2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
619 * Valid return values are:
623 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
624 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
626 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
628 switch (st->hand_state) {
630 /* Shouldn't happen */
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
635 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
637 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
638 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
641 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
642 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
643 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 /* No construction function needed */
649 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
653 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
654 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
658 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
659 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
662 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
663 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
664 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
667 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
668 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
669 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
673 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
674 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
677 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
678 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
679 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
682 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
683 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
684 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
687 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
688 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
689 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
697 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
698 * calculated as follows:
700 * 2 + # client_version
701 * 32 + # only valid length for random
702 * 1 + # length of session_id
703 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
704 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
705 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
706 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
707 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
708 * 2 + # length of extensions
709 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
711 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
713 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
714 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
717 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
718 * reading. Excludes the message header.
720 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
722 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
724 switch (st->hand_state) {
726 /* Shouldn't happen */
729 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
730 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
733 return s->max_cert_list;
735 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
736 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
738 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
739 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
742 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
743 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
746 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
747 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
749 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
750 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
755 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
757 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
759 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
761 switch (st->hand_state) {
763 /* Shouldn't happen */
764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
767 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
770 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
773 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
776 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
780 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
784 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
787 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
792 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
795 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
797 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
799 switch (st->hand_state) {
801 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
805 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
807 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
808 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
810 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
813 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
814 /* Are we renegotiating? */
815 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
816 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
817 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
818 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
819 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
820 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
823 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
826 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
832 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
834 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
836 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
838 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
839 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
840 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
842 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
846 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
848 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
855 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
858 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
860 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
866 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
868 unsigned int cookie_leni;
869 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
870 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
871 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
874 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
877 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
879 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
880 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
890 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
896 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
898 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
900 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
901 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
902 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
903 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
906 * First step is to parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG
910 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
912 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
914 if (clienthello.isv2) {
917 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
918 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
919 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
920 * the rest right through. Its format is:
922 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
923 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
925 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
926 * 7-8 session_id_length
927 * 9-10 challenge_length
931 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
932 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
934 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
935 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
943 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.version)) {
944 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
949 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
950 if (clienthello.isv2) {
952 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
953 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
954 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
956 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
959 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
960 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
961 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
963 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
964 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
967 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
969 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
970 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
975 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
977 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id,
978 clienthello.session_id_len)
979 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
981 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
983 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
984 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
988 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
989 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
991 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
992 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
993 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
994 challenge_len, challenge_len)
995 /* Advertise only null compression. */
996 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
998 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1002 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1004 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1005 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1006 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1007 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1012 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1013 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1014 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1018 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1019 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1020 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1021 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1026 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1027 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1028 * So check cookie length...
1030 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1031 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1036 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1037 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1042 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1043 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1048 /* Could be empty. */
1049 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1050 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1052 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1060 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1061 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, &clienthello.compressions_len)
1062 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1063 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1064 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1070 /* We preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1071 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1072 if (!tls_parse_raw_extensions(&extensions, &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
1073 &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
1074 /* SSLerr already been called */
1078 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1080 /* Set up the client_random */
1081 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1083 /* Choose the version */
1085 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1086 if (clienthello.version == 0x0002) {
1087 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1090 } else if ((clienthello.version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1092 s->client_version = clienthello.version;
1094 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1100 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1101 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1103 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1104 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1105 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1106 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.version, s->version)) {
1107 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1114 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1116 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1119 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.version;
1121 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1125 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1126 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1127 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1128 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1129 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1130 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1131 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1133 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1135 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1137 /* default verification */
1138 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1139 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1140 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1141 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1145 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1147 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1148 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1149 if (protverr != 0) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1151 s->version = s->client_version;
1152 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1160 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1161 if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s, &clienthello))
1163 /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
1164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1170 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1171 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1173 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1174 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1175 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1176 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1177 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1178 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1179 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1180 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1181 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1182 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1185 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1187 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1188 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1191 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1193 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1195 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1196 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1197 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1198 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1199 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1201 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1202 /* previous session */
1204 } else if (i == -1) {
1208 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1213 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &(ciphers),
1214 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1218 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1221 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1224 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1226 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1227 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1229 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1230 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1239 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1242 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1244 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1249 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1250 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1254 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1256 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1261 /* TLS extensions */
1262 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1268 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1269 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1270 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1271 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1275 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1276 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1281 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1282 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1284 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1285 * backwards compat reasons
1287 int master_key_length;
1289 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1290 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1291 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1293 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1294 && master_key_length > 0) {
1295 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1297 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1298 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1302 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1304 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1309 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1310 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1315 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1316 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1317 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1318 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1319 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1324 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1325 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1326 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1328 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1330 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1331 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1332 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1334 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1335 /* Can't disable compression */
1336 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1338 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1341 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1342 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1343 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1344 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1349 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1351 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1354 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1355 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1356 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1359 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1360 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1362 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1367 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1368 /* See if we have a match */
1369 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1372 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1373 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1374 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1376 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1377 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1386 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1392 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1393 * using compression.
