2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
626 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
628 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
630 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
633 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
636 /* If not EC nothing to do */
637 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
642 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
646 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
647 * supported curves extension.
649 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
652 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
653 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
655 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
662 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
663 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
664 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
665 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
666 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
668 return 0; /* Should never happen */
669 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
670 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
672 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
676 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
677 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
679 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
684 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
687 unsigned char curve_id[2];
688 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
689 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
690 * no other curves permitted.
694 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
695 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
696 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
697 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
702 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
703 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
705 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
706 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
708 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
711 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
714 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
716 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
722 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
724 /* Need a shared curve */
725 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
731 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
736 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
738 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
742 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
746 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
750 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
751 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
754 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
755 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
757 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
760 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
761 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
763 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
766 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
767 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
769 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
772 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
773 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
774 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
775 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
777 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
779 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
780 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
783 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
784 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
787 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
790 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
794 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
795 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
796 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
799 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
801 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
804 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
806 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
807 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
808 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
810 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
811 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
814 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
815 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
819 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
820 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
822 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
823 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
825 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
827 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
828 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
832 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
834 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
836 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
839 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
842 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
843 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
845 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
846 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
848 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
849 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
850 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
851 /* Should never happen */
854 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
855 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
862 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
863 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
864 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
866 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
868 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
873 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
875 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
878 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
882 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
884 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
887 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
895 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
898 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
899 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
900 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
902 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
905 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
906 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
911 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
919 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
920 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
921 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
922 * session and not global settings.
925 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
928 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
929 size_t i, sigalgslen;
930 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
933 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
934 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
935 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
938 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
939 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
942 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
943 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
948 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
953 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
958 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
964 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
965 * signature algorithms.
969 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
970 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
974 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
975 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
979 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
980 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
983 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
985 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
986 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
990 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
991 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
993 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
994 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
996 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1000 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1001 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1003 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1004 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1013 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1016 unsigned char *ret = p;
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1018 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1020 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1028 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1030 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1031 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1032 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1033 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1042 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1043 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1044 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1049 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1051 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1053 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1054 unsigned long size_str;
1057 /* check for enough space.
1058 4 for the servername type and entension length
1059 2 for servernamelist length
1060 1 for the hostname type
1061 2 for hostname length
1065 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1066 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1069 /* extension type and length */
1070 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1071 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1073 /* length of servername list */
1074 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1076 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1077 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1079 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1083 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1088 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1094 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1096 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1099 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1109 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1110 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1111 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1113 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1114 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 /* check for enough space.
1121 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1122 1 for the srp user identity
1123 + srp user identity length
1125 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1127 /* fill in the extension */
1128 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1129 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1130 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1131 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1139 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1141 const unsigned char *plist;
1143 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
1145 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1147 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1150 plist = ecformats_default;
1151 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
1154 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1155 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1163 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1164 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1165 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1168 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1169 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1170 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1172 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1173 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1174 if (plistlen > 65532)
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1181 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1183 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1184 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1185 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1186 * resolves this to two bytes.
1189 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1192 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1194 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1197 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1198 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1199 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1200 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1202 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1203 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1204 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1206 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1207 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1209 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1213 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1214 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1216 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1219 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1224 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1230 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1233 const unsigned char *salg;
1234 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1235 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1237 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1238 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1240 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1244 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1246 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1248 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1250 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1252 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1255 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1258 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1263 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1264 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1267 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1271 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1273 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1274 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1280 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1282 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1289 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1290 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1291 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1293 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1294 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1296 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1298 /* save position of id len */
1299 unsigned char *q = ret;
1300 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1301 /* skip over id len */
1303 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1309 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1313 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1317 * 1: peer may send requests
1318 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1320 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1321 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1323 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1327 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1329 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1330 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1331 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1333 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1338 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1342 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1344 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1346 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1349 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1358 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1359 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1360 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1361 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1362 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1365 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1366 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1368 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1371 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1373 *(ret++) = list_len;
1374 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1377 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1384 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1387 unsigned char *ret = p;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1389 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1392 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1393 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1397 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1399 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1401 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1407 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1411 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1417 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1422 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1432 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1433 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1435 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1438 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1439 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1440 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1447 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1448 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1449 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1450 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1453 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1454 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1456 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1457 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1459 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1464 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1466 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1472 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1473 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1475 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1477 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1479 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1482 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1485 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1494 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1496 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1501 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1509 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1510 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1511 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1512 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1513 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1514 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1515 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1516 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1517 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1518 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1519 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1525 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1526 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1531 * 1: peer may send requests
