2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
33 tls1_export_keying_material,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
36 tls_close_construct_packet,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
50 tls1_export_keying_material,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
53 tls_close_construct_packet,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
67 tls1_export_keying_material,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
71 tls_close_construct_packet,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
78 tls13_setup_key_block,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls1_export_keying_material,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 tls_close_construct_packet,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
109 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
111 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
115 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
118 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
119 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
121 s->version = s->method->version;
124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
127 int nid; /* Curve NID */
128 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
129 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
133 * Table of curve information.
134 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
135 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
137 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
138 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
139 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
140 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
141 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
142 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
143 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
144 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
145 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
146 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
147 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
148 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
149 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
150 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
151 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
152 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
153 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
154 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
155 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
157 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
158 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
159 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
161 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
162 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
166 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
169 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
175 /* The default curves */
176 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
177 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
178 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
179 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
180 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
184 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
185 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
188 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
190 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
194 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
196 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
200 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
203 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
204 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
211 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
213 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
214 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
215 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
216 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
217 * lists in the first place.
218 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
219 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
220 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
222 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
225 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
228 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
229 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
231 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
232 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
233 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
234 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
235 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
238 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
239 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
243 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
244 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
248 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
249 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
252 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
253 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
257 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
258 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
263 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
267 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
268 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
270 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
273 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
275 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
276 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
280 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
283 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
284 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
286 const unsigned char *curves;
287 size_t num_curves, i;
288 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
289 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
291 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
293 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
296 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
297 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
299 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
300 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
302 } else /* Should never happen */
305 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
307 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
308 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
309 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
315 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
316 * if there is no match.
317 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
318 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
319 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
321 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
323 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
324 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
327 /* Can't do anything on client side */
331 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
333 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
334 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
336 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
339 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
341 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
342 /* Should never happen */
345 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
349 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
350 * but s->options is a long...
352 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
353 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
355 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
357 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
358 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
360 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
362 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
363 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
365 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
366 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
367 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
370 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
372 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
380 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
384 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
385 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
387 unsigned char *glist, *p;
390 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
393 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
394 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
397 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
398 unsigned long idmask;
400 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
401 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
403 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
412 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
416 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
420 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
423 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
425 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
431 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
433 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
435 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
437 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
438 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
440 if (nid == NID_undef)
441 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
442 if (nid == NID_undef)
444 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
445 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
447 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
451 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
452 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
456 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
460 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
463 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
464 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
471 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
472 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
477 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
478 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
482 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
484 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
486 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
489 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
490 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
492 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
498 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
499 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
500 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
502 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
503 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
506 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
507 * supported (see RFC4492).
509 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
510 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
511 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
512 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
513 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
516 if (i == num_formats)
521 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
522 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
523 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
525 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
527 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
528 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
529 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
530 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
531 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
536 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
541 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
548 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
552 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
554 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
555 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
556 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
558 *pformats = ecformats_default;
559 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
561 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
563 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
568 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
569 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
571 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
573 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
576 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
579 /* If not EC nothing to do */
580 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
582 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
586 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
589 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
593 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
594 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
596 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
602 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
603 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
604 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
605 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
606 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
608 return 0; /* Should never happen */
609 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
610 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
612 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
614 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
615 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
616 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
618 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
626 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
628 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
630 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
631 * is compatible with the client extensions.
