2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 #define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \
25 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val))
27 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
28 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
30 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
31 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
33 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
37 tls1_generate_master_secret,
38 tls1_change_cipher_state,
39 tls1_final_finish_mac,
40 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
41 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
44 tls1_export_keying_material,
46 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
47 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
51 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
55 tls1_generate_master_secret,
56 tls1_change_cipher_state,
57 tls1_final_finish_mac,
58 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
59 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
62 tls1_export_keying_material,
63 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
64 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
65 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
91 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
92 * http, the cache would over fill
101 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
105 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
107 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
111 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
114 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
115 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
117 s->version = s->method->version;
120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
123 int nid; /* Curve NID */
124 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
125 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
129 * Table of curve information.
130 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
131 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
133 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
134 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
135 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
136 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
137 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
138 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
139 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
140 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
141 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
142 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
143 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
144 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
145 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
146 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
147 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
148 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
149 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
150 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
151 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
152 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
153 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
154 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
155 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
157 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
158 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
159 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
160 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
162 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
165 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
166 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
167 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
171 /* The default curves */
172 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
173 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
174 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
175 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
176 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
179 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
180 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
181 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
184 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
186 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
187 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
188 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
190 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
192 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
196 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
199 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
200 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
207 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
209 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
210 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
211 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
212 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
213 * lists in the first place.
214 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
215 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
216 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
218 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
219 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
221 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
224 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
225 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
227 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
228 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
230 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
231 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
234 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
235 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
239 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
240 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
244 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
245 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
248 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
249 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
253 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
254 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
259 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
263 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
264 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
266 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
269 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
271 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
272 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
276 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
279 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
280 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
282 const unsigned char *curves;
283 size_t num_curves, i;
284 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
285 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
287 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
289 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
292 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
293 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
295 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
296 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
298 } else /* Should never happen */
301 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
303 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
304 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
305 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
311 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
312 * if there is no match.
313 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
314 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
315 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
317 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
319 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
320 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
323 /* Can't do anything on client side */
327 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
329 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
330 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
332 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
334 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
335 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
336 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
337 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
338 /* Should never happen */
341 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
345 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
346 * but s->options is a long...
348 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
349 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
351 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
352 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
353 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
354 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
358 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
359 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
361 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
362 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
363 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
366 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
368 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
376 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
380 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
381 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
383 unsigned char *clist, *p;
386 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
389 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
390 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
393 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
394 unsigned long idmask;
396 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
398 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
407 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
411 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
415 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
418 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
420 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
426 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
428 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
430 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
432 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
435 if (nid == NID_undef)
436 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
437 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
440 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
442 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
446 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
447 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
451 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
455 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
458 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
459 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
466 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
467 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
470 /* Determine curve ID */
471 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
472 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
473 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
477 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
479 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
481 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
482 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
484 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
485 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
493 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
494 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
495 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
497 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
498 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
501 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
502 * supported (see RFC4492).
504 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
505 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
506 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
507 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
508 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
511 if (i == num_formats)
516 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
517 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
518 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
520 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
522 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
523 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
524 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
525 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
526 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
530 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
531 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
536 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
543 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
547 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
549 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
550 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
551 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
553 *pformats = ecformats_default;
554 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
556 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
558 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
563 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
564 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
566 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
568 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
571 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
574 /* If not EC nothing to do */
575 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
577 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
581 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
584 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
588 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
589 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
591 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
597 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
598 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
599 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
600 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
601 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
603 return 0; /* Should never happen */
604 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
605 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
607 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
609 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
610 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
611 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
613 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
619 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
621 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
623 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
625 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
626 * is compatible with the client extensions.
