2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
55 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
56 #include <openssl/rand.h>
57 #include <openssl/objects.h>
58 #include <openssl/evp.h>
59 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
60 #include <openssl/x509.h>
61 #include <openssl/dh.h>
62 #include <openssl/bn.h>
63 #include <openssl/md5.h>
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
66 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
68 int sslv2format, int *al);
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
86 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
87 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
88 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
93 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
95 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
96 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
98 * 2) If we did request one then
99 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
101 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
102 * list if we requested a certificate)
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
105 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
106 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
107 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
108 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
110 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
111 * not going to accept it because we require a client
114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
115 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
116 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
117 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
142 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
144 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
145 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
146 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
147 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
148 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
151 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
152 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
154 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
155 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
156 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
157 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
164 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
170 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
172 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
177 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
179 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
196 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
197 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
198 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
204 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
205 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
206 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
317 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
320 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
322 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
324 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
326 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
327 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
329 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
330 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
331 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
332 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
335 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
337 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
338 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
340 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
342 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or SRP */
349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
350 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
352 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
354 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
360 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
363 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
365 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
369 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
370 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
372 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
376 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
377 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
378 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
379 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
383 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
384 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
385 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
388 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
390 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
392 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
393 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
394 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
395 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
398 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
402 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
412 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
415 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
433 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
436 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
439 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
441 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
442 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
443 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
448 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
449 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
451 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
452 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
458 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
460 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
461 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
463 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
465 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
466 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
468 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
469 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
475 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
476 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
477 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
478 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
481 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
483 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
484 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
485 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
486 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
490 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
493 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
496 /* No pre work to be done */
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
514 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
515 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
517 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
518 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
523 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
524 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
526 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
527 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
528 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
532 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
533 * treat like it was the first packet
538 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
541 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
542 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
545 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
548 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
549 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
551 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
552 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
553 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
554 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
558 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
559 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
564 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
568 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
571 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
575 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
576 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
577 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
582 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
585 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
586 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
590 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
591 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
594 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
596 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
599 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
606 /* No post work to be done */
610 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
614 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
616 * Valid return values are:
620 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
622 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
624 switch (st->hand_state) {
625 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
626 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
628 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
629 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
631 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
632 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
635 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
637 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
638 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
640 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
641 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
643 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
644 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
647 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
649 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
650 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
652 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
654 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
656 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
658 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
659 return tls_construct_finished(s,
661 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
663 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
666 /* Shouldn't happen */
674 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
675 * calculated as follows:
677 * 2 + # client_version
678 * 32 + # only valid length for random
679 * 1 + # length of session_id
680 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
681 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
682 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
683 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
684 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
685 * 2 + # length of extensions
686 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
688 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
690 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
691 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
694 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
695 * reading. Excludes the message header.
697 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
699 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
701 switch (st->hand_state) {
702 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
703 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
706 return s->max_cert_list;
708 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
709 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
711 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
712 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
715 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
716 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
719 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
720 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
722 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
723 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
726 /* Shouldn't happen */
734 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
736 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
738 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
740 switch (st->hand_state) {
741 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
742 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
745 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
747 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
748 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
750 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
751 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
754 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
755 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
758 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
759 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
761 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
762 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
765 /* Shouldn't happen */
769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
773 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
776 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
778 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
780 switch (st->hand_state) {
781 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
782 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
784 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
785 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
787 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
789 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
790 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
791 /* Are we renegotiating? */
793 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
794 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
795 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
796 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
797 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
798 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
801 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
804 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
810 /* Shouldn't happen */
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
815 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
817 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
819 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
821 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
822 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
823 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
825 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
829 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
831 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
838 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
840 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
842 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
849 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
850 unsigned char *cookie,
851 unsigned char cookie_len)
853 unsigned int msg_len;
857 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
858 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
859 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
861 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
862 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
869 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
874 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
876 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
877 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
878 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
879 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
881 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
882 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
886 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
887 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
889 dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
891 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
893 /* number of bytes to write */
900 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
902 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
903 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
907 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
909 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
911 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
912 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
914 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
916 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
918 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
919 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
921 unsigned int version;
924 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
925 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
926 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
927 * the rest right through. Its format is:
929 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
930 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
932 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
933 * 7-8 session_id_length
934 * 9-10 challenge_length
938 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
939 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
941 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
942 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
949 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
950 /* No protocol version supplied! */
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
954 if (version == 0x0002) {
955 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
958 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
960 s->client_version = version;
962 /* No idea what protocol this is */
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
968 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
969 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
971 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
972 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
979 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
980 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
982 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
983 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
984 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
985 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
986 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
993 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
995 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
998 s->version = s->client_version;
1000 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1004 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1007 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1008 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1009 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1011 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1014 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1015 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1016 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1018 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1019 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1023 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1024 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1029 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1030 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1031 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1032 /* No extensions. */
1033 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1035 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1036 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1040 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1041 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1043 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1044 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1045 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1046 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1047 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1048 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1054 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1056 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1057 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1058 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1064 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1070 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1071 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1077 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1078 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1079 * So check cookie length...
