2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1465 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1492 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1493 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1495 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1496 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1498 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1500 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1501 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1502 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1503 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1505 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1507 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1509 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1517 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1522 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1525 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1529 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1532 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1533 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1535 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1538 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1539 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1540 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1541 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1543 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1548 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1550 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1552 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1558 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1562 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1568 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1570 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1573 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1585 const unsigned char *plist;
1587 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1590 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1592 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1593 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1601 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1602 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1603 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1607 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1608 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1610 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1617 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1619 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1624 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1625 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1627 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1629 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1631 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1637 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1646 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1648 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1653 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1661 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1662 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1663 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1664 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1665 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1666 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1667 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1668 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1669 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1670 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1671 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1677 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1678 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1680 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1685 * 1: peer may send requests
1686 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1688 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1689 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1691 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1697 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1699 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1701 const unsigned char *npa;
1702 unsigned int npalen;
1705 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1706 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1708 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1709 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1711 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1713 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1717 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1719 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1720 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1722 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1723 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1725 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1726 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1735 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1737 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1738 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1740 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1746 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1750 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1753 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1757 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1759 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1760 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1761 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1764 * returns: 0 on success. */
1765 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1766 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1770 const unsigned char *selected;
1771 unsigned char selected_len;
1774 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1780 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1781 * length-prefixed strings. */
1782 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1783 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1792 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1794 proto_len = data[i];
1800 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1806 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1807 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1808 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1809 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1812 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1814 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1817 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1818 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1841 unsigned short type, size;
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1844 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1846 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1847 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1848 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1850 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1851 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1852 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1853 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1856 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1857 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1858 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1859 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1860 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1861 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1863 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1865 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1868 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1880 if (data+size > d+n)
1884 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1898 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1900 if (data + len != d+n)
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1906 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1908 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1911 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1913 unsigned short type;
1914 unsigned short size;
1916 unsigned char *data = *p;
1917 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1920 s->servername_done = 0;
1921 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1923 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1926 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1929 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1932 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1933 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1934 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1936 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1937 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1941 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1942 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1947 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1948 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1950 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1951 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1953 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1954 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1956 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1957 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1960 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1962 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1963 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1965 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1966 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1969 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1970 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1973 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1977 if (data > (d+n-len))
1980 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1985 if (data+size > (d+n))
1988 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1990 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1991 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1992 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1993 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1995 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1996 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1997 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1998 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1999 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2000 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2001 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2002 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2003 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2004 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2005 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2006 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2007 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2008 the value of the Host: field.
2009 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2010 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2011 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2012 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2016 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2018 unsigned char *sdata;
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2038 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2048 switch (servname_type)
2050 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2053 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2058 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2063 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2065 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2069 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2070 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2071 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2072 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2073 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2076 s->servername_done = 1;
2080 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2081 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2082 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2100 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2102 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2114 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2115 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2117 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2119 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2126 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2128 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2129 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2131 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2132 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2139 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2141 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2142 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2144 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2145 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2147 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2150 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2151 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2154 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2155 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2156 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2157 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2158 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2163 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2164 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2165 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2167 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2168 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2170 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2177 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2181 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2187 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2190 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2191 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2192 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2193 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2194 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2197 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2198 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2199 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2201 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2208 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2209 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2216 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2217 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2218 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2220 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2221 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2228 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2230 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2231 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2233 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2237 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2239 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2241 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2246 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2248 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2255 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2266 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2269 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2270 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2285 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2287 const unsigned char *sdata;
2289 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2330 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2331 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2333 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2334 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2337 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2338 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2340 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2346 /* Read in request_extensions */
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2364 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2365 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2368 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2369 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2371 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2372 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2379 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2383 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2390 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2393 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2394 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2395 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2397 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2403 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2404 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2405 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2407 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2410 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2411 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2412 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2413 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2414 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2415 * anything like that, but this might change).