1532 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1534 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1535 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1537 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1543 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1544 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1545 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1547 const unsigned char *npa;
1548 unsigned int npalen;
1551 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1552 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1554 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1557 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1559 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1564 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1566 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1568 size_t authz_length;
1569 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1570 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1571 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1572 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1573 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1575 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1577 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1578 * uint8_t authz_type
1580 * uint8_t data[length]
1582 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1583 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1585 unsigned short length;
1589 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1591 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1595 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1603 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1604 * 2 bytes for extension type
1605 * 2 bytes for extension length
1606 * 1 byte for the list length
1607 * n bytes for the list */
1608 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1610 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1613 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1614 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1618 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1620 unsigned short length;
1625 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1627 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1630 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1637 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1644 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1646 unsigned short type;
1647 unsigned short size;
1649 unsigned char *data = *p;
1650 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1653 s->servername_done = 0;
1654 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1656 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1660 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1661 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1663 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1664 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1666 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1667 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1669 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1670 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1672 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1673 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1675 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1676 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1678 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1679 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1682 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1686 if (data > (d+n-len))
1689 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1694 if (data+size > (d+n))
1697 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1699 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1700 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1701 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1702 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1704 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1705 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1706 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1707 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1708 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1709 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1710 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1711 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1712 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1713 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1714 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1715 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1716 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1717 the value of the Host: field.
1718 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1719 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1720 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1721 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1725 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1727 unsigned char *sdata;
1733 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1740 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1747 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1753 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1756 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1757 switch (servname_type)
1759 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1762 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1764 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1767 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1769 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1772 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1774 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1777 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1778 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1779 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1780 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1781 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1782 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1785 s->servername_done = 1;
1789 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1790 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1791 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1803 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1809 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1811 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1813 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1816 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1818 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1821 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1823 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1824 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1826 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1836 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1838 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1839 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1841 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1843 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1848 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1850 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1851 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1853 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1854 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1856 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1859 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1860 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1863 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1864 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1865 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1866 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1867 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1870 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1871 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1873 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1874 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1875 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1877 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1878 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1880 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1885 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1887 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1890 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1891 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1893 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1896 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1897 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1900 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1901 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1902 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1903 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1904 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1908 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1909 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1910 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1912 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1916 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1919 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1920 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1922 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1926 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1927 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1928 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1929 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1931 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1932 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1934 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1939 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1941 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1942 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1944 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1950 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1952 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1954 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1957 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1959 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1964 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1966 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1969 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1977 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1980 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1981 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1985 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1986 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1995 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1997 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1999 const unsigned char *sdata;
2001 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2019 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2032 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2042 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2043 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2045 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2046 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2049 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2050 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2052 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2053 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2058 /* Read in request_extensions */
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2076 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2077 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2080 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2081 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2083 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2084 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2095 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2098 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2102 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2103 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2105 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2106 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2107 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2109 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2115 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2116 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2118 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2121 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2122 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2123 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2124 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2125 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2126 * anything like that, but this might change).
2128 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2129 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2130 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2131 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2132 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2133 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2137 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2138 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2140 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2147 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2148 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2152 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2158 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2160 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2165 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2166 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2169 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2170 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2171 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2172 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2173 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2175 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2179 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2180 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2181 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2183 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2185 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2186 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2187 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2188 1 /* element size */,
2191 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2194 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2195 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2197 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2213 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2214 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2216 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2218 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2221 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2222 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2223 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2228 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2231 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2233 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2237 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2246 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2247 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2248 * the length of the block. */
2249 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2251 unsigned int off = 0;
2265 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2267 unsigned short length;
2268 unsigned short type;
2269 unsigned short size;
2270 unsigned char *data = *p;
2271 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2272 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2275 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2279 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2280 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2283 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2287 if (data+length != d+n)
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2298 if (data+size > (d+n))
2301 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2302 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2303 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2305 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2307 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2309 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2312 tlsext_servername = 1;
2315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2316 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2317 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2319 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2320 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2322 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2323 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2325 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2328 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2329 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2330 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2332 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2336 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2338 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2339 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2340 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2341 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2342 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2345 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2347 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2349 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2350 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2352 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2355 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2358 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2363 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2364 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2365 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2367 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2374 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2375 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2382 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2383 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2384 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2386 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2388 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2390 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2395 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2396 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2398 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2399 * a status request message.
