2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
42 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 switch (st->hand_state) {
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
54 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
55 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
56 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
60 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
61 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
62 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
71 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
85 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
86 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
87 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
91 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
92 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
126 /* No valid transition found */
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
141 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
149 switch (st->hand_state) {
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
174 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
175 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
176 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
177 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
192 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
195 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
219 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
291 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
296 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 * Valid return values are:
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 * Valid return values are:
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
361 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
366 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
367 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
373 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
379 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
386 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
398 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
400 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
407 switch (st->hand_state) {
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
432 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
433 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
435 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
442 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
459 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
460 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
489 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
490 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
498 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
505 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
518 * been configured for.
520 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
532 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
534 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
544 switch (st->hand_state) {
546 /* Shouldn't happen */
547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
553 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
556 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
576 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
577 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
578 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
592 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
598 /* normal PSK or SRP */
599 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
600 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
621 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
627 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
642 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
644 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the server to the client.
672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 /* No pre work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
722 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
754 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
755 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
768 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
769 * server to the client.
771 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
773 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
777 switch (st->hand_state) {
779 /* No post work to be done */
782 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
783 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
785 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
791 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
792 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
794 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
795 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
800 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
801 * treat like it was the first packet
806 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
807 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
808 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
809 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
814 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
815 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
816 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
819 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
822 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
823 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
825 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
826 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
827 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
830 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
835 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
836 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
840 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
841 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
845 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
846 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
847 if (!statem_flush(s))
852 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
853 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
854 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
855 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
856 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
861 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
862 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
863 /* SSLfatal() already called */
867 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
868 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
869 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
871 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
876 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
878 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
881 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
885 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
886 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
888 /* SSLfatal() already called */
893 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
896 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
897 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
901 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
902 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
905 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
907 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
910 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
914 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
915 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
916 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
917 &s->session->master_key_length)
918 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
919 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
920 /* SSLfatal() already called */
925 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
926 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
927 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
932 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
933 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
935 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
941 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
942 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
947 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
951 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
954 * Valid return values are:
958 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
959 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
961 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
963 switch (st->hand_state) {
965 /* Shouldn't happen */
966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
967 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
968 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
971 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
973 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
975 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
979 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
980 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
981 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
984 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
985 /* No construction function needed */
987 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
990 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
991 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
992 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
996 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
997 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1000 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1001 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1002 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1006 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1007 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1008 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1011 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1012 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1013 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1016 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1017 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1018 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1021 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1022 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1023 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1026 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1027 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1032 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1033 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1036 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1038 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1041 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1042 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1043 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1046 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1047 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1048 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1056 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1057 * calculated as follows:
1059 * 2 + # client_version
1060 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1061 * 1 + # length of session_id
1062 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1063 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1064 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1065 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1066 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1067 * 2 + # length of extensions
1068 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1070 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1072 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1073 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1076 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1077 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1079 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1081 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1083 switch (st->hand_state) {
1085 /* Shouldn't happen */
1088 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1089 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1091 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1092 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1094 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1095 return s->max_cert_list;
1097 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1098 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1100 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1101 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1104 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1105 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1108 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1109 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1111 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1112 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1114 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1115 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1120 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1122 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1126 switch (st->hand_state) {
1128 /* Shouldn't happen */
1129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1130 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1131 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1134 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1135 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1137 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1138 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1140 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1141 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1143 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1144 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1146 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1147 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1150 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1151 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1154 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1155 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1157 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1158 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1160 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1161 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1167 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1170 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1172 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1174 switch (st->hand_state) {
1176 /* Shouldn't happen */
1177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1178 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1183 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1185 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1186 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1191 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1192 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1195 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1199 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1201 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1205 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1206 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1212 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1214 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1215 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1216 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1225 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1228 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1229 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1230 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1236 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1238 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1239 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1240 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1241 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1242 cookie_leni > 255) {
1243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1244 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1247 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1249 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1250 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1252 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1261 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1262 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1263 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1267 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1269 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1270 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1271 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1272 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1274 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1276 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1277 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1278 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1279 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1280 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1281 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1282 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1284 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1285 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1286 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1287 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1288 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1289 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1290 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1291 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1292 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1293 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1294 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1295 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1296 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1298 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1299 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1304 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1306 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1307 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1308 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1312 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1315 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1316 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1318 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1321 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1323 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1325 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1326 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1327 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1328 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1330 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1331 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1332 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1334 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1337 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1338 || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding
1340 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1341 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1342 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1348 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1349 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1356 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1358 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1359 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1361 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1364 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1365 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1367 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1372 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1373 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1374 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1375 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1377 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1378 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1380 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1381 * 7-8 session_id_length
1382 * 9-10 challenge_length
1386 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1387 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1389 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1390 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1391 * in the first place
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1394 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1399 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1401 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1405 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1406 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1408 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1409 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1410 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1412 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1415 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1416 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1417 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1419 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1423 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1425 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1429 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1431 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1432 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1433 /* No extensions. */
1434 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1436 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1439 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1441 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1442 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1443 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1444 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1446 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1447 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1448 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1449 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1450 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1451 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1452 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1453 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1455 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1459 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1461 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1462 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1463 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1464 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1465 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1466 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1472 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1473 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1475 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1478 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1479 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1480 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1487 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1488 * So check cookie length...