628 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
630 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
633 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
636 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
637 unsigned char curve_id[2];
638 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
639 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
640 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
641 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
642 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
646 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
647 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
651 /* Need a shared curve */
652 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
656 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
660 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
668 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
669 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
672 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
673 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
675 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
678 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
679 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
681 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
685 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
687 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
690 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
691 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
692 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
693 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
695 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
696 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
697 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
698 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
699 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
700 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
702 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
703 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
704 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
709 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
710 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
711 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
714 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
717 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
721 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
722 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
723 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
724 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
726 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
727 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
730 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
731 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
735 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
736 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
737 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
738 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
739 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
740 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
741 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
743 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
744 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
749 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
750 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
752 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
753 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
755 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
756 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
757 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
758 /* Should never happen */
761 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
762 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
768 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
769 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
770 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
772 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
776 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
777 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
781 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
783 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
786 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
787 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
789 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
795 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
799 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
800 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
801 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
802 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
805 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
806 if (i == sent_sigslen
807 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
808 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
812 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
817 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
818 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
819 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
826 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
831 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
832 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
833 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
835 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
838 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
840 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
842 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
843 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
844 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
845 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
847 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
848 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
849 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
850 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
852 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
854 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
855 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
856 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
862 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
863 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
864 * @c: cipher to check
865 * @op: Security check that you want to do
867 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
869 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
871 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
872 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
874 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
876 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
877 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
879 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
880 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
883 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
886 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
888 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
890 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
893 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
895 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
896 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
906 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
907 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
908 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
909 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
910 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
913 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
915 PACKET extensions = *packet;
916 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
917 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
920 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
921 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
924 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
925 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
931 if (num_extensions <= 1)
934 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
935 if (extension_types == NULL) {
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
940 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
941 extensions = *packet;
942 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
944 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
945 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
946 /* This should not happen. */
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
952 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
956 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
957 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
958 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
959 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
964 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
968 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
969 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
972 unsigned char *orig = buf;
973 unsigned char *ret = buf;
974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
977 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
979 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
980 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
982 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
983 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
985 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
986 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
987 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
988 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
999 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1001 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1002 if (s->renegotiate) {
1005 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1013 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1016 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1023 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1024 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1027 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1028 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1032 * check for enough space.
1033 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1034 * 2 for servernamelist length
1035 * 1 for the hostname type
1036 * 2 for hostname length
1039 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
1040 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit))
1043 /* extension type and length */
1044 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1045 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1047 /* length of servername list */
1048 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1050 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1051 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1053 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1057 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1058 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1059 * Client Hello message */
1061 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1062 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1068 * check for enough space.
1069 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1070 * 1 for the srp user identity
1071 * + srp user identity length
1073 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit))
1076 /* fill in the extension */
1077 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1078 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1079 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1080 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1090 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1091 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1093 unsigned char *etmp;
1095 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1097 if (num_formats > 255) {
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 * check for enough space.
1103 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
1104 * 1 byte for the length of the formats
1107 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit))
1110 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1111 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1112 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1113 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1114 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1118 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1120 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1121 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1124 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1129 * check for enough space.
1130 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
1131 * 2 bytes for the curve list length
1132 * + curve list length
1134 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + (num_curves * 2), limit))
1137 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1139 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1140 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1141 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1142 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1143 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1147 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1149 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1150 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1151 ret += curves_list_len;
1153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1155 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1157 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1158 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1159 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1160 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1161 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1162 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1163 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1165 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1166 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1167 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1170 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1171 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1174 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1177 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit))
1179 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1182 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1188 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1190 const unsigned char *salg;
1191 unsigned char *etmp;
1192 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
1195 * check for enough space.
1196 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
1197 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
1198 * + sigalg list length
1200 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit))
1202 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1204 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1206 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1207 /* Fill in lengths */
1208 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1213 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1215 size_t extlen, idlen;
1220 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1221 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1222 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1225 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
1228 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1229 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1232 extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
1236 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1239 * 2 bytes for status request type
1240 * 2 bytes for status request len
1241 * 1 byte for OCSP request type
1242 * 2 bytes for length of ids
1243 * 2 bytes for length of extensions
1245 * + length of extensions
1247 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit))
1250 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1251 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1252 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1254 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1255 /* save position of id len */
1256 unsigned char *q = ret;
1257 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1258 /* skip over id len */
1260 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1266 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1270 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1271 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1274 * check for enough space.
1275 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
1276 * 1 byte for the mode
1278 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1285 * 1: peer may send requests
1286 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1288 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1289 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1291 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1296 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1298 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1299 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1303 * check for enough space.
1304 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
1306 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1314 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1315 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1316 * (see longer comment below)
1318 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1320 * check for enough space.