1395 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1402 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1406 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1407 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1409 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1411 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1412 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1413 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1414 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1419 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1425 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1426 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1428 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1430 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1432 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1433 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1437 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1439 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1440 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1442 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1444 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1445 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1446 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1448 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1450 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1454 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1457 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1460 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1462 if (cipher == NULL) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1464 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1467 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1468 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1469 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1470 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1471 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1472 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1473 /* do not send a session ticket */
1474 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1476 /* Session-id reuse */
1477 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1480 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1481 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1482 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1488 * we now have the following setup.
1490 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1491 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1492 * compression - basically ignored right now
1493 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1494 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1495 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1496 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1499 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1500 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1501 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1503 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1511 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1513 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1515 * callback indicates further work to be done
1517 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1520 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1522 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1523 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1525 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1527 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1534 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1536 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1537 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1541 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1543 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1546 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1548 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1549 * tls_process_client_hello()
1551 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1558 * back in the server hello:
1559 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1560 * we send back the old session ID.
1561 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1562 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1563 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1564 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1566 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1567 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1568 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1569 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1572 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1573 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1575 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1577 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1578 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 /* set up the compression method */
1584 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1587 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1590 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1593 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1594 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1595 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
1596 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1597 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1610 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1611 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1612 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1622 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1625 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1626 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1630 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1631 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1634 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1635 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1637 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1642 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1647 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1649 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1651 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1652 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1654 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1656 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1657 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1659 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1662 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1663 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1664 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1665 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1668 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1671 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1674 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1676 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1677 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1678 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1681 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1686 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1687 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1689 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1692 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1693 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1694 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1696 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1699 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1701 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1705 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1707 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1712 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1714 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1717 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1718 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1722 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1725 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1732 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1733 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1734 if (curve_id == 0) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1736 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1739 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1740 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1741 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1746 /* Encode the public key. */
1747 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1749 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1755 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1756 * can set these to NULLs
1763 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1765 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1766 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1767 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1768 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1770 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1773 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1774 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1775 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1776 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1780 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1782 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1786 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1787 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1788 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1790 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1798 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1799 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1800 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1803 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1804 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1806 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1807 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1810 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1816 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1817 unsigned char *binval;
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1821 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1822 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
1825 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1829 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1835 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1836 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1839 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1840 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
1843 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1845 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1848 memset(binval, 0, len);
1852 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
1853 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1855 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1863 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1865 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1866 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1867 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
1871 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1872 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
1873 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1878 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1879 encodedPoint = NULL;
1886 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1887 * points to the space at the end.
1890 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
1891 unsigned int siglen;
1893 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1894 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1899 /* send signature algorithm */
1900 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1901 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
1902 /* Should never happen */
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1904 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1909 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1912 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1913 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1914 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1917 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
1919 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1920 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1921 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1922 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1923 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1924 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
1926 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
1927 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
1928 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1934 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1935 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1937 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1942 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1945 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1948 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1951 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1953 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1957 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1960 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1962 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1963 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1964 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
1965 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1970 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1971 const unsigned char *psigs;
1972 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1973 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1974 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
1975 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1982 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1983 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1988 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1990 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1991 unsigned char *namebytes;
1992 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1996 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
1997 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
1999 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2001 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2006 /* else no CA names */
2008 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2013 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2021 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2024 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2026 PACKET psk_identity;
2028 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2029 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2033 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2038 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2039 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2044 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2045 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2050 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2053 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2057 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2059 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2061 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2063 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2067 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2068 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2069 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2071 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2072 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2077 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2081 /* Should never happen */
2082 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2088 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2091 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2093 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2094 size_t j, padding_len;
2095 PACKET enc_premaster;
2097 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2100 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2102 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2107 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2108 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2109 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2111 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2112 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2113 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2120 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2121 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2122 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2123 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2125 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2126 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2131 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2132 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2133 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2139 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2140 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2141 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2142 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2143 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2146 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2150 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2151 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2153 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2154 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2155 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2156 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2157 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2160 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2163 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2164 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2165 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2167 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2168 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2173 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2174 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2175 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2176 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2177 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2179 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2182 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2183 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2184 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2185 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2186 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2187 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2190 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2191 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2193 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2194 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2197 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2198 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2199 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2200 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2201 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2202 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2205 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2206 unsigned char workaround_good;
2207 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2208 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2210 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2211 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2212 version_good |= workaround_good;
2216 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2217 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2219 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2222 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2223 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2224 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2225 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2227 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2228 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2229 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2230 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2231 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2234 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2235 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2236 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2243 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2246 /* Should never happen */
2247 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2253 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2256 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2260 const unsigned char *data;
2261 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2264 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2265 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2267 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2270 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2272 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2277 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2278 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2282 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2283 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2284 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2288 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2289 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2293 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2294 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2296 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2298 if (pub_key != NULL)
2303 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2304 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2310 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2311 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2313 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2316 /* Should never happen */
2317 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2323 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2326 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2327 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2330 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2331 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2332 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2337 const unsigned char *data;
2340 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2341 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2344 /* Get encoded point length */
2345 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2346 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2351 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2352 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2356 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2357 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2363 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2370 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2371 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2373 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2377 /* Should never happen */
2378 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2384 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2388 const unsigned char *data;
2390 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2391 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2392 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2396 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2400 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2401 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2405 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2406 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2407 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2412 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2419 /* Should never happen */
2420 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2426 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2429 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2430 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2431 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2432 const unsigned char *start;
2433 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2434 unsigned long alg_a;
2437 size_t sess_key_len;
2438 const unsigned char *data;
2441 /* Get our certificate private key */
2442 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2443 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2445 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2447 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2449 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2452 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2454 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2455 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2458 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2459 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2460 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2464 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2465 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2470 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2471 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2472 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2473 * client certificate for authorization only.
