2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
82 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
83 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
85 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
86 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
89 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
91 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
92 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
97 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
99 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
105 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
108 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
109 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
111 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
113 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
114 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
116 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
127 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
130 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
135 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
136 * the appropriate error.
138 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
141 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
142 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
144 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
145 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
148 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
151 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
155 static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2)
157 const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1;
158 const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2;
160 if (e1->type < e2->type)
162 else if (e1->type > e2->type)
169 * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content
170 * of the extensions yet, except to check their types.
172 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
173 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
174 * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
175 * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
176 * parsed, or an internal error occurred.
179 * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then
180 * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions()
182 int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res,
183 size_t *numfound, int *ad)
185 PACKET extensions = *packet;
186 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
187 RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
189 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
190 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
194 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
195 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
196 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
202 if (num_extensions > 0) {
203 raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions)
205 if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
206 *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
211 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
212 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
213 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) ||
214 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet,
215 &raw_extensions[i].data)) {
216 /* This should not happen. */
217 *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
223 if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) {
224 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
228 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
229 qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(*raw_extensions),
231 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
232 if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) {
233 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
239 *res = raw_extensions;
240 *numfound = num_extensions;
244 OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
250 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
255 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
257 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
258 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
259 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
261 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
262 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
263 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
264 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
265 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
266 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
268 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
273 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
275 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
280 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
281 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
282 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
288 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
289 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
294 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
295 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
297 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
298 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
302 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
303 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
306 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
310 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
313 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
314 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
317 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
322 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
323 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
324 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
328 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
330 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
332 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
333 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
338 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
340 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
346 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
349 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
350 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
352 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
354 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
355 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
357 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
360 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
362 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
363 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
364 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
367 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
369 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
371 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
378 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
380 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
381 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)
382 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
389 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
391 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
394 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
396 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
397 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
402 /* clean a few things up */
403 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
405 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
407 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
408 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
410 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
414 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
418 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
419 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
424 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
426 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
427 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
429 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
431 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
433 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
434 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
437 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
438 cb = s->info_callback;
439 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
440 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
443 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 /* done with handshaking */
447 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
448 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
449 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
450 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
454 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
457 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
459 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
460 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
464 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
467 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
468 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
470 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
473 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
476 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
478 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
479 * in the middle of a handshake message.
481 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
482 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
484 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
487 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
488 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
489 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
490 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
492 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
493 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
497 s->init_num += readbytes;
502 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
504 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
505 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
506 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
509 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
514 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
515 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
516 s->msg_callback_arg);
518 } while (skip_message);
519 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
522 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
524 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
526 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
529 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
530 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
532 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
533 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
534 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
536 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
537 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
540 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
541 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
542 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
546 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
548 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
554 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
558 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
564 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
565 /* We've already read everything in */
566 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
571 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
573 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
574 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
576 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
580 s->init_num += readbytes;
584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
586 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
587 * Finished verification.
589 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
593 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
594 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
595 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
598 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
603 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
604 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
606 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
607 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
609 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
614 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
615 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
616 s->msg_callback_arg);
623 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
625 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
628 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
632 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
634 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
640 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
641 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
642 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
643 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
644 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
645 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
650 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
655 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
656 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
657 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
658 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
660 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
661 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
662 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
663 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
664 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
665 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
666 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
667 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
668 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
669 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
670 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
671 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
672 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
673 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
674 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
675 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
676 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
677 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
678 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
680 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
681 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
682 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
684 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
685 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
686 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
688 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
689 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
691 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
692 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
693 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
694 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
695 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
697 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
698 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
699 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
700 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
701 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
702 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
703 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
704 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
706 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
707 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
709 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
710 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
713 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
719 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
721 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
723 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
726 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
728 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
733 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
734 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
739 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
740 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
743 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
744 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
747 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
749 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
751 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
754 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
756 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
759 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
761 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
764 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
766 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
769 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
771 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
776 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
777 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
780 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
782 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
784 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
787 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
788 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
790 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
791 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
797 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
799 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
800 * @method: the intended method.
802 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
804 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
806 int version = method->version;
808 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
809 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
810 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
811 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
813 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
814 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
815 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
817 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
818 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
819 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
820 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
821 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
822 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
828 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
831 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
832 * @version: Protocol version to test against
834 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
836 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
838 const version_info *vent;
839 const version_info *table;
841 switch (s->method->version) {
843 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
844 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
845 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
846 table = tls_version_table;
848 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
849 table = dtls_version_table;
854 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
856 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
857 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
858 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
866 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
867 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
868 * supported protocol version.
870 * @s server SSL handle.
872 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
874 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
876 const version_info *vent;
877 const version_info *table;
880 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
881 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
884 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
888 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
889 * highest protocol version).
891 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
892 table = tls_version_table;
893 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
894 table = dtls_version_table;
896 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
900 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
901 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
902 return s->version == vent->version;
908 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
909 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
910 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
911 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
913 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
914 * @version: the intended limit.
915 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
917 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
919 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
927 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
928 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
929 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
931 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
932 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
933 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
934 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
935 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
937 switch (method_version) {
940 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
941 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
942 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
943 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
948 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
949 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
953 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
954 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
955 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
965 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
966 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
967 * the version specific method.
969 * @s: server SSL handle.
971 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
973 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
976 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
978 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
979 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
981 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
984 int server_version = s->method->version;
985 int client_version = hello->version;
986 const version_info *vent;
987 const version_info *table;
990 s->client_version = client_version;
992 switch (server_version) {
994 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
995 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
997 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
998 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
999 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1000 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1001 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1004 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1005 table = tls_version_table;
1007 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1008 table = dtls_version_table;
1012 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1013 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1015 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1016 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1018 method = vent->smeth();
1019 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1020 s->version = vent->version;
1026 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1030 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1031 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1032 * the version specific method.
1034 * @s: client SSL handle.
1035 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1037 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1039 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
1041 const version_info *vent;
1042 const version_info *table;
1044 switch (s->method->version) {
1046 if (version != s->version)
1047 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1049 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1050 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1051 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1052 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1053 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1056 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1057 table = tls_version_table;
1059 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1060 table = dtls_version_table;
1064 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1065 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1068 if (version != vent->version)
1070 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1072 method = vent->cmeth();
1073 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1077 s->version = version;
1081 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1085 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1086 * @s: The SSL connection
1087 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1088 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1090 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1091 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1092 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1093 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1094 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1096 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1097 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1098 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1100 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1101 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1103 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1108 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1109 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1110 const version_info *table;
1111 const version_info *vent;
1113 switch (s->method->version) {
1116 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1117 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1118 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1119 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1120 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1122 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1124 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1125 table = tls_version_table;
1127 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1128 table = dtls_version_table;
1133 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1134 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1135 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1136 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1138 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1139 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1140 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1142 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1143 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1144 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1146 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1147 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1148 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1149 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1150 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1151 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1153 *min_version = version = 0;
1155 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1157 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1158 * "version capability" vector.
1160 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1164 method = vent->cmeth();
1165 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1169 *min_version = method->version;
1171 version = (single = method)->version;
1172 *min_version = version;
1177 *max_version = version;
1179 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1181 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1187 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1188 * the initial ClientHello.
1190 * @s: client SSL handle.
1192 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1194 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1196 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1198 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1203 s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;