2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
30 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
34 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
37 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
39 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
40 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
41 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
42 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
44 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
46 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
49 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
50 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
51 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
52 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
54 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
55 * (transition not allowed)
57 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
59 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
62 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
63 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
64 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
66 switch (st->hand_state) {
70 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
71 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
72 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
73 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
77 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
78 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
79 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
86 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
87 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
88 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
94 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
95 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
102 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
103 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
104 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
115 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
116 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
117 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
124 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
125 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
127 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
131 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
143 /* No valid transition found */
148 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
149 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
150 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
151 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
153 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
154 * (transition not allowed)
156 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
158 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
160 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
161 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
166 switch (st->hand_state) {
172 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
179 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
181 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
182 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
184 * 2) If we did request one then
185 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
187 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
188 * list if we requested a certificate)
190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
191 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
192 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
193 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
194 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
196 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
197 * not going to accept it because we require a client
200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
201 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
202 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
212 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
213 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
214 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
227 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
229 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
230 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
231 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
232 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
233 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
236 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
239 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
240 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
241 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
242 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
255 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
256 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
262 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
271 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
281 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
282 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
283 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
289 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
290 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
291 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
298 /* No valid transition found */
299 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
303 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
304 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
307 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
308 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
309 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
310 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
313 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
314 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
315 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
320 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
322 * Valid return values are:
326 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
328 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
331 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
332 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
333 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
334 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
335 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
338 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
340 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
344 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
345 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
346 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
347 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
348 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
351 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
352 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
362 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
364 * Valid return values are:
368 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
371 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
372 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
374 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
375 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
377 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
378 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
380 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
383 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
384 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
386 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
387 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
390 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
392 * ... except when the application insists on
393 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
396 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
397 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
398 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
400 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
403 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
411 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
412 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
415 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
417 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
420 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
421 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
424 switch (st->hand_state) {
426 /* Shouldn't happen */
427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
428 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
430 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
433 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 /* Try to read from the client instead */
442 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
444 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
449 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
450 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
452 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
459 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
468 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
476 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
477 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
501 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
502 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
505 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
506 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
507 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
509 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
510 * handshake at this point.
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
522 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
527 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
528 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
529 * been configured for.
531 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
532 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
541 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
543 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
545 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
548 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
549 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
553 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
555 switch (st->hand_state) {
557 /* Shouldn't happen */
558 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
559 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
560 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
561 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
564 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
565 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
567 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
571 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
572 /* SSLfatal() already called */
573 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
578 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
579 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
581 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
586 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
587 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
588 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
589 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
590 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
598 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
599 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
601 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
603 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
608 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
609 /* normal PSK or SRP */
610 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
611 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
613 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
615 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
618 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
624 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
630 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
631 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
638 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
644 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
645 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
646 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
648 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
649 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
651 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
653 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
654 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
655 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
658 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
666 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
667 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
668 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
670 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
672 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
674 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
675 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
680 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
681 * the server to the client.
683 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
685 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
687 switch (st->hand_state) {
689 /* No pre work to be done */
692 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
695 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
698 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
700 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
701 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
702 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
707 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
710 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
711 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
717 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
719 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
720 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
721 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
724 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
726 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
727 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
729 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
730 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
731 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
733 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
735 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
736 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
738 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
739 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
745 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
748 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
749 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
753 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
755 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
756 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
757 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
758 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
762 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
764 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
765 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
766 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
767 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
771 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
772 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
775 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
778 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
780 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
785 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
789 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
799 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
800 * server to the client.