1081 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1082 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1087 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1088 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1093 /* Could be empty. */
1097 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1098 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1099 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1100 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1101 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1102 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1103 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1105 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1107 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1109 /* default verification */
1110 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1111 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1112 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1116 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1118 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1119 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1120 if (protverr != 0) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1122 s->version = s->client_version;
1123 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1132 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1133 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1135 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1136 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1137 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1138 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1139 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1140 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1141 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1142 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1143 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1144 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1149 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1150 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1153 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1155 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1157 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1158 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1159 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1160 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1161 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1163 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1164 /* previous session */
1166 } else if (i == -1) {
1170 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1175 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1176 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1180 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1183 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1186 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1187 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1189 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1190 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1192 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1193 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1202 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1205 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1212 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1213 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1214 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1225 /* TLS extensions */
1226 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1227 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1234 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1235 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1236 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1237 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1241 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1247 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1248 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1250 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1251 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1252 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1254 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1256 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1257 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1261 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1263 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1268 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1269 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1274 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1276 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1277 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1278 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1283 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1284 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1285 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1287 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1289 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1290 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1291 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1293 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1294 /* Can't disable compression */
1295 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1297 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1300 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1301 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1302 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1303 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1304 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1308 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1310 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1313 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1314 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1315 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1321 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1326 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1327 /* See if we have a match */
1328 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1331 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1332 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1333 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1335 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1336 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1351 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1352 * using compression.
1354 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1361 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1365 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1368 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1370 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1371 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1372 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1373 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1384 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1385 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1387 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1389 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1391 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1392 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1396 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1398 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1399 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1401 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1403 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1404 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1405 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1407 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1412 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1415 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1417 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1419 if (cipher == NULL) {
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1424 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1425 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1426 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1427 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1428 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1429 /* do not send a session ticket */
1430 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1432 /* Session-id reuse */
1433 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1436 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1437 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1438 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1444 * we now have the following setup.
1446 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1447 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1448 * compression - basically ignored right now
1449 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1450 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1451 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1452 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1455 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1456 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1457 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1459 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1467 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1469 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1471 * callback indicates further work to be done
1473 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1476 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1478 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1479 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1481 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1490 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1492 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1493 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1497 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1500 unsigned char *p, *d;
1505 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1507 /* Do the message type and length last */
1508 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1510 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1511 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1514 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1515 * tls_process_client_hello()
1517 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1518 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1521 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1522 * back in the server hello:
1523 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1524 * we send back the old session ID.
1525 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1526 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1527 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1528 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1530 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1531 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1532 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1533 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1536 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1537 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1539 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1541 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1542 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1548 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1551 /* put the cipher */
1552 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1555 /* put the compression method */
1556 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1559 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1562 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1565 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1567 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1571 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1573 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1575 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1581 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1590 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1592 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1598 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1599 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1600 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1607 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1610 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1614 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1619 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1620 unsigned char *p, *d;
1627 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1629 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1631 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1635 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1639 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1642 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1644 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1647 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1648 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1650 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1651 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1653 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1655 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1656 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1658 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1661 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1662 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1663 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1664 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1666 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1668 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1671 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1674 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1676 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1677 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1678 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1680 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1688 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1690 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1693 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1694 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1695 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1697 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1700 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1702 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1706 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef);
1708 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1713 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1715 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1718 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1719 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1723 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1726 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1732 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1733 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1734 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1735 if (curve_id == 0) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1737 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1740 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid);
1741 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1742 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1743 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1748 /* Encode the public key. */
1749 encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey),
1750 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1751 &encodedPoint, NULL);
1753 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1759 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1760 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1761 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1763 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1766 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1767 * can set these to NULLs
1774 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1776 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1777 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1778 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1779 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1781 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1784 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1785 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1786 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1787 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1791 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1793 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1796 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1797 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1799 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1805 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1806 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1807 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
1809 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))
1816 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1817 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1818 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1820 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1823 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1824 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
1825 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1827 /* Allow space for signature length */
1834 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1838 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1841 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1842 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1843 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1844 size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1845 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1847 * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1855 memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);
1863 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1872 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1873 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1876 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1878 for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1890 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1892 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1893 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1894 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1895 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1897 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1905 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1906 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1907 encodedPoint = NULL;
1915 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1916 * points to the space at the end.
