2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
33 tls1_export_keying_material,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
36 tls_close_construct_packet,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
50 tls1_export_keying_material,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
53 tls_close_construct_packet,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
67 tls1_export_keying_material,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
71 tls_close_construct_packet,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
78 tls13_setup_key_block,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls1_export_keying_material,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 tls_close_construct_packet,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
109 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
111 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
115 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
118 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
119 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
121 s->version = s->method->version;
124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
127 int nid; /* Curve NID */
128 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
129 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
133 * Table of curve information.
134 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
135 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
137 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
138 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
139 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
140 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
141 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
142 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
143 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
144 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
145 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
146 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
147 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
148 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
149 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
150 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
151 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
152 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
153 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
154 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
155 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
157 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
158 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
159 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
161 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
162 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
166 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
169 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
175 /* The default curves */
176 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
177 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
178 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
179 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
180 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
184 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
185 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
188 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
190 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
194 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
196 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
200 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
203 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
204 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
211 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
213 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
214 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
215 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
216 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
217 * lists in the first place.
218 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
219 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
220 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
222 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
225 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
228 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
229 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
231 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
232 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
233 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
234 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
235 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
238 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
239 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
243 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
244 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
248 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
249 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
252 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
253 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
257 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
258 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
263 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
267 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
268 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
270 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
273 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
275 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
276 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
280 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
283 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
284 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
286 const unsigned char *curves;
287 size_t num_curves, i;
288 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
289 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
291 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
293 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
296 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
297 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
299 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
300 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
302 } else /* Should never happen */
305 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
307 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
308 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
309 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
315 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
316 * if there is no match.
317 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
318 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
319 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
321 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
323 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
324 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
327 /* Can't do anything on client side */
331 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
333 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
334 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
336 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
339 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
341 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
342 /* Should never happen */
345 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
349 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
350 * but s->options is a long...
352 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
353 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
355 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
357 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
358 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
360 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
362 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
363 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
365 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
366 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
367 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
370 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
372 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
380 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
384 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
385 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
387 unsigned char *glist, *p;
390 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
393 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
394 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
397 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
398 unsigned long idmask;
400 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
401 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
403 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
412 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
416 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
420 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
423 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
425 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
431 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
433 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
435 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
437 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
438 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
440 if (nid == NID_undef)
441 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
442 if (nid == NID_undef)
444 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
445 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
447 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
451 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
452 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
456 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
460 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
463 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
464 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
471 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
472 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
477 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
478 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
482 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
484 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
486 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
489 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
490 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
492 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
498 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
499 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
500 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
502 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
503 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
506 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
507 * supported (see RFC4492).
509 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
510 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
511 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
512 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
513 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
516 if (i == num_formats)
521 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
522 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
523 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
525 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
527 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
528 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
529 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
530 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
531 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
536 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
541 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
548 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
552 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
554 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
555 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
556 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
558 *pformats = ecformats_default;
559 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
561 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
563 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
568 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
569 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
571 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
573 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
576 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
579 /* If not EC nothing to do */
580 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
582 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
586 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
589 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
593 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
594 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
596 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
602 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
603 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
604 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
605 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
606 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
608 return 0; /* Should never happen */
609 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
610 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
612 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
614 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
615 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
616 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
618 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
626 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
628 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
630 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
631 * is compatible with the client extensions.
