2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
176 /* The default curves */
177 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
178 29, /* X25519 (29) */
179 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
180 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
181 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
184 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
189 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
194 return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
197 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
200 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
201 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
202 return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
208 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
209 * the number of groups supported.
211 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
215 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
216 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
217 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
218 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
219 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
222 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
223 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
227 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
228 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
233 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
234 *pgroups = eccurves_default;
235 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
237 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
238 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
244 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
245 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
247 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
248 unsigned char ctmp[2];
252 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
253 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
256 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
257 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
258 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
261 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
262 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
265 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
272 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
273 * if there is no match.
274 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
275 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
276 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
278 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
280 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
281 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
284 /* Can't do anything on client side */
288 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
290 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
291 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
293 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
295 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
296 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
297 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
298 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
299 /* Should never happen */
302 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
306 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
307 * otherwise peer decides.
309 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
310 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
311 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
313 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
314 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
317 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
318 uint16_t id = pref[i];
320 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
321 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
329 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
333 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
334 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
339 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
342 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
343 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist));
346 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
347 unsigned long idmask;
349 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
350 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
352 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
365 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
369 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
372 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
374 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
380 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
382 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
384 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
386 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
387 if (nid == NID_undef)
388 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
389 if (nid == NID_undef)
390 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
391 if (nid == NID_undef)
393 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
394 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
396 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
400 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
401 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
405 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
409 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
411 /* Return group id of a key */
412 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
414 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
419 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
420 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
423 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
424 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
428 unsigned char comp_id;
431 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
432 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
434 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
435 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
437 /* Get required compression id */
438 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
439 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
440 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
441 /* Compression not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
444 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
446 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
447 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
448 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
449 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
454 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
455 * supported (see RFC4492).
457 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
460 for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
461 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
467 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
468 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id)
470 const uint16_t *groups;
476 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
477 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
478 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
480 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
481 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
483 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
484 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
487 /* Should never happen */
492 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
493 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
494 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
497 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
500 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
504 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
505 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
508 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
509 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
510 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
511 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
515 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
518 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
522 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
524 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
525 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
526 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
528 *pformats = ecformats_default;
529 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
531 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
533 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
538 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
539 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
541 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
545 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
548 /* If not EC nothing to do */
549 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
551 /* Check compression */
552 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
554 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
555 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id))
558 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
561 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
566 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
567 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
568 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
569 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
570 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
572 return 0; /* Should never happen */
573 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
574 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
583 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
585 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
587 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
588 * is compatible with the client extensions.
590 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
592 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
594 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
596 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
598 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
601 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
602 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256);
603 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
604 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384);
611 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
618 /* Default sigalg schemes */
619 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
621 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
622 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
623 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
624 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
627 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
628 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
629 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
630 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
631 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
632 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
634 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
635 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
636 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
639 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
640 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
655 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
661 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
663 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
664 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
665 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
666 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
667 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
668 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
669 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
670 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
671 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
672 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
673 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
674 NID_undef, NID_undef},
675 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
676 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
677 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
678 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
679 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
680 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
682 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
683 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
684 NID_undef, NID_undef},
685 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
686 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
687 NID_undef, NID_undef},
688 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
689 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
690 NID_undef, NID_undef},
691 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
692 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
693 NID_undef, NID_undef},
694 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
695 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
696 NID_undef, NID_undef},
697 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
698 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
699 NID_undef, NID_undef},
700 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
701 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
702 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
703 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
704 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
705 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
706 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
707 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
708 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
709 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
710 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
711 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
712 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
713 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
714 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
716 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
717 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
718 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
719 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
720 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
721 NID_undef, NID_undef},
722 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
723 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
724 NID_undef, NID_undef},
725 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
726 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
727 NID_undef, NID_undef},
728 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
729 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
730 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
733 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
734 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
735 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
736 NID_undef, NID_undef},
737 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
738 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
739 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
740 NID_undef, NID_undef},
741 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
742 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
743 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
744 NID_undef, NID_undef}
747 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
748 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
749 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
750 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
751 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
756 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
757 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
759 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
760 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
761 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
762 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
763 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
764 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
765 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
766 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
767 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
770 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
771 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
774 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
776 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
778 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
783 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
784 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
789 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
790 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
793 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
803 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
805 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
806 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
807 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
809 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
810 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
816 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
818 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
824 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
825 * is fixed by the certificate type.