802 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
804 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
808 switch (st->hand_state) {
810 /* No post work to be done */
813 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
814 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
816 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
822 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
823 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
825 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
826 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
831 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
832 * treat like it was the first packet
837 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
839 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
840 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
845 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
846 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
847 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
851 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
854 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
855 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
857 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
858 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
859 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
862 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
863 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
867 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
868 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
872 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
873 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
877 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
878 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
882 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
883 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
884 if (!statem_flush(s))
889 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
890 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
891 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
892 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
893 /* SSLfatal() already called */
897 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
898 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
899 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
900 /* SSLfatal() already called */
904 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
905 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
906 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
908 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
913 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
915 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
918 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
922 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
923 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
925 /* SSLfatal() already called */
930 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
933 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
934 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
938 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
939 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
942 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
944 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
947 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
951 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
952 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
953 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
954 &s->session->master_key_length)
955 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
956 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
957 /* SSLfatal() already called */
962 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
963 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
964 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
969 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
970 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
972 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
973 /* SSLfatal() already called */
978 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
980 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
981 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
982 && conn_is_closed()) {
984 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
985 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
986 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
987 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
988 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
990 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
999 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1003 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1006 * Valid return values are:
1010 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1011 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1013 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1015 switch (st->hand_state) {
1017 /* Shouldn't happen */
1018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1019 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1020 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1023 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1025 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1027 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1028 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1031 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1032 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1033 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1036 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1037 /* No construction function needed */
1039 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1042 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1043 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1044 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1048 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1049 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1053 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1054 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1058 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1059 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1060 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1063 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1064 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1065 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1068 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1069 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1070 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1073 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1074 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1075 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1078 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1079 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1080 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1083 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1084 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1085 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1088 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1090 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1093 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1094 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1095 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1098 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1099 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1100 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1108 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1109 * calculated as follows:
1111 * 2 + # client_version
1112 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1113 * 1 + # length of session_id
1114 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1115 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1116 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1117 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1118 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1119 * 2 + # length of extensions
1120 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1122 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1124 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1125 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1128 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1129 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1131 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1133 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1135 switch (st->hand_state) {
1137 /* Shouldn't happen */
1140 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1141 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1143 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1144 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1146 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1147 return s->max_cert_list;
1149 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1150 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1152 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1153 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1156 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1157 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1160 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1161 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1163 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1164 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1166 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1167 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1172 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1174 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1176 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1178 switch (st->hand_state) {
1180 /* Shouldn't happen */
1181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1182 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1186 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1187 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1189 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1190 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1192 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1193 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1195 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1196 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1198 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1199 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1202 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1203 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1206 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1207 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1209 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1210 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1212 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1213 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1219 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1222 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1224 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1226 switch (st->hand_state) {
1228 /* Shouldn't happen */
1229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1230 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1235 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1237 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1238 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1243 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1244 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1247 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1249 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1250 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1251 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1253 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1257 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1258 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1261 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1264 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1266 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1267 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1268 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1277 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1280 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1282 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1288 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1290 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1291 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1292 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1293 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1294 cookie_leni > 255) {
1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1296 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1299 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1301 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1302 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1304 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1313 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1314 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1315 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1319 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1321 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1322 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1323 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1324 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1326 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1328 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1329 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1330 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1331 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1332 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1333 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1334 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1336 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1337 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1338 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1339 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1340 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1341 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1342 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1343 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1344 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1345 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1346 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1347 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1348 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1350 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1351 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1356 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1358 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1359 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1360 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1364 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1367 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1368 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1370 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1373 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1375 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1377 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1378 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1379 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1380 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1382 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1383 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1384 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1386 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1390 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1392 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1393 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1394 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1400 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1401 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1408 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1410 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1411 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1413 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1416 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1417 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1419 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1424 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1425 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1426 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1427 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1429 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1430 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1432 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1433 * 7-8 session_id_length
1434 * 9-10 challenge_length
1438 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1439 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1441 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1442 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1443 * in the first place
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1446 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1453 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1457 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1458 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1460 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1461 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1462 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1464 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1467 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1468 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1469 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1471 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1475 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1477 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1481 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1483 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1484 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1485 /* No extensions. */
1486 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1488 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1491 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1493 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1494 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1495 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1496 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1498 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1499 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1500 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1501 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1502 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1503 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1504 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1505 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1507 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1513 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1514 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1515 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1516 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1517 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1518 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1520 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1524 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1525 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1527 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1530 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1531 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1532 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1539 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1540 * So check cookie length...
1542 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1543 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1544 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1545 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1550 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1551 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1552 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1556 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1558 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1562 /* Could be empty. */
1563 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1564 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1566 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1567 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1569 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1575 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1576 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1577 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1584 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1585 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1586 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1587 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1588 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1591 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1593 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1596 if (clienthello != NULL)
1597 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1598 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1600 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1603 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1606 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1611 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1613 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1614 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1615 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1616 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1617 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1619 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1620 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1621 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1622 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1623 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1624 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1626 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1627 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1629 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1632 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1633 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1638 /* Set up the client_random */
1639 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1641 /* Choose the version */
1643 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1644 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1645 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1646 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1648 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1652 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1653 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1657 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1660 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1661 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1663 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1664 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1665 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1666 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1667 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1673 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1674 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1675 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1678 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1682 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1683 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1685 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1686 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1690 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1691 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1692 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1693 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1694 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1695 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1697 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1698 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1700 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1702 /* default verification */
1703 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1704 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1705 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1707 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1708 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1711 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1713 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1714 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1715 if (protverr != 0) {
1716 s->version = s->client_version;
1717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1718 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1726 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1727 clienthello->isv2) ||
1728 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1729 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1734 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1735 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1736 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1737 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1738 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1739 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1740 if (s->renegotiate) {
1741 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1743 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1744 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1747 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1748 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1749 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1751 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1752 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1753 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1754 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1755 * an insecure downgrade.