633 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
635 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
638 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
641 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
642 unsigned char curve_id[2];
643 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
644 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
645 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
646 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
647 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
651 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
652 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
656 /* Need a shared curve */
657 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
661 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
665 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
672 /* Default sigalg schemes */
673 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
677 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
702 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
703 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
704 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
708 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
710 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
711 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
712 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
713 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
714 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
715 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
716 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
717 NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
719 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
720 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_undef, NID_undef},
721 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
722 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_undef, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
724 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_undef, NID_undef},
725 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
726 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
727 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
728 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
730 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
731 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
732 NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
734 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
735 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
736 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
737 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_undef, NID_undef},
738 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
739 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_undef, NID_undef},
740 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
741 NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
744 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
745 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, NID_undef,
747 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
748 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, NID_undef,
750 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
751 NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001, NID_undef, NID_undef}
755 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
756 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
759 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
761 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
763 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
769 static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(uint16_t sigalg)
771 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
773 return r != NULL ? r->hash : 0;
776 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(uint16_t sigalg)
778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
780 return r != NULL ? r->sig : 0;
783 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
786 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
790 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
791 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
792 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
793 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
795 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
796 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
799 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
800 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
805 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
806 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
807 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
809 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
810 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
811 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
812 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
813 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
814 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
816 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
817 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
822 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
823 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
826 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
828 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
829 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
831 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
832 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
833 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
835 /* Should never happen */
838 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
840 * Check sigalgs is known and key type is consistent with signature:
841 * RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
843 if (lu == NULL || (pkeyid != lu->sig
844 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
849 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
850 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
851 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
852 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
854 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
858 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
859 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
862 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
863 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha256) {
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
865 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
868 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
869 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha384) {
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
871 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
877 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
881 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
882 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
883 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
884 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
887 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
888 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
889 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
893 md = tls12_get_hash(lu->hash);
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
899 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
900 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
902 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
903 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
904 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
905 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
906 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
911 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
913 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = md;
914 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
918 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
920 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
922 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
927 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
928 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
929 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
931 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
934 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
936 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
938 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
939 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
940 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
941 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
943 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
944 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
945 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
946 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
948 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
950 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
951 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
952 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
958 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
959 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
960 * @c: cipher to check
961 * @op: Security check that you want to do
963 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
965 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
967 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
968 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
970 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
972 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
973 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
975 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
976 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
979 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
982 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
984 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
986 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
989 /* Initialise digests to default values */
990 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
992 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
994 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
997 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
998 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1000 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
1001 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1004 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1007 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
1008 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
1009 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
1013 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1018 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1019 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1020 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1021 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1022 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1023 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1024 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1025 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1028 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1029 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1030 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1032 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1035 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1036 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1038 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1039 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1043 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1047 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1052 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1054 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1055 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1056 * point to the resulting session.
1058 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1059 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1060 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1063 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1064 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1065 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1066 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1067 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1068 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1069 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1072 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1073 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1074 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1075 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1076 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1077 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1079 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1084 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1087 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1090 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1091 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1094 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1097 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1098 if (!ticketext->present)
1101 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1104 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1107 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1108 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1110 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1112 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1113 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1114 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1115 * calculate the master secret later.
1117 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1120 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1121 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1123 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1124 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1125 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1127 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1128 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1130 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1131 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1132 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1135 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1140 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1142 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1143 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1144 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1145 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1146 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1147 * point to the resulting session.
1149 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1150 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1151 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1154 unsigned char *sdec;
1155 const unsigned char *p;
1156 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1157 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1159 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1160 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1161 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1162 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1164 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1165 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1167 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1168 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1170 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1173 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1174 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1175 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1180 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1186 /* Check key name matches */
1187 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1188 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1189 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1192 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1193 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1194 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1195 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1196 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1198 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1203 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1206 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1210 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1212 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1213 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1217 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1218 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1219 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1222 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1223 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1224 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1225 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1227 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1228 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1229 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1230 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1231 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1232 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1233 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1234 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1236 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1238 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1239 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1241 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1244 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1248 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1252 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1253 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1254 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1258 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1259 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1262 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1264 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1268 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1270 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1272 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1273 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1277 int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
1278 const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss)
1282 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1286 md_id = EVP_MD_type(md);
1287 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
1288 if (md_id == NID_undef)
1290 /* For TLS 1.3 only allow RSA-PSS */
1291 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1292 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1294 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1295 /* Should never happen: we abort if no sigalgs extension and TLS 1.3 */
1296 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1298 /* For TLS 1.2 and no sigalgs lookup using complete table */
1299 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1301 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1302 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1304 *ispss = curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1311 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1312 curr = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
1315 * Look for matching key and hash. If key type is RSA also match PSS
1318 if (curr->hash == md_id && (curr->sig == sig_id
1319 || (sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA && curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS))){
1320 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1322 *ispss = curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1335 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
1336 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX},
1337 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX},
1338 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX},
1339 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX},
1340 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX},
1341 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX},
1342 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX},
1343 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX},
1344 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX},
1347 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid)
1350 if (hash_nid == NID_undef)
1353 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
1354 if (tls12_md_info[i].nid == hash_nid)
1355 return tls12_md_info + i;
1361 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid)
1363 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
1364 if (hash_nid == NID_md5 && FIPS_mode())
1366 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid);
1369 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
1372 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1377 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1379 * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
1380 * this will need to be updated.