1919 /* send signature algorithm */
1920 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1921 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1922 /* Should never happen */
1923 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1925 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1931 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1933 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1934 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1935 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1936 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1937 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1938 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1939 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1940 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1942 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1947 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1950 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1951 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1953 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1958 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
1959 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1964 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1967 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1970 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1973 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1975 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1976 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1980 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1982 unsigned char *p, *d;
1983 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1984 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1990 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1992 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1994 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1999 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2000 const unsigned char *psigs;
2001 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2002 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2003 /* Skip over length for now */
2005 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2006 /* Now fill in length */
2016 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2019 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2020 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2021 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2022 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2023 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2028 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2030 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2035 /* else no CA names */
2036 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2039 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2044 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2048 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2052 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2055 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2057 PACKET psk_identity;
2059 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2064 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2065 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2069 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2072 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2076 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2077 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2082 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2085 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2086 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2089 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2091 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2093 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2095 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2099 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2100 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2101 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2103 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2104 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2109 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2113 /* Should never happen */
2114 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2121 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2124 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2126 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2127 size_t j, padding_len;
2128 PACKET enc_premaster;
2130 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2133 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2135 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2140 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2141 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2142 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2144 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2145 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2153 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2154 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2155 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2156 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2158 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2159 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2164 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2165 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2166 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2172 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2173 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2174 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2175 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2176 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2179 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2180 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2184 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2185 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2187 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2188 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2189 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2190 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2193 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2196 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2197 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2198 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2200 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2206 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2207 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2208 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2209 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2210 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2212 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2215 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2216 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2217 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2218 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2219 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2220 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2223 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2224 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2226 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2227 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2230 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2231 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2232 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2233 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2234 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2235 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2238 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2239 unsigned char workaround_good;
2240 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2241 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2243 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2244 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2245 version_good |= workaround_good;
2249 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2250 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2252 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2255 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2256 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2257 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2258 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2260 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2261 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2262 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2263 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2264 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2267 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2268 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2269 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2276 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2279 /* Should never happen */
2280 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2286 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2289 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2293 const unsigned char *data;
2294 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2297 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2298 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2300 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2303 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2305 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2310 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2311 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2315 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2316 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2317 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2321 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2322 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2326 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2327 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2329 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 if (pub_key != NULL)
2336 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2337 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2344 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2346 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2349 /* Should never happen */
2350 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2356 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2359 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2360 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2363 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2364 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2365 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2370 const unsigned char *data;
2373 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2374 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2377 /* Get encoded point length */
2378 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2379 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2380 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2384 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2385 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2389 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i,
2391 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2397 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2398 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2404 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2405 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2407 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2411 /* Should never happen */
2412 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2422 const unsigned char *data;
2424 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2425 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2426 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2430 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2434 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2435 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2436 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2440 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2441 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2442 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2447 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2454 /* Should never happen */
2455 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2461 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2464 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2465 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2466 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2467 const unsigned char *start;
2468 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2469 unsigned long alg_a;
2473 const unsigned char *data;
2476 /* Get our certificate private key */
2477 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2478 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2480 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2482 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2484 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2487 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2489 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2490 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2493 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2494 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2495 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2499 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2500 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2505 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2506 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2507 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2508 * client certificate for authorization only.