1757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1758 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1759 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1765 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1766 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1767 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1768 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1770 if (cipher == NULL) {
1771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1772 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1773 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1776 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1777 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1778 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1780 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1781 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1784 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1788 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1791 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1792 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1793 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1794 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1800 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1801 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1803 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1804 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1805 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1806 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1807 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1808 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1809 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1810 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1811 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1812 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1815 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1817 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1818 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1823 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1825 /* previous session */
1827 } else if (i == -1) {
1828 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1832 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1839 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1840 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1841 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1842 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1846 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1847 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1849 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1851 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1853 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1854 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1855 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1857 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1858 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1859 if (trc_out != NULL)
1860 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1861 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1869 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1872 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1873 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1874 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1875 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1878 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1881 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1882 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1886 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1889 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1890 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1895 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1896 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1897 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1899 /* TLS extensions */
1900 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1901 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1902 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1907 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1908 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1909 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1910 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1914 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1915 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1917 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1918 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1924 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1927 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1928 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1930 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1931 * backwards compat reasons
1933 int master_key_length;
1935 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1936 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1937 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1939 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1940 && master_key_length > 0) {
1941 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1943 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1944 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1948 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1949 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1950 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1951 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1952 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1954 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1955 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1959 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1960 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1961 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1962 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1963 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1968 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1969 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1970 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1972 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1973 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1975 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1976 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1977 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1979 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1981 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1982 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1987 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1988 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1989 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1991 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1992 /* Can't disable compression */
1993 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1995 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1996 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1999 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2000 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2001 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2002 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2003 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2007 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2009 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2010 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2013 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2014 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2015 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2018 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2020 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2021 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2024 } else if (s->hit) {
2026 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2027 /* See if we have a match */
2028 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2031 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2032 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2033 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2035 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2036 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2045 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2051 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2052 * using compression.
2054 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2056 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2057 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2063 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2066 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2067 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2068 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2069 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2071 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2072 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2079 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2080 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2082 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2084 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2085 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2090 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2091 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2092 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2093 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2094 s->clienthello = NULL;
2097 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2098 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2099 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2100 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2101 s->clienthello = NULL;
2107 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2108 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2110 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2112 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2115 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2116 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2117 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2118 * influence which certificate is sent
2120 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2121 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2124 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2125 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2127 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2128 * et al can pick it up.
2130 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2131 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2133 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2134 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2135 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2137 /* status request response should be sent */
2138 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2139 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2140 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2142 /* something bad happened */
2143 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2146 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2147 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2157 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2158 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2160 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2162 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2163 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2165 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2166 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2167 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2168 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2169 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2171 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2172 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2173 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2174 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2175 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2176 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2179 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2181 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2185 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2186 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2187 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2188 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2189 selected_len) != 0) {
2190 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2191 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2195 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2196 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2199 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2201 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2205 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2207 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2209 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2213 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2218 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2220 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2224 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2229 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2230 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2231 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2232 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2238 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2240 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2242 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2243 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2245 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2252 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2253 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2254 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2255 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2256 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2259 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2260 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2264 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2267 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2270 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2271 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2273 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2275 if (cipher == NULL) {
2276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2277 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2278 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2281 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2284 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2285 /* SSLfatal already called */
2288 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2289 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2290 s->session->not_resumable =
2291 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2292 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2293 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2294 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2295 /* do not send a session ticket */
2296 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2299 /* Session-id reuse */
2300 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2304 * we now have the following setup.
2306 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2307 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2308 * compression - basically ignored right now
2309 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2310 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2311 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2312 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2316 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2317 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2319 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2320 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2324 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2325 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2326 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2327 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2329 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2330 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2337 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2339 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2341 * callback indicates further work to be done
2343 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2353 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2358 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2363 unsigned char *session_id;
2364 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2366 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2367 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2369 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2370 * tls_process_client_hello()
2372 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2373 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2374 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2375 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2377 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2382 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2383 * back in the server hello:
2384 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2385 * we send back the old session ID.
