2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
32 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
34 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
35 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
36 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
40 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
46 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
48 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
49 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
50 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
51 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
58 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
64 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
66 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
69 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
70 * ciphersuite or for SRP
72 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
81 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
82 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
83 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
84 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
86 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
87 * (transition not allowed)
89 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
91 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
94 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
95 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
96 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
99 switch (st->hand_state) {
103 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
105 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
106 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
114 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
121 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
132 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
133 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
139 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
170 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
171 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
173 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
174 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
176 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
177 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
178 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
179 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
181 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
182 /* SSLfatal() already called */
185 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
192 /* No valid transition found */
197 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
198 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
199 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
200 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
202 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
203 * (transition not allowed)
205 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
207 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
211 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
212 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
214 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
215 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
220 switch (st->hand_state) {
224 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
225 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
226 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
230 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
231 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
232 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
238 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
240 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
241 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
244 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
250 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
252 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
253 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
257 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
262 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
263 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
265 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
266 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
267 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
268 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
270 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
271 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
272 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
273 * the server is resuming.
276 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
278 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
279 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
280 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
285 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
286 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
288 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
289 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
290 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
291 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
295 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
296 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
298 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
299 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
308 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
309 * |ext.status_expected| is set
311 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
312 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
317 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
318 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
319 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
320 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
321 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
322 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
330 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
331 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
332 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
341 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
342 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
347 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
348 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
349 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
353 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
359 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
367 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
374 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
382 /* No valid transition found */
383 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
387 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
388 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
391 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
392 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
393 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
394 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
397 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
402 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
403 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
406 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
408 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
411 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
412 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
413 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
415 switch (st->hand_state) {
417 /* Shouldn't happen */
418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
428 * we already sent close_notify
430 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
431 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
439 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
440 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
442 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
443 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
446 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
447 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
451 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
458 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
459 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
460 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
465 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
466 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
474 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
475 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 /* Try to read from the server instead */
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
492 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
493 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
497 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
500 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
501 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
507 switch (st->hand_state) {
509 /* Shouldn't happen */
510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
511 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
514 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
517 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
528 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
530 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
531 * actually selected a version yet.
533 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
543 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
545 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
547 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
548 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
549 * because we did early data.
551 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
552 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
559 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
561 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
562 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
563 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
566 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
578 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
579 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
582 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
583 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
584 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
585 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
587 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
592 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
602 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
604 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
607 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
610 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
619 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
620 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
624 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
626 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
632 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
634 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
641 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
643 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
646 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
647 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
649 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
651 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
652 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
655 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
660 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
661 * the client to the server.
663 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
665 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
667 switch (st->hand_state) {
669 /* No pre work to be done */
672 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
675 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
676 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
677 /* SSLfatal() already called */
683 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
687 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
688 * messages unless we need to.
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
693 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
694 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
695 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
701 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
703 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
704 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
705 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
707 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
708 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
709 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
712 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
713 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
716 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
717 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
720 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
724 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
725 * client to the server.
727 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
729 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
733 switch (st->hand_state) {
735 /* No post work to be done */
738 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
739 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
740 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
742 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
743 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
744 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
746 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
747 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
748 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
749 /* SSLfatal() already called */
753 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
754 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
758 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
759 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
764 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
766 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
767 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
769 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
770 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
773 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
774 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
775 /* SSLfatal() already called */
780 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
781 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
783 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
784 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
786 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
787 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
788 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
790 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
791 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
795 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
796 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
797 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
799 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
800 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
802 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
804 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
809 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
810 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
815 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
819 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
822 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
827 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
831 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
833 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
835 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
838 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
842 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
845 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
846 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
847 /* SSLfatal() already called */
850 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
851 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
852 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
853 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
861 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
870 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
874 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
877 * Valid return values are:
881 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
882 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
884 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
886 switch (st->hand_state) {
888 /* Shouldn't happen */
889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
892 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
894 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
896 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
897 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
900 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
901 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
902 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
905 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
906 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
907 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
910 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
916 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
917 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
920 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
921 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
922 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
925 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
926 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
927 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
930 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
931 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
932 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
933 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
936 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
937 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
938 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
941 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
942 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
943 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
951 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
952 * reading. Excludes the message header.
