2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
722 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
745 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
801 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
802 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
803 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
859 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
866 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
870 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
884 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
887 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
890 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
893 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
896 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
903 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
906 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
908 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
909 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
913 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
914 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
915 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
917 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
918 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
922 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
923 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
924 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
925 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
928 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
931 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
934 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
936 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
937 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
940 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
941 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
944 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
945 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
949 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
950 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
951 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
952 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
953 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
954 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
955 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
957 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
958 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
963 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
964 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
966 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
967 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
969 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
970 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
971 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
972 /* Should never happen */
975 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
976 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
980 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
982 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
983 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
984 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
986 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
990 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
991 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
994 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1000 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1001 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1009 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1013 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1014 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1015 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1016 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1019 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1020 if (i == sent_sigslen
1021 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1022 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1026 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1031 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1032 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1033 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1039 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1041 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1042 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1047 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1048 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1049 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1052 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1057 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1058 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1059 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1062 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1064 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1067 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1068 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1069 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1073 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1074 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1079 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1080 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1081 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1085 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1086 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1087 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1088 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1089 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1095 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1098 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1099 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1101 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1104 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1106 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1108 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1111 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1112 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1115 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1116 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1117 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1118 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1120 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1122 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1123 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1125 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1126 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1128 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1129 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1130 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1131 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1142 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1144 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1145 if (s->renegotiate) {
1148 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1156 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1159 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1167 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1170 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1171 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1172 unsigned long size_str;
1176 * check for enough space.
1177 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1178 * 2 for servernamelist length
1179 * 1 for the hostname type
1180 * 2 for hostname length
1184 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1186 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1189 /* extension type and length */
1190 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1191 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1193 /* length of servername list */
1194 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1196 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1197 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1199 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1202 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1203 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1204 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1205 * Client Hello message */
1207 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1208 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 * check for enough space.
1215 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1216 * 1 for the srp user identity
1217 * + srp user identity length
1219 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1222 /* fill in the extension */
1223 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1224 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1225 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1226 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1231 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1237 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1238 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1246 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1248 if (num_formats > 255) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1254 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1255 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1256 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1257 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1261 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1263 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1264 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1267 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1269 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1271 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1276 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1278 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1279 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1280 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1281 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1282 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1286 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1288 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1289 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1290 ret += curves_list_len;
1292 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1294 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1296 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1297 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1298 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1300 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1301 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1302 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1304 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1305 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1306 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1309 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1313 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1316 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1321 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1327 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1329 const unsigned char *salg;
1330 unsigned char *etmp;
1331 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1332 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1334 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1336 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1338 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1339 /* Fill in lengths */
1340 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1344 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1345 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1346 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1348 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1350 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1353 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1356 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1361 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1363 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1368 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1369 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1375 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1376 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1382 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1385 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1387 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1388 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1390 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1391 /* save position of id len */
1392 unsigned char *q = ret;
1393 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1394 /* skip over id len */
1396 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1402 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1404 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1405 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1406 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1408 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1412 * 1: peer may send requests
1413 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1415 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1416 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1418 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1421 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1422 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1424 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1425 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1427 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1434 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1435 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1438 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1439 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1440 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1441 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1443 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1444 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1447 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1449 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1452 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1455 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1463 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1464 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1466 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1472 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1473 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1474 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1477 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1478 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1480 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1481 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1484 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1486 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1487 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1495 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1502 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1505 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1509 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1510 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1513 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1514 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1515 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1516 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1518 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1519 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1520 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1521 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1522 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1523 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1528 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1530 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1533 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1544 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1553 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1556 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1557 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1558 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1564 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1566 const unsigned char *plist;
1569 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1573 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1575 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1577 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1579 if (plistlen > 255) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1585 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1586 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1587 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1592 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1595 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1597 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1604 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1605 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1607 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1610 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1611 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1612 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1616 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1622 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1627 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1628 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1631 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1633 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1636 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1639 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1648 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1649 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1650 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1651 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1652 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1653 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1654 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1655 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1656 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1658 if (limit - ret < 36)
1660 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1664 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1665 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1666 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1667 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1669 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1673 * 1: peer may send requests
1674 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1676 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1677 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1679 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1684 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1685 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1686 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1687 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1688 const unsigned char *npa;
1689 unsigned int npalen;
1692 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1694 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1695 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1696 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1698 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1700 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1706 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1708 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1709 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1711 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1712 * for other cases too.