2386 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2387 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2388 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2389 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2391 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2392 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2393 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2395 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2396 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2399 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2400 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2402 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2405 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2406 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2408 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2409 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2412 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2414 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 /* set up the compression method */
2419 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2422 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2425 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2428 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2429 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2430 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2432 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2436 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2437 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2438 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2440 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2441 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2443 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2447 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2448 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2449 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2454 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2455 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2457 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2461 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2462 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2463 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2470 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2472 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2473 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2474 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2481 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2484 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2487 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2488 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2491 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2495 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2496 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2497 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2499 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2501 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2505 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2507 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2511 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2513 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2515 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2516 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2518 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2520 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2521 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2523 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2526 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2527 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2528 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2529 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2532 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2536 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2539 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2541 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2542 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2543 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2552 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2554 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2555 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2558 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2559 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2561 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2565 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2567 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2572 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2573 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2574 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2578 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2581 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2582 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2586 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2589 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2590 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2594 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2596 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2598 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2599 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2603 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2604 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2605 if (curve_id == 0) {
2606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2607 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2608 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2611 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2612 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2613 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2618 /* Encode the public key. */
2619 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2621 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2623 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2628 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2629 * can set these to NULLs
2636 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2638 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2639 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2640 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2641 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2643 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2644 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2647 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2648 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2649 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2650 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2655 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2656 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2660 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2661 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2663 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2665 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2670 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2671 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2672 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2675 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2676 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2678 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2679 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2682 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2689 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2690 unsigned char *binval;
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2694 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2695 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2698 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2702 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2703 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2709 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2710 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2713 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2714 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2717 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2719 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2723 memset(binval, 0, len);
2727 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2728 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2730 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2731 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2735 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2739 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2741 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2742 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2743 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2746 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2747 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2748 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2749 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2751 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2755 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2756 encodedPoint = NULL;
2762 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2764 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2765 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2767 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2768 /* Should never happen */
2769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2770 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2771 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2774 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2775 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2777 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2778 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2781 /* send signature algorithm */
2782 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2784 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2789 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2791 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2795 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2796 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2797 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2799 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2804 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2805 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2808 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2812 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2813 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2814 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2815 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2816 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2819 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2826 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2830 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2833 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2835 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2839 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2841 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2842 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2843 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2844 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2845 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2846 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2847 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
2848 s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2849 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2851 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2856 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2861 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2863 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2864 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2869 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2870 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2878 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2879 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2880 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2882 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2887 const uint16_t *psigs;
2888 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2890 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2891 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2892 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2893 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2895 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2902 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2908 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2912 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2915 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2917 PACKET psk_identity;
2919 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2921 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2924 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2926 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2929 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2931 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2935 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2941 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2944 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2946 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2948 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2950 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2953 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2954 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2958 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2959 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2960 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2962 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2964 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2968 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2972 /* Should never happen */
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2979 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2983 PACKET enc_premaster;
2984 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2985 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2987 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2988 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2990 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2993 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2997 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2998 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2999 enc_premaster = *pkt;
3001 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
3002 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3004 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3009 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3010 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
3011 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3013 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3017 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(rsa, NULL);
3019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3020 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3025 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3026 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3027 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3028 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
3029 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3030 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3031 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3032 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3033 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3035 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3036 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3038 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3042 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3043 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3044 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3045 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3046 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3047 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3048 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3050 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3051 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3052 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3053 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3055 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3060 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3061 * we double check anyway.
3063 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3064 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3066 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3070 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3071 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
3072 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
3073 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3079 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3080 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3083 /* Should never happen */
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3090 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3093 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3097 const unsigned char *data;
3098 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3101 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3103 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3106 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3109 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3113 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3115 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3118 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3119 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3121 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3124 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3125 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3131 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3132 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3133 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3135 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3140 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3141 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3146 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3147 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3149 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3152 /* Should never happen */
3153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3162 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3163 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3166 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3167 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3169 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3173 const unsigned char *data;
3176 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3177 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3180 /* Get encoded point length */
3181 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3182 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3184 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3189 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3193 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3194 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3199 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3206 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3207 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3212 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3213 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3215 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3219 /* Should never happen */
3220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3230 const unsigned char *data;
3232 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3233 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3235 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3238 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3243 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3245 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3248 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3249 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3250 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3252 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3256 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3263 /* Should never happen */
3264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3273 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3274 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3275 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3276 const unsigned char *start;
3277 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3278 unsigned long alg_a;
3279 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3280 const unsigned char *ptr;
3283 /* Get our certificate private key */
3284 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3285 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3287 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3289 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3291 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3294 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3296 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3297 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3300 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3301 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3303 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3306 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3308 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3312 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3313 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3314 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3315 * client certificate for authorization only.