2417 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2418 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2419 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2420 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2421 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2422 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2427 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2428 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2430 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2433 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2434 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2438 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2439 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2441 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2445 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2446 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2447 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2448 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2449 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2453 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al))
2456 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2458 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2468 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2470 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2471 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2473 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2475 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2478 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2479 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2480 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2485 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2488 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2489 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2491 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2495 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2504 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2505 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2506 * the length of the block. */
2507 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2509 unsigned int off = 0;
2523 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2525 unsigned short length;
2526 unsigned short type;
2527 unsigned short size;
2528 unsigned char *data = *p;
2529 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2530 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2536 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2543 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2544 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2547 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2548 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2551 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2555 if (data+length != d+n)
2557 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2566 if (data+size > (d+n))
2569 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2570 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2571 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2573 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2575 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2577 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2580 tlsext_servername = 1;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2584 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2586 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2587 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2589 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2596 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2597 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2598 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2603 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2604 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2607 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2608 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2609 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2610 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2611 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2614 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2618 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2619 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2624 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2626 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2629 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2631 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2632 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2634 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2638 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2641 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2642 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2644 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2649 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2650 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2651 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2653 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2655 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2657 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2662 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2664 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2665 * a status request message.
2667 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2669 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2672 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2673 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2676 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2677 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2679 unsigned char *selected;
2680 unsigned char selected_len;
2682 /* We must have requested it. */
2683 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2685 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2688 /* The data must be valid */
2689 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2696 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2699 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2700 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2705 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2706 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2707 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2711 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2715 /* We must have requested it. */
2716 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 /* The extension data consists of:
2727 * uint16 list_length
2728 * uint8 proto_length;
2729 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2733 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2739 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2744 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2745 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2746 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2747 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2749 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2753 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2756 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2758 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2760 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2763 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2767 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2768 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2770 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2771 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2772 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2774 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2779 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2781 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2785 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2786 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2788 else if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al))
2790 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2791 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2793 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2794 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2795 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2804 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2808 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2810 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2812 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2814 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2815 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2817 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2833 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2834 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2835 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2836 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2837 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2838 * absence on initial connect only.
2840 if (!renegotiate_seen
2841 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2842 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2844 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2846 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2854 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2857 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2861 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2863 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2868 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2870 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2871 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2873 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2874 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2876 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2877 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2882 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2886 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2887 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2894 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2899 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2901 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2902 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2905 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2906 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2908 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2909 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2913 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2914 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2915 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2916 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2918 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2920 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2921 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2922 * so this has to happen here in
2923 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2927 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2929 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2932 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2933 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2938 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2939 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2940 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2942 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2945 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2947 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2948 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2950 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2951 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2953 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2954 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2956 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2957 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2960 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2964 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2966 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2967 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2968 * abort the handshake.
2970 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2971 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2979 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2980 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2983 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2984 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2987 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2988 s->servername_done=0;
2994 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2996 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2999 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3000 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3001 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3002 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3004 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3007 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3008 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3009 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3010 if (certpkey == NULL)
3012 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3015 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3016 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3018 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3019 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3022 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3024 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3026 /* status request response should be sent */
3027 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3028 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3029 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3033 /* something bad happened */
3034 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3035 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3036 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3041 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3059 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3061 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3062 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3065 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3066 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3067 * it must contain uncompressed.
3069 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3070 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3071 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3072 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3073 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3075 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3077 unsigned char *list;
3078 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3079 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3080 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3082 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3084 found_uncompressed = 1;
3088 if (!found_uncompressed)
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3094 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3095 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3097 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3098 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3099 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3100 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3102 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3103 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3105 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3106 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3108 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3110 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3111 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3114 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3115 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3116 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3117 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3119 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3120 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3125 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3128 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3129 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3132 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3133 * there is no response.
3135 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3137 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3138 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3140 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3141 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3144 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3145 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3149 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3150 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3156 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3157 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3160 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3161 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3164 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3165 s->servername_done=0;
3171 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3174 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3176 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3178 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3182 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3190 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3191 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3192 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3194 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3195 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3196 * extension, if any.