1490 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1491 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1492 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1496 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1498 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1502 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1504 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1508 /* Could be empty. */
1509 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1510 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1512 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1513 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1515 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1521 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1522 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1523 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1525 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1529 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1530 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1531 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1532 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1533 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1534 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1537 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1539 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1542 if (clienthello != NULL)
1543 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1544 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1546 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1549 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1552 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1557 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1559 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1560 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1561 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1562 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1563 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1565 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1566 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1567 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1568 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1569 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1570 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1572 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1573 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1575 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1578 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1579 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1584 /* Set up the client_random */
1585 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1587 /* Choose the version */
1589 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1590 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1591 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1592 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1594 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1598 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1599 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1603 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1606 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1607 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1609 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1610 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1611 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1612 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1613 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1619 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1620 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1621 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1624 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1628 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1629 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1631 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1632 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1636 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1637 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1638 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1639 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1640 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1641 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1643 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1644 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1646 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1648 /* default verification */
1649 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1650 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1651 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1653 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1654 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1657 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1659 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1660 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1661 if (protverr != 0) {
1662 s->version = s->client_version;
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1664 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1672 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1673 clienthello->isv2) ||
1674 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1675 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1680 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1681 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1682 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1683 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1684 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1685 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1686 if (s->renegotiate) {
1687 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1689 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1690 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1693 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1694 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1695 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1697 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1698 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1699 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1700 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1701 * an insecure downgrade.
1703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1704 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1705 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1711 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1712 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1713 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1714 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1716 if (cipher == NULL) {
1717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1718 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1719 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1722 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1723 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1724 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1726 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1727 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1730 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1734 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1737 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1738 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1739 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1740 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1741 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1746 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1747 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1749 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1750 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1751 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1752 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1753 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1754 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1755 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1756 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1757 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1758 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1761 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1763 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1764 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1765 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1769 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1771 /* previous session */
1773 } else if (i == -1) {
1774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1778 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1779 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1785 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1786 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1787 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1788 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1792 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1793 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1795 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1797 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1800 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1802 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1803 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1805 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1806 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1815 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1819 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1820 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1825 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1826 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1830 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1833 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1834 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1839 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1840 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1841 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1843 /* TLS extensions */
1844 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1845 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1851 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1852 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1853 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1854 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1858 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1859 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1861 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1868 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1871 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1872 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1874 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1875 * backwards compat reasons
1877 int master_key_length;
1879 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1880 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1881 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1883 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1884 && master_key_length > 0) {
1885 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1887 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1888 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1892 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1893 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1894 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1895 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1896 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1898 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1899 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1903 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1904 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1905 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1906 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1907 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1912 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1913 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1914 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1916 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1917 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1919 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1920 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1921 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1923 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1925 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1926 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1931 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1932 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1933 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1935 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1936 /* Can't disable compression */
1937 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1939 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1940 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1943 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1944 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1945 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1946 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1947 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1951 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1953 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1954 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1957 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1958 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1959 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1962 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1964 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1965 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1968 } else if (s->hit) {
1970 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1971 /* See if we have a match */
1972 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1975 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1976 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1977 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1979 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1980 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1989 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1995 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1996 * using compression.
