2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
618 * Valid return values are:
622 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
624 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
625 int (*confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) = NULL;
628 if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) {
629 /* Special case becase it is a different content type */
631 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
633 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
634 } else if (st->hand_state == DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
635 /* Special case because we don't call ssl_close_construct_packet() */
636 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s, pkt);
638 switch (st->hand_state) {
640 /* Shouldn't happen */
643 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
644 /* No construction function needed */
645 mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
648 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
649 confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
650 mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
654 confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
655 mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
658 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
659 confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
660 mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
663 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
664 confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
665 mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
668 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
669 confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
670 mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
673 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
674 confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
675 mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
678 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
679 confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
680 mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
683 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
684 mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
688 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, pkt, mt)) {
689 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
690 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
694 if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED)
695 ret = tls_construct_finished(s, pkt,
697 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
699 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
700 else if (confunc != NULL)
701 ret = confunc(s, pkt);
703 if (!ret || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, pkt)) {
704 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
713 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
714 * calculated as follows:
716 * 2 + # client_version
717 * 32 + # only valid length for random
718 * 1 + # length of session_id
719 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
720 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
721 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
722 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
723 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
724 * 2 + # length of extensions
725 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
727 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
729 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
730 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
733 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
734 * reading. Excludes the message header.
736 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
738 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
740 switch (st->hand_state) {
742 /* Shouldn't happen */
745 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
746 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
749 return s->max_cert_list;
751 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
752 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
754 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
755 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
758 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
759 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
762 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
763 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
765 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
766 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
771 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
773 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
775 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
777 switch (st->hand_state) {
779 /* Shouldn't happen */
780 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
782 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
783 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
786 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
788 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
789 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
791 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
792 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
795 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
796 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
799 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
800 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
802 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
803 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
808 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
811 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
813 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
815 switch (st->hand_state) {
817 /* Shouldn't happen */
820 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
821 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
823 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
824 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
826 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
828 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
829 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
830 /* Are we renegotiating? */
831 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
832 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
833 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
834 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
835 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
836 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
839 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
842 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
848 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
850 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
852 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
854 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
855 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
856 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
858 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
862 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
864 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
871 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
872 unsigned char cookie_len)
874 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
875 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
876 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
882 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
886 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
887 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
888 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
889 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
891 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
895 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, pkt,
896 DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
897 || !dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
900 * We don't call close_construct_packet() because we don't want
901 * to buffer this message
903 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
904 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
905 || !WPACKET_finish(pkt)) {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
910 /* number of bytes to write */
911 s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
912 s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
913 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
919 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
921 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
922 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
926 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
928 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
930 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
931 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
933 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
935 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
937 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
938 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
940 unsigned int version;
943 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
944 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
945 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
946 * the rest right through. Its format is:
948 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
949 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
951 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
952 * 7-8 session_id_length
953 * 9-10 challenge_length
957 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
958 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
960 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
961 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
968 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
969 /* No protocol version supplied! */
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
973 if (version == 0x0002) {
974 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
977 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
979 s->client_version = version;
981 /* No idea what protocol this is */
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
987 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
988 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
990 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
991 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
998 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
999 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1001 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1002 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1003 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1004 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
1005 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1012 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1014 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1017 s->version = s->client_version;
1019 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1023 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1026 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1027 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1028 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1030 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1033 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1034 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1035 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1037 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1042 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1043 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1048 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1049 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1050 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1051 /* No extensions. */
1052 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1054 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1060 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1062 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1063 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1064 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1065 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1066 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1067 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1069 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1073 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1075 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1076 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1077 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1078 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1083 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1089 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1090 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1091 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1096 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1097 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1098 * So check cookie length...
1100 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1101 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1106 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1107 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1108 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1112 /* Could be empty. */
1116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1117 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1118 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1119 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1120 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1121 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
1123 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1125 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1127 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1129 /* default verification */
1130 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1131 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1135 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1137 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1138 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1139 if (protverr != 0) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1141 s->version = s->client_version;
1142 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1151 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1152 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1154 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1155 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1156 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1157 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1158 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1159 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1160 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1161 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1162 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1163 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1168 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1169 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1172 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1174 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1176 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1177 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1178 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1179 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1180 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1182 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1183 /* previous session */
1185 } else if (i == -1) {
1189 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1194 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1195 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1199 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1202 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1205 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1207 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1208 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1210 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1211 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1220 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1223 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1225 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1230 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1231 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1232 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1243 /* TLS extensions */
1244 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1245 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1252 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1253 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1254 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1255 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1259 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1260 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1265 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1266 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1268 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1269 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1270 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1272 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1274 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1275 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1279 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1281 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1286 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1287 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1292 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1293 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1294 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1295 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1296 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1301 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1302 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1303 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1305 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1307 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1308 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1309 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1311 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1312 /* Can't disable compression */
1313 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1315 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1318 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1319 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1320 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1321 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1322 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1326 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1328 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1331 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1332 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1333 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1337 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1339 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1344 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1345 /* See if we have a match */
1346 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1349 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1350 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1351 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1353 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1354 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1363 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1369 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1370 * using compression.