1321 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1322 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
1323 * + ALPN protocol list length
1325 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit))
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1328 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1329 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1330 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1331 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1332 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1335 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1338 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1339 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 * check for enough space.
1346 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
1347 * + SRTP profiles length
1349 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1352 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1355 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1362 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1363 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1364 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1367 * In 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c we negotiated EtM with DTLS, then just
1368 * silently failed to actually do it. It is fixed in 1.1.1 but to
1369 * ease the transition especially from 1.1.0b to 1.1.0c, we just
1370 * disable it in 1.1.0.
1372 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1374 * check for enough space.
1375 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1377 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1384 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1386 * check for enough space.
1387 * 4 bytes for the SCT type and extension length
1389 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1392 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1398 * check for enough space.
1399 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1401 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1407 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1408 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1409 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1412 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1413 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1415 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1416 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1423 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
1424 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
1425 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
1426 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
1428 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
1431 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit))
1433 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1435 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1442 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1445 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1449 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1450 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1453 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1454 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1456 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1459 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1460 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1461 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1462 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1467 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1469 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1472 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 * check for enough space.
1479 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
1480 * + reneg data length
1482 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1488 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1496 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1497 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1500 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1501 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1503 * check for enough space.
1504 * 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length
1506 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1509 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1514 const unsigned char *plist;
1517 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1520 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1522 if (plistlen > 255) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 * check for enough space.
1529 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
1530 * 1 byte for the points format list length
1531 * + length of points format list
1533 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1537 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1538 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1539 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1544 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1547 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1549 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1551 * check for enough space.
1552 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
1554 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1560 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1563 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1566 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1568 * check for enough space.
1569 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
1571 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1577 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1580 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1581 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 * check for enough space.
1587 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
1588 * + length of the SRTP profiles list
1590 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1596 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1605 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1606 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1607 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1608 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1609 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1610 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1611 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1612 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1613 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1616 /* check for enough space. */
1617 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
1619 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
1620 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1624 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1625 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1627 * check for enough space.
1628 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
1629 * 1 byte for the mode
1631 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1637 * 1: peer may send requests
1638 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1643 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1649 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1651 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1652 const unsigned char *npa;
1653 unsigned int npalen;
1656 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1658 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1659 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1661 * check for enough space.
1662 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
1663 * + length of protocols list
1665 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
1667 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1669 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1671 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1675 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1677 if (s->tlsext_use_etm) {
1679 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1680 * for other cases too.
1682 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1683 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1684 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1685 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1686 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1689 * check for enough space.
1690 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1692 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1694 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1698 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1700 * check for enough space.
1701 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1703 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1705 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1709 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1710 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1711 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1714 * check for enough space.
1715 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1716 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
1717 * 1 byte for selected protocol length
1718 * + length of the selected protocol
1720 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
1722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1726 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1732 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1735 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1740 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1741 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1742 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1743 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1745 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1747 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1749 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1751 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1752 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1756 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1758 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1759 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1760 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1763 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1765 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1766 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1767 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1775 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1776 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1777 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1779 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1781 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1782 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1784 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1785 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1786 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1787 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1788 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1790 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1791 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1792 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1793 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1794 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1797 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1799 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1800 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1802 } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
1803 /* Behave as if no callback was present. */
1806 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1816 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1817 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1818 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1823 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1824 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1825 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1826 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1828 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1834 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1835 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1836 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1837 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1838 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1839 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1840 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1842 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1843 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1844 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1845 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1846 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1847 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1848 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1849 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1850 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1851 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1852 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1853 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1854 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1857 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1858 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1862 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1863 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1864 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1868 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1871 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1872 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1874 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1877 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1880 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1881 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1883 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1884 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1887 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1888 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1890 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1893 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1896 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1897 s->servername_done = 0;
1898 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1900 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1903 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1904 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1905 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1907 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1908 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1910 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1911 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1915 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1916 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1917 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1919 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1920 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1921 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1922 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1925 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1926 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1929 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1931 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1934 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1937 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1941 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1942 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1945 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1947 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1950 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1951 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1952 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1953 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1955 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1956 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1958 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1959 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1962 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1964 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1965 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1966 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1967 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1968 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1969 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1970 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1971 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1972 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1973 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1974 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1975 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1976 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1977 * the value of the Host: field.
