2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
117 #include <openssl/ec.h>
119 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
120 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
136 tls1_setup_key_block,
137 tls1_generate_master_secret,
138 tls1_change_cipher_state,
139 tls1_final_finish_mac,
140 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
141 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
142 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
143 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
148 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
152 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
155 tls1_setup_key_block,
156 tls1_generate_master_secret,
157 tls1_change_cipher_state,
158 tls1_final_finish_mac,
159 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
160 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
161 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
162 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_export_keying_material,
165 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
166 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
167 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
171 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
174 tls1_setup_key_block,
175 tls1_generate_master_secret,
176 tls1_change_cipher_state,
177 tls1_final_finish_mac,
178 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
179 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
180 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
181 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_export_keying_material,
184 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
185 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
186 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
187 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
191 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
194 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
200 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
208 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
216 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
219 s->version = s->method->version;
222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224 static int nid_list[] =
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
257 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
267 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
270 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
274 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
276 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
277 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
279 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
280 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
286 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
287 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
288 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
293 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
294 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
296 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
297 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
303 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
304 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
305 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
308 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
311 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
315 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
316 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] =
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
320 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
322 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
324 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
325 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
327 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
329 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
330 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
332 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
333 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
335 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
336 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
337 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
339 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
340 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
342 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
343 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
345 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
346 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
349 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
350 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
352 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
353 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
358 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
360 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
361 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
362 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
364 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
367 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
369 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
372 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
374 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
376 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
378 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
380 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
382 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
384 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
386 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
388 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
390 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
392 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
394 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
396 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
398 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
400 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
402 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
404 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
406 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
408 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
410 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
412 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
414 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
416 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
418 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
420 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
422 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
424 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
426 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
433 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
435 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
436 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
437 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
438 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
439 * lists in the first place.
440 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
441 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
442 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
444 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
445 const unsigned char **pcurves,
448 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
451 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
452 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
456 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
457 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
459 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
460 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
461 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
464 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
465 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
469 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
470 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
474 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
475 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
482 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
483 *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
488 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
489 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
493 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
502 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
506 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
507 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
509 const unsigned char *curves;
510 size_t num_curves, i;
511 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
512 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
514 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
517 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
520 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
522 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
525 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
527 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
530 else /* Should never happen */
533 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
537 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
544 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
545 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
546 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
547 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
549 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
551 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
552 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
554 /* Can't do anything on client side */
561 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
562 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
565 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
566 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
567 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
568 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
569 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
570 /* Should never happen */
573 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
577 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
578 * but s->options is a long...
580 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
582 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
583 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
584 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
586 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
588 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
590 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
591 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
593 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
597 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
598 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
606 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
610 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
613 unsigned char *clist, *p;
615 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
616 * while curve ids < 32
618 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
619 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
623 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
626 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
628 unsigned long idmask;
630 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
632 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
633 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25)
639 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
640 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
642 EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
643 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
645 if(curve) EC_GROUP_free(curve);
650 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
653 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
664 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
668 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
673 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
676 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
678 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
682 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
684 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
686 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
688 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
689 if (nid == NID_undef)
690 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
691 if (nid == NID_undef)
692 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
693 if (nid == NID_undef)
695 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
696 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
698 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
701 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
702 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
707 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
711 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
713 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
714 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
719 const EC_METHOD *meth;
722 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
723 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
726 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
729 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
733 /* Determine curve ID */
734 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
735 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
736 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
740 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
752 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
754 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
757 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
759 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
762 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
766 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
767 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
768 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
770 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
771 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
773 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
774 * is supported (see RFC4492).
776 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
778 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
779 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
780 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
782 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
785 if (i == num_formats)
790 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
791 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
793 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
795 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
797 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
798 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
803 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
810 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
813 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
815 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
817 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
818 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
822 *pformats = ecformats_default;
823 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
825 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
827 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
831 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
832 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
834 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
839 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
842 /* If not EC nothing to do */
843 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
848 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
852 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
853 * supported curves extension.
855 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
858 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
859 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
861 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
868 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
869 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
870 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
871 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
872 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
874 return 0; /* Should never happen */
875 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
876 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
878 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
882 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
883 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
885 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
890 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
891 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
893 unsigned char curve_id[2];
894 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
895 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
896 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
897 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
900 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
901 * no other curves permitted.