2510 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2511 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2512 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2515 /* Decrypt session key */
2516 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2517 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2518 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2522 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2523 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2524 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2525 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2526 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2532 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2533 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2534 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2538 /* Generate master secret */
2539 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2540 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2541 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2545 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2546 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2547 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2548 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2552 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2555 /* Should never happen */
2556 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2562 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2565 unsigned long alg_k;
2567 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2569 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2570 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2573 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2574 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2575 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2576 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2580 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2581 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2582 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2586 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2587 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2589 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2590 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2592 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2593 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2595 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2596 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2598 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2599 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2602 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2607 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2610 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2612 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2613 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2615 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2616 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2619 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2622 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2623 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2624 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2625 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2627 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2630 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2631 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2633 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2634 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2635 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2636 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2640 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2641 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2646 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2648 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2649 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2651 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2652 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2653 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2654 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2655 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2656 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2657 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2658 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2661 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2665 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2666 /* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need the
2669 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2670 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2673 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2675 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2677 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2678 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2682 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2683 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2685 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2686 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2691 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2694 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2696 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2697 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2699 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2701 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2705 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2709 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2713 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2717 peer = s->session->peer;
2718 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2719 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2721 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2723 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2724 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2728 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2730 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2731 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2734 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2735 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2740 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2743 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2744 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2747 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2749 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 } else if (rv == 0) {
2752 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2756 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2759 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2760 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2762 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2764 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2769 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2771 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2775 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2776 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2777 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2779 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2782 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2784 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2788 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2789 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2791 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2795 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2797 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2798 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2800 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2806 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2807 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2808 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2809 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2810 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2812 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2821 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2822 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2823 s->session->master_key_length,
2824 s->session->master_key)) {
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2826 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2830 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2831 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2836 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2839 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2840 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2842 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2843 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2844 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2846 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2851 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2853 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2855 unsigned long l, llen;
2856 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2857 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2860 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2865 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2866 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2867 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2868 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2873 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2874 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2875 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2876 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2878 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2882 certstart = certbytes;
2883 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2888 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2889 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2891 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2894 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2901 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2902 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2903 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2904 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2906 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2909 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2910 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2911 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2913 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2914 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2917 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2918 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2923 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2925 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2927 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2932 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2935 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2937 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2939 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2944 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2945 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2946 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2948 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2949 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2951 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2952 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2955 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2959 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2960 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2963 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2967 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2971 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2974 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2978 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2987 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2989 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2990 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2991 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2992 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2993 const unsigned char *const_p;
2994 int len, slen_full, slen;
2997 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2998 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2999 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3002 /* get session encoding length */
3003 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3005 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3008 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3009 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3012 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3014 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3018 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3019 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3022 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3026 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3029 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3032 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3034 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3035 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3036 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3040 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3041 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3044 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3047 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3048 * follows handshake_header_length +
3049 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3050 * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3051 * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
3052 * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
3054 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3055 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
3056 EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3057 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3060 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3062 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3063 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3065 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3066 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3067 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3071 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
3072 s2n(0, p); /* length */
3073 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
3076 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3077 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3082 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3084 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3086 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3087 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3089 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3090 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3092 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3093 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3094 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3096 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3097 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3101 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3102 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3103 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3105 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3107 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3109 /* Output key name */
3111 memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
3112 p += sizeof(key_name);
3114 memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
3116 /* Encrypt session data */
3117 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3120 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3124 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3126 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3129 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3130 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3135 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3137 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3138 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3139 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3141 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3148 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3149 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3150 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3154 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3158 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3159 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3160 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3163 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3164 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3168 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3171 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3172 /* message length */
3173 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3175 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3176 /* length of OCSP response */
3177 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3178 /* actual response */
3179 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3180 /* number of bytes to write */
3181 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3189 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3190 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3192 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3194 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3195 size_t next_proto_len;
3198 * The payload looks like:
3200 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3201 * uint8 padding_len;
3202 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3204 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3205 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3206 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3211 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3213 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3217 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3219 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3221 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3222 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3226 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3228 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3229 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3230 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3231 int sslv2format, int *al
3234 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3235 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3237 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3238 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3240 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3242 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3244 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3246 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3250 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3252 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3257 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3258 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3261 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3266 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3269 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3270 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3271 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3275 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3277 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3278 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3279 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3281 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3284 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3285 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3286 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3287 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3288 if (s->renegotiate) {
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3290 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3291 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3294 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3298 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3299 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3300 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3302 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3303 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3306 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3308 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3309 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3315 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3316 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3318 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3320 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3325 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3326 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3335 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3336 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);