827 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
833 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
834 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
835 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
837 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
843 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
846 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
848 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
849 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
851 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
855 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
857 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
858 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
861 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
863 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
865 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
868 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
872 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
875 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
879 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
880 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
881 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
882 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
888 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
889 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
894 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
895 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
896 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
898 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
899 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
900 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
901 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
902 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
903 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
905 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
906 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
911 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
912 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
915 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
917 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
918 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
920 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
921 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
922 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
924 /* Should never happen */
927 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
928 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
929 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
931 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
934 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
935 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
936 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
938 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
940 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
941 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
944 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
945 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
946 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
948 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
952 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
954 /* Check point compression is permitted */
955 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
957 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
958 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
962 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
963 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
964 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
965 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
967 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
969 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
973 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
974 /* Check curve matches extensions */
975 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey))) {
976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
977 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
980 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
981 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
982 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
983 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
985 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
986 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
991 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
993 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
999 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1000 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1001 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1004 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1005 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1006 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1008 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1011 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1013 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1018 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1019 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1021 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1022 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1023 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1024 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1025 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1027 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1031 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1032 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1036 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1038 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1040 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1045 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1046 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1047 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1049 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1052 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1054 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1056 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1057 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1058 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1059 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1061 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1062 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1063 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1064 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1066 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1068 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1069 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1070 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1076 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1077 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1078 * @c: cipher to check
1079 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1080 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1082 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1084 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1086 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1087 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1089 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1091 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1092 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1095 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1096 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1098 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1099 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1100 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1102 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1105 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1106 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1109 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1112 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1114 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1116 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1119 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1123 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1124 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1125 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1126 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1127 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1128 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1129 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1131 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1132 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1134 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1135 && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1136 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1137 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1139 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1140 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1145 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1146 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1147 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1148 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1156 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1158 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1161 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1164 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1166 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1171 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1173 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1174 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1175 * point to the resulting session.
1177 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1178 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1179 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1182 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1183 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1184 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1185 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1186 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1187 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1188 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1191 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1192 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1193 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1194 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1195 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1196 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1198 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1203 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1206 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1209 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1210 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1213 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1216 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1217 if (!ticketext->present)
1220 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1223 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1226 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1227 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1229 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1231 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1232 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1233 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1234 * calculate the master secret later.
1236 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1239 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1240 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1242 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1243 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1244 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1246 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1247 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1249 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1250 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1251 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1254 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1259 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1261 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1262 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1263 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1264 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1265 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1266 * point to the resulting session.
1268 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1269 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1270 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1273 unsigned char *sdec;
1274 const unsigned char *p;
1275 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1276 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1278 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1279 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1280 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1281 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1283 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1284 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1286 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1287 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1289 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1292 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1293 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1294 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1299 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1305 /* Check key name matches */
1306 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1307 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1308 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1311 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1312 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1313 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1314 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1315 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1317 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1322 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1325 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1329 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1331 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1332 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1336 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1337 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1338 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1341 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1342 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1344 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1346 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1347 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1348 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1349 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1350 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1351 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1352 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1355 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1357 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1358 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1360 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1367 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1371 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1372 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1373 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1374 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1377 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1378 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1379 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1383 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1384 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1387 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1389 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1393 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1395 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1397 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1398 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1402 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1403 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1405 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1408 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1409 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1411 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1412 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1414 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1415 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1416 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1417 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1418 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1420 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1421 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1423 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1425 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1426 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1427 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1428 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1429 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1430 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1434 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1435 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1439 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1441 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1442 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1443 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1445 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1448 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1449 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1450 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1451 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1456 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1460 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1461 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1462 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1463 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1465 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1468 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1469 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1474 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1475 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1477 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1479 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1482 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1483 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1485 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1486 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1487 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1488 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1496 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1497 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1498 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1499 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1501 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1502 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1503 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1504 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1506 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1507 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1509 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1510 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1521 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1522 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1524 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1525 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1527 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1529 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1531 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1532 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1533 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1534 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1535 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1536 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1537 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1538 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1539 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1540 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1542 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1543 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1546 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1547 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1551 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1552 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1554 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1556 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1559 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1563 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1564 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1568 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1574 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1576 /* Invalid data length */
1577 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1582 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf));
1585 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1593 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1600 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1602 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1603 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1605 /* Should never happen */
1606 if (s->cert == NULL)
1610 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1611 &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1613 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1614 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1618 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1620 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1623 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1626 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1629 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1632 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1633 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1634 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1636 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1637 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1639 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1640 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1641 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1646 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1647 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1648 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1650 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1651 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1652 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1655 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1657 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1661 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1663 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1664 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1666 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1668 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1669 if (psignhash != NULL)
1670 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1672 return (int)numsigalgs;
1675 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1676 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1677 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1679 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1680 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1682 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1683 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1685 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1687 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1689 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1690 if (psignhash != NULL)
1691 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1693 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1695 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1696 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1699 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1700 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1704 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1705 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1708 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1710 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1711 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1712 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1713 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1714 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1715 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1716 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1717 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1719 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1720 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1721 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1724 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1725 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1727 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1729 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1731 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1732 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1733 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1736 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1738 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1740 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1742 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1744 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1745 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1746 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1747 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1748 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1749 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1753 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1755 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1756 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1760 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1767 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1768 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1769 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1771 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1773 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
1774 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1778 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1782 /* Reject duplicates */
1783 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
1784 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
1793 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1794 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1796 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1800 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1804 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1807 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
1812 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1813 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1815 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1818 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1819 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1820 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
1822 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1823 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1824 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
1830 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1832 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1837 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1838 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1840 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1842 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1843 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1844 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1846 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1848 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1849 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1854 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1859 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1860 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1861 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1863 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1864 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1865 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1871 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1875 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1879 if (default_nid == -1)
1881 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1883 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1884 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1885 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1890 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1891 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1895 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1896 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1897 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1904 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1905 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1906 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1907 * attempting to use them.
