2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
399 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
453 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
470 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
473 const unsigned char *curves;
474 size_t num_curves, i;
475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
508 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
525 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
526 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
529 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
531 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
532 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
533 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
534 /* Should never happen */
537 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
541 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
542 * but s->options is a long...
544 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
546 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
547 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
548 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
554 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
555 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
557 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
559 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
563 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
564 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
572 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
576 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
579 unsigned char *clist, *p;
581 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
582 * while curve ids < 32
584 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
585 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
588 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
590 unsigned long idmask;
592 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
594 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
605 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
609 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
614 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
617 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
619 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
623 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
625 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
627 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
629 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
630 if (nid == NID_undef)
631 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
632 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
634 if (nid == NID_undef)
636 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
637 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
639 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
642 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
643 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
648 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
652 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
654 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
655 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
660 const EC_METHOD *meth;
663 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
664 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
667 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
670 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
674 /* Determine curve ID */
675 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
676 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
677 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
681 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
693 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
695 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
698 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
703 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
707 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
708 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
709 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
711 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
712 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
714 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
715 * is supported (see RFC4492).
717 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
723 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
726 if (i == num_formats)
731 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
732 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
734 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
736 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
738 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
739 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
744 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
751 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
754 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
756 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
758 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
759 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
763 *pformats = ecformats_default;
764 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
766 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
768 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
772 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
773 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
775 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
777 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
780 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
783 /* If not EC nothing to do */
784 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
789 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
793 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
794 * supported curves extension.
796 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
799 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
800 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
802 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
809 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
810 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
811 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
812 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
813 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
815 return 0; /* Should never happen */
816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
817 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
819 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
823 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
824 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
826 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
832 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
833 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
835 unsigned char curve_id[2];
836 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
838 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
839 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
842 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
843 * no other curves permitted.
847 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
848 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
849 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
850 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
851 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
855 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
856 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
858 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
861 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
864 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
869 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
884 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
889 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
891 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
895 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
898 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
902 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
911 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
912 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
915 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
916 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
918 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
922 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
924 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
927 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
928 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
930 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
933 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
934 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
935 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
938 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
941 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
944 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
945 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
948 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
952 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
953 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
954 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
957 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
959 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
967 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
978 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
979 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
981 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
984 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
986 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
987 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
991 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
992 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
995 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
996 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
998 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
999 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1001 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1002 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1003 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1004 /* Should never happen */
1007 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1008 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1014 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1016 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1017 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1018 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1020 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1025 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1030 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1035 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1039 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1041 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1044 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1052 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1056 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1057 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1058 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1060 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1063 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1064 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1069 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1075 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1076 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1077 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1086 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1087 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1091 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1092 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1093 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1094 * session and not global settings.
1097 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1102 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1103 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1104 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1107 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1108 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1109 * signature algorithms.
1111 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1112 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1113 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1114 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1115 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1118 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1120 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1121 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1125 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1126 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1128 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1129 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1131 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1133 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1135 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1136 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1142 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1145 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1147 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1150 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1152 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1154 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1157 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1160 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1161 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1163 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1165 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1168 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1171 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1173 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1175 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1176 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1177 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1178 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1189 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1191 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1207 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1216 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1219 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1221 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1222 unsigned long size_str;
1226 * check for enough space.
1227 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1228 * 2 for servernamelist length
1229 * 1 for the hostname type
1230 * 2 for hostname length
1234 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1235 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1238 /* extension type and length */
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1240 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1242 /* length of servername list */
1243 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1245 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1246 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1248 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1253 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1254 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1255 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1257 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1258 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 * check for enough space.