633 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
635 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
638 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
641 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
642 unsigned char curve_id[2];
643 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
644 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
645 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
646 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
647 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
651 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
652 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
656 /* Need a shared curve */
657 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
661 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
665 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
672 /* Default sigalg schemes */
673 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
677 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
702 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
703 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
704 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
708 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
710 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
711 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
712 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
713 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
714 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
715 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
716 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
717 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
718 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
719 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
720 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
721 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
724 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
725 NID_undef, NID_undef},
726 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
727 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
728 NID_undef, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
730 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
731 NID_undef, NID_undef},
732 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
733 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN,
734 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
735 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
736 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN,
737 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
738 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
739 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN,
740 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
741 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
742 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN,
743 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
745 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
746 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
747 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
748 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
749 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
750 NID_undef, NID_undef},
751 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
752 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef},
754 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
755 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
756 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
762 NID_undef, NID_undef},
763 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
766 NID_undef, NID_undef},
767 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
768 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
769 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
770 NID_undef, NID_undef}
774 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
775 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
780 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
782 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
788 static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(uint16_t sigalg)
790 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
792 return r != NULL ? r->hash : 0;
795 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(uint16_t sigalg)
797 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
799 return r != NULL ? r->sig : 0;
802 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
805 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
809 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
810 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
811 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
812 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
814 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
815 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
818 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
819 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
824 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
825 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
826 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
828 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
829 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
830 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
831 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
832 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
833 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
835 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
836 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
841 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
842 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
845 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
847 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
848 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
850 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
851 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
852 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
854 /* Should never happen */
857 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
858 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
859 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
860 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
862 * Check sigalgs is known and key type is consistent with signature:
863 * RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
865 if (lu == NULL || (pkeyid != lu->sig
866 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
871 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
872 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
873 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
874 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
875 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
876 if (curve != lu->curve) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
881 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
882 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
883 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
885 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
889 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
890 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
893 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
894 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha256) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
896 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
899 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
900 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha384) {
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
902 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
910 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
915 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
916 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
917 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
918 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
921 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
922 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
923 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
927 md = tls12_get_hash(lu->hash);
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
933 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
934 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
936 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
937 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
938 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
939 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
940 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
945 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
947 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = md;
948 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
952 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
954 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
956 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
961 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
962 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
963 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
965 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
968 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
970 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
972 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
973 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
974 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
975 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
977 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
978 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
979 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
980 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
982 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
984 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
985 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
986 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
992 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
993 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
994 * @c: cipher to check
995 * @op: Security check that you want to do
997 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
999 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1001 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1002 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1004 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1006 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1007 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1009 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1010 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1013 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1016 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1018 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1020 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1023 /* Initialise digests to default values */
1024 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
1026 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1028 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1031 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1032 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1034 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
1035 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
1037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1038 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1041 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
1042 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
1043 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
1047 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1052 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1053 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1054 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1055 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1056 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1057 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1058 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1059 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1062 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1063 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1064 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1066 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1069 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1070 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1072 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1073 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1077 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1086 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1088 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1089 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1090 * point to the resulting session.
1092 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1093 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1094 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1097 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1098 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1099 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1100 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1101 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1102 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1103 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1106 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1107 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1108 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1109 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1110 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1111 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1113 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1118 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1121 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1124 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1125 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1128 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1131 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1132 if (!ticketext->present)
1135 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1138 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1141 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1142 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1144 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1146 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1147 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1148 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1149 * calculate the master secret later.
1151 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1154 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1155 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1157 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1158 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1159 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1161 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1162 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1164 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1165 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1166 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1169 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1174 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1176 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1177 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1178 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1179 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1180 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1181 * point to the resulting session.
1183 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1184 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1185 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1188 unsigned char *sdec;
1189 const unsigned char *p;
1190 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1191 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1193 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1194 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1195 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1196 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1198 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1199 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1201 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1202 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1204 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1207 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1208 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1209 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1214 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1220 /* Check key name matches */
1221 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1222 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1223 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1226 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1227 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1228 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1229 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1230 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1232 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1237 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1240 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1244 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1246 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1247 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1251 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1252 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1253 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1256 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1257 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1258 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1259 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1261 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1262 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1263 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1264 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1265 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1266 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1267 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1268 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1270 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1272 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1273 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1275 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1278 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1282 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1286 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1287 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1288 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1292 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1293 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1296 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1298 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1302 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1304 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1307 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1311 int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
1312 const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss)
1316 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1320 md_id = EVP_MD_type(md);
1321 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
1322 if (md_id == NID_undef)
1324 /* For TLS 1.3 only allow RSA-PSS */
1325 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1326 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1328 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1329 /* Should never happen: we abort if no sigalgs extension and TLS 1.3 */
1330 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1332 /* For TLS 1.2 and no sigalgs lookup using complete table */
1333 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1335 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1336 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1338 *ispss = curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1345 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1346 curr = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
1349 * Look for matching key and hash. If key type is RSA also match PSS
1352 if (curr->hash == md_id && (curr->sig == sig_id
1353 || (sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA && curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS))){
1354 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1356 *ispss = curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1369 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
1370 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX},
1371 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX},
1372 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX},
1373 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX},
1374 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX},
1375 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX},
1376 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX},
1377 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX},
1378 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX},
1381 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid)
1384 if (hash_nid == NID_undef)
1387 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
1388 if (tls12_md_info[i].nid == hash_nid)
1389 return tls12_md_info + i;
1395 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid)
1397 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
1398 if (hash_nid == NID_md5 && FIPS_mode())
1400 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid);
1403 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
1406 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1411 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1413 * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
1414 * this will need to be updated.