1978 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1979 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1980 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1982 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1986 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1987 unsigned int servname_type;
1988 PACKET sni, hostname;
1990 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1991 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1992 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1997 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1998 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1999 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2001 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2002 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2003 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2005 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2006 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2008 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2009 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2010 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2015 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2016 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2020 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2021 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2025 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2026 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2030 s->servername_done = 1;
2033 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2034 * fall back to a full handshake.
2036 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2037 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2038 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2045 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2048 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2052 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2053 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2055 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2056 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2063 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2064 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2066 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
2067 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2072 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2073 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2075 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2076 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2080 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2081 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2083 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2084 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
2085 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2086 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2091 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2092 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2094 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2095 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2100 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2101 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2102 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2103 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2104 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2105 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2107 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2110 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2111 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2113 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2114 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2115 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2120 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2121 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2125 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2126 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2127 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2131 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2132 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2133 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2134 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2135 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2139 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2140 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2142 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2144 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2145 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2146 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2147 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2151 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2154 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2156 PACKET responder_id;
2157 const unsigned char *id_data;
2159 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2161 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2165 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2166 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2167 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2171 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2172 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2176 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2177 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2178 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 /* Read in request_extensions */
2184 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2187 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2188 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2189 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2190 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2191 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2192 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2193 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2194 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2195 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2203 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2205 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2209 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2210 unsigned int hbtype;
2212 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2213 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2219 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2221 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2222 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2223 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2226 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2232 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2233 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2235 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2238 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2239 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2240 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2241 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2242 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2243 * anything like that, but this might change).
2245 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2246 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2247 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2248 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2249 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2251 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2255 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2256 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2257 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2261 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2263 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2264 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2265 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2270 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2272 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2273 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2277 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2278 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2279 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2280 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2281 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2284 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2285 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2290 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2292 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2294 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2300 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2302 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2303 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2304 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2306 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2311 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2312 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2313 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2314 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2319 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2322 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2323 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2327 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2336 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2337 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2338 * fill the length of the block.
2340 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2342 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2344 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2346 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2354 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2356 unsigned int length, type, size;
2357 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2358 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2361 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2363 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2365 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2366 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2368 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2369 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2372 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
2374 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2376 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2379 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2380 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2385 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2389 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2390 const unsigned char *data;
2393 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2394 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2397 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2398 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2400 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2401 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2403 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2404 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2405 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2406 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2410 tlsext_servername = 1;
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2413 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2414 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2415 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2416 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2421 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2422 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2423 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2424 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2428 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2429 ecpointformatlist_length;
2430 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2431 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2432 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2433 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2442 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2443 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2444 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2446 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2449 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2453 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2454 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2456 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2459 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2463 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2464 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2468 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2469 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2470 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2473 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2474 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2475 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2476 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2477 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2479 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2481 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2482 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2483 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2486 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2491 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2492 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2493 unsigned char *selected;
2494 unsigned char selected_len;
2495 /* We must have requested it. */
2496 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2497 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2500 /* The data must be valid */
2501 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2502 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2508 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2509 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2514 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2515 * a single Serverhello
2517 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2518 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2519 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2520 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2523 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2524 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2525 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2529 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2531 /* We must have requested it. */
2532 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2533 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2537 * The extension data consists of:
2538 * uint16 list_length
2539 * uint8 proto_length;
2540 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2542 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2543 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2544 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2545 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2548 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2549 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2550 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2551 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2554 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2555 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2558 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2561 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2562 unsigned int hbtype;
2563 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2564 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2569 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2571 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2572 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2573 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2576 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2582 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2583 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2587 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2588 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2589 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2590 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2591 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2592 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2593 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2595 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2598 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2599 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2601 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2605 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2610 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2611 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2612 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2613 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2614 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2615 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2616 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2620 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2629 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2630 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2631 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2632 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2633 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2635 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2636 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2637 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2639 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2645 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2648 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2649 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2650 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2659 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2661 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2665 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2670 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2672 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2673 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2677 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2678 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2681 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2682 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2686 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2688 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2689 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2690 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2691 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2693 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2695 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2698 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2699 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2702 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2703 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2706 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2707 s->servername_done = 0;
2713 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2714 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2716 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2718 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2721 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2722 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2724 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2725 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2728 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2731 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2732 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2733 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2737 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2742 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2743 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2744 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2745 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2746 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2747 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2748 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2749 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2752 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2753 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2754 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2756 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2759 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2760 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2762 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2763 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2767 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2771 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2776 * Upon success, returns 1.