1266 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1267 * 1 for the srp user identity
1268 * + srp user identity length
1270 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1272 /* fill in the extension */
1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1274 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1275 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1276 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1284 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1286 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1287 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1289 unsigned char *etmp;
1291 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1293 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1294 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1295 if (num_formats > 255)
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1302 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1303 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1304 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1305 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1308 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1309 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1310 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1313 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1314 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1315 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1324 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1325 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
1327 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1329 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1330 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1334 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1336 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1337 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1338 ret += curves_list_len;
1340 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1342 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1345 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1346 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1347 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1348 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1350 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1351 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1352 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1354 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1355 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1357 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1361 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1362 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1364 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1378 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1381 const unsigned char *salg;
1382 unsigned char *etmp;
1383 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1384 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1388 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1390 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1391 /* Fill in lengths */
1392 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1397 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1398 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1400 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1404 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1410 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1415 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1418 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1424 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1425 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1431 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1433 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1440 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1442 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1444 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1445 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1447 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1449 /* save position of id len */
1450 unsigned char *q = ret;
1451 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1452 /* skip over id len */
1454 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1460 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1464 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1465 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1471 * 1: peer may send requests
1472 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1474 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1475 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1477 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1481 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1483 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1484 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1485 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1492 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1494 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1497 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1498 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1499 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1500 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1501 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1505 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1509 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1511 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1516 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1525 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1526 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1528 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1533 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1534 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1536 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1537 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1539 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1541 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1542 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1543 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1544 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1546 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1548 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1550 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1558 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1565 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1568 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1572 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1575 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1576 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1578 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1581 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1582 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1583 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1584 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1588 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1590 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1594 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1605 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1615 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1618 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1620 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1629 const unsigned char *plist;
1631 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1634 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1636 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1637 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1645 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1646 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1647 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1651 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1652 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1654 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1656 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1657 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1661 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1663 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1664 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1668 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1669 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1671 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1675 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1681 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1687 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1691 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1693 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1698 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1707 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1708 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1709 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1710 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1711 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1712 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1713 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1714 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1715 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1716 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1717 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1723 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1724 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1726 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1728 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1732 * 1: peer may send requests
1733 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1735 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1736 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1738 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1744 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1745 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1746 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1748 const unsigned char *npa;
1749 unsigned int npalen;
1752 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1753 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1758 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1760 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1764 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1766 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1767 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1769 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1770 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1772 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1773 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1774 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1777 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1783 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1785 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1786 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1788 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1790 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1794 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1800 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1803 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1807 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1809 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1810 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1811 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1814 * returns: 0 on success. */
1815 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1816 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1820 const unsigned char *selected;
1821 unsigned char selected_len;
1824 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1830 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1831 * length-prefixed strings. */
1832 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1833 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1842 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1844 proto_len = data[i];
1850 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1856 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1857 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1858 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1859 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1860 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1861 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1862 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1864 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1867 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1868 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1873 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1879 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1880 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1881 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1886 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1887 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1888 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1889 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1891 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1892 unsigned short type, size;
1893 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1894 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1895 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1896 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1897 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1898 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1899 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1901 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1902 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1903 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1904 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1907 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1908 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1909 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1910 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1911 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1912 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1913 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1914 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1915 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1916 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1919 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1928 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1931 if (data+size > d+n)
1935 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1937 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1938 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1940 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1942 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1944 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1949 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1951 if (data + len != d+n)
1953 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1957 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1959 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1962 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1964 unsigned short type;
1965 unsigned short size;
1967 unsigned char *data = *p;
1968 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1970 s->servername_done = 0;
1971 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1973 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1976 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1979 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1983 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1984 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1988 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1989 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1990 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1992 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1993 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1995 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1996 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1999 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2000 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2004 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2006 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2007 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2011 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2013 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2017 if (data > (d+n-len))
2020 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2025 if (data+size > (d+n))
2028 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2030 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2031 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2032 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2033 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2035 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2037 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2039 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2042 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2057 * the value of the Host: field.
2058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2066 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2068 unsigned char *sdata;
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2098 switch (servname_type)
2100 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2103 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2113 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2119 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2120 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2121 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2122 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2123 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2126 s->servername_done = 1;
2130 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2131 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2132 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2144 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2152 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2164 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2165 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2167 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2169 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2178 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2179 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2181 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2182 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2184 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2191 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2200 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2201 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2204 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2205 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2206 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2207 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2208 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2211 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2213 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2214 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2215 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2217 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2218 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2219 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2220 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2222 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2233 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2238 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2239 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2242 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2243 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2244 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2245 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2246 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2249 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2250 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2253 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2261 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2267 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2268 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2270 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2272 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2274 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2275 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2277 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2282 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2284 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2285 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2287 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2294 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2301 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2306 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2323 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2325 const unsigned char *sdata;
2327 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2332 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2341 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2354 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2363 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2364 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2368 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2369 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2371 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2372 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2375 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2376 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2378 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2379 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2384 /* Read in request_extensions */
2387 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2400 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2402 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2403 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2406 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2407 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2409 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2410 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2412 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2417 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2421 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2424 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2428 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2429 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2431 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2432 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2433 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2435 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2442 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2443 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2446 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2449 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2450 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2451 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2452 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2453 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2454 * anything like that, but this might change).