1910 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1912 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1913 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1914 /* Strict mode flags */
1915 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1916 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1917 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1919 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1924 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1925 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1928 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1929 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1931 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1934 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1936 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1937 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1939 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1941 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1942 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1951 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
1954 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1956 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1957 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1959 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1966 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1967 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1968 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1969 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1970 else if (!check_flags)
1975 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1976 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1978 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1981 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
1982 || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
1984 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1988 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1989 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1992 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1993 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1994 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1998 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1999 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2002 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2003 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2004 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2007 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2008 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2009 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2012 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2013 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2014 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2023 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2024 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2026 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2028 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2029 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2030 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2032 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2035 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2042 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2043 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2048 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2049 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2050 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2052 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2059 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2060 else if (check_flags)
2061 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2063 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2064 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2066 else if (!check_flags)
2069 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2070 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2071 else if (strict_mode) {
2072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2073 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2074 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2075 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2077 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2084 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2085 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2087 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2089 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2092 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2095 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2099 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2102 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2103 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2104 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2108 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2111 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2114 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2116 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2117 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2119 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2120 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2123 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2124 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2125 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2126 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2127 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2132 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2135 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2137 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2138 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2142 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2143 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2145 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2148 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2152 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2155 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2156 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2163 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2164 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2166 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2167 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2168 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2169 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2170 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2171 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2172 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2173 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2176 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2177 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2179 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2183 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2185 int dh_secbits = 80;
2186 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2187 return DH_get_1024_160();
2188 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2189 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2194 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2196 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2199 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2207 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2208 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2210 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2211 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2219 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2220 return DH_get_2048_224();
2221 return DH_get_1024_160();
2225 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2228 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2231 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2232 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2233 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2234 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2236 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2239 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2241 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2244 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2246 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2247 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2248 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2249 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2251 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2253 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2254 if (nid == NID_undef)
2257 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2259 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2262 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2265 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2267 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2268 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2270 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2271 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2273 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2274 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2279 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2280 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2281 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2284 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2286 int rv, start_idx, i;
2288 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2293 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2297 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2298 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2299 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2307 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2308 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2311 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2313 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2314 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2316 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2317 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2320 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2324 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2325 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2326 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2327 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2328 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2330 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2332 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2336 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2339 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2341 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2342 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2343 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2345 || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
2346 &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2349 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2350 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2351 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2352 * signing certificate.
2354 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2363 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2364 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2366 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2367 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2369 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2370 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2371 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2373 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2375 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2378 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2379 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2381 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2384 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2387 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2388 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2389 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2392 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2393 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2394 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2395 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2396 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2398 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2399 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2401 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2404 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2406 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2407 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2408 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2411 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2416 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2417 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2420 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2421 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2426 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2430 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2434 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2435 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2437 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2440 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2442 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2446 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2447 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2448 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2449 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2456 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2459 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2460 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2463 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2466 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2468 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2469 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2472 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2473 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2475 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2476 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2477 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2479 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2483 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2487 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2496 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2498 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2499 size_t sent_sigslen;
2501 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2505 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2510 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2511 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2512 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2513 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2516 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2520 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2521 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2526 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2530 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2536 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2537 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2538 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2539 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
2543 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2545 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2546 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2548 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2552 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2556 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2558 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2559 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2561 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2565 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2569 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2571 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;