2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #include <openssl/comp.h>
31 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
35 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
38 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
40 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
41 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
42 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
43 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
45 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
47 static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
50 static ossl_inline int received_client_cert(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
52 return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
56 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
57 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
58 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
59 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
61 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
62 * (transition not allowed)
64 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
66 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
69 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
70 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
71 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
73 switch (st->hand_state) {
77 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
78 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
79 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
80 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
84 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
85 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
86 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
93 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
94 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
95 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
96 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
97 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
101 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
102 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
115 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
117 if (!received_client_cert(s)) {
118 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
119 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
130 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
139 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
140 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
142 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
145 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
151 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
152 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
153 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
173 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
183 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
184 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
189 switch (st->hand_state) {
195 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
202 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
204 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
205 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
207 * 2) If we did request one then
208 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
210 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
211 * list if we requested a certificate)
213 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
214 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
215 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
216 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
217 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
219 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
220 * not going to accept it because we require a client
223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
224 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
231 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
234 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
249 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
251 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
252 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
253 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
254 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
255 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
258 if (!received_client_cert(s) || st->no_cert_verify) {
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
261 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
262 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
263 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
264 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
277 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
278 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
284 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
286 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
287 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
288 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
293 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
294 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
303 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
311 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
320 /* No valid transition found */
321 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
325 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
326 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
329 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
330 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
331 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
332 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
335 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
340 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
342 * Valid return values are:
346 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
348 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
351 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
352 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
353 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
354 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
355 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
358 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
360 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
364 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
365 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
366 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
367 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
368 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
372 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
382 * Used to determine if we shoud send a CompressedCertificate message
384 * Returns the algorithm to use, TLSEXT_comp_cert_none means no compression
386 static int get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
389 int *alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer;
391 if (sc->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
392 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
394 for (; *alg != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; alg++) {
395 if (sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[*alg] != NULL)
399 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
403 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
405 * Valid return values are:
409 int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
412 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
413 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
415 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
416 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
418 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
419 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
420 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
422 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
425 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
428 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
429 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
432 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
434 * ... except when the application insists on
435 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
438 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
439 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
440 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
442 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
445 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
452 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
454 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't attempt to compress it */
455 return sc->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
456 && get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
460 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
461 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
464 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
466 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
469 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
470 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
473 switch (st->hand_state) {
475 /* Shouldn't happen */
476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
480 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 /* Try to read from the client instead */
493 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
495 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
499 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
500 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
501 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
503 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
504 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
510 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
513 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
516 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
519 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
521 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
529 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
530 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
531 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
532 } else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
552 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
553 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
555 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
557 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
558 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
561 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
562 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
563 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
565 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
566 * handshake at this point.
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
571 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
578 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
583 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
584 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
585 * been configured for.
587 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
590 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
598 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
599 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
601 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
603 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
606 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
607 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
610 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
611 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
613 switch (st->hand_state) {
615 /* Shouldn't happen */
616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
617 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
620 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
621 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
623 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
627 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
628 /* SSLfatal() already called */
629 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
634 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
635 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
641 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
642 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
643 && (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
644 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
645 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
646 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
647 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
655 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
657 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
659 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
660 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
664 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
665 /* normal PSK or SRP */
666 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
667 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
668 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
669 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
670 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
671 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
672 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
674 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
677 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
680 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
681 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
682 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
686 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
687 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
688 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
689 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
693 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
694 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
695 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
696 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
700 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
701 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
702 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
704 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
705 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
707 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
709 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
710 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
711 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
712 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
714 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
716 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
718 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
719 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
720 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
722 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
723 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
724 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
726 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
728 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
730 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
731 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
736 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
737 * the server to the client.
739 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
741 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
742 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
744 switch (st->hand_state) {
746 /* No pre work to be done */
749 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
751 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
752 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
755 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
757 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
758 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
759 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
764 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
765 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
767 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
768 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
774 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
776 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
777 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
778 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
781 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
783 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
784 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
785 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
787 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
788 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
789 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
791 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
793 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
795 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
797 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
798 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
804 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
805 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
807 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
808 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
809 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
810 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
814 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
818 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
820 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
821 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
822 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
823 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
827 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
829 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
830 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
831 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
832 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
836 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
837 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
840 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
843 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
845 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
850 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
854 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
864 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
865 * server to the client.