3317 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3318 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3319 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3323 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3324 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3325 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3326 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3328 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3329 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3331 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3335 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3337 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3341 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3343 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3347 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3348 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3350 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3353 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3356 /* Generate master secret */
3357 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3358 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3359 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3362 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3363 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3365 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3369 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3370 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3373 /* Should never happen */
3374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3375 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3380 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3382 unsigned long alg_k;
3384 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3386 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3387 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3388 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3392 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3393 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3394 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3396 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3397 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3400 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3401 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3405 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3406 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3410 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3411 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3412 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3415 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3416 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3417 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3420 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3421 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3422 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3425 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3426 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3427 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3432 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3433 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3437 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3440 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3441 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3443 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3446 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3449 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3450 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3451 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3452 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3455 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3458 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3459 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3461 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3462 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3463 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3466 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3467 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3471 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3472 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3476 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3477 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3482 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3484 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3485 * the handshake_buffer
3487 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3488 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3491 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3493 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3495 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3500 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3501 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3503 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3504 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3509 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3512 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3515 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3518 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3519 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3520 PACKET spkt, context;
3522 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3525 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3526 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3529 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3531 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3533 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3537 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3538 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3539 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3540 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3542 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3546 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3547 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3549 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3553 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3554 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3555 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3557 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3558 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3562 certstart = certbytes;
3563 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3566 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3569 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3571 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3572 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3577 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3580 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3582 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3586 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3587 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3588 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3589 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3590 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3591 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3592 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3595 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3598 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3600 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3601 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3607 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3608 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3609 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3611 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3612 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3615 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3616 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3617 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3619 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3620 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3623 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3624 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3625 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3630 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3632 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3633 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3634 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3639 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3642 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3645 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3646 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3652 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3653 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3654 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3655 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3656 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3659 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3660 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3662 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3663 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3667 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3668 s->session = new_sess;
3671 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3672 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3673 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3675 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3676 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3679 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3682 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3688 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3689 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3693 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3694 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3695 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3696 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3697 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3702 /* Resend session tickets */
3703 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3706 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3710 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3714 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3716 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3720 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3725 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3726 * for the server Certificate message
3728 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3730 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3733 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3741 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3742 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3745 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3746 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3747 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3750 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3751 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3752 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3758 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3759 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3760 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3767 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3768 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3777 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3778 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3780 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3781 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3782 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3783 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3784 const unsigned char *const_p;
3785 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3788 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3789 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3790 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3792 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3794 /* get session encoding length */
3795 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3797 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3800 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3805 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3808 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3812 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3813 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3814 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3816 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3821 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3828 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3831 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3838 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3839 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3840 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3842 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3843 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3847 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3850 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3853 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3856 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3857 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3859 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3860 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3861 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3866 /* Put timeout and length */
3867 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3868 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3870 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3875 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3876 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3881 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3884 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3886 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3888 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3889 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3890 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3891 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3892 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3893 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3894 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3899 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3900 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3903 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3908 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3909 /* Output key name */
3910 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3912 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3913 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3915 /* Encrypt session data */
3916 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3917 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3918 || encdata1 != encdata2
3919 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3920 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3921 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3922 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3923 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3924 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3925 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3926 macendoffset - macoffset)
3927 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3928 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3929 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3930 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3931 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3933 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3937 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3938 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3947 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3948 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3952 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3953 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3955 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3956 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3960 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3961 s->session->session_id_length)
3962 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
3964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3971 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3973 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3974 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3976 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3980 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3982 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3985 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
3986 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
3987 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
3989 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
3990 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
3991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3992 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3993 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3996 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
3999 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4000 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4001 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4003 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4004 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4006 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4007 /* SSLfatal already called */
4011 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4012 s->session = new_sess;
4015 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4016 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4019 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
4020 sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4022 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4023 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4026 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4028 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4029 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4030 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4034 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4036 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4039 s->session->master_key,
4041 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4044 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4046 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4047 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4048 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4049 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4050 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4051 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4053 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4054 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4057 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4059 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4062 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4063 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4067 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4068 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4069 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4072 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4073 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4074 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4075 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4076 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4079 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4081 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4085 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4086 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4087 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4089 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4093 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4094 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4095 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4098 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4099 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4108 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4109 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4111 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4113 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4114 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4115 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4124 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4126 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4127 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4136 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4137 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4139 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4141 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4142 size_t next_proto_len;
4145 * The payload looks like:
4147 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4148 * uint8 padding_len;
4149 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4152 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4153 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4155 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4156 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4159 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4163 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4166 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4168 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4172 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4174 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4176 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4183 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4185 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4187 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4188 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4191 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4192 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4195 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4199 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4200 * a record boundary.
4202 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4204 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4205 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4206 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4209 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4210 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4211 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4212 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4213 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4216 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;