2777 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2779 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2781 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2784 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2785 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2786 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2787 * influence which certificate is sent
2789 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2791 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2792 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2793 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2794 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2796 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2797 * et al can pick it up.
2799 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2800 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2802 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2803 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2804 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2806 /* status request response should be sent */
2807 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2808 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2809 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2811 /* something bad happened */
2812 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2814 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2820 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2827 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2829 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2830 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2834 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2835 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2836 * must contain uncompressed.
2838 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2839 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2840 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2841 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2842 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2843 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2844 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2845 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2847 unsigned char *list;
2848 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2849 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2850 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2851 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2852 found_uncompressed = 1;
2856 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2858 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2862 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2863 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2865 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2867 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2868 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2869 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2870 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2872 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2874 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2877 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2878 * that we don't receive a status message
2880 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2881 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2882 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2885 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2886 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2889 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2890 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2893 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2894 s->servername_done = 0;
2900 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2903 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2905 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2910 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2918 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2919 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2920 * need to be handled at the same time.
2922 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2925 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2926 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2927 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2928 * point to the resulting session.
2930 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2931 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2932 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2935 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2936 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2937 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2938 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2939 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2940 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2941 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2944 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2945 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2946 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2947 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2948 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2949 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2951 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2954 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2955 const PACKET *session_id,
2959 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2962 int have_ticket = 0;
2963 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2966 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2967 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2970 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2973 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2976 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2980 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2981 unsigned int type, size;
2983 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2984 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2985 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2989 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2993 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2995 const unsigned char *etick;
2997 /* Duplicate extension */
2998 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3006 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3009 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3013 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3015 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3016 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3017 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3018 * calculate the master secret later.
3023 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3024 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3028 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3029 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3031 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3032 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3035 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3038 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3039 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3042 default: /* fatal error */
3048 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3049 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3050 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3056 if (have_ticket == 0)
3063 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3065 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3066 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3067 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3068 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3069 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3070 * point to the resulting session.
3073 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3074 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3075 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3076 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3077 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3079 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3080 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3081 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3084 unsigned char *sdec;
3085 const unsigned char *p;
3086 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3087 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3088 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3089 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3090 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3092 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3093 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3096 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3101 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3102 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3103 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3114 /* Check key name matches */
3115 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3116 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3120 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3121 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3122 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3123 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3124 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3125 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3131 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3134 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3138 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3140 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3145 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3146 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3147 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3150 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3151 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3152 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3155 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3156 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3157 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3158 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3159 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3160 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3161 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3165 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3166 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3171 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3175 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3179 /* Some additional consistency checks */
3180 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
3181 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3185 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3186 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3187 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3191 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3192 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3201 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3205 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3206 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3210 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3217 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3218 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3219 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3220 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3221 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3222 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3223 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3224 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3225 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3226 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3229 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3230 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3231 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3232 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3233 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3234 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3235 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3238 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3241 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3242 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3248 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3251 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3252 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3253 return table[i].nid;
3258 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3263 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3266 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3269 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3270 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3274 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3276 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3283 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3286 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3287 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3288 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3289 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3290 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3291 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3292 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3293 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3294 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3295 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3296 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3297 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3300 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3306 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3307 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3308 return tls12_md_info + i;
3314 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3316 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3317 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3319 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3322 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3325 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3329 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3330 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3333 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3334 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3337 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3338 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3341 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3342 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3344 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3345 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3347 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3348 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3354 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3355 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3356 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3358 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3359 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3361 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3362 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3364 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3366 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3367 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3369 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3371 if (psignhash_nid) {
3372 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3373 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3374 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3378 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3379 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3381 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3382 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3383 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3385 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3386 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3388 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3389 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3393 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3394 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3398 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3400 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3401 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3402 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3404 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3405 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3406 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3408 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
3409 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3410 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3412 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3413 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3418 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3419 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3424 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3425 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3432 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3434 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3436 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3439 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3440 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3442 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3444 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3445 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3446 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3447 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3450 return tmpout - out;
3453 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3454 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3455 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3456 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3458 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3459 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3460 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3461 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3462 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3464 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3465 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3468 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3469 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3470 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3472 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3482 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3483 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3485 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3486 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3488 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3490 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3492 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3493 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3494 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3495 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3496 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3497 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3498 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3499 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3500 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3501 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3503 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
3504 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3507 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3508 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3512 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3513 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3515 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3517 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3520 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3524 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3525 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3529 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3531 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3534 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3535 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3537 /* Should never happen */
3541 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3542 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3543 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3545 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3546 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3550 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3555 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3556 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3558 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3559 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3562 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3563 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3564 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3565 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3566 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3568 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3569 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3570 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3571 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3577 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3578 * the certificate for signing.