1998 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2000 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2001 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2007 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2010 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2011 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
2012 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
2013 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2015 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2016 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2023 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2024 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2026 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2028 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2029 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2034 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2035 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2036 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2037 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2038 s->clienthello = NULL;
2041 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2042 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2043 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2044 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2045 s->clienthello = NULL;
2051 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2052 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2054 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2056 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2059 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2060 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2061 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2062 * influence which certificate is sent
2064 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2065 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2068 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2069 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
2071 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2072 * et al can pick it up.
2074 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2075 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2077 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2078 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2079 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2081 /* status request response should be sent */
2082 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2083 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2084 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2086 /* something bad happened */
2087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2090 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2091 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2101 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2102 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2104 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2106 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2107 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2109 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2110 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2111 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
2112 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2113 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2115 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2116 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2117 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2118 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2123 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2125 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2126 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2129 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2130 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2131 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2132 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2133 selected_len) != 0) {
2134 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2135 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2139 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2140 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2143 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2145 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2146 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2149 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2151 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2153 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2157 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2162 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2164 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2168 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2173 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2174 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2175 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2176 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2182 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2184 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2186 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2187 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2189 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2196 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2197 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2198 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2199 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2200 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2203 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2204 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2208 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2211 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2214 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2215 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2217 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2219 if (cipher == NULL) {
2220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2221 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2222 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2225 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2228 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2229 /* SSLfatal already called */
2232 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2233 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2234 s->session->not_resumable =
2235 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2236 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2237 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2238 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2239 /* do not send a session ticket */
2240 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2243 /* Session-id reuse */
2244 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2248 * we now have the following setup.
2250 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2251 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2252 * compression - basically ignored right now
2253 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2254 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2255 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2256 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2260 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2261 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2263 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2264 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2268 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2269 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2270 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2271 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2273 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2281 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2283 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2285 * callback indicates further work to be done
2287 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2297 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2302 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2307 unsigned char *session_id;
2308 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2310 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2311 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2313 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2314 * tls_process_client_hello()
2316 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2317 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2318 ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random,
2319 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2321 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2326 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2327 * back in the server hello:
2328 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2329 * we send back the old session ID.
2330 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2331 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2332 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2333 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2335 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2336 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2337 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2339 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2340 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2343 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2344 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2346 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2349 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2350 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2352 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2353 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2356 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 /* set up the compression method */
2363 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2366 if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2369 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2372 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2373 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2374 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2380 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2381 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2382 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2384 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2385 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2391 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2392 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2393 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2398 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2399 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2401 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2405 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2406 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2407 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2414 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2416 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2417 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2425 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2428 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2431 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2432 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2435 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2439 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2440 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2441 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2443 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2445 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2449 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2451 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2455 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2457 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2459 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2460 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2462 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2464 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2465 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2467 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2470 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2471 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2472 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2473 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2476 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2477 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2480 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2483 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2485 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2486 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2487 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2490 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2496 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2498 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2499 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2502 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2503 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2505 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2506 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2509 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2511 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2516 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2517 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2522 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2525 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2526 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2530 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2533 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2534 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2538 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2540 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2547 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2548 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2549 if (curve_id == 0) {
2550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2551 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2552 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2555 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2556 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2557 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2558 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2562 /* Encode the public key. */
2563 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2565 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2567 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2572 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2573 * can set these to NULLs
2580 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2582 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2583 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2584 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2585 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2587 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2591 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2592 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2593 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2594 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2599 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2604 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2605 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2607 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2609 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2614 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2615 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2616 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2619 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2620 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2622 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2623 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2626 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2633 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2634 unsigned char *binval;