867 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
869 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
870 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
874 switch (st->hand_state) {
876 /* No post work to be done */
879 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
880 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
882 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
888 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
889 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
891 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
892 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
893 /* SSLfatal() already called */
897 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
898 * treat like it was the first packet
903 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
904 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
905 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
906 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
907 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
912 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
913 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
914 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
918 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
921 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
922 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
924 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
925 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
926 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
929 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
930 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
937 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
938 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
941 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
942 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
943 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
947 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
948 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
949 if (!statem_flush(s))
954 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
955 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
956 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
957 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
958 /* SSLfatal() already called */
962 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
963 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
964 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
965 /* SSLfatal() already called */
969 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
970 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
971 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
973 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
974 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 1);
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
979 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
981 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
984 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
988 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
989 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
990 /* SSLfatal() already called */
994 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
995 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
998 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
999 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1003 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1004 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1007 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1009 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1012 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
1016 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1017 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
1019 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1020 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
1022 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1023 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
1024 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1029 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1030 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
1031 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1034 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1035 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
1036 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
1040 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1041 if (!s->hit && !send_certificate_request(s)) {
1042 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1043 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
1044 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
1048 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1049 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1051 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
1052 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1059 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
1060 if (SSL_get_error(ssl, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
1061 && conn_is_closed()) {
1063 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
1064 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
1065 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
1066 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
1067 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
1069 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1078 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1082 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1085 * Valid return values are:
1089 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1090 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1092 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1094 switch (st->hand_state) {
1096 /* Shouldn't happen */
1097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1100 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1101 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1104 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1105 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1108 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1109 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1110 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1113 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1114 /* No construction function needed */
1116 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1119 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1120 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1121 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1124 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1125 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1126 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1130 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
1131 *confunc = tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate;
1132 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
1136 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1137 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1138 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1142 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1143 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1144 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1147 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1148 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1149 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1152 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1153 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1154 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1157 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1158 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1159 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1162 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1163 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1164 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1167 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1168 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1169 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1172 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1174 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1177 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1178 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1179 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1182 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1183 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1184 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1192 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1193 * calculated as follows:
1195 * 2 + # client_version
1196 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1197 * 1 + # length of session_id
1198 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1199 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1200 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1201 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1202 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1203 * 2 + # length of extensions
1204 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1206 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1208 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1209 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1212 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1213 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1215 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1217 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1219 switch (st->hand_state) {
1221 /* Shouldn't happen */
1224 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1225 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1227 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1228 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1230 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
1231 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1232 return s->max_cert_list;
1234 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1235 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1237 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1238 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1241 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1242 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1246 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1248 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1249 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1251 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1252 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1257 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1259 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1262 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1264 switch (st->hand_state) {
1266 /* Shouldn't happen */
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1270 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1271 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1273 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1274 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1276 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1277 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1280 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
1281 return tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1284 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1285 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1287 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1288 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1291 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1292 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1295 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1296 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1298 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1299 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1301 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1302 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1308 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1311 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1314 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1316 switch (st->hand_state) {
1318 /* Shouldn't happen */
1319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1323 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1325 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1326 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1331 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1332 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1335 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1337 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1338 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1339 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1341 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1345 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1348 ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
1351 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1353 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1354 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1355 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1364 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1367 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1368 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1369 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1375 CON_FUNC_RETURN dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1378 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1379 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1381 if (sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
1382 || sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->d1->cookie,
1384 || cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1386 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1388 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1390 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1391 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1393 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1396 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1400 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1401 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1402 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1406 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1408 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1409 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1410 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1411 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1413 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1414 const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1416 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1417 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1418 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1419 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1420 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1421 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1422 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1424 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1425 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1426 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1427 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1428 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1429 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1430 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1431 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1432 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1433 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1434 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1435 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1436 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1438 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1439 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1444 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1446 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1447 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1448 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1452 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1455 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(
1456 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1457 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1459 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1463 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
1464 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
1465 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
1467 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1469 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1470 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1471 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1472 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1474 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1475 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1476 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1480 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
1481 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1483 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1484 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1485 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1491 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1492 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1498 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1500 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1501 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1503 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1506 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1507 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1513 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1514 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1515 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1516 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1518 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1519 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1521 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1522 * 7-8 session_id_length
1523 * 9-10 challenge_length
1527 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1528 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1530 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1531 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1532 * in the first place
1534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1544 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1545 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1547 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1548 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1549 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1551 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1554 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1555 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1556 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1561 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1566 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1568 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1569 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1570 /* No extensions. */
1571 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1575 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1577 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1578 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1579 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1580 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1582 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1583 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1584 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1585 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1586 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1587 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1588 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1589 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1596 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1597 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1598 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1599 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1600 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1601 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1606 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1607 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1608 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1611 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1612 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1613 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1619 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1620 * So check cookie length...