1372 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1379 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1383 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1384 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1386 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1388 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1389 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1390 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1391 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1402 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1403 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1407 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1409 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1410 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1414 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1416 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1417 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1419 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1421 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1422 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1423 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1425 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1427 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1431 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1434 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1437 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1439 if (cipher == NULL) {
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1441 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1444 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1445 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1446 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1447 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1448 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1449 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1450 /* do not send a session ticket */
1451 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1453 /* Session-id reuse */
1454 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1457 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1458 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1465 * we now have the following setup.
1467 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1468 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1469 * compression - basically ignored right now
1470 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1471 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1472 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1473 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1476 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1477 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1478 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1480 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1488 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1490 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1492 * callback indicates further work to be done
1494 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1497 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1499 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1500 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1502 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1504 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1511 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1513 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1514 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1518 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1520 int sl, compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1523 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1525 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1526 * tls_process_client_hello()
1528 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1534 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1535 * back in the server hello:
1536 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1537 * we send back the old session ID.
1538 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1539 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1540 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1541 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1543 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1544 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1545 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1546 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1549 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1550 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1552 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1554 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1555 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1560 /* set up the compression method */
1561 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1564 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1567 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1570 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1571 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1572 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
1573 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1574 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1587 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1588 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1589 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1599 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1602 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1607 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1608 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1611 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1612 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1614 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1624 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1626 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1628 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1629 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1631 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1633 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1634 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1636 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1639 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1640 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1641 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1642 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1645 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1651 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1653 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1654 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1655 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1658 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1664 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1666 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1669 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1670 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1671 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1673 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1676 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1684 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1689 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1691 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1694 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1695 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1699 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1702 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1708 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1709 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1710 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1711 if (curve_id == 0) {
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1713 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1716 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1717 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1718 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1723 /* Encode the public key. */
1724 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1726 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1732 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1733 * can set these to NULLs
1740 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1742 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1743 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1744 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1745 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1747 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1750 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1751 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1752 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1753 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1757 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1759 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1763 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1764 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1765 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1767 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1775 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1776 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1777 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1780 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1781 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1783 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1784 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1793 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1794 unsigned char *binval;
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1798 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1799 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
1802 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1812 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1813 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1816 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1817 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
1820 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1822 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1825 memset(binval, 0, len);
1829 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
1830 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1832 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1836 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1840 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1842 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1843 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1844 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1847 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
1848 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1849 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
1850 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1855 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1856 encodedPoint = NULL;
1863 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1864 * points to the space at the end.
1867 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
1868 unsigned int siglen;
1870 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1871 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1873 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1876 /* send signature algorithm */
1877 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1878 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
1879 /* Should never happen */
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1881 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1886 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1889 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1890 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1891 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1894 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
1896 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1897 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1898 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1899 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1900 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1901 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
1903 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
1904 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
1905 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1907 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1911 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1912 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1914 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1919 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1922 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1925 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1928 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1930 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1934 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1937 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1939 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1940 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1941 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
1942 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1947 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1948 const unsigned char *psigs;
1949 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1950 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1951 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
1952 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1959 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1960 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1965 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1967 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1968 unsigned char *namebytes;
1969 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1973 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
1974 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
1976 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 /* else no CA names */
1985 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1990 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
1994 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1998 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2001 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2003 PACKET psk_identity;
2005 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2010 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2011 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2015 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2016 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2021 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2022 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2027 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2030 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2031 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2034 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2036 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2038 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2040 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2044 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2045 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2046 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2048 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2049 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2054 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2058 /* Should never happen */
2059 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2065 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2068 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2070 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2071 size_t j, padding_len;
2072 PACKET enc_premaster;
2074 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2077 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2079 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2084 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2085 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2086 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2088 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2089 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2097 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2098 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2099 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2100 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2102 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2103 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2108 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2109 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2110 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2116 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2117 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2118 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2119 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2120 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2123 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2127 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2128 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2130 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2131 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2132 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2133 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2136 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2139 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2140 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2141 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2143 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2144 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2149 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2150 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2151 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2152 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2153 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2155 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2158 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2159 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2160 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2161 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2162 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2163 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2166 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2167 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2169 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2170 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2173 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2174 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2175 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2176 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2177 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2178 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2181 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2182 unsigned char workaround_good;
2183 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2184 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2186 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2187 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2188 version_good |= workaround_good;
2192 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2193 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2195 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2198 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2199 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2200 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2201 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2203 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2204 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2205 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2206 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2207 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2210 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2211 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2212 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2219 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2222 /* Should never happen */
2223 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2229 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2232 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2236 const unsigned char *data;
2237 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2240 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2241 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2243 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2246 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2248 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2253 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2254 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2258 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2259 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2260 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2264 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2265 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2269 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2270 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2272 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2274 if (pub_key != NULL)
2279 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2280 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2286 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2287 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2289 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2292 /* Should never happen */
2293 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2299 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2302 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2303 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2306 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2307 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2308 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2313 const unsigned char *data;
2316 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2317 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2320 /* Get encoded point length */
2321 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2322 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2327 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2328 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2332 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2333 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2339 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2340 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2347 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2349 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2353 /* Should never happen */
2354 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2360 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2364 const unsigned char *data;
2366 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2367 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2372 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2376 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2377 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2381 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2382 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2383 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2388 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2395 /* Should never happen */
2396 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2402 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2405 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2406 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2407 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2408 const unsigned char *start;
2409 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2410 unsigned long alg_a;
2414 const unsigned char *data;
2417 /* Get our certificate private key */
2418 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2419 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2421 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2423 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2425 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2428 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2430 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2431 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2434 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2435 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2436 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2440 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2441 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2446 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2447 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2448 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2449 * client certificate for authorization only.
