2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1427 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1428 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1431 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1434 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1435 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1442 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1443 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1444 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1449 /* Encode the public key. */
1450 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1452 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1454 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1458 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1460 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1464 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1469 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1470 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1471 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1473 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1474 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1476 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1520 * Add the key_share extension.
1522 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1524 static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1526 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1527 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1528 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1536 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1537 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1544 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1545 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1546 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1548 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1552 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1553 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1556 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1559 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1561 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1562 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1563 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1564 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1575 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1578 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1579 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1580 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1581 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1584 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1585 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1591 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1597 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1600 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1601 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1602 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1610 const unsigned char *plist;
1613 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1615 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1617 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1618 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1619 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1620 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1631 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1632 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1633 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1642 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1645 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1653 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1654 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1655 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1656 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1657 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1659 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1667 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1668 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1669 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1670 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1671 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1672 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1673 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1674 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1675 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1677 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1684 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1685 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1686 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1687 const unsigned char *npa;
1688 unsigned int npalen;
1691 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1693 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1694 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1695 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1696 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1705 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1708 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1713 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1715 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1716 * for other cases too.
1718 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1719 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1720 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1721 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1722 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1724 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1725 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1732 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1733 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1739 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1740 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1741 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1742 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1743 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1744 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1745 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1746 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1747 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1754 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1762 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1763 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1764 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1765 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1767 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1769 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1773 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1774 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1778 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1780 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1781 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1782 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1785 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1787 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1788 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1789 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1797 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1798 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1799 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1801 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1803 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1804 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1806 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1807 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1808 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1809 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1810 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1812 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1813 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1814 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1815 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1816 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1821 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1822 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1825 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1836 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1837 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1842 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1843 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1844 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1845 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1847 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1853 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1854 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1855 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1856 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1857 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1858 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1859 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1861 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1862 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1863 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1864 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1865 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1866 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1867 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1868 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1869 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1871 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1873 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1876 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1877 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1879 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1881 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1882 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1883 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1887 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1890 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1891 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1893 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1896 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1900 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1901 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1903 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
1905 static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1908 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1909 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1910 hello->num_extensions,
1911 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1913 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1916 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1917 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1918 &supported_groups_list)
1919 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1920 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1925 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1926 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1927 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1935 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1936 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1937 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1938 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1940 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1941 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1946 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1949 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1950 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1952 if (group_id == share_id
1953 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1954 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1959 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1960 return i < num_groups;
1964 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1965 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1966 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1968 static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1970 unsigned int group_id;
1971 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
1972 const unsigned char *curves;
1974 int group_nid, found = 0;
1975 unsigned int curve_flags;
1978 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1979 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1984 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1985 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1991 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
1992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
1993 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
1994 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1995 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1997 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2002 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2003 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2008 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
2009 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2010 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2012 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2015 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
2016 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2018 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2022 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
2023 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2024 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2029 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
2030 /* Share not suitable */
2034 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2036 if (group_nid == 0) {
2037 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2039 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2043 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2044 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2045 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2047 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2048 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2053 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2055 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2056 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2058 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2059 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2061 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2062 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2064 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2067 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2070 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2072 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2073 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2074 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2087 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2088 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2089 * object as required.
2091 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2092 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2095 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
2096 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2098 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
2101 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 s->servername_done = 0;
2105 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2107 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2110 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2111 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2112 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2113 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2114 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2115 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2118 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2119 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
2120 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2122 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2123 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2124 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2125 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2128 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2129 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2132 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2135 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2136 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2138 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2139 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2144 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2145 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2148 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2149 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2151 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2152 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2153 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2154 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2155 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2157 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2158 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2159 &currext->data, al))
2161 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2162 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2165 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2167 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2168 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2169 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2170 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2171 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2172 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2173 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2174 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2175 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2176 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2177 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2178 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2179 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2180 * the value of the Host: field.
2181 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2182 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2183 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2185 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2189 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2190 unsigned int servname_type;
2191 PACKET sni, hostname;
2193 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2194 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2195 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2200 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2201 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2202 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2204 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2205 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2206 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2208 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2209 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2211 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2212 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2213 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2218 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2219 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2223 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2224 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2228 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2233 s->servername_done = 1;
2236 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2237 * fall back to a full handshake.