1622 if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1623 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1624 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1625 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1630 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1635 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1640 /* Could be empty. */
1641 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1642 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1644 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1645 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1652 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1653 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1654 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1659 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1660 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1661 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1662 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1663 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1664 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1667 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1669 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1672 if (clienthello != NULL)
1673 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1674 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1679 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1682 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1687 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1689 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1690 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1691 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1692 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1693 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1694 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1695 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1697 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1698 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1699 if (sctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1700 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1701 switch (sctx->client_hello_cb(ssl, &al, sctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1702 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1704 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1705 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1707 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1709 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1714 /* Set up the client_random */
1715 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1717 /* Choose the version */
1719 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1720 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1721 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1722 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1724 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1731 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1734 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1735 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1737 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1738 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1739 } else if (ssl->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1740 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1741 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1747 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1748 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1749 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1755 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1756 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1757 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1762 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1763 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1764 if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1765 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1766 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1767 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1769 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1771 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1773 /* default verification */
1774 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1775 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1776 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1780 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1782 if (ssl->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1783 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1784 if (protverr != 0) {
1785 s->version = s->client_version;
1786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1794 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1795 clienthello->isv2) ||
1796 !ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1797 &scsvs, clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1802 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1803 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1804 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1805 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1806 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1807 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1808 if (s->renegotiate) {
1809 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1811 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1814 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1815 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1816 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1818 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1819 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1820 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1821 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1822 * an insecure downgrade.
1824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1825 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1831 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1832 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1833 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1834 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
1836 if (cipher == NULL) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1840 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1841 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1842 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1844 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1845 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1850 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1853 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1854 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1855 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1856 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1862 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1863 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1865 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1866 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1867 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1868 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1869 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1870 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1871 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1872 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1873 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1874 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1877 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1879 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1880 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1881 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1885 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1887 /* previous session */
1889 } else if (i == -1) {
1890 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1894 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1895 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1901 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1902 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1903 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1904 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1908 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1909 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1911 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1913 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1915 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1916 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1917 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1919 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1920 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1921 if (trc_out != NULL)
1922 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1923 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1931 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1934 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1935 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1936 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1939 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1942 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1943 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1947 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1953 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1954 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1956 /* TLS extensions */
1957 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1958 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1964 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1965 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1966 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1967 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1971 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1972 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1979 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1980 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1981 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1982 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL) {
1983 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1985 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1986 * backwards compat reasons
1988 int master_key_length;
1990 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1991 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1992 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1994 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1995 && master_key_length > 0) {
1996 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1998 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1999 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
2003 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
2004 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
2005 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
2006 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
2007 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
2008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2012 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
2013 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
2014 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
2015 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
2016 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
2021 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
2022 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
2023 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
2025 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
2026 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2028 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
2029 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
2030 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
2032 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
2033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2034 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2039 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
2040 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2041 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
2043 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
2044 /* Can't disable compression */
2045 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
2046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2047 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2050 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2051 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2052 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
2053 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2054 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2058 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2060 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2063 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2064 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2065 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2068 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2070 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2073 } else if (s->hit) {
2075 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods) {
2076 /* See if we have a match */
2077 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2080 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
2081 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2082 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
2084 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2085 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2094 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2100 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2101 * using compression.
2103 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2110 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2113 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2114 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2115 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2116 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2124 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2125 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2127 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2129 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2130 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2135 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2136 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2137 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2138 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2139 s->clienthello = NULL;
2142 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2143 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2144 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2145 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2146 s->clienthello = NULL;
2152 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2153 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2155 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2157 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2159 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2162 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2163 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2164 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2165 * influence which certificate is sent
2167 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx != NULL
2168 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2171 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2172 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2174 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2175 * et al can pick it up.
2177 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2178 ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2179 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2181 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2182 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2183 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2185 /* status request response should be sent */
2186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2187 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2188 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2190 /* something bad happened */
2191 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2203 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2204 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2206 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2208 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2209 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2210 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2212 if (sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2213 int r = sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2214 &selected, &selected_len,
2215 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2216 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2217 sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2219 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2220 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2221 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2222 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2223 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
2224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2227 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2229 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2233 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2234 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2235 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2236 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2237 selected_len) != 0) {
2238 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2239 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2243 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2244 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2247 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2252 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2254 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2259 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2264 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
2266 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2270 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2275 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2276 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2277 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2278 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2284 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2286 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2287 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2289 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2290 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2292 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2299 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2300 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2301 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2302 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2303 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2309 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2312 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2315 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2316 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2318 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
2319 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
2321 if (cipher == NULL) {
2322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2323 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2326 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2329 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2330 /* SSLfatal already called */
2333 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2334 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2335 s->session->not_resumable =
2336 s->not_resumable_session_cb(ssl,
2337 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2338 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2339 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2340 /* do not send a session ticket */
2341 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2344 /* Session-id reuse */
2345 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2349 * we now have the following setup.