905 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
906 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
907 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
908 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
909 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
913 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
914 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
916 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
917 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
919 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
922 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
925 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
927 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
933 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
935 /* Need a shared curve */
936 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
942 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
949 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
953 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
959 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
964 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
968 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
969 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
972 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
973 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
975 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
978 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
979 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
981 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
984 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
985 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
987 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
990 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
991 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
992 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
993 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
995 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
997 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
998 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1001 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1002 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1005 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1009 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1010 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1011 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1014 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1016 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1020 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
1022 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1023 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1024 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1026 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1027 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1030 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1031 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1035 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1036 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
1038 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1039 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1041 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
1043 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1044 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1048 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1049 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1052 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1053 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1055 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1056 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1058 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1059 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1060 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1061 /* Should never happen */
1064 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1065 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1071 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1073 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1074 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1075 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1077 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1082 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1087 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1089 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1092 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1096 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1098 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1101 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1109 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1113 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1114 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1115 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1117 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1120 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1121 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1126 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1132 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1135 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1136 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1139 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1140 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1141 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1142 * session and not global settings.
1145 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1148 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1149 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1150 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1153 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1154 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1155 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1158 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1159 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1162 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1163 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1168 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1173 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1178 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1184 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1185 * signature algorithms.
1189 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1190 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1199 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1200 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1203 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1205 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1206 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1210 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1211 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1213 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1214 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1218 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1227 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1230 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1231 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1233 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1235 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1243 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1245 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1246 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1247 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1248 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1257 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1258 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1259 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1264 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1266 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1268 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1269 unsigned long size_str;
1272 /* check for enough space.
1273 4 for the servername type and entension length
1274 2 for servernamelist length
1275 1 for the hostname type
1276 2 for hostname length
1280 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1281 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1284 /* extension type and length */
1285 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1286 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1288 /* length of servername list */
1289 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1291 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1292 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1294 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1298 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1303 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1309 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1311 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1314 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1324 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1325 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1326 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1328 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1329 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1335 /* check for enough space.
1336 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1337 1 for the srp user identity
1338 + srp user identity length
1340 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1342 /* fill in the extension */
1343 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1344 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1345 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1346 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1354 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1356 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1357 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1359 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1361 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1362 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1363 if (num_formats > 255)
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1370 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1371 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1372 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1373 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1376 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1377 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1378 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1381 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1382 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1383 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 curves_list_len = 2*num_curves;
1389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1390 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1391 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1392 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1393 ret+=curves_list_len;
1395 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1397 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1400 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1401 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1402 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1403 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1405 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1406 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1407 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1409 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1410 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1412 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1416 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1417 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1419 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1422 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1433 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1436 const unsigned char *salg;
1437 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1438 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1441 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1443 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1447 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1448 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1450 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1452 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1454 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1465 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1468 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1472 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1474 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1475 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1481 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1483 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1490 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1491 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1492 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1494 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1495 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1497 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1499 /* save position of id len */
1500 unsigned char *q = ret;
1501 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1502 /* skip over id len */
1504 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1510 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1514 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1515 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1517 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1520 * 1: peer may send requests
1521 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1523 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1524 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1526 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1530 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1532 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1533 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1534 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1541 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1543 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1545 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1546 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1547 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1548 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1549 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1550 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1553 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1557 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1559 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1564 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1572 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1573 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1576 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1577 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1579 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1580 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1582 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1584 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1585 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1586 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1587 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1589 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1591 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1593 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1601 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1606 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1609 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1613 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1616 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1617 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1619 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1622 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1623 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1624 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1625 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1627 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1628 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1632 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1634 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1636 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1642 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1646 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1657 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1669 const unsigned char *plist;
1671 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1674 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1676 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1677 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1684 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1685 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1686 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1687 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1691 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1692 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1694 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1695 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1698 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1702 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1704 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1705 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1709 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1710 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1712 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1714 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1716 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1719 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1722 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1727 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1731 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1733 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1735 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1738 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1746 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1747 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1748 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1749 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1750 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1751 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1752 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1753 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1754 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1755 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1756 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1762 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1763 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1765 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1767 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1770 * 1: peer may send requests
1771 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1773 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1774 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1776 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1782 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1783 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1784 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1786 const unsigned char *npa;
1787 unsigned int npalen;
1790 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1791 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1793 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1796 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1798 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1802 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1805 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1807 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1808 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1810 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1812 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1816 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1820 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1823 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1841 unsigned short type, size;
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1844 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1846 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1847 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1848 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1850 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1851 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1852 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1853 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1856 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1857 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1858 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1859 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1860 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1861 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1863 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1865 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1868 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1880 if (data+size > d+n)
1884 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1898 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1900 if (data + len != d+n)
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1906 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1908 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1910 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1912 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1913 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1914 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1917 * returns: 0 on success. */
1918 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1919 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1923 const unsigned char *selected;
1924 unsigned char selected_len;
1927 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1933 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1934 * length-prefixed strings. */
1935 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1936 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1945 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1947 proto_len = data[i];
1953 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1959 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1960 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1961 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1962 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1963 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1964 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1965 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1967 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1970 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1971 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1976 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1980 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1982 unsigned short type;
1983 unsigned short size;
1985 unsigned char *data = *p;
1986 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1988 s->servername_done = 0;
1989 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1991 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1994 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1996 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1997 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2001 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2002 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2006 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2007 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2008 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2010 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2011 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2013 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2014 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2017 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2021 if (data > (d+n-len))
2024 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2029 if (data+size > (d+n))
2032 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2034 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2035 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2036 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2037 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2039 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2040 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2041 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2042 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2043 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2044 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2045 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2046 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2047 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2048 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2049 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2050 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2051 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2052 the value of the Host: field.