2401 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2403 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2406 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2407 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2410 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2411 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2413 unsigned char *selected;
2414 unsigned char selected_len;
2416 /* We must have requested it. */
2417 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2422 /* The data must be valid */
2423 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2433 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2434 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2440 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2441 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2446 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2448 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2451 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2455 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2456 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2458 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2459 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2460 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2462 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2467 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2469 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2476 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2477 * an authz hello extension if the client
2478 * didn't request a proof. */
2479 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2480 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2482 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2484 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2490 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2494 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2495 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2497 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2501 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2502 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2503 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2504 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2506 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2510 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2518 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2524 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2526 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2528 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2529 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2531 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2537 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2547 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2548 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2549 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2550 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2551 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2552 * absence on initial connect only.
2554 if (!renegotiate_seen
2555 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2556 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2558 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2560 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2568 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2571 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2575 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2577 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2582 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2584 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2585 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2587 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2588 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2590 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2591 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2596 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2600 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2601 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2608 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2611 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2612 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2613 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2616 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2617 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2618 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2619 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2623 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2624 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2629 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2630 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2631 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2632 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2634 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2639 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2641 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2642 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2645 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2646 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2648 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2649 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2653 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2654 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2655 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2656 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2658 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2660 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2661 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2662 * so this has to happen here in
2663 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2667 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2669 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2672 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2673 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2679 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2680 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2682 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2684 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2685 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2687 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2688 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2690 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2691 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2693 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2694 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2696 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2697 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2700 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2704 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2706 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2707 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2708 * abort the handshake.
2710 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2711 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2719 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2720 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2723 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2724 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2727 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2728 s->servername_done=0;
2734 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2736 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2739 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2740 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2741 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2742 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2744 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2747 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2748 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2749 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2750 if (certpkey == NULL)
2752 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2755 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2756 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2758 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2759 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2762 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2764 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2766 /* status request response should be sent */
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2768 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2769 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2773 /* something bad happened */
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2775 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2776 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2781 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2787 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2790 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2791 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2799 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2801 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2802 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2805 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2806 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2807 * it must contain uncompressed.
2809 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2810 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2811 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2812 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2813 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2815 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2817 unsigned char *list;
2818 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2819 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2820 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2822 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2824 found_uncompressed = 1;
2828 if (!found_uncompressed)
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2834 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2835 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2837 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2838 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2839 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2840 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2842 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2843 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2845 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2846 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2848 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2850 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2851 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2854 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2855 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2856 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2857 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2859 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2860 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2865 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2868 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2869 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2872 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2873 * there is no response.
2875 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2877 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2878 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2880 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2881 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2884 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2885 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2889 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2890 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2896 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2900 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2901 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2905 s->servername_done=0;
2911 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2914 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2916 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2918 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2922 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2930 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2931 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2932 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2934 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2935 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2936 * extension, if any.
2937 * len: the length of the session ID.
2938 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2939 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2940 * point to the resulting session.
2942 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2943 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2944 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2947 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2948 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2949 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2950 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2951 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2952 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2953 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2956 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2957 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2958 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2959 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2960 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2961 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2963 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2964 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2966 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2967 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2971 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2973 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2974 * to permit stateful resumption.
2976 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2978 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2982 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2983 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2990 /* Skip past cipher list */
2995 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3000 /* Now at start of extensions */
3001 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3004 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3006 unsigned short type, size;
3009 if (p + size > limit)
3011 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3016 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3017 * currently have one. */
3018 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3021 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3023 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3024 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3025 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3026 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3027 * calculate the master secret later. */
3030 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3033 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3034 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3036 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3038 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3039 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3041 default: /* fatal error */
3050 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3052 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3053 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3054 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3055 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3056 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3057 * point to the resulting session.
3060 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3061 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3062 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3063 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3065 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3066 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3067 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3070 unsigned char *sdec;
3071 const unsigned char *p;
3072 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3073 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3076 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3077 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3080 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3081 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3082 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3083 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3085 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3086 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3097 /* Check key name matches */
3098 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3100 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3101 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3102 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3103 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3105 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3106 * integrity checks on ticket.
3108 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3111 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3115 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3116 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3117 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3118 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3119 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3121 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3122 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3123 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3124 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3125 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3128 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3131 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3132 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3135 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3138 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3142 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3143 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3144 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3145 * as required by standard.