1714 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1715 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1716 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1718 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1724 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1725 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1726 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1728 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1730 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1734 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1740 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1743 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1748 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1749 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1750 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1751 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1754 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1755 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1759 const unsigned char *selected;
1760 unsigned char selected_len;
1763 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1770 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1771 * length-prefixed strings.
1773 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1782 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1783 proto_len = data[i];
1789 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1795 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1796 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1797 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1798 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1799 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1800 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1801 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1802 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1805 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1806 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1811 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1815 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1817 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1818 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1819 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1824 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1825 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1826 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1827 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1829 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1830 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1832 unsigned short type, size;
1833 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1834 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1835 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1836 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1837 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1838 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1839 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1841 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1842 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1843 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1844 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1847 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1848 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1849 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1850 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1851 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1852 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1853 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1854 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1855 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1856 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1859 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1863 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1868 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1871 if (data + size > d + n)
1875 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1876 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1877 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1879 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1881 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1883 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1886 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1888 if (data + len != d + n)
1890 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1894 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1896 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1898 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1899 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1901 unsigned short type;
1902 unsigned short size;
1904 unsigned char *data = *p;
1905 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1907 s->servername_done = 0;
1908 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1909 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1910 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1913 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1914 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1915 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1917 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1918 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1919 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1922 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1923 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1924 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1925 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1927 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1928 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1930 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1932 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1933 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1936 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1938 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1939 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1943 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1945 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1949 if (data > (d + n - len))
1952 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1956 if (data + size > (d + n))
1959 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1961 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1962 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1963 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1964 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1966 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1967 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1970 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1972 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1973 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1974 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1975 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1976 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1977 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1978 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1979 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1980 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1981 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1982 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1983 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1984 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1985 * the value of the Host: field.
1986 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1987 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1988 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1990 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1994 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1995 unsigned char *sdata;
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2012 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2017 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2020 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2021 switch (servname_type) {
2022 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2024 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2029 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2032 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2033 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2034 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2037 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2038 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2039 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2040 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2041 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2042 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2045 s->servername_done = 1;
2048 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2049 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2050 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2051 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2062 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2068 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2069 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2079 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2080 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2082 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2090 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2091 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2092 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2094 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2095 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2096 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2100 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2101 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2102 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2104 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2105 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2106 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2107 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2110 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2111 ecpointformatlist_length;
2112 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2113 ecpointformatlist_length);
2117 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2118 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2119 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2120 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2121 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2122 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2124 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2125 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2126 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2127 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2129 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2130 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2131 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2132 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2133 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2137 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2138 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2142 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2143 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2147 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2148 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2149 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2150 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2154 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2155 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2156 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2157 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2158 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2159 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2162 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2163 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2164 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2165 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2168 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2172 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2178 /* shouldn't really happen */
2179 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2182 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2183 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2184 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2186 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2187 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2188 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2195 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2196 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2197 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2199 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2202 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2204 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2227 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2228 const unsigned char *sdata;
2230 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2234 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2248 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2255 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 if (data != sdata) {
2259 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2264 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2265 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2266 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2267 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2271 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2272 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2277 /* Read in request_extensions */
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 if (dsize != size) {
2285 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2291 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2292 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2295 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2296 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2297 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2307 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2309 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2310 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2312 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2313 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2315 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2316 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2317 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2320 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2325 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2326 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2327 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2328 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2330 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2333 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2334 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2335 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2336 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2337 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2338 * anything like that, but this might change).
2340 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2341 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2342 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2343 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2344 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2346 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2350 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2351 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2352 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2354 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2355 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2356 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2360 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2361 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2362 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2363 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2364 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2368 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2369 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2370 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2373 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2374 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2375 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2376 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2377 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2380 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2391 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2393 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2394 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2395 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2397 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2404 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2408 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2409 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2410 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2414 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2421 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2423 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2424 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2425 * fill the length of the block.
