2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
24 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
26 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
31 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
32 s->init_num, &written);
35 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
37 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
38 * ignore the result anyway
40 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
41 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
45 if (written == s->init_num) {
47 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
48 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
52 s->init_off += written;
53 s->init_num -= written;
57 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
61 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
62 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
65 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
71 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
73 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
76 /* Reset any extension flags */
77 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
80 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
81 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
84 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
85 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
88 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
89 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
90 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
93 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
94 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
97 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
98 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
100 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
108 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
110 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
113 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
114 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, s->ctx->lock);
115 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
116 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
119 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
121 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
123 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
124 * support secure renegotiation.
126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
127 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
131 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i,
134 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
138 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
139 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard,
142 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, 1,
143 &discard, s->ctx->lock);
145 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
146 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
149 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
152 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
159 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
160 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
162 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
163 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
165 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
166 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
168 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
169 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
171 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
174 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
175 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
176 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
177 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
178 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
179 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
181 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
184 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
185 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
186 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
188 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
189 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
190 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
191 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
192 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
193 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
194 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
199 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
203 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
212 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
214 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
215 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
216 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
217 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
218 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
220 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
221 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
222 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
224 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
228 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
230 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
235 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
241 /* Get the data to be signed */
242 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
247 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
251 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
252 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
258 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
263 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
264 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
265 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
266 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
271 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
272 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
273 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
274 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
275 s->session->master_key)
276 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
281 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
288 int pktype = lu->sig;
290 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
291 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
292 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
293 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
297 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
302 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
303 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
307 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
311 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
316 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
318 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
319 const unsigned char *data;
320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
321 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
323 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
324 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
328 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
331 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
332 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
333 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
340 peer = s->session->peer;
341 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
345 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
347 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
348 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
352 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
356 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
357 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
360 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
363 } else if (rv == 0) {
364 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
368 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
370 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
371 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
375 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
381 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
383 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
384 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
387 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
388 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
389 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
390 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
391 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
392 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
393 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
396 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
398 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
402 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
403 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
404 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
406 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
409 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
411 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
415 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
421 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
423 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
429 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
430 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
431 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
432 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
433 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
437 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
443 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
444 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
445 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
446 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
451 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
452 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
453 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
454 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
455 s->session->master_key)) {
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
459 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
460 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
465 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
467 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
473 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
476 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
477 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
479 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
480 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
481 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
483 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
488 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
490 size_t finish_md_len;
494 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
496 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
499 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
504 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
505 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
506 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
509 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
510 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
511 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
517 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
518 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
520 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
521 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
524 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
526 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
527 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
532 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
534 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
540 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
541 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
543 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
544 s->session->master_key,
545 s->session->master_key_length)) {
546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
551 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
553 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
558 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
560 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
562 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
564 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
569 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
575 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
580 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
584 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
588 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
591 unsigned int updatetype;
593 s->key_update_count++;
594 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
595 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
601 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
602 * be on a record boundary.
604 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
605 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
606 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
610 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
611 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
612 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
618 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
621 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
622 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
623 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
629 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
630 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
631 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
633 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
634 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
636 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
637 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
644 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
645 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
646 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
651 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
654 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
659 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
660 * the appropriate error.
662 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
665 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
666 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
668 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
669 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
672 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
675 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
679 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
684 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
686 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
687 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
688 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
690 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
691 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
692 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
693 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
694 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
695 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
697 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
702 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
704 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
709 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
710 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
711 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
716 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
717 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
718 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
723 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
724 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
726 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
727 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
731 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
732 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
735 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
739 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
741 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
742 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
743 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
746 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
748 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
752 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
754 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
757 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
758 * message must be on a record boundary.