2053 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2054 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2055 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2056 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2060 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2062 unsigned char *sdata;
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2092 switch (servname_type)
2094 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2097 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2099 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2107 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2109 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2112 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2113 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2114 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2115 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2116 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2117 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2120 s->servername_done = 1;
2124 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2125 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2126 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2146 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2153 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2158 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2159 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2161 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2163 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2172 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2173 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2175 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2176 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2178 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2185 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2186 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2188 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2189 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2191 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2195 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2198 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2199 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2200 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2201 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2202 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2207 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2208 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2209 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2211 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2212 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2213 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2214 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2216 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2227 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2232 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2233 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2236 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2237 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2238 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2239 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2240 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2243 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2244 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2245 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2247 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2251 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2255 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2262 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2264 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2266 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2267 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2269 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2276 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2277 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2279 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2283 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2285 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2287 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2292 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2310 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2319 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2321 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2323 const unsigned char *sdata;
2325 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2339 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2361 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2362 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2365 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2366 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2367 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2369 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2370 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2374 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2376 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2377 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2382 /* Read in request_extensions */
2385 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2392 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2400 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2401 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2404 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2405 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2407 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2408 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2410 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2415 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2419 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2426 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2427 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2429 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2430 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2431 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2433 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2439 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2440 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2441 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2443 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2446 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2447 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2448 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2449 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2450 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2451 * anything like that, but this might change).
2453 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2454 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2455 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2456 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2457 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2458 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2462 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2463 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2464 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2466 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2469 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2470 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2474 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2475 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2476 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2478 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2490 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2492 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2493 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2495 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2497 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2505 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2506 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2509 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2511 unsigned short type, size, len;
2512 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2513 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2516 if (data >= limit - 2)
2520 if (data > limit - len)
2523 while (data <= limit - 4)
2528 if (data+size > limit)
2530 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2539 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2542 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2544 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2545 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2546 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2547 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2549 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2551 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2555 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2561 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2562 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0)
2564 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2572 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2573 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2574 * the length of the block. */
2575 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2577 unsigned int off = 0;
2591 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2593 unsigned short length;
2594 unsigned short type;
2595 unsigned short size;
2596 unsigned char *data = *p;
2597 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2598 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2601 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2603 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2605 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2607 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2608 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2612 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2613 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2616 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2620 if (data+length != d+n)
2622 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2626 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2631 if (data+size > (d+n))
2634 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2635 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2636 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2638 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2640 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2642 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2645 tlsext_servername = 1;
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2651 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2652 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2654 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2661 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2662 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2663 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2665 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2668 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2669 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2672 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2673 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2674 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2675 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2676 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2679 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2681 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2683 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2684 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2695 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2697 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2698 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2700 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2704 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2707 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2708 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2710 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2715 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2716 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2717 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2719 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2721 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2728 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2730 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2731 * a status request message.
2733 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2738 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2739 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2742 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2743 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2745 unsigned char *selected;
2746 unsigned char selected_len;
2748 /* We must have requested it. */
2749 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2751 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2754 /* The data must be valid */
2755 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2757 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2760 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2762 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2765 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2766 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2768 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2771 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2772 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2773 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2777 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2781 /* We must have requested it. */
2782 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2784 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2789 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 /* The extension data consists of:
2793 * uint16 list_length
2794 * uint8 proto_length;
2795 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2799 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2801 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2805 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2807 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2811 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2812 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2813 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2815 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2818 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2819 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2822 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2824 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2826 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2829 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2833 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2834 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2836 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2837 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2838 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2840 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2845 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2847 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2851 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2852 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2854 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2862 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2866 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2868 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2870 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2872 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2873 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2875 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2881 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2891 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2892 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2893 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2894 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2895 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2896 * absence on initial connect only.