3197 * len: the length of the session ID.
3198 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3199 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3200 * point to the resulting session.
3202 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3203 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3204 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3207 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3208 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3209 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3210 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3211 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3212 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3213 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3216 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3217 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3218 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3219 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3220 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3221 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3223 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3224 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3226 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3227 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3231 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3233 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3234 * to permit stateful resumption.
3236 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3238 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3242 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3250 /* Skip past cipher list */
3255 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3260 /* Now at start of extensions */
3261 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3264 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3266 unsigned short type, size;
3269 if (p + size > limit)
3271 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3276 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3277 * currently have one. */
3278 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3281 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3283 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3284 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3285 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3286 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3287 * calculate the master secret later. */
3290 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3293 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3294 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3296 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3298 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3299 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3301 default: /* fatal error */
3310 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3312 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3313 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3314 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3315 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3316 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3317 * point to the resulting session.
3320 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3321 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3322 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3323 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3325 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3326 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3327 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3330 unsigned char *sdec;
3331 const unsigned char *p;
3332 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3333 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3336 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3337 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3340 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3341 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3343 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3345 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3346 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3357 /* Check key name matches */
3358 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3360 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3361 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3362 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3363 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3365 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3366 * integrity checks on ticket.
3368 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3375 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3376 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3377 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3378 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3379 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3381 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3382 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3383 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3384 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3385 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3391 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3392 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3394 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3399 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3402 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3406 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3407 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3408 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3409 * as required by standard.
3412 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3413 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3421 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3426 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3434 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3435 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3436 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3437 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3438 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3439 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3440 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3443 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3444 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3445 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3446 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3449 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3452 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3454 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3460 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3463 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3465 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3466 return table[i].nid;
3471 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3476 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3477 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3480 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3483 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3484 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3488 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3490 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3491 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3498 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3501 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3502 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3505 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3507 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3510 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3512 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3513 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3514 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3516 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3517 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3519 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3520 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3521 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3523 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3524 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3528 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3532 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3534 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3537 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3539 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3540 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3541 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3544 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3545 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3547 return inf->mfunc();
3550 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3555 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3556 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3559 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3560 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3563 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3564 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3570 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3571 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3572 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3574 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3575 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3577 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3579 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3580 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3582 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3584 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3586 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3587 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3589 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3593 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3594 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3595 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3597 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3600 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3601 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3603 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3604 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3605 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3607 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3608 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3610 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3611 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3614 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3615 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3616 * then RSA is disabled.
3619 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3621 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3622 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3623 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3624 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3625 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3626 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3629 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3630 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3635 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3636 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3641 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3642 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3647 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3648 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3655 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3657 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3659 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3662 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3663 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3665 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3667 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3669 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3671 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3672 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3675 return tmpout - out;
3678 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3679 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3680 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3681 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3683 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3684 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3685 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3687 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3688 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3690 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3692 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3697 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3698 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3699 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3701 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3712 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3713 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3715 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3716 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3718 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3720 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3721 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3723 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3724 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3726 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3727 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3729 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3730 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3732 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3734 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3735 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3738 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3739 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3743 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3744 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3750 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3751 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3753 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3756 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3759 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3760 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3761 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3766 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3768 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3774 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3775 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3776 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3778 /* Should never happen */
3782 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3783 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3784 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3785 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3787 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3788 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3790 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3792 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3793 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3795 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3796 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3798 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3800 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3802 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3805 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3806 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3807 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3808 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3809 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3811 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3812 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3818 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3819 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3821 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3822 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3824 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3825 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3826 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3827 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3829 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3830 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3835 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3836 * use the certificate for signing.