760 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
761 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
766 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
767 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
768 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
772 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
774 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
776 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
777 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
782 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
784 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
790 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
792 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
793 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
798 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
800 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
802 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
804 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
808 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
809 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
811 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
813 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
814 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
819 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
820 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
821 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
825 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
826 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
830 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
835 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
837 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
838 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
839 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
842 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
844 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
846 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
853 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
854 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
858 unsigned char *outbytes;
860 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
863 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
866 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
867 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
869 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
874 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
881 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
882 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
886 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
887 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
888 X509_STORE *chain_store;
889 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
891 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
897 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
899 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
900 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
902 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
904 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
906 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
907 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
909 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
911 if (chain_store != NULL) {
912 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
914 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
918 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
919 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
924 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
925 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
926 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
927 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
929 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
930 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
932 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
933 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
936 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
941 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
945 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
946 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
947 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
949 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
950 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
954 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
956 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
961 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
963 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
964 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
965 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
976 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
979 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
981 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
982 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
983 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
992 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
993 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
996 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
999 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1002 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
1004 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
1005 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
1011 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1013 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1014 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1016 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1019 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s))
1024 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
1025 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1028 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1030 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1033 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1035 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard,
1037 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1040 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1043 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1044 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1046 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard,
1049 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1050 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, &discard,
1054 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1055 cb = s->info_callback;
1056 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1057 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1060 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1062 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1063 /* done with handshaking */
1064 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1065 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1066 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1067 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1072 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1076 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1078 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1079 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1082 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1084 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1085 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
1087 size_t l, readbytes;
1089 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1092 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1093 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1095 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1098 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1101 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1103 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1104 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1106 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1107 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1109 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1112 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1113 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1114 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1115 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1117 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1118 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1122 s->init_num += readbytes;
1127 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1128 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1130 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1131 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1132 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1135 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1139 if (s->msg_callback)
1140 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1141 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1142 s->msg_callback_arg);
1144 } while (skip_message);
1145 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1148 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1150 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1152 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1155 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1156 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1158 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1159 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1160 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1162 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1163 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1166 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1167 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1168 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1172 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1174 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1180 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1184 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1186 size_t n, readbytes;
1190 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1191 /* We've already read everything in */
1192 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1197 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1199 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1200 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1202 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1206 s->init_num += readbytes;
1210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1212 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1213 * Finished verification.
1215 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1219 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1220 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1221 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1224 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1228 if (s->msg_callback)
1229 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1230 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1233 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1234 * processing the message
1236 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1237 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1238 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1240 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 if (s->msg_callback)
1245 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1246 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1247 s->msg_callback_arg);
1254 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1259 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1260 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1261 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1262 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1264 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1265 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1266 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1267 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1268 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1269 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1270 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1272 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1273 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1274 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1275 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1276 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1277 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1278 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1281 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1282 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1284 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1285 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1286 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1288 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1289 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1290 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1292 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1293 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1295 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1296 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1297 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1298 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1299 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1301 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1302 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1303 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1304 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1305 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1306 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1307 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1308 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1310 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1311 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1313 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1314 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1317 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1323 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1325 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1327 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1330 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1332 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1337 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1338 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1343 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1344 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1347 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1348 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1351 /* Must be in order high to low */
1352 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1354 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1356 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1359 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1361 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1364 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1366 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1369 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1371 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1374 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1376 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1381 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1382 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1385 /* Must be in order high to low */
1386 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1388 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1390 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1393 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1394 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1396 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1397 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1403 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1405 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1406 * @method: the intended method.
1408 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1410 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1412 int version = method->version;
1414 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1415 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1416 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1417 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1419 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1420 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1421 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1423 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1424 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1425 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1426 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1432 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1435 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1436 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1438 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1440 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1442 const version_info *vent;
1443 const version_info *table;
1445 switch (s->method->version) {
1447 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1448 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1449 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1450 table = tls_version_table;
1452 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1453 table = dtls_version_table;
1458 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1460 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1461 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1462 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1470 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1471 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1472 * supported protocol version.
1474 * @s server SSL handle.
1476 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1478 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1480 const version_info *vent;
1481 const version_info *table;
1484 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1485 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1488 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1492 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1493 * highest protocol version).
1495 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1496 table = tls_version_table;
1497 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1498 table = dtls_version_table;
1500 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1504 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1505 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1506 return s->version == vent->version;
1512 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1513 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1514 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1515 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1517 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1518 * @version: the intended limit.
1519 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1521 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1523 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1531 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1532 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1533 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1535 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1536 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1537 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1538 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1539 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1541 switch (method_version) {
1544 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1545 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1546 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1547 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1552 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1553 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1557 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1558 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1559 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1568 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1570 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1571 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1572 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1573 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1574 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
1575 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
1576 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1578 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1583 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1584 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1585 * the version specific method.