2898 if (!renegotiate_seen
2899 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2900 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2902 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2904 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2912 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2915 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2919 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2921 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2926 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2928 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2929 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2931 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2932 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2935 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2940 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2944 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2945 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2952 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2957 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2959 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2960 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2963 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2964 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2966 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2967 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2971 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2972 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2973 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2974 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2976 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2978 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2979 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2980 * so this has to happen here in
2981 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2985 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2987 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2990 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2996 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2997 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2998 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3000 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3002 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3003 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3005 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3006 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3008 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3009 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3011 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3012 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3014 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3015 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3022 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3024 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3025 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3026 * abort the handshake.
3028 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3029 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3042 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3045 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3046 s->servername_done=0;
3052 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3056 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3057 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3059 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3060 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3062 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3063 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3065 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3066 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3069 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3070 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3072 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3075 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3076 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3079 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3080 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3083 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3084 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3089 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3096 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3098 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3101 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3102 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3103 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3104 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3106 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3109 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3110 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3111 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3112 if (certpkey == NULL)
3114 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3117 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3118 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3120 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3121 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3124 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3125 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3126 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3128 /* status request response should be sent */
3129 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3130 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3131 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3133 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3135 /* something bad happened */
3136 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3137 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3138 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3143 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3148 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3149 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3152 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3153 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3161 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3163 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3164 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3167 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3168 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3169 * it must contain uncompressed.
3171 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3172 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3173 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3174 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3175 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3177 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3179 unsigned char *list;
3180 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3181 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3182 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3184 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3186 found_uncompressed = 1;
3190 if (!found_uncompressed)
3192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3196 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3197 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3199 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3200 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3201 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3202 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3204 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3205 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3207 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3208 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3210 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3212 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3213 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3216 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3217 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3218 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3219 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3221 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3222 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3227 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3230 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3231 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3234 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3235 * there is no response.
3237 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3239 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3240 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3242 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3243 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3246 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3247 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3251 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3252 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3258 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3259 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3262 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3263 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3266 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3267 s->servername_done=0;
3273 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3276 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3278 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3280 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3284 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3292 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3293 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3294 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3296 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3297 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3298 * extension, if any.
3299 * len: the length of the session ID.
3300 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3301 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3302 * point to the resulting session.
3304 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3305 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3306 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3309 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3310 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3311 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3312 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3313 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3314 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3315 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3318 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3319 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3320 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3321 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3322 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3323 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3325 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3326 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3328 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3329 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3333 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3335 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3336 * to permit stateful resumption.
3338 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3340 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3344 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3352 /* Skip past cipher list */
3357 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3362 /* Now at start of extensions */
3363 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3366 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3368 unsigned short type, size;
3371 if (p + size > limit)
3373 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3378 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3379 * currently have one. */
3380 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3383 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3385 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3386 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3387 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3388 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3389 * calculate the master secret later. */
3392 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3395 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3396 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3398 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3400 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3401 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3403 default: /* fatal error */
3412 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3414 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3415 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3416 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3417 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3418 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3419 * point to the resulting session.
3422 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3423 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3424 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3425 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3427 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3428 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3429 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3432 unsigned char *sdec;
3433 const unsigned char *p;
3434 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3435 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3438 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3439 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3442 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3443 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3444 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3445 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3447 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3448 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3459 /* Check key name matches */
3460 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3462 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3463 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3464 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3465 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3467 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3468 * integrity checks on ticket.
3470 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3473 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3477 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3478 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3479 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3480 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3481 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3486 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3487 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3488 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3489 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3490 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3493 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3496 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3497 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3499 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3504 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3507 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3511 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3512 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3513 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3514 * as required by standard.