2239 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2240 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2241 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2245 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2248 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2251 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2255 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2256 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2258 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2259 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2266 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2267 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2269 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2270 &ec_point_format_list)
2271 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2276 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2277 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2279 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2280 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2286 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2287 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2288 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2289 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2290 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2291 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2292 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2295 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2296 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2298 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2299 &supported_sig_algs)
2300 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2301 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2306 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2307 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2311 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2312 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2313 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2317 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2318 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2319 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2320 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2321 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2325 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2326 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2328 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2330 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2331 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2332 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2333 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2337 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2340 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2342 PACKET responder_id;
2343 const unsigned char *id_data;
2345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2347 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2351 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2352 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2353 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2354 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2358 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2359 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2363 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2364 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2365 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2370 /* Read in request_extensions */
2371 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2372 &currext->data, &exts))
2375 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2376 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2377 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2378 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2379 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2380 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2381 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2382 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2383 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2391 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2393 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2397 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2398 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2400 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2403 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2404 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2405 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2406 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2407 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2408 * anything like that, but this might change).
2410 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2411 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2412 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2413 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2414 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2416 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2420 else if (currext->type
2421 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2422 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2423 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2424 &currext->data, al))
2428 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2430 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2431 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2432 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2433 &currext->data, al))
2437 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2438 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2439 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2440 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2441 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2442 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2446 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2447 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2451 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2452 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2453 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2454 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2455 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2458 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2459 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2460 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2465 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2467 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2468 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2469 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2471 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2476 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2477 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2478 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2479 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2484 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2487 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2488 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2489 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2492 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2501 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2502 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2503 * fill the length of the block.
2505 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2507 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2509 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2510 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2511 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2519 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2521 unsigned int length, type, size;
2522 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2523 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2526 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2528 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2530 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2531 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2533 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2535 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2537 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2540 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2541 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2545 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2546 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2551 const unsigned char *data;
2554 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2555 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2558 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2559 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2561 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2562 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2564 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2565 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2566 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2567 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2568 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2571 tlsext_servername = 1;
2573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2574 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2575 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2576 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2577 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2578 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2582 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2583 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2584 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2585 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2589 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2590 ecpointformatlist_length;
2591 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2592 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2593 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2594 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2600 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2603 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2604 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2605 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2607 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2610 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2611 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2614 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2615 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2617 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2620 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2624 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2625 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2629 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2630 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2631 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2634 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2635 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2636 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2637 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2638 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2640 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2642 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2643 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2647 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2652 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2653 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2654 unsigned char *selected;
2655 unsigned char selected_len;
2656 /* We must have requested it. */
2657 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2658 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2661 /* The data must be valid */
2662 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2663 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2666 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2669 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2670 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2671 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2676 * a single Serverhello
2678 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2679 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2680 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2681 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2685 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2686 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2690 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2692 /* We must have requested it. */
2693 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2694 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2698 * The extension data consists of:
2699 * uint16 list_length
2700 * uint8 proto_length;
2701 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2703 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2704 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2705 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2706 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2709 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2710 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2711 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2712 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2715 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2716 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2719 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2722 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2723 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2727 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2728 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2729 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2730 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2731 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2732 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2733 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2734 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
2735 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2737 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2738 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2739 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2740 unsigned int group_id;
2742 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2746 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2752 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2754 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2758 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2760 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2763 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2765 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2769 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2770 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2773 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2777 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2778 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2779 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2780 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2785 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2786 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2791 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2793 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2794 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2796 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2800 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2801 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2805 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2806 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2807 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2808 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2809 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2810 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2811 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2815 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2824 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2825 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2826 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2827 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2828 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2830 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2831 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2832 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2834 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2840 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2843 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2844 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2845 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2854 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2856 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2860 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2865 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2867 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2868 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2872 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2873 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2876 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2877 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2881 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2883 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2884 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2885 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2886 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2888 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2890 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2893 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2894 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2897 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2901 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2902 s->servername_done = 0;
2908 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2909 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2911 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2913 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2916 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2917 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2919 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2920 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2923 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2926 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2927 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2928 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2932 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2937 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2939 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2940 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2941 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2942 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2943 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2944 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2947 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2948 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2949 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2951 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2954 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2955 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2957 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2958 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2962 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2966 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2971 * Upon success, returns 1.