1382 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1383 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1387 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1391 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1394 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1395 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1397 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1398 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1400 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1401 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1407 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1408 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp)
1410 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1411 const tls12_hash_info *hinf
1412 = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp));
1413 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1415 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
1417 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1418 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1)
1420 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1421 sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
1422 sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
1423 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr);
1427 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1428 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1432 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1434 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1435 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1436 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1438 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1439 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1440 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1442 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1443 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1444 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
1445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1446 /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
1447 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1449 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1455 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1461 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1468 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1470 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1472 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1475 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1476 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1480 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1481 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
1482 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1489 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1490 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1491 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1492 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1494 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1495 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1496 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1497 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1498 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
1500 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1501 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1504 *shsig = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1514 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1515 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1517 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1518 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1520 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1522 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1524 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1525 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1526 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1527 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1528 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1529 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1530 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1531 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1532 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1533 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1535 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1536 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1539 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1540 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1544 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1545 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1547 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1549 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1552 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1556 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1557 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1561 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1563 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1569 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1570 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1572 /* Should never happen */
1576 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1578 /* Invalid data length */
1579 if ((size & 1) != 0)
1584 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1585 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1586 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1587 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1589 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1590 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1591 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
1599 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1604 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1605 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1608 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1611 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1612 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1614 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1615 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1617 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig);
1618 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1619 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->hash);
1621 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1622 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
1623 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1624 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
1630 * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
1631 * use the certificate for signing.
1633 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1634 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1636 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1637 * supported it stays as NULL.
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1640 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1641 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1644 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
1645 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1646 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1650 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1651 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1654 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1655 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1656 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1657 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1658 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1659 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1660 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1661 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1667 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1668 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1669 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1671 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1672 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1673 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1676 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1678 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1682 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1684 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1685 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1687 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1689 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1690 if (psignhash != NULL)
1691 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1693 return (int)numsigalgs;
1696 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1697 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1698 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1700 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1701 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1702 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1703 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1705 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1707 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1709 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1710 if (psignhash != NULL)
1711 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1713 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1715 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1716 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1719 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1720 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1724 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1727 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1729 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1730 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1731 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1732 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1733 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1734 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1735 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1736 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1738 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1739 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1740 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1743 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1744 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1746 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1748 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1750 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1751 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1754 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1756 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1758 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1760 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1761 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1763 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1765 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1767 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1778 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1779 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1782 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1785 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1786 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1789 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1790 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1795 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1796 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1798 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1802 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1806 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1809 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1811 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1816 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1817 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1819 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1821 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1822 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1823 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1825 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1827 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1828 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1833 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1838 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1839 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1840 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1842 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1843 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1844 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1850 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1854 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1858 if (default_nid == -1)
1860 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1862 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1863 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1864 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1869 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1870 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1874 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1875 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1876 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1883 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1884 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1885 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1886 * attempting to use them.
1889 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1891 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1892 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1893 /* Strict mode flags */
1894 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1895 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1896 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1898 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1903 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1904 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1907 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1908 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1910 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1913 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1915 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1916 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1918 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1920 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1921 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1927 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1930 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1932 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1933 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1935 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1942 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1943 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1944 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1945 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1946 else if (!check_flags)
1951 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1952 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1954 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1957 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1959 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1962 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
1963 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
1964 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1965 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1968 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1969 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1970 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1974 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1975 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1978 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1979 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1980 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1983 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1984 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1985 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1988 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1989 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1990 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1999 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2000 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2002 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2004 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2005 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2006 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == NID_sha1
2007 && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign)
2010 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2017 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2018 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2023 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2024 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2025 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2027 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2034 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2035 else if (check_flags)
2036 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2038 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2039 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2040 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2041 else if (!check_flags)
2044 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2045 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2046 else if (strict_mode) {
2047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2048 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2049 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2050 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2052 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2059 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2060 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2062 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2064 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2067 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2070 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2074 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2078 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2080 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2081 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2083 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2084 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2089 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2092 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2094 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2096 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2097 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2099 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2100 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2101 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2103 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2104 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2105 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2106 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2112 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2117 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2122 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2123 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2124 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2125 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2128 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2131 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2135 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2138 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2139 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2146 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2147 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2149 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
2150 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
2151 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2152 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2153 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2154 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2155 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2158 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2159 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2161 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2165 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2167 int dh_secbits = 80;
2168 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2169 return DH_get_1024_160();
2170 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2171 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2176 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2177 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
2180 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2188 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2189 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2191 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2192 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2200 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2201 return DH_get_2048_224();
2202 return DH_get_1024_160();
2206 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2209 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2212 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2213 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2214 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2215 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2217 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2220 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2222 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2225 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2227 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2228 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2229 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2230 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2232 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2233 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2235 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2236 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2239 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2241 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2244 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2247 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2249 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2250 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2252 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2253 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2255 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2256 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2261 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2262 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2263 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2266 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2268 int rv, start_idx, i;
2270 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2275 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2279 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2280 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2281 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);