 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4221 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4222 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4225 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4229 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4232 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4234 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4236 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4237 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4240 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4241 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4242 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4244 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4245 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4254 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4257 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4258 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4259 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4261 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4269 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4270 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4271 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4274 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4280 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4281 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4284 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4287 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4288 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4290 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4295 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4296 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4297 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4298 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4299 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4302 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4303 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4304 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4305 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4309 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4310 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4318 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4319 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4322 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4325 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4326 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4328 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4331 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4339 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4340 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4342 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4345 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4346 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4347 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4349 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4354 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4362 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4363 else if(check_flags)
4364 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4366 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4367 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4369 else if (!check_flags)
4372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4373 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4374 else if (strict_mode)
4376 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4377 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4379 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4380 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4384 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4392 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4394 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4399 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4402 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4405 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4410 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4411 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4412 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4413 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4414 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4419 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4424 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4428 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4429 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4431 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4433 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4439 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4443 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4446 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4448 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4449 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4451 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4453 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4454 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4456 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4458 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4460 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4461 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4463 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4468 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4474 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4475 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4479 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4481 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4482 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4483 else if (cpk->digest)
4484 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4487 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4489 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4490 * if the chain is invalid.
4494 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4495 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4498 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4499 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4506 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4507 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4509 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4510 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4511 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4512 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4513 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4514 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4516 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4517 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4519 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4525 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4527 int dh_secbits = 80;
4528 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4529 return DH_get_1024_160();
4530 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4532 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4539 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4540 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4543 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4550 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4551 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4552 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4554 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4555 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4562 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4563 return DH_get_2048_224();
4564 return DH_get_1024_160();
4568 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4571 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4574 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4575 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4580 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4582 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4585 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4587 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4588 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4589 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4590 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4593 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4594 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4597 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4599 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4602 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4605 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4608 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4609 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4613 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4614 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4616 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4617 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4621 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4622 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4623 * not sending one to the peer.
4624 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4627 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4629 int rv, start_idx, i;
4632 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4638 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4642 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4644 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4645 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);