2456 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2457 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2458 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2459 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2460 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2462 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2466 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2467 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2468 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2470 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2473 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2474 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2478 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2480 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2481 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2483 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2488 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2489 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2490 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2492 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2493 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2494 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2495 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2496 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2500 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2511 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2513 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2514 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2516 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2518 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2525 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2528 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2529 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2531 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2535 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2544 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2545 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2546 * the length of the block. */
2547 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2549 unsigned int off = 0;
2563 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2565 unsigned short length;
2566 unsigned short type;
2567 unsigned short size;
2568 unsigned char *data = *p;
2569 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2570 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2573 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2575 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2577 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2579 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2580 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2584 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2585 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2588 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2589 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2592 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2596 if (data+length != d+n)
2598 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2602 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2607 if (data+size > (d+n))
2610 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2611 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2612 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2615 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2617 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2619 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2621 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2623 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2625 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2630 tlsext_servername = 1;
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2634 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2636 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2637 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2639 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2641 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2646 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2647 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2648 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2650 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2653 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2654 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2657 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2658 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2659 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2660 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2661 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2664 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2666 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2668 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2669 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2671 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2674 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2676 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2679 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2681 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2682 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2684 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2688 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2691 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2692 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2698 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2699 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2700 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2701 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2703 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2705 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2707 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2712 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2714 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2715 * a status request message.
2717 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2722 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2723 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2726 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2727 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2729 unsigned char *selected;
2730 unsigned char selected_len;
2732 /* We must have requested it. */
2733 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2738 /* The data must be valid */
2739 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2744 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2746 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2750 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2752 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2755 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2756 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2757 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2761 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2765 /* We must have requested it. */
2766 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2768 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2773 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 * The extension data consists of:
2778 * uint16 list_length
2779 * uint8 proto_length;
2780 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2785 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2787 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2793 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2796 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2798 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2799 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2801 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2804 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2805 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2808 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2812 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2813 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2815 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2816 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2817 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2819 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2825 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2827 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2832 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2833 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2835 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2836 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2837 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2838 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2841 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2842 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2844 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2852 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2856 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2858 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2860 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2862 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2863 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2865 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2871 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2881 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2882 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2883 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2884 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2885 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2886 * absence on initial connect only.
2888 if (!renegotiate_seen
2889 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2890 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2892 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2894 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2902 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2905 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2909 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2911 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2916 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2918 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2919 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2921 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2922 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2924 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2925 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2930 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2934 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2935 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2942 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2947 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2949 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2950 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2953 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2954 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2956 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2957 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2961 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2962 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2963 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2964 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2966 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2968 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2969 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2970 * so this has to happen here in
2971 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2975 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2977 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2980 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2981 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2987 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2988 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2990 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2992 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2993 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2995 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2996 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2998 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2999 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3001 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3002 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3004 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3005 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3008 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3012 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3014 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3015 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3016 * abort the handshake.
3018 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3019 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3027 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3028 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3031 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3032 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3035 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3036 s->servername_done=0;
3042 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3046 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3047 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3049 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3050 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3052 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3053 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3055 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3056 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3059 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3060 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3062 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3065 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3066 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3069 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3070 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3073 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3074 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3079 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3082 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3086 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3088 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3091 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3092 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3093 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3094 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3096 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3099 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3100 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3101 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3102 if (certpkey == NULL)
3104 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3107 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3108 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3110 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3111 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3114 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3115 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3116 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3118 /* status request response should be sent */
3119 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3120 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3121 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3123 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3125 /* something bad happened */
3126 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3127 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3128 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3133 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3138 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3139 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3142 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3143 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3151 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3153 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3154 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3157 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3158 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3159 * it must contain uncompressed.