3517 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3518 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3526 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3531 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3539 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3540 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3541 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3542 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3543 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3544 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3545 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3548 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3549 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3550 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3551 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3554 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3557 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3559 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3565 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3568 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3570 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3571 return table[i].nid;
3576 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3581 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3582 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3585 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3588 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3589 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3593 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3595 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3596 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3599 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3604 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3612 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3616 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3617 return EVP_sha224();
3619 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3620 return EVP_sha256();
3622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3623 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3624 return EVP_sha384();
3626 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3627 return EVP_sha512();
3635 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3640 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3641 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3644 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3645 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3648 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3649 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3655 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3656 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3657 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3659 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3660 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3662 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3664 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3665 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3667 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3669 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3671 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3672 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3674 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3678 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3679 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3680 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3682 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3685 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3686 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3687 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3688 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3690 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3691 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3692 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3694 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3695 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3697 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3699 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3701 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3706 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3707 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3708 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3710 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3721 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3722 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3724 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3725 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3727 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3729 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3730 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3732 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3733 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3735 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3736 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3738 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3739 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3741 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3743 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3744 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3747 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3748 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3752 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3753 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3759 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3760 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3762 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3765 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3768 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3769 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3770 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3775 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3777 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3780 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3781 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3783 /* Should never happen */
3787 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3788 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3789 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3790 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3792 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3793 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3797 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3803 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3804 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3807 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3808 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3810 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3811 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3813 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3815 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3817 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3820 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3821 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3822 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3823 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3824 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3826 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3827 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3833 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3834 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3836 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3837 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3839 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3840 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3841 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3842 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3844 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3845 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3850 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3851 * use the certificate for signing.
3853 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3855 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3856 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3859 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3860 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3863 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3865 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3866 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3870 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3871 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3878 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3879 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3880 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3882 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3888 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3895 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3897 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3900 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3901 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3902 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3904 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3905 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3909 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3911 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3913 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3915 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3917 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3918 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3924 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3926 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3927 unsigned short hbtype;
3928 unsigned int payload;
3929 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3931 if (s->msg_callback)
3932 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3933 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3934 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3936 /* Read type and payload length first */
3937 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3938 return 0; /* silently discard */
3941 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3942 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3945 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3947 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3950 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3951 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3952 * payload, plus padding
3954 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3957 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3958 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3960 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3962 /* Random padding */
3963 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3965 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3967 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3968 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3969 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3970 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3972 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3977 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3981 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3982 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3983 * sequence number */
3986 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3989 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3997 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3999 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4001 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4002 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4004 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4005 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4006 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4012 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4013 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4019 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4020 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4026 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4027 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4029 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4031 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4032 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4033 * some random stuff.
4034 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4035 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4036 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4037 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4040 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4043 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4044 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4046 /* Sequence number */
4047 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4048 /* 16 random bytes */
4049 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4051 /* Random padding */
4052 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4054 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4057 if (s->msg_callback)
4058 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4059 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4060 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4062 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4071 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4076 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4079 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4081 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4084 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4085 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4087 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4089 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4091 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4099 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4100 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4101 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4102 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4103 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4104 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4107 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4108 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4109 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4110 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4113 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4115 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4116 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4119 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4120 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4124 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4125 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4126 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4130 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4134 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4137 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4139 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4144 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4145 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4147 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4149 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4150 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4151 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4152 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4154 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4162 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4163 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4164 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4165 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4169 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4170 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4171 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4172 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4178 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4182 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4186 if (default_nid == -1)
4188 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4190 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4191 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4192 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4196 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4197 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4201 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4202 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4204 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4210 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4211 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4212 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4213 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4216 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4218 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4219 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4220 /* Strict mode flags */
4221 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4222 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4223 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4225 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4230 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4231 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4233 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4234 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4237 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4241 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4244 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4246 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4248 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4249 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4252 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4253 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4254 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4256 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4257 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4266 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4269 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4270 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4271 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4273 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4281 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4282 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4283 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4284 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4285 else if (!check_flags)
4289 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4290 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4293 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4296 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4297 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4299 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4304 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4305 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4306 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4307 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4308 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4311 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4312 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4313 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4314 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4318 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4319 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4327 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4328 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4331 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4334 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4335 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4337 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4340 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4348 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4349 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4351 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4355 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4356 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4358 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4363 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4371 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4372 else if(check_flags)
4373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4375 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4376 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4377 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4378 else if (!check_flags)
4381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4382 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4383 else if (strict_mode)
4385 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4386 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4388 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4389 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4393 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4401 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4403 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4408 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4411 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4414 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4419 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4420 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4421 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4422 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4423 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4428 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4433 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4437 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4438 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4440 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4442 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4444 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4448 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4452 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4455 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4457 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4458 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4460 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4462 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4463 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4465 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4467 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4469 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4470 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4477 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4481 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4483 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4484 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4488 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4490 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4491 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4492 else if (cpk->digest)
4493 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4496 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4498 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4499 * if the chain is invalid.
4503 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4504 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4507 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4508 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4515 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4516 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4518 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4519 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4520 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4521 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4522 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4523 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4525 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4526 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4528 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);