2427 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2429 unsigned int off = 0;
2442 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2443 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2445 unsigned short length;
2446 unsigned short type;
2447 unsigned short size;
2448 unsigned char *data = *p;
2449 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2450 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2452 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2453 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2455 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2457 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2458 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2459 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2461 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2462 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2463 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2466 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2467 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2470 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2474 if (data + length != d + n) {
2475 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2479 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2483 if (data + size > (d + n))
2486 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2487 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2489 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2490 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2492 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2493 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2494 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2495 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2499 tlsext_servername = 1;
2501 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2502 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2503 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2504 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2506 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2511 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2512 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2513 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2514 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2515 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2519 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2520 ecpointformatlist_length;
2521 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2522 ecpointformatlist_length);
2526 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2527 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2528 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2529 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2530 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2533 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2535 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2536 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2537 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2538 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2540 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2543 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2544 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2547 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2549 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2551 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2554 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2558 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2559 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2563 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2564 /* shouldn't really happen */
2565 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2567 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2568 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2569 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2571 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2572 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2575 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2576 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2583 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2586 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2587 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2590 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2591 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2593 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2594 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2595 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2596 unsigned char *selected;
2597 unsigned char selected_len;
2599 /* We must have requested it. */
2600 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2604 /* The data must be valid */
2605 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2606 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2610 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2612 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2613 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2617 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2618 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2619 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2622 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2623 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2624 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2628 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2631 /* We must have requested it. */
2632 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2633 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2637 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2641 * The extension data consists of:
2642 * uint16 list_length
2643 * uint8 proto_length;
2644 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2649 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2650 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2654 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2655 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2658 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2659 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2660 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2661 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2662 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2666 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2668 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2669 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2671 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2672 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2674 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2675 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2676 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2679 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2684 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2685 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2686 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2690 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2691 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2692 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2693 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2694 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2695 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2699 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2700 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2702 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2708 if (data != d + n) {
2709 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2713 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2714 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2715 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2716 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2717 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2718 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2722 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2733 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2734 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2735 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2736 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2737 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2738 * initial connect only.
2740 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2741 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2742 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2744 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2751 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2754 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2758 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2759 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2761 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2766 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2767 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2768 /* shouldn't really happen */
2769 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2772 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2773 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2774 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2776 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2777 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2778 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2780 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2782 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2785 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2786 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2791 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2792 * server opaque PRF input
2794 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2795 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2802 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2807 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2809 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2810 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2812 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2814 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2815 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2818 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2819 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2823 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2825 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2826 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2827 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2828 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2830 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2832 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2834 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2837 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2838 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2839 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2844 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2845 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2847 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2849 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2850 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2855 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2856 /* shouldn't really happen */
2857 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2859 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2861 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2862 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2863 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2864 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2866 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2867 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2870 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2871 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2872 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2874 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2875 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2876 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2878 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2879 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2880 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2883 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2884 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2888 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2890 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2891 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2894 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2895 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2902 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2903 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2906 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2907 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2910 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2911 s->servername_done = 0;
2917 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2921 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2922 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2923 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2924 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2926 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2927 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2928 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2929 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2932 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2933 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2934 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2936 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2939 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2940 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2942 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2943 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2947 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2954 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2956 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2960 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2961 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2962 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2963 * influence which certificate is sent
2965 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2967 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2968 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2969 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2970 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2971 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2975 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2976 * et al can pick it up.
2978 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2979 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2981 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2982 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2983 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2985 /* status request response should be sent */
2986 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2987 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2988 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2990 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2992 /* something bad happened */
2993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2994 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2995 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2999 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3003 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3007 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3008 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3016 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3018 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3019 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3021 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3023 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3024 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3025 * must contain uncompressed.
3027 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3028 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3029 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3030 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3031 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3032 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3033 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3034 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3035 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3037 unsigned char *list;
3038 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3039 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3040 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3041 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3042 found_uncompressed = 1;
3046 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3048 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3052 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3053 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3055 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3057 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3058 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3059 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3060 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3062 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3064 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3066 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3067 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3069 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3070 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3071 * value from the server too.