2351 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2352 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2353 * compression - basically ignored right now
2354 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2355 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2356 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2357 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2361 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2362 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2364 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2365 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2369 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2370 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2371 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2372 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2374 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2375 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2382 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2384 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2386 * callback indicates further work to be done
2388 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2392 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2398 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2403 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2408 unsigned char *session_id;
2409 int usetls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2410 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2412 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2413 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2415 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2416 * tls_process_client_hello()
2418 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2419 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2420 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2421 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2423 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2427 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2428 * back in the server hello:
2429 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2430 * we send back the old session ID.
2431 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2432 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2433 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2434 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2436 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2437 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2438 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2440 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2441 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2444 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2445 (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2447 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2450 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2451 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2453 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2454 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2457 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2459 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2462 /* set up the compression method */
2463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2466 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2469 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2472 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2473 || !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher,
2475 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2477 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2480 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2481 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2482 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2483 : (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2484 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2485 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2488 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2491 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2492 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2493 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2498 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2499 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2501 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2502 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2503 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2505 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2506 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2507 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2508 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2511 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2514 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2516 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2517 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2519 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2522 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2525 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2528 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2529 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2530 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2532 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2536 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2537 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2538 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2540 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2541 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2543 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2548 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2553 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2555 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2557 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2558 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2560 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2561 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2562 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2563 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2565 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2566 pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2573 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2575 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
2576 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2577 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2586 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2590 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2591 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2595 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2600 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2601 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2609 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2611 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
2613 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
2615 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2616 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
2617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2620 } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2622 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2627 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2628 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2629 if (curve_id == 0) {
2630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2631 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2634 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
2635 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2636 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2637 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2638 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2639 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2643 /* Encode the public key. */
2644 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2646 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2652 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2653 * can set these to NULLs
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2661 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2662 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2663 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2664 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2668 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2669 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2670 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2671 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2679 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2680 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2682 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2688 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2689 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2690 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2693 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2694 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2696 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2697 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2705 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2706 unsigned char *binval;
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2710 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2711 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2714 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2723 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2726 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2727 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2730 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2734 memset(binval, 0, len);
2738 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2739 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2747 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2749 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2750 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2751 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2754 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2755 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2756 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2757 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2761 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2762 encodedPoint = NULL;
2767 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2769 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2770 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2772 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
2773 /* Should never happen */
2774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2777 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2778 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2782 /* send signature algorithm */
2783 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2789 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2790 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2795 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2796 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2797 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2802 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2803 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2810 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2811 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2812 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2813 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2814 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2822 ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2824 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2825 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2826 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2836 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2839 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2840 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2841 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2842 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2843 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2844 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
2845 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2849 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
2850 s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
2851 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
2852 s->pha_context_len)) {
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2856 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2857 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2859 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2862 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2864 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2868 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2869 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2872 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2877 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2878 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2879 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2881 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2884 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2885 const uint16_t *psigs;
2886 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2888 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2889 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2890 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2891 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2893 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2897 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2898 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2899 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2904 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2905 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2908 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2911 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2913 PACKET psk_identity;
2915 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2919 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2923 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2928 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2933 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2934 s->session->psk_identity,
2937 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2942 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2948 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2949 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2950 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2952 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2953 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
2954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2958 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2962 /* Should never happen */
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2968 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2971 PACKET enc_premaster;
2972 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2973 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2975 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2976 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2977 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2979 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2985 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2986 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2987 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2989 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2990 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2996 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2997 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
2998 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3003 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, rsa, sctx->propq);
3005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3010 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3011 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3012 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3013 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
3014 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3015 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3016 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3017 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3018 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3020 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3021 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3026 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3027 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3028 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3029 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3030 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3031 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3032 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3034 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3035 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3036 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3037 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3043 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3044 * we double check anyway.