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2638 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2639 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2642 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2646 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2653 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2654 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2657 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2658 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2661 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2663 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2664 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2667 memset(binval, 0, len);
2671 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2672 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2674 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2675 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2679 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2683 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2685 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2686 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2687 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2690 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2691 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2692 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2693 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2695 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2699 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2700 encodedPoint = NULL;
2706 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2708 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2709 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2712 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2713 /* Should never happen */
2714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2715 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2716 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2719 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2720 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2722 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2723 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2726 /* send signature algorithm */
2727 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2729 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2734 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2735 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2736 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2739 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2740 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2741 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2743 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2747 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2748 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2749 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2751 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2756 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2757 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2763 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2765 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2766 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2768 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2769 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2774 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2778 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2781 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2783 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2787 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2789 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2790 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2791 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2792 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2793 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2794 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2795 || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2796 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2798 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2799 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2802 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2803 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2808 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2810 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2811 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2816 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2817 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2825 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2826 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2827 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2829 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2833 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2834 const uint16_t *psigs;
2835 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2837 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2838 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2839 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2840 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2842 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2848 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2855 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2859 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2862 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2864 PACKET psk_identity;
2866 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2868 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2871 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2873 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2876 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2878 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2882 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2884 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2888 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2891 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2895 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2897 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2900 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2901 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2905 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2906 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2907 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2909 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2911 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2915 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2919 /* Should never happen */
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2929 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2931 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2932 size_t j, padding_len;
2933 PACKET enc_premaster;
2935 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2938 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2941 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2945 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2946 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2947 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2949 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2950 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2952 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2958 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2959 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2960 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2961 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2963 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2965 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2969 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2970 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2972 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2977 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2978 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2979 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2980 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2981 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2984 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2985 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2992 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2993 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2995 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2996 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2997 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2998 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2999 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
3000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3001 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3005 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3008 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3009 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3010 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3012 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3014 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3018 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3019 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
3020 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
3021 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
3022 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
3024 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
3027 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3028 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3029 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3030 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3031 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3032 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3035 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3036 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
3038 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3039 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
3042 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3043 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3044 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3045 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3046 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3047 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3050 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
3051 unsigned char workaround_good;
3052 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
3053 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
3055 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
3056 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
3057 version_good |= workaround_good;
3061 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3062 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3064 decrypt_good &= version_good;
3067 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3068 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3069 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3070 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3072 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
3073 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
3074 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
3075 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
3076 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
3079 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
3080 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
3081 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3087 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3090 /* Should never happen */
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3097 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3100 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3104 const unsigned char *data;
3105 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3108 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3110 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3113 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3116 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3120 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3122 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3125 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3126 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3131 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3132 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3138 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3139 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3140 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3142 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3147 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3148 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3153 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3154 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3156 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3159 /* Should never happen */
3160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3166 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3169 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3170 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3173 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3174 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3176 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3180 const unsigned char *data;
3183 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3184 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3187 /* Get encoded point length */
3188 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3189 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3191 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3194 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3195 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3200 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3207 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3208 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3213 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3214 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3216 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3220 /* Should never happen */
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3222 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3227 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3231 const unsigned char *data;
3233 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3234 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3236 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3239 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3244 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3246 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3249 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3250 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3251 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3253 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3257 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3264 /* Should never happen */
3265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3271 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3274 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3275 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3276 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3277 const unsigned char *start;
3278 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3279 unsigned long alg_a;
3280 unsigned int asn1id, asn1len;
3284 /* Get our certificate private key */
3285 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3286 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3288 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3290 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3292 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3295 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3297 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3298 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3301 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3302 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3304 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3307 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3309 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3313 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3314 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3315 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3316 * client certificate for authorization only.