1416 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1417 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1421 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1425 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1428 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1429 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1431 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1432 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1434 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1435 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1441 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1442 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp)
1444 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1445 const tls12_hash_info *hinf
1446 = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp));
1447 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1449 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
1451 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1452 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1)
1454 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1455 sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
1456 sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
1457 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr);
1461 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1462 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1466 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1468 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1469 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1470 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1472 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1473 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1474 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1476 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1477 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1478 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1480 /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
1481 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1483 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1489 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1495 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1502 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1504 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1506 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1509 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1510 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1514 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1515 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
1516 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1523 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1524 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1525 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1526 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1528 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1529 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1530 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1531 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1532 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
1534 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1535 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1538 *shsig = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1548 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1549 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1551 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1552 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1554 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1556 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1558 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1559 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1560 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1561 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1562 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1563 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1564 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1565 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1566 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1567 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1569 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1570 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1573 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1574 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1578 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1579 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1581 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1583 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1586 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1590 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1591 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1595 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1597 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1603 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1604 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1606 /* Should never happen */
1610 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1612 /* Invalid data length */
1613 if ((size & 1) != 0)
1618 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1619 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1620 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1621 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1623 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1624 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1625 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
1633 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1638 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1639 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1642 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1645 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1646 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1648 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1649 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1651 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig);
1652 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1653 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->hash);
1655 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1656 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
1657 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1658 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
1664 * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
1665 * use the certificate for signing.
1667 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1668 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1670 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1671 * supported it stays as NULL.
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1674 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1675 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1678 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
1679 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1680 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1684 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1685 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1688 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1689 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1690 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1691 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1692 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1693 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1694 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1695 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1701 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1702 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1703 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1705 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1706 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1707 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1710 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1712 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1716 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1718 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1719 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1721 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1723 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1724 if (psignhash != NULL)
1725 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1727 return (int)numsigalgs;
1730 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1731 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1732 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1734 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1735 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1736 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1737 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1739 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1741 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1743 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1744 if (psignhash != NULL)
1745 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1747 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1749 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1750 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1753 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1754 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1758 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1761 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1763 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1764 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1765 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1766 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1767 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1768 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1769 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1770 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1772 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1773 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1774 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1777 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1778 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1780 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1782 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1784 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1785 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1788 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1790 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1792 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1794 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1795 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1797 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1799 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1801 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1812 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1813 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1816 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1819 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1820 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1823 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1824 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1829 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1830 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1832 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1836 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1840 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1843 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1845 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1850 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1851 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1853 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1855 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1856 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1857 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1859 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1861 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1862 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1867 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1872 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1873 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1874 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1876 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1877 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1878 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1884 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1888 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1892 if (default_nid == -1)
1894 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1896 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1897 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1898 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1903 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1904 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1908 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1909 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1910 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1917 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1918 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1919 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1920 * attempting to use them.
1923 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1925 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1926 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1927 /* Strict mode flags */
1928 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1929 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1930 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1932 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1937 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1938 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1941 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1942 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1944 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1947 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1949 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1950 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1952 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1954 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1955 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1961 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1964 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1966 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1967 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1969 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1976 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1977 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1978 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1979 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1980 else if (!check_flags)
1985 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1986 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1988 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1991 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1993 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1996 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
1997 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
1998 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1999 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2002 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2003 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2004 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2008 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2009 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2012 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2013 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2014 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2017 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2018 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2019 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2022 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2023 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2024 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2033 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2034 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2036 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2038 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2039 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2040 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == NID_sha1
2041 && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign)
2044 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2051 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2052 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2056 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2057 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2058 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2059 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2061 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2068 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2069 else if (check_flags)
2070 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2072 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2073 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2075 else if (!check_flags)
2078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2079 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2080 else if (strict_mode) {
2081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2082 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2083 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2084 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2086 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2093 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2094 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2096 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2098 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2101 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2104 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2108 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2112 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2114 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2115 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2117 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2118 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2119 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2123 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2128 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2130 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2131 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2133 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2134 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2135 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2137 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2138 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2139 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2140 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2146 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2149 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2151 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2156 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2157 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2158 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2159 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2160 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2162 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2165 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2169 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2172 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2173 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2180 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2181 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2183 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
2184 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
2185 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2186 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2187 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2188 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2189 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2192 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2193 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2195 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2199 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2201 int dh_secbits = 80;
2202 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2203 return DH_get_1024_160();
2204 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2205 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2210 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2211 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
2214 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2222 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2223 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2225 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2226 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2234 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2235 return DH_get_2048_224();
2236 return DH_get_1024_160();
2240 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2243 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2246 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2247 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2248 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2249 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2251 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2254 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2256 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2259 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2261 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2262 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2263 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2264 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2266 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2267 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2269 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2270 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2273 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2275 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2278 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2281 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2283 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2284 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2286 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2287 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2289 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2290 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2295 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2296 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2297 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2300 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2302 int rv, start_idx, i;
2304 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2309 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2313 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2314 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2315 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);