2451 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2452 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2453 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2456 /* Decrypt session key */
2457 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2458 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2459 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2463 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2464 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2465 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2466 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2472 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2473 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2474 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2478 /* Generate master secret */
2479 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2480 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2481 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2485 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2486 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2487 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2488 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2492 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2495 /* Should never happen */
2496 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2502 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2505 unsigned long alg_k;
2507 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2509 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2510 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2513 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2514 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2515 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2516 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2518 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2521 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2522 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2523 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2527 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2528 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2530 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2531 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2533 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2534 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2536 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2537 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2539 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2540 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2543 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2552 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2554 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2555 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2557 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2558 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2561 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2564 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2565 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2566 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2567 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2569 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2572 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2573 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2575 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2576 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2577 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2579 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2583 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2584 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2589 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2591 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2592 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2594 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2595 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2596 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2597 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2598 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2599 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2600 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2601 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2604 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2608 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2610 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2611 * the handshake_buffer
2613 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2614 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2617 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2619 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2622 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2626 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2627 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2629 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2630 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2635 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2638 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2640 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2641 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2643 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2645 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2649 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2653 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2657 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 peer = s->session->peer;
2662 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2663 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2665 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2667 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2668 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2672 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2674 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2675 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2678 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2679 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2684 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2687 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2688 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2691 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2693 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2695 } else if (rv == 0) {
2696 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2700 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2703 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2704 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2706 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2708 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2713 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2715 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2719 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2720 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2721 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2723 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2728 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2732 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2733 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2735 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2739 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2741 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2742 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2744 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2749 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2750 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2751 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2752 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2753 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2755 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2758 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2764 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2765 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2766 s->session->master_key_length,
2767 s->session->master_key)) {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2769 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2773 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2774 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2779 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2782 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2783 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2785 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2786 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2787 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2789 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2794 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2796 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2798 unsigned long l, llen;
2799 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2800 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2803 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2808 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2809 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2810 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2811 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2816 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2817 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2818 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2819 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2821 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2825 certstart = certbytes;
2826 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2831 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2832 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2834 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2837 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2844 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2845 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2846 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2847 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2849 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2852 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2853 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2854 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2856 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2857 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2860 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2861 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2866 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2868 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2870 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2875 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2878 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2880 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2882 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2887 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2888 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2889 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2891 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2892 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2894 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2895 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2898 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2903 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2906 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2910 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2914 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2920 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2928 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2930 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2931 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2932 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2933 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
2934 const unsigned char *const_p;
2935 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
2938 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2939 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2940 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2942 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
2944 /* get session encoding length */
2945 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2947 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2950 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2951 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2954 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2956 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2960 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2961 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2962 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2968 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2972 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2975 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2978 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2980 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2981 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2982 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2986 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
2987 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2990 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2993 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
2994 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
2996 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2997 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2998 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3003 /* Put timeout and length */
3004 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3005 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)
3006 || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, pkt)) {
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3008 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3012 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3013 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3018 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3020 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3022 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3023 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3025 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3026 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3028 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3029 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3030 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3032 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3033 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3037 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3038 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3039 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3041 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3042 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3043 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3044 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3045 /* Output key name */
3046 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3048 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3049 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3051 /* Encrypt session data */
3052 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3053 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3054 || encdata1 != encdata2
3055 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3056 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3057 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3058 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3059 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3060 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3061 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3062 macendoffset - macoffset)
3063 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3064 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3065 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3066 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3067 || macdata1 != macdata2
3068 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3072 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3073 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3079 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3080 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3085 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3087 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3088 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3089 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3100 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3101 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3103 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3105 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3106 size_t next_proto_len;
3109 * The payload looks like:
3111 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3112 * uint8 padding_len;
3113 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3115 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3116 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3117 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3122 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3123 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3127 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3129 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3131 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3132 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3136 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3138 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3139 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3140 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3141 int sslv2format, int *al)
3143 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3144 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3146 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3147 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3149 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3151 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3153 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3155 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3159 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3161 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3162 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3166 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3167 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3170 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3175 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3178 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3179 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3180 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3184 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3186 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3187 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3188 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3190 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3193 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3194 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3195 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3196 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3197 if (s->renegotiate) {
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3199 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3200 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3203 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3207 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3208 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3209 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3211 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3212 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3215 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3217 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3218 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3224 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3225 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3227 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3229 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3234 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3235 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3244 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3245 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);