3318 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3319 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3320 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3323 /* Decrypt session key */
3324 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id)
3325 || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3326 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) {
3327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3328 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3331 if (asn1len == 0x81) {
3333 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3335 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3337 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) {
3338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3339 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3342 } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) {
3344 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3348 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3350 } /* else short form length */
3352 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) {
3353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3354 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3357 inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata);
3358 start = PACKET_data(&encdata);
3360 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3363 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3366 /* Generate master secret */
3367 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3368 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3369 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3372 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3373 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3375 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3379 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3382 /* Should never happen */
3383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3384 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3389 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3391 unsigned long alg_k;
3393 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3395 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3396 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3397 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3401 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3402 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3403 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3405 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3406 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3409 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3410 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3414 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3415 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3419 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3420 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3424 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3425 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3426 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3429 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3430 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3431 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3434 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3435 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3436 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3441 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3442 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3446 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3449 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3450 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3452 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3455 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3458 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3459 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3460 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3461 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3463 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3466 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3467 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3469 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3470 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3471 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3474 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3475 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3479 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3480 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3485 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3487 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3488 * the handshake_buffer
3490 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3496 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3498 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3499 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3503 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3504 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3506 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3507 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3512 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3515 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3518 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3521 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3522 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3523 PACKET spkt, context;
3525 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3528 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3529 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3532 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3534 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3536 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3540 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3541 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3542 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3543 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3545 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3549 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3550 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3552 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3556 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3557 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3558 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3560 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3561 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3565 certstart = certbytes;
3566 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3569 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3572 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3574 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3575 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3579 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3580 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3583 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3585 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3589 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3590 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3591 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3592 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3593 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3594 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3595 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3598 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3601 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3603 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3604 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3610 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3611 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3612 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3614 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3615 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3618 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3619 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3620 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3622 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3623 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3626 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3627 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3628 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3633 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3635 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3636 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3637 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3642 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3645 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3648 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3649 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3655 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3656 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3657 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3658 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3659 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3662 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3663 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3665 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3666 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3670 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3671 s->session = new_sess;
3674 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3675 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3676 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3678 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3679 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3682 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3685 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3691 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3692 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3696 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3697 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3698 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3699 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3700 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3705 /* Resend session tickets */
3706 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3709 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3713 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3717 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3719 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3723 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3728 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3729 * for the server Certificate message
3731 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3733 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3736 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3737 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3744 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3745 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3748 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3749 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3750 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3753 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3754 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3755 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3761 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3762 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3763 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3770 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3771 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3773 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3780 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3781 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3783 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3784 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3785 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3786 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3787 const unsigned char *const_p;
3788 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3791 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3792 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3793 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3795 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3797 /* get session encoding length */
3798 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3800 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3803 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3805 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3808 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3811 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3815 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3816 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3817 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3819 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3824 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3826 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3831 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3834 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3841 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3842 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3843 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3845 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3846 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3850 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3853 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3856 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3859 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3860 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3862 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3863 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3864 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3869 /* Put timeout and length */
3870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3871 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3873 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3878 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3879 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3884 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3887 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3889 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3891 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3892 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0
3893 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3894 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3895 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3896 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3897 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3899 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3902 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3903 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3906 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3907 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3911 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3912 /* Output key name */
3913 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3915 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3916 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3918 /* Encrypt session data */
3919 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3920 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3921 || encdata1 != encdata2
3922 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3923 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3924 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3925 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3926 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3927 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3928 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3929 macendoffset - macoffset)
3930 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3931 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3932 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3933 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3934 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3936 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3940 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3941 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3942 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3943 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3950 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3951 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3955 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3956 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3958 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3963 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3964 s->session->session_id_length)
3965 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
3967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3974 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3976 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3977 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3979 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3983 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3985 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3988 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
3989 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
3990 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
3991 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
3993 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3994 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
3995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3996 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4000 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4002 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
4003 cb = s->info_callback;
4004 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
4005 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
4009 * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
4010 * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
4013 if (s->sent_tickets != 0) {
4014 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
4015 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
4016 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
4018 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
4021 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4022 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4023 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4025 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4026 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4028 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4029 /* SSLfatal already called */
4033 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4034 s->session = new_sess;
4037 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4038 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4041 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4043 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4047 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4049 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4050 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4051 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4055 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4057 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4060 s->session->master_key,
4062 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4065 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4067 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4068 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
4069 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4070 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4071 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
4072 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4074 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4075 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4078 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
4080 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4083 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4084 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4088 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4089 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4090 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4093 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4094 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4095 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4096 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4097 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4100 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4102 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4106 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4107 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4108 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4110 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4114 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4115 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4116 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4119 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4120 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4129 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4130 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4132 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4135 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4136 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4138 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4145 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4147 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4148 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4157 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4158 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4160 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4162 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4163 size_t next_proto_len;
4166 * The payload looks like:
4168 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4169 * uint8 padding_len;
4170 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4172 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4173 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4174 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4176 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4177 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4180 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4184 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4187 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4189 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4193 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4195 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4197 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4204 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4206 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4208 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4209 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4212 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4213 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4215 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4216 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4220 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4221 * a record boundary.
4223 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4225 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4226 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4227 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4230 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4231 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4232 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4234 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4237 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;