3046 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3047 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3052 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3053 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, outlen, 0)) {
3054 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3060 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3061 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3065 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3067 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3069 const unsigned char *data;
3070 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3073 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3077 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3083 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3087 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3088 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3092 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3093 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3098 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
3099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3103 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3104 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3109 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3110 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3112 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3116 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3118 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3119 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3122 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3123 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3128 const unsigned char *data;
3131 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3132 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3135 /* Get encoded point length */
3136 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3137 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3146 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3147 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3152 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3158 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3159 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3164 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3165 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3167 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3172 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3176 const unsigned char *data;
3178 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3179 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3183 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3187 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3191 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3192 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3193 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3198 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3199 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3205 /* Should never happen */
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3211 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3214 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3215 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3216 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3217 const unsigned char *start;
3218 size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen;
3219 unsigned long alg_a;
3220 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3221 const unsigned char *ptr;
3223 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3225 /* Get our certificate private key */
3226 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3227 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3229 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3231 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3233 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3236 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3238 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3239 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3242 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3243 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3247 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3252 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3253 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3254 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3255 * client certificate for authorization only.
3257 client_pub_pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
3258 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3259 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3263 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3264 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3265 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3266 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3268 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3269 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3274 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3279 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3284 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3285 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3287 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3292 /* Generate master secret */
3293 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
3294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3297 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3298 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3300 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3304 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3305 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3308 /* Should never happen */
3309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3314 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3317 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3318 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3319 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3320 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3321 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3322 size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen = 0;
3324 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3325 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3327 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3332 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3337 /* Get our certificate private key */
3338 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3339 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3340 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3346 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3347 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3351 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3357 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3358 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3363 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3364 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3368 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3369 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3371 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3375 /* Generate master secret */
3376 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
3377 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3383 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3386 /* Should never happen */
3387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3392 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3395 unsigned long alg_k;
3397 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3399 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3400 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3401 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3405 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3406 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3407 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3411 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3412 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3413 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3416 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3417 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3421 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3422 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3423 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3426 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3427 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3428 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3431 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3432 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3436 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3437 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3438 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3441 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3442 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3443 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3451 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3454 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3455 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3456 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3458 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3461 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3465 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3466 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3467 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3468 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3471 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3474 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3475 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3477 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3478 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3479 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3482 if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3484 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3491 BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3492 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3497 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !received_client_cert(s)) {
3499 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3500 * the handshake_buffer
3502 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3503 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3506 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3508 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3513 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3514 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3516 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3522 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3525 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
3527 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3528 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3529 EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk = NULL;
3531 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
3532 /* SSLfatal already called */
3536 if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
3537 if ((sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
3538 && (sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
3539 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3540 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3544 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, peer_rpk) <= 0) {
3545 SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
3546 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3552 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3553 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3554 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3555 * a new RPK (or certificate) is received via post-handshake authentication,
3556 * as the session may have already gone into the session cache.
3559 if (sc->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3560 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(sc->session, 0)) == NULL) {
3561 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3565 SSL_SESSION_free(sc->session);
3566 sc->session = new_sess;
3569 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
3570 X509_free(sc->session->peer);
3571 sc->session->peer = NULL;
3572 sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3573 sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
3575 EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
3576 sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
3579 sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
3582 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3585 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
3586 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(sc, 1)) {
3587 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3591 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3592 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
3593 sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
3594 &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3595 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
3599 /* resend session tickets */
3600 sc->sent_tickets = 0;
3603 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3606 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_rpk);
3610 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3614 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3617 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3618 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3619 PACKET spkt, context;
3621 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3622 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3625 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3626 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
3628 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
3629 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
3631 if (s->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
3632 return tls_process_client_rpk(s, pkt);
3634 if (s->ext.client_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
3635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
3636 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3640 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3645 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3646 && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3647 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3648 || (s->pha_context != NULL
3649 && !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context,
3650 s->pha_context_len)))) {
3651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3655 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3656 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3661 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3662 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3663 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3668 certstart = certbytes;
3669 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
3671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
3674 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3679 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3684 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3685 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3688 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3692 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3693 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3694 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3695 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3696 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3697 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3698 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3701 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3704 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3711 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3712 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3713 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3715 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3718 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3719 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3720 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3722 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3725 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3726 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3727 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3732 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3734 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3735 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3738 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3741 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3747 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3748 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3749 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3750 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3751 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3754 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3755 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3760 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3761 s->session = new_sess;
3764 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3765 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3766 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3768 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
3769 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3771 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
3772 EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
3773 s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
3776 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3779 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3780 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3785 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3786 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3789 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3790 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3791 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3792 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3793 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3798 /* Resend session tickets */
3799 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3802 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3806 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
3810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3811 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
3813 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3815 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
3817 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
3818 ret = tls_process_client_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
3825 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3827 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3831 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3835 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3836 * for the server Certificate message
3838 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3840 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3842 switch (s->ext.server_cert_type) {
3843 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
3844 if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3845 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3849 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
3850 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
3851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3860 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3864 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt)
3866 int alg = get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc);
3867 OSSL_COMP_CERT *cc = sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[alg];
3869 if (!ossl_assert(cc != NULL)) {
3870 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3874 * Server can't compress on-demand
3875 * Use pre-compressed certificate
3877 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3878 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, cc->orig_len)
3879 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3880 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cc->data, cc->len)
3881 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3884 sc->s3.tmp.cert->cert_comp_used++;
3889 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3890 uint32_t age_add, unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3892 uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(s->session->timeout);
3895 * Ticket lifetime hint:
3896 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3897 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
3898 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
3899 * resumed session (for simplicity).