1587 * @s: server SSL handle.
1589 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1591 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1594 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1596 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1597 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1599 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1602 int server_version = s->method->version;
1603 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1604 const version_info *vent;
1605 const version_info *table;
1607 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1609 s->client_version = client_version;
1611 switch (server_version) {
1613 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1614 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1615 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1616 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1618 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1619 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1620 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1621 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1622 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1627 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1628 * a HelloRetryRequest
1631 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1632 table = tls_version_table;
1634 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1635 table = dtls_version_table;
1639 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1641 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1642 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1643 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1644 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1645 PACKET versionslist;
1647 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1649 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1650 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1651 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1654 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1655 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1656 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1657 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1659 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1660 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1661 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1663 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1666 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1669 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1670 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1672 method = vent->smeth();
1673 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1674 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1675 best_method = method;
1679 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1680 /* Trailing data? */
1681 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1684 if (best_vers > 0) {
1685 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1687 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1688 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1690 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1691 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1694 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1695 s->version = best_vers;
1696 s->method = best_method;
1699 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1703 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1704 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1706 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1707 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1710 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1713 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1714 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1716 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1717 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1719 method = vent->smeth();
1720 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1721 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1722 s->version = vent->version;
1728 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1732 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1733 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1734 * the version specific method.
1736 * @s: client SSL handle.
1737 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1738 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1739 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1741 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1743 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
1745 const version_info *vent;
1746 const version_info *table;
1749 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1750 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1751 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1753 if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1754 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1755 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1758 switch (s->method->version) {
1760 if (version != s->version) {
1761 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1762 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1765 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1766 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1767 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1768 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1769 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1772 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1773 table = tls_version_table;
1775 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1776 table = dtls_version_table;
1780 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1781 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1784 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1787 if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
1790 method = vent->cmeth();
1791 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1793 if (version == vent->version) {
1794 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1801 highver = vent->version;
1803 if (version != vent->version)
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1807 /* Check for downgrades */
1809 if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
1810 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1811 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1812 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1813 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1814 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1815 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1817 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1818 && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1819 && highver > version) {
1820 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1821 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1822 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1823 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1824 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1825 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1832 s->version = version;
1836 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1837 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1841 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1842 * @s: The SSL connection
1843 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1844 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1846 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1847 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1848 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1849 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1850 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1852 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1853 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1854 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1856 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1857 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1859 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
1863 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1864 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1865 const version_info *table;
1866 const version_info *vent;
1868 switch (s->method->version) {
1871 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1872 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1873 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1874 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1875 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1877 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1879 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1880 table = tls_version_table;
1882 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1883 table = dtls_version_table;
1888 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1889 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1890 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1891 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1893 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1894 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1895 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1897 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1898 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1899 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1901 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1902 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1903 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1904 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1905 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1906 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1908 *min_version = version = 0;
1910 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1912 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1913 * "version capability" vector.
1915 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1919 method = vent->cmeth();
1920 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1924 *min_version = method->version;
1926 version = (single = method)->version;
1927 *min_version = version;
1932 *max_version = version;
1934 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1936 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1942 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1943 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1945 * @s: client SSL handle.
1947 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1949 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1951 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1953 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1958 s->version = ver_max;
1960 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1961 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1962 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1964 s->client_version = ver_max;
1969 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1970 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1971 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1972 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1975 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
1976 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
1980 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1983 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1984 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1986 if (group_id == group
1988 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1997 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
1998 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
2000 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2002 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2004 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2006 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2007 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2008 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2013 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2014 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
2017 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2018 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2019 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen;
2020 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2021 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2029 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2031 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2034 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2036 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2037 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2040 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2044 /* get the CA RDNs */
2045 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2046 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2051 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2052 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2053 unsigned int name_len;
2055 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2056 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2061 namestart = namebytes;
2062 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2066 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2071 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2073 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2080 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2092 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2094 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2096 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2097 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt))
2100 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2103 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2104 unsigned char *namebytes;
2105 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2109 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2110 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2112 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2118 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt))
2124 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2125 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2126 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2128 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2129 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2133 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2134 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2136 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);