3148 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3149 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3157 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3162 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3170 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3171 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3172 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3173 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3174 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3175 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3176 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3179 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3180 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3181 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3182 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3185 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3188 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3190 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3196 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3199 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3201 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3202 return table[i].nid;
3207 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3212 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3213 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3216 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3219 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3220 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3224 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3226 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3227 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3230 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3235 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3243 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3247 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3248 return EVP_sha224();
3250 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3251 return EVP_sha256();
3253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3254 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3255 return EVP_sha384();
3257 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3258 return EVP_sha512();
3266 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3271 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3272 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3275 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3276 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3279 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3280 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3286 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3287 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3288 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3290 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3291 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3293 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3295 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3296 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3298 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3300 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3302 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3303 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3305 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3309 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3310 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3311 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3313 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3316 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3317 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3318 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3319 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3321 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3322 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3323 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3325 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3326 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3328 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3330 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3332 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3337 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3338 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3339 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3341 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3352 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3353 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3355 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3356 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3358 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3360 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3361 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3362 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3364 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3365 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3367 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3369 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3370 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3373 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3374 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3378 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3379 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3385 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3386 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3388 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3391 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3394 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3395 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3396 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3401 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3403 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3409 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3410 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3411 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3413 /* Should never happen */
3417 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3418 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3420 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3421 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3423 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3425 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3426 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3428 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3429 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3431 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3432 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3433 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3434 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3436 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3437 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3442 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3443 * use the certificate for signing.
3445 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3447 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3448 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3451 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3452 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3455 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3457 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3458 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3462 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3463 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3470 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3471 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3472 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3474 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3480 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3487 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3489 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3492 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3493 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3494 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3496 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3497 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3501 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3503 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3505 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3507 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3509 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3510 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3516 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3518 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3519 unsigned short hbtype;
3520 unsigned int payload;
3521 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3523 /* Read type and payload length first */
3528 if (s->msg_callback)
3529 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3530 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3531 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3533 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3535 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3538 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3539 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3540 * payload, plus padding
3542 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3545 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3546 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3548 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3550 /* Random padding */
3551 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3553 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3555 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3556 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3557 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3558 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3560 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3565 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3569 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3570 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3571 * sequence number */
3574 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3577 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3585 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3587 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3589 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3590 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3592 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3593 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3594 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3600 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3601 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3607 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3608 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3614 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3615 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3617 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3619 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3620 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3621 * some random stuff.
3622 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3623 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3624 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3625 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3628 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3631 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3632 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3634 /* Sequence number */
3635 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3636 /* 16 random bytes */
3637 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3639 /* Random padding */
3640 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3642 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3645 if (s->msg_callback)
3646 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3647 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3648 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3650 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3659 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3664 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3667 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3669 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3672 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3673 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3675 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3677 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3679 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3687 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3688 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3689 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3690 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3691 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3692 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3695 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3696 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3697 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3698 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3701 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3703 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3704 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3707 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3708 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3712 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3713 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3714 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3718 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3720 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3723 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3725 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3730 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3731 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3733 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3735 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3736 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3737 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3738 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3740 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3748 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3749 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3750 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3751 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3755 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3756 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3757 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3758 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3764 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3768 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3772 if (default_nid == -1)
3774 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3776 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3778 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3782 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3783 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3787 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3788 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3790 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3796 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3797 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3798 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3799 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3802 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3804 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3805 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3806 /* Strict mode flags */
3807 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3808 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3809 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3811 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3816 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3817 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3819 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3820 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3823 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3827 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3830 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3832 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3834 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3835 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3843 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3846 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3847 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3848 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3850 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3858 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3859 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3860 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3863 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3869 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3870 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3873 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3876 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3877 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3879 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3884 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3885 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3886 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3887 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3888 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3891 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3892 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3893 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3894 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3898 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3899 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3907 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3908 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3911 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3914 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3915 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3917 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3920 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3928 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3929 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3931 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3935 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3936 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3938 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3943 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3951 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3952 else if(check_flags)
3953 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3955 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3956 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3957 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3958 else if (!check_flags)
3961 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3962 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3963 else if (strict_mode)
3965 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3966 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3968 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3969 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
3973 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3981 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
3983 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3988 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3991 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3994 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3999 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4000 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4001 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4002 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4003 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4008 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4013 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4017 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4018 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4020 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4022 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4028 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4032 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4035 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4037 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4038 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4040 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4042 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4043 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4045 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4047 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4049 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4050 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4052 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4057 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4061 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4063 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4064 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4068 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4070 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4072 else if (cpk->digest)
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4078 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4079 * if the chain is invalid.
4083 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4084 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4087 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4088 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4095 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4096 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4098 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4099 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4100 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4101 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4102 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4103 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4105 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4106 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4108 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);