3901 #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
3903 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3904 if (ossl_time_compare(s->session->timeout,
3905 ossl_seconds2time(ONE_WEEK_SEC)) > 0)
3906 timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
3910 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
3911 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3915 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3916 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3917 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3923 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3924 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3932 static CON_FUNC_RETURN construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3935 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3937 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3938 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3939 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3940 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3941 const unsigned char *const_p;
3942 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3945 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3946 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3947 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3949 CON_FUNC_RETURN ok = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3950 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3951 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3952 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3954 /* get session encoding length */
3955 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3957 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3960 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3964 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3970 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3975 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3982 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3988 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3991 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &const_p, slen_full, sctx->libctx,
3994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3998 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3999 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
4000 /* shouldn't ever happen */
4001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4002 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4006 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
4007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4008 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4011 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4014 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
4015 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
4017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4018 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4020 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4025 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4026 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
4027 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
4029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4030 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4031 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
4032 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
4033 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
4038 * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
4039 * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
4042 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4043 ok = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
4046 /* Put timeout and length */
4047 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
4048 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
4049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4053 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4054 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4055 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
4061 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
4063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4067 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
4070 if (cipher == NULL) {
4071 /* Error is already recorded */
4072 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4076 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
4078 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
4079 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
4080 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
4081 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
4082 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
4084 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4088 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4089 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
4090 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
4093 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4094 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4098 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
4099 /* Output key name */
4100 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
4102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
4103 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
4105 /* Encrypt session data */
4106 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
4107 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
4108 || encdata1 != encdata2
4109 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
4110 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
4111 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
4112 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
4113 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
4114 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
4115 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
4116 macendoffset - macoffset)
4117 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
4118 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
4119 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
4120 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
4121 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
4122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4126 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4127 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4132 ok = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4135 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4136 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4140 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
4142 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4144 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4145 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4149 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4150 s->session->session_id_length)
4151 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4159 static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
4162 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4163 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4164 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4165 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4168 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4169 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
4170 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
4173 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4175 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4176 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4178 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4181 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4183 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4185 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4188 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4189 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4190 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
4192 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4193 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4197 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4200 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4201 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4202 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4204 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4205 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4207 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4208 /* SSLfatal already called */
4212 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4213 s->session = new_sess;
4216 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4217 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4220 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
4221 age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
4222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4225 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4227 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4228 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4229 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4233 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4235 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4238 s->session->master_key,
4240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4243 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4245 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
4246 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
4247 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4248 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4249 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4250 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4251 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4252 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
4253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
4256 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4258 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4261 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4262 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
4263 tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
4264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4268 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4269 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4270 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4272 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
4273 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4274 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4275 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4276 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4277 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4281 CON_FUNC_RETURN tmpret;
4283 tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4285 if (tmpret != CON_FUNC_SUCCESS) {
4286 if (tmpret == CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND) {
4287 /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
4288 ret = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
4289 /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
4290 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4292 /* else SSLfatal() already called */
4297 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4298 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4299 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4304 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4305 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4308 ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4314 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4315 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4317 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4319 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4320 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4321 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4329 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4331 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4333 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4336 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4341 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4342 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4344 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4346 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4347 size_t next_proto_len;
4350 * The payload looks like:
4352 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4353 * uint8 padding_len;
4354 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4356 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4357 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4358 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4360 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4363 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4366 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4369 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4371 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4375 static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
4378 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4381 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4384 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4387 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4389 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4391 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4394 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4395 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4397 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4401 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4402 * a record boundary.
4404 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4406 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4409 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4410 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4411 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4413 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4416 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;