2475 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2476 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2477 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2480 /* Decrypt session key */
2481 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2482 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2483 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2487 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2488 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2489 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2490 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2491 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2497 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2498 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2499 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2503 /* Generate master secret */
2504 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2505 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2506 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2510 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2511 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2512 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2513 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2517 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2520 /* Should never happen */
2521 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2527 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2530 unsigned long alg_k;
2532 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2534 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2535 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2538 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2539 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2540 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2541 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2546 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2547 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2548 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2552 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2553 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2555 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2556 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2558 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2559 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2561 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2562 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2564 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2565 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2568 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2574 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2577 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2579 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2580 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2582 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2583 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2586 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2589 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2591 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2592 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2594 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2597 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2598 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2600 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2601 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2602 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2604 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2608 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2609 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2614 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2616 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2617 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2619 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2620 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2621 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2622 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2623 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2624 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2625 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2626 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2629 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2633 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2635 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2636 * the handshake_buffer
2638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2639 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2642 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2644 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2646 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2647 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2651 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2652 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2660 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2663 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2665 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2666 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2668 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2670 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2674 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2678 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2682 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 peer = s->session->peer;
2687 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2688 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2690 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2692 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2693 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2697 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2699 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2700 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2703 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2704 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2709 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2712 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2713 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2718 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 } else if (rv == 0) {
2721 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2728 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2729 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2731 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2733 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2738 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2740 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2744 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2745 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2746 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2748 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2751 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2753 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2757 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2758 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2766 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2767 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2769 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2774 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2775 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2776 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2777 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2778 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2780 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2789 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2790 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2791 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2792 s->session->master_key)) {
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2794 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2798 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2799 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2804 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2807 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2808 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2810 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2811 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2812 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2814 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2819 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2821 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2823 unsigned long l, llen;
2824 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2825 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2828 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2833 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2834 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2835 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2836 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2841 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2842 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2843 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2844 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2846 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2850 certstart = certbytes;
2851 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2856 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2857 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2859 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2862 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2869 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2870 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2871 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2872 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2874 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2877 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2878 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2879 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2881 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2882 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2885 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2886 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2891 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2893 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2895 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2900 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2903 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2905 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2907 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2912 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2913 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2914 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2916 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2917 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2919 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2920 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2923 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2928 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2931 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2935 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2939 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2955 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2956 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2957 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2958 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
2959 const unsigned char *const_p;
2960 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
2963 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2964 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2965 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2967 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
2969 /* get session encoding length */
2970 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2972 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2975 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2976 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2979 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2981 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2985 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2986 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2987 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2993 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2997 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3000 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3003 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3005 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3006 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3007 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3011 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3012 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3015 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3018 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3019 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3021 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3022 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3023 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3028 /* Put timeout and length */
3029 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3030 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3036 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3037 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3042 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3044 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3046 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3047 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3049 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3050 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3052 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3053 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3054 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3056 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3057 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3061 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3062 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3063 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3065 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3066 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3067 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3068 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3069 /* Output key name */
3070 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3072 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3073 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3075 /* Encrypt session data */
3076 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3077 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3078 || encdata1 != encdata2
3079 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3080 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3081 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3082 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3083 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3084 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3085 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3086 macendoffset - macoffset)
3087 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3088 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3089 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3090 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3091 || macdata1 != macdata2
3092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3097 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3103 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3104 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3105 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3109 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3111 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3112 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3113 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3115 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3124 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3125 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3127 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3129 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3130 size_t next_proto_len;
3133 * The payload looks like:
3135 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3136 * uint8 padding_len;
3137 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3139 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3140 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3141 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3146 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3147 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3151 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3153 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3155 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3156 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3160 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3162 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3163 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3164 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3165 int sslv2format, int *al)
3167 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3168 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3170 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3171 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3173 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3175 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3177 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3179 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3183 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3185 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3186 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3190 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3191 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3194 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3199 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3202 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3203 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3204 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3208 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3210 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3211 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3212 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3214 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3217 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3218 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3219 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3220 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3221 if (s->renegotiate) {
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3223 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3224 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3227 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3231 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3232 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3233 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3235 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3236 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3239 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3241 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3242 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3248 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3249 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3251 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3253 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3258 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3259 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3268 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3269 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);