3161 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3162 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3163 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3164 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3165 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3167 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3169 unsigned char *list;
3170 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3171 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3172 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3174 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3176 found_uncompressed = 1;
3180 if (!found_uncompressed)
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3186 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3187 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3189 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3190 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3191 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3192 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3194 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3195 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3197 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3198 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3200 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3202 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3203 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3206 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3207 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3208 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3209 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3211 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3212 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3217 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3220 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3221 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3224 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3225 * there is no response.
3227 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3229 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3230 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3232 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3233 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3236 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3237 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3242 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3248 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3249 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3252 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3253 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3256 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3257 s->servername_done=0;
3263 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3266 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3268 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3270 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3274 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3283 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3284 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3285 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3287 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3288 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3289 * extension, if any.
3290 * len: the length of the session ID.
3291 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3292 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3293 * point to the resulting session.
3295 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3296 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3297 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3300 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3301 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3302 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3303 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3304 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3305 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3306 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3309 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3310 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3311 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3312 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3313 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3314 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3316 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3317 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3319 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3320 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3324 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3326 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3327 * to permit stateful resumption.
3329 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3331 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3335 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3343 /* Skip past cipher list */
3348 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3353 /* Now at start of extensions */
3354 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3357 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3359 unsigned short type, size;
3362 if (p + size > limit)
3364 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3369 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3370 * currently have one. */
3371 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3374 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3376 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3377 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3378 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3379 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3380 * calculate the master secret later. */
3383 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3386 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3387 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3389 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3391 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3392 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3394 default: /* fatal error */
3404 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3406 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3407 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3408 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3409 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3410 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3411 * point to the resulting session.
3414 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3415 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3416 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3417 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3419 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3420 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3421 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3424 unsigned char *sdec;
3425 const unsigned char *p;
3426 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3427 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3430 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3431 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3434 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3435 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3436 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3437 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3439 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3440 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3451 /* Check key name matches */
3452 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3454 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3455 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3456 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3457 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3459 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3460 * integrity checks on ticket.
3462 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3465 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3469 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3470 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3471 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3472 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3473 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3475 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3478 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3479 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3480 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3481 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3482 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3488 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3489 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3491 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3496 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3499 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3503 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3504 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3505 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3506 * as required by standard.
3509 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3510 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3518 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3523 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3531 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3532 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3533 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3534 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3535 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3536 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3537 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3540 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3541 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3542 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3543 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3546 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3549 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3551 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3557 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3560 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3562 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3563 return table[i].nid;
3568 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3573 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3574 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3577 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3580 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3581 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3585 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3587 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3588 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3595 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3598 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3599 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3602 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3604 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3607 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3609 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3610 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3611 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3613 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3614 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3616 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3617 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3618 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3620 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3621 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3625 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3629 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3631 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3634 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3636 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3637 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3639 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3640 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3642 return inf->mfunc();
3645 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3650 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3651 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3654 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3655 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3658 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3659 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3665 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3666 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3667 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3669 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3670 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3672 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3674 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3675 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3677 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3679 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3681 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3682 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3684 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3688 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3689 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3690 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3692 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3695 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3696 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3698 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3699 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3700 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3702 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3703 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3705 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3706 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3709 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3710 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3711 * then RSA is disabled.
3714 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3716 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3717 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3718 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3719 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3720 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3721 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3724 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3725 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3730 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3731 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3736 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3737 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3742 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3743 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3750 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3752 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3754 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3757 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3758 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3760 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3762 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3764 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3766 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3767 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3770 return tmpout - out;
3773 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3774 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3775 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3776 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3778 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3779 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3780 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3782 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3783 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3785 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3787 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3792 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3793 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3794 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3796 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3807 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3808 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3810 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3811 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3813 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3815 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3816 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3818 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3819 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3821 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3822 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3824 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3825 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3827 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3829 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3830 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3833 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3834 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3838 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3839 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3845 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3846 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3848 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3851 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3854 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3855 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3856 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3861 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3863 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3866 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3867 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3869 /* Should never happen */
3873 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3874 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3875 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3876 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3878 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3879 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3883 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3889 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3890 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3893 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3894 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3896 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3897 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3899 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3901 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3903 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3906 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3907 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3908 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3909 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3910 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3912 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3913 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3919 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3920 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3922 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3923 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3925 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3926 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3927 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3928 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3930 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3931 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3936 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3937 * use the certificate for signing.