3074 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3075 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3076 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3080 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3081 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3083 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3084 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3085 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3086 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3087 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3093 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3096 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3097 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3100 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3103 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3104 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3105 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3107 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3108 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3110 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3111 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3115 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3120 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3124 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3125 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3128 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3129 s->servername_done = 0;
3135 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3139 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3141 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3142 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3146 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3154 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3155 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3156 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3158 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3159 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3160 * extension, if any.
3161 * len: the length of the session ID.
3162 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3163 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3164 * point to the resulting session.
3166 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3167 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3168 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3171 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3172 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3173 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3174 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3175 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3176 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3177 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3180 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3181 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3182 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3183 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3184 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3185 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3187 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3188 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3190 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3191 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3195 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3198 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3201 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3203 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3207 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3208 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3214 /* Skip past cipher list */
3219 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3224 /* Now at start of extensions */
3225 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3228 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3229 unsigned short type, size;
3232 if (p + size > limit)
3234 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3238 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3241 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3244 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3246 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3247 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3248 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3249 * calculate the master secret later.
3253 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3255 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3256 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3258 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3260 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3261 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3263 default: /* fatal error */
3273 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3275 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3276 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3277 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3278 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3279 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3280 * point to the resulting session.
3283 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3284 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3285 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3286 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3288 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3289 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3290 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3293 unsigned char *sdec;
3294 const unsigned char *p;
3295 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3296 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3299 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3300 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3303 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3304 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3305 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3306 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3307 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3308 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3317 /* Check key name matches */
3318 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3320 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3321 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3322 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3323 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3326 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3329 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3331 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3335 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3336 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3337 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3338 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3339 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3340 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3343 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3344 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3345 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3346 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3347 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3349 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3352 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3353 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3354 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3362 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3366 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3367 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3368 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3372 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3373 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3382 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3387 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3394 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3395 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3396 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3397 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3398 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3399 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3400 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3403 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3404 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3405 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3406 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3409 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3412 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3413 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3419 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3422 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3423 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3424 return table[i].nid;
3429 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3435 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3436 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3439 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3442 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3443 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3447 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3449 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3450 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3456 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3459 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3460 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3463 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3465 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3468 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3470 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3471 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3472 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3474 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3475 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3477 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3478 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3479 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3481 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3482 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3486 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3490 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3492 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3495 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3497 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3498 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3500 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3501 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3503 return inf->mfunc();
3506 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3509 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3510 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3511 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3513 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3514 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3515 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3517 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3518 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3519 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3525 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3526 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3527 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3529 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3530 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3532 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3533 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3534 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3536 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3538 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3539 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3540 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3542 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3544 if (psignhash_nid) {
3545 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3546 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3548 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3552 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3553 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3555 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3556 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3557 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3559 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3560 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3562 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3563 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3567 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3568 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3572 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3574 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3575 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3576 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3578 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3579 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3580 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3582 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3583 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3584 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3585 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3586 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3587 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3591 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3592 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3593 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3597 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3598 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3599 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3606 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3608 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3610 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3613 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3614 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3616 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3618 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3619 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3620 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3621 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3624 return tmpout - out;
3627 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3628 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3629 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3630 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3632 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3633 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3634 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3635 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3636 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3638 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3639 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3642 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3643 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3644 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3646 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3656 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3657 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3659 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3660 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3662 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3664 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3665 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3666 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3667 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3669 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3670 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3671 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3672 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3673 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3674 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3675 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3677 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3678 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3681 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3682 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3686 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3687 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3689 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3692 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3695 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3696 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3697 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3701 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3703 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3706 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3707 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3709 /* Should never happen */
3713 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3714 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3715 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3716 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3718 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3719 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3723 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3729 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3730 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3733 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3734 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3736 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3737 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3739 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3741 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3743 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3745 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3746 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3747 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3748 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3749 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3750 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3751 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3752 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3758 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3759 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3760 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3761 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3762 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3763 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3764 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3765 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3766 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3767 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3768 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3774 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3775 * the certificate for signing.
3777 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3779 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3780 * supported it stays as NULL.