3838 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3840 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3841 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3844 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3845 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3848 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3850 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3851 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3855 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3856 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3863 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3864 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3865 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3867 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3873 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3880 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3882 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3885 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3886 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3887 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3889 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3890 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3894 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3896 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3898 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3900 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3902 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3903 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3909 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3911 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3912 unsigned short hbtype;
3913 unsigned int payload;
3914 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3916 if (s->msg_callback)
3917 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3918 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3919 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3921 /* Read type and payload length first */
3922 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3923 return 0; /* silently discard */
3926 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3927 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3930 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3932 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3935 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3936 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3937 * payload, plus padding
3939 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3942 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3943 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3945 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3947 /* Random padding */
3948 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3950 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3952 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3953 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3954 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3955 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3957 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3962 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3966 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3967 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3968 * sequence number */
3971 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3974 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3982 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3984 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3986 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3987 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3989 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3990 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3991 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3997 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3998 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4004 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4005 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4011 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4012 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4014 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4016 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4017 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4018 * some random stuff.
4019 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4020 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4021 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4022 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4025 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4028 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4029 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4031 /* Sequence number */
4032 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4033 /* 16 random bytes */
4034 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4036 /* Random padding */
4037 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4039 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4042 if (s->msg_callback)
4043 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4044 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4045 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4047 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4056 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4061 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4064 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4066 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4069 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4070 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4072 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4074 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4076 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4084 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4085 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4086 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4087 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4088 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4089 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4092 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4093 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4094 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4095 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4098 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4100 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4101 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4104 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4105 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4109 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4110 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4111 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4115 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4119 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4122 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4124 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4129 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4130 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4132 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4134 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4135 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4136 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4137 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4139 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4147 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4148 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4149 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4150 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4154 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4155 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4156 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4157 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4163 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4167 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4171 if (default_nid == -1)
4173 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4175 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4176 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4177 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4181 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4182 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4186 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4187 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4189 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4195 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4196 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4197 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4198 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4201 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4203 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4204 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4205 /* Strict mode flags */
4206 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4207 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4208 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4210 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4215 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4216 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4218 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4219 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4222 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4226 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4229 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4231 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4233 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4234 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4237 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4238 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4239 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4241 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4242 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4251 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4254 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4255 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4256 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4258 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4266 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4267 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4268 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4271 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4277 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4278 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4281 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4284 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4285 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4287 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4292 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4293 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4294 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4295 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4296 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4299 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4300 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4301 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4302 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4306 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4307 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4315 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4316 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4319 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4322 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4323 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4325 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4328 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4336 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4337 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4339 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4343 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4344 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4346 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4351 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4359 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4360 else if(check_flags)
4361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4363 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4364 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4366 else if (!check_flags)
4369 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4370 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4371 else if (strict_mode)
4373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4374 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4376 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4377 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4381 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4389 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4391 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4396 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4399 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4402 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4407 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4408 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4409 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4410 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4411 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4416 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4421 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4425 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4426 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4428 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4430 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4432 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4436 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4443 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4445 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4446 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4448 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4450 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4451 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4453 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4455 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4457 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4458 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4460 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4465 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4469 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4471 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4476 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4478 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4479 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4480 else if (cpk->digest)
4481 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4484 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4486 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4487 * if the chain is invalid.
4491 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4492 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4495 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4496 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4503 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4504 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4506 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4507 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4508 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4509 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4510 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4511 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4513 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4514 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4516 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4522 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4524 int dh_secbits = 80;
4525 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4526 return DH_get_1024_160();
4527 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4529 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4536 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4537 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4540 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4547 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4548 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4549 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4551 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4552 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4559 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4560 return DH_get_2048_224();
4561 return DH_get_1024_160();
4565 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4568 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4571 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4572 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4577 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4579 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4582 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4584 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4585 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4586 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4587 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4590 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4591 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4594 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4596 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4599 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4602 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4605 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4606 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4610 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4611 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4613 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4614 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4618 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4619 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4620 * not sending one to the peer.
4621 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4624 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4626 int rv, start_idx, i;
4629 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4635 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4639 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4641 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4642 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);