3939 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3941 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3942 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3945 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3946 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3949 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3951 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3952 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3956 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3957 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3964 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3965 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3966 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3968 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3974 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3981 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3983 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3986 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3987 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3988 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3990 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3991 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3995 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3997 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3999 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
4001 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
4003 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
4004 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
4008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4010 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4012 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4013 unsigned short hbtype;
4014 unsigned int payload;
4015 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4017 if (s->msg_callback)
4018 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4019 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4020 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4022 /* Read type and payload length first */
4023 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4024 return 0; /* silently discard */
4027 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4028 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4031 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4033 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4036 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4037 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4038 * payload, plus padding
4040 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4048 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4049 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4051 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4053 /* Random padding */
4054 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4056 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4058 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4059 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4060 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4061 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4063 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4068 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4072 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4073 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4074 * sequence number */
4077 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4080 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4088 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4090 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4092 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4093 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4095 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4096 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4097 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4103 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4104 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4110 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4111 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4117 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4118 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4120 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4123 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4124 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4125 * some random stuff.
4126 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4127 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4128 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4129 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4132 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4140 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4141 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4143 /* Sequence number */
4144 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4145 /* 16 random bytes */
4146 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4148 /* Random padding */
4149 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4151 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4154 if (s->msg_callback)
4155 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4156 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4157 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4159 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4168 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4173 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4176 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4178 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4181 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4182 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4184 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4186 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4188 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4196 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4197 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4198 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4199 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4200 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4201 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4204 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4205 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4206 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4207 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4210 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4212 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4213 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4216 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4217 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4221 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4222 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4223 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4227 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4231 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4234 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4236 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4241 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4242 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4244 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4246 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4247 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4248 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4249 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4251 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4259 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4260 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4261 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4262 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4266 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4267 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4268 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4269 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4275 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4279 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4283 if (default_nid == -1)
4285 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4287 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4288 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4289 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4293 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4294 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4298 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4299 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4301 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4307 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4308 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4309 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4310 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4313 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4315 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4316 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4317 /* Strict mode flags */
4318 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4319 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4320 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4322 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4327 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4328 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4330 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4331 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4334 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4338 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4341 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4343 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4345 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4346 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4349 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4350 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4351 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4353 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4354 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4363 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4366 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4367 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4368 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4370 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4378 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4379 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4380 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4382 else if (!check_flags)
4386 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4387 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4390 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4393 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4394 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4396 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4401 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4402 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4403 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4404 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4405 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4408 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4409 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4410 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4411 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4415 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4416 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4424 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4425 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4428 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4431 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4432 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4434 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4437 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4445 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4446 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4448 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4451 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4452 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4453 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4455 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4460 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4468 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4469 else if(check_flags)
4470 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4472 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4473 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4474 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4475 else if (!check_flags)
4478 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4479 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4480 else if (strict_mode)
4482 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4483 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4485 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4486 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4490 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4498 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4500 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4505 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4508 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4511 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4516 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4517 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4518 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4519 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4520 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4525 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4530 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4534 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4535 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4537 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4539 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4541 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4545 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4549 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4552 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4554 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4555 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4557 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4559 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4560 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4562 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4564 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4566 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4567 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4569 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4574 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4578 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4580 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4581 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4585 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4587 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4588 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4589 else if (cpk->digest)
4590 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4593 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4595 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4596 * if the chain is invalid.
4600 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4601 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4604 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4605 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4612 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4613 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4615 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4616 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4617 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4618 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4619 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4620 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4622 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4623 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4625 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4631 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4633 int dh_secbits = 80;
4634 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4635 return DH_get_1024_160();
4636 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4638 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4645 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4646 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4649 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4656 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4657 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4658 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4660 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4661 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4668 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4669 return DH_get_2048_224();
4670 return DH_get_1024_160();
4674 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4677 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4680 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4681 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4686 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4688 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4691 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4693 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4694 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4695 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4696 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4699 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4700 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4703 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4705 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4708 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4711 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4714 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4715 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4719 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4720 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4722 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4723 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4727 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4728 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4729 * not sending one to the peer.
4730 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4733 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4735 int rv, start_idx, i;
4738 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4744 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4748 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4750 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4751 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);