3782 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3783 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3784 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3786 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3787 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3788 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3789 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3792 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3793 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3794 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3800 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3801 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3802 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3804 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3809 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3816 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3818 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3821 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3822 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3823 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3825 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3826 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3830 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3832 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3834 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3836 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3838 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3839 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3842 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3843 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3845 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3846 unsigned short hbtype;
3847 unsigned int payload;
3848 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3850 if (s->msg_callback)
3851 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3852 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3853 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3855 /* Read type and payload length first */
3856 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3857 return 0; /* silently discard */
3860 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3861 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3864 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3865 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3869 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3870 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3872 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3873 if (buffer == NULL) {
3874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3879 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3880 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3882 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3884 /* Random padding */
3885 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3887 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3888 3 + payload + padding);
3890 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3891 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3892 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3893 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3895 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3899 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3903 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3904 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3908 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3910 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3917 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3919 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3921 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3922 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3924 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3925 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3926 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3931 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3932 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3937 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3938 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3944 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3945 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3947 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3950 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3951 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3952 * some random stuff.
3953 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3954 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3955 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3956 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3959 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3966 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3967 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3969 /* Sequence number */
3970 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3971 /* 16 random bytes */
3972 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3974 /* Random padding */
3975 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3977 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3979 if (s->msg_callback)
3980 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3981 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3982 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3984 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3993 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3997 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4000 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4002 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4005 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4008 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4010 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4012 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4014 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4022 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4023 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4024 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4025 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4026 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4027 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4031 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4032 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4033 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4034 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4037 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4038 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4041 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4042 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4047 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4048 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4050 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4054 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4058 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4061 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4064 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4069 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4070 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4072 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4073 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4074 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4075 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4076 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4078 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4085 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4086 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4087 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4088 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4090 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4091 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4092 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4093 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4099 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4103 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4107 if (default_nid == -1)
4109 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4111 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4112 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4113 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4118 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4119 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4123 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4124 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4125 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4132 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4133 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4134 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4135 * attempting to use them.
4138 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4140 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4141 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4142 /* Strict mode flags */
4143 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4144 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4145 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4147 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4152 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4153 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4155 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4156 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4158 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4161 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4163 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4165 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4167 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4168 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4171 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4172 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4173 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4174 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4175 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4176 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4183 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4186 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4187 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4188 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4190 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4197 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4198 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4199 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4200 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4201 else if (!check_flags)
4206 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4207 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4209 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4211 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4212 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4214 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4217 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4218 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4219 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4220 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4221 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4224 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4225 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4226 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4227 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4231 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4232 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4241 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4242 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4244 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4246 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4247 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4248 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4251 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4258 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4259 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4263 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4264 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4265 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4266 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4268 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4275 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4276 else if (check_flags)
4277 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4279 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4280 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4281 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4282 else if (!check_flags)
4285 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4286 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4287 else if (strict_mode) {
4288 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4289 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4290 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4291 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4293 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4300 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4301 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4305 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4308 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4311 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4316 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4317 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4318 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4319 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4320 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4324 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4328 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4330 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4331 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4333 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4334 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4335 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4339 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4344 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4346 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4349 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4350 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4351 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4353 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4354 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4355 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4356 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4357 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4362 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4367 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4372 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4373 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4374 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4375 else if (cpk->digest)
4376 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4378 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4381 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4385 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4386 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4388 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4389 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4396 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4397 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4401 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4402 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4403 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4404 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4407 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4408 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4410 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4416 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4418 int dh_secbits = 80;
4419 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4420 return DH_get_1024_160();
4421 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4422 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4427 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4428 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4431 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4437 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4438 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4439 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4441 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4442 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4448 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4449 return DH_get_2048_224();
4450 return DH_get_1024_160();
4454 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4457 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4459 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4460 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4464 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4466 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4469 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4471 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4472 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4473 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4474 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4476 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4477 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4480 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4482 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4485 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4488 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4490 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4491 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4493 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4494 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4496 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4497 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4502 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4503 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4504 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4507 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4509 int rv, start_idx, i;
4511 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4516 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4520 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4521 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4522 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);