2972 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2974 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2976 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2979 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2980 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2981 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2982 * influence which certificate is sent
2984 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2986 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2987 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2988 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2989 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2991 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2992 * et al can pick it up.
2994 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2995 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2997 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2998 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2999 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3001 /* status request response should be sent */
3002 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3003 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3004 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3006 /* something bad happened */
3007 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3009 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3015 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3022 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3024 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3025 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3029 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3030 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3031 * must contain uncompressed.
3033 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3034 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3035 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3036 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3037 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3038 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3039 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3040 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3042 unsigned char *list;
3043 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3044 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3045 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3046 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3047 found_uncompressed = 1;
3051 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3053 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3057 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3058 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3060 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3062 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3063 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3064 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3065 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3067 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3069 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3072 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3073 * that we don't receive a status message
3075 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3076 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3077 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3080 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3089 s->servername_done = 0;
3095 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3098 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3100 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3101 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3105 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3113 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3114 * type and return it.
3116 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3117 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3118 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3120 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3122 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3127 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3128 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3136 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3138 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3139 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3140 * point to the resulting session.
3142 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3143 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3144 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3147 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3148 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3149 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3150 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3151 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3152 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3153 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3156 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3157 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3158 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3159 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3160 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3161 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3163 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3167 const unsigned char *etick;
3169 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3172 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3175 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3178 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3181 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3182 hello->num_extensions,
3183 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3184 if (ticketext == NULL)
3187 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3190 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3193 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3196 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3198 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3199 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3200 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3201 * calculate the master secret later.
3205 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3206 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3209 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3210 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3212 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3213 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3216 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3219 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3220 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3223 default: /* fatal error */
3229 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3230 * ClientHello and we can support it
3235 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3237 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3239 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3241 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3242 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3245 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3246 hello->num_extensions,
3247 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3250 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3251 * client doesn't support EMS.
3256 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3257 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3260 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3266 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3268 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3269 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3270 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3271 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3272 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3273 * point to the resulting session.
3276 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3277 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3278 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3279 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3280 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3282 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3283 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3284 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3287 unsigned char *sdec;
3288 const unsigned char *p;
3289 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3291 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3292 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3293 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3294 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3296 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3297 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3300 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3305 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3306 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3307 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3318 /* Check key name matches */
3319 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3320 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3324 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3325 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3326 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3327 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3328 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3329 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3335 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3338 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3342 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3344 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3349 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3350 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3351 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3354 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3355 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3356 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3359 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3360 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3361 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3362 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3363 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3364 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3365 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3370 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3380 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3384 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3385 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3386 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3390 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3391 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3400 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3405 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3409 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3416 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3417 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3418 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3419 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3420 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3421 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3422 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3423 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3424 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3425 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3428 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3429 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3430 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3431 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3432 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3433 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3434 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3437 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3440 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3441 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3447 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3450 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3451 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3452 return table[i].nid;
3457 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3463 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3466 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3475 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3477 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3484 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3487 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3488 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3489 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3490 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3491 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3492 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3493 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3494 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3495 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3496 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3497 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3498 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3501 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3507 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3508 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3509 return tls12_md_info + i;
3515 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3517 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3518 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3520 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3523 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3526 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3530 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3531 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3534 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3535 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3538 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3539 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3542 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3543 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3545 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3546 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3548 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3549 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3555 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3556 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3557 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3559 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3560 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3562 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3563 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3565 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3567 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3568 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3570 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3572 if (psignhash_nid) {
3573 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3574 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3575 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3579 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3580 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3582 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3583 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3584 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3586 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3587 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3589 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3590 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3594 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3595 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3599 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3601 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3602 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3603 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3605 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3606 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3607 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3609 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3610 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3611 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3613 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3614 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3619 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3620 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3625 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3626 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3633 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3635 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3637 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3640 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3641 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3645 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3646 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3647 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3648 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3655 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3656 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3657 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3658 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3660 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3661 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3662 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3663 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3664 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3666 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3667 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3670 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3671 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3672 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3674 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3684 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3685 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3687 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3688 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3690 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3692 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3694 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3695 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3696 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3697 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3698 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3699 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3700 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3701 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3702 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3703 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3705 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3706 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3709 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3710 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3714 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3715 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3717 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3719 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3722 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3726 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3727 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3731 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3733 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3736 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3737 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3739 /* Should never happen */
3743 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3744 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3745 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3747 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3748 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3752 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3757 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3758 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3760 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3761 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3764 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3765 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3766 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3767 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3768 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3770 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3771 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3772 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3773 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3779 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3780 * the certificate for signing.