3580 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3582 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3583 * supported it stays as NULL.
3585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3586 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3587 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3590 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3591 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3596 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3597 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3600 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3602 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3603 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3604 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3605 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3606 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3607 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3613 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3614 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3615 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3617 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3622 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3629 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3631 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3634 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3635 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3636 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3638 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3639 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3643 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3645 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3647 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3649 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3651 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3652 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3655 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3659 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3662 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3664 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3665 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3666 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3667 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3668 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3669 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3671 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3672 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3673 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3677 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3679 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3682 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3685 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3687 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3689 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3691 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3699 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3700 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3702 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3705 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3706 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3709 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3710 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3715 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3716 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3718 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3722 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3726 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3729 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3731 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3736 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3737 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3739 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3740 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3741 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3743 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3750 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3751 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3752 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3754 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3755 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3756 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3762 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3766 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3770 if (default_nid == -1)
3772 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3774 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3775 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3776 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3781 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3782 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3786 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3787 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3788 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3795 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3796 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3797 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3798 * attempting to use them.
3801 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3803 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3804 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3805 /* Strict mode flags */
3806 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3807 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3808 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3810 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3815 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3816 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3819 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3820 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3822 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3825 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3827 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3828 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3830 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3832 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3833 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3839 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3842 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3844 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3845 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3847 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3854 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3855 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3856 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3857 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3858 else if (!check_flags)
3863 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3864 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3866 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3868 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3869 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3871 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3874 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3875 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3876 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3877 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3880 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3881 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3882 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3886 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3887 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3890 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3891 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3892 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3895 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3896 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3897 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3900 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3901 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3902 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3911 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3912 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3914 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3916 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3917 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3918 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3921 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3928 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3929 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3933 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3935 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3936 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3938 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3945 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3946 else if (check_flags)
3947 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3949 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3950 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3951 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3952 else if (!check_flags)
3955 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3956 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3957 else if (strict_mode) {
3958 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3959 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3960 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3961 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3963 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3970 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3971 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3973 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3975 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3978 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3981 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3985 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3989 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3991 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3992 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3994 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3995 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4000 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4005 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4007 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4010 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4011 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4014 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4015 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4016 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4017 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4018 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4023 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4028 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4029 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4033 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4034 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4036 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4037 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4042 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4046 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4049 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4050 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4057 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4058 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4060 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4061 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4062 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4063 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4064 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4065 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4066 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4069 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
4070 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4072 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4076 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4078 int dh_secbits = 80;
4079 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4080 return DH_get_1024_160();
4081 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4082 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4087 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4088 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4091 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4099 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4100 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4102 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4103 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4111 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4112 return DH_get_2048_224();
4113 return DH_get_1024_160();
4117 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4120 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4123 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4124 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4125 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4126 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4128 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4131 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4133 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4136 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4138 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4139 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4140 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4141 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4143 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4144 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4146 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4147 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4150 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4152 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4155 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4158 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4160 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4161 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4163 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4164 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4166 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4167 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4172 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
4173 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4174 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4177 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4179 int rv, start_idx, i;
4181 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4186 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4190 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4191 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4192 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);