3782 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3784 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3785 * supported it stays as NULL.
3787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3788 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3789 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3792 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3793 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3794 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3798 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3799 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3802 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3803 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3804 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3805 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3806 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3807 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3808 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3809 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3815 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3816 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3817 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3819 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3820 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3821 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3825 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3832 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3834 return (int)numsigalgs;
3837 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3838 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3839 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3841 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3842 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3843 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3847 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3849 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3851 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3853 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3855 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3856 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3859 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3863 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3866 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3868 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3869 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3870 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3871 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3872 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3873 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3875 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3876 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3877 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3881 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3883 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3886 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3889 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3891 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3893 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3895 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3903 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3904 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3906 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3909 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3910 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3913 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3914 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3919 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3920 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3922 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3926 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3930 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3933 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3935 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3940 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3941 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3943 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3944 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3945 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3947 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3954 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3955 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3956 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3958 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3959 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3960 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3966 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3970 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3974 if (default_nid == -1)
3976 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3978 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3979 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3980 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3985 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3986 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3990 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3991 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3992 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3999 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4000 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4001 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4002 * attempting to use them.
4005 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4007 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4008 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4009 /* Strict mode flags */
4010 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4011 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4012 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4014 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4019 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4020 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4023 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4024 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4026 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4029 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4031 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4032 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4034 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4036 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4037 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4043 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4046 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4048 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4049 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4051 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4058 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4059 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4060 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4061 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4062 else if (!check_flags)
4067 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4068 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4070 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4072 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4073 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4075 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4078 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4079 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4080 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4081 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4084 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4085 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4086 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4090 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4091 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4094 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4095 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4096 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4099 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4100 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4101 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4104 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4105 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4106 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4115 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4116 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4118 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4120 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4121 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4122 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4125 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4132 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4133 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4137 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4138 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4139 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4140 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4142 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4149 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4150 else if (check_flags)
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4153 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4154 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4155 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4156 else if (!check_flags)
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4160 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4161 else if (strict_mode) {
4162 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4163 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4164 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4165 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4167 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4174 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4175 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4177 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4179 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4182 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4185 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4189 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4193 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4195 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4196 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4198 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4199 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4200 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4204 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4207 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4209 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4211 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4212 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4214 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4215 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4216 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4218 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4219 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4220 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4221 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4222 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4227 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4230 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4232 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4233 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4237 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4238 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4240 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4241 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4246 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4250 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4253 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4254 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4261 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4262 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4264 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4265 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4266 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4267 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4268 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4269 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4270 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4273 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4274 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4276 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4280 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4282 int dh_secbits = 80;
4283 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4284 return DH_get_1024_160();
4285 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4286 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4291 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4292 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4295 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4303 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4304 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4306 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4307 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4315 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4316 return DH_get_2048_224();
4317 return DH_get_1024_160();
4321 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4324 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4327 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4328 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4329 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4330 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4332 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4335 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4337 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4340 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4342 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4343 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4344 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4345 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4347 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4348 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4350 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4351 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4354 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4356 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4359 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4362 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4364 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4365 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4367 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4368 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4370 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4371 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4376 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4377 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4378 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4381 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4383 int rv, start_idx, i;
4385 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4390 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4394 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4395 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4396 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);