954 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
956 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
958 switch (st->hand_state) {
960 /* Shouldn't happen */
963 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
964 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
966 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
967 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
970 return s->max_cert_list;
972 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
973 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
976 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
978 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
979 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
983 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
984 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
985 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
987 return s->max_cert_list;
989 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
990 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
992 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
993 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
995 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
997 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
998 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1001 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1004 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1007 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1012 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1014 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1016 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1018 switch (st->hand_state) {
1020 /* Shouldn't happen */
1021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1022 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1025 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1027 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1028 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1030 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1031 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1033 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1034 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1036 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1037 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1040 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1043 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1046 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1049 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1052 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1055 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1058 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1061 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1064 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1069 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1072 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1074 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1076 switch (st->hand_state) {
1078 /* Shouldn't happen */
1079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1082 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1083 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
1085 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1086 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1087 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1091 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1099 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1100 unsigned char *session_id;
1102 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1103 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1104 if (protverr != 0) {
1105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
1110 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1111 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1112 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1113 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1114 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1118 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1120 p = s->s3.client_random;
1123 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1124 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1126 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1129 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1136 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1139 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1140 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1147 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1148 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1149 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1150 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1151 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1152 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1153 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1156 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1157 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1158 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1159 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1160 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1161 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1162 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1163 * know that is maximum server supports.
1164 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1165 * containing version 1.0.
1167 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1168 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1169 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1170 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1171 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1172 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1173 * the negotiated version.
1175 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1176 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1178 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1179 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1186 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1187 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1188 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1189 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1190 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1191 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1192 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1193 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1194 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1203 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1204 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1205 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1206 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1209 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1210 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1212 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1218 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1219 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1220 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1221 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 /* Ciphers supported */
1228 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1234 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1237 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1248 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1249 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1250 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1251 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1252 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1253 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1254 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 /* Add the NULL method */
1262 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 /* TLS extensions */
1268 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1269 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1276 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1281 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1282 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1284 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1287 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1288 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1290 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1293 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1295 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1297 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1299 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1302 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1304 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1305 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1308 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1310 /* unknown cipher */
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1315 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1316 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1318 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1323 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1324 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1326 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1331 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1332 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1333 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1339 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1340 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1341 * set and use it for comparison.
1343 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1344 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1345 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1346 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1348 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1349 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1351 if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
1352 != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1354 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1359 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1363 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1367 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1372 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1374 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1375 size_t session_id_len;
1376 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1378 unsigned int compression;
1379 unsigned int sversion;
1380 unsigned int context;
1381 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1386 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1391 /* load the server random */
1392 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1393 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1394 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1395 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1396 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1398 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1403 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1409 /* Get the session-id. */
1410 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1414 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1415 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1416 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1421 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1426 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1431 /* TLS extensions */
1432 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1433 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1434 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1435 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1441 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1442 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1443 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1444 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1445 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1449 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1450 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1455 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1456 if (compression != 0) {
1457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1458 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1462 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1463 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1464 session_id_len) != 0) {
1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1471 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1472 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1476 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1480 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1481 * are appropriate for this version.
1483 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1484 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1485 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1492 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1494 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1495 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1497 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1499 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1503 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1504 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1505 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1506 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1507 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1512 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1513 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1514 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1515 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1516 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1517 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1518 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1519 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1520 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1521 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1523 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1524 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1525 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1527 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1528 * backwards compat reasons
1530 int master_key_length;
1531 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1532 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1535 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1536 && master_key_length > 0) {
1537 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1538 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1539 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 if (session_id_len != 0
1547 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1548 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1549 session_id_len) == 0)
1554 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1555 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1556 /* actually a client application bug */
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1558 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1563 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1564 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1565 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1566 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1567 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1569 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1570 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1571 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1572 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1577 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1579 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1580 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1581 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1582 * used for resumption.
1584 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1585 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1586 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1587 if (session_id_len > 0)
1588 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1593 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1594 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1596 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1600 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1603 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1604 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1606 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1611 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1612 if (compression != 0) {
1613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1614 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1618 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1619 * using compression.
1621 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1626 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1628 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1631 if (compression == 0)
1633 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1637 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1640 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1642 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1645 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1649 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1650 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1656 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1657 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1661 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1664 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1665 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1667 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1668 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1669 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1672 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1673 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1675 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1680 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1681 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1682 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1687 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1688 * we're done with this message
1691 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1692 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1693 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1698 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1699 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1701 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1702 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1705 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1708 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1711 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1712 * should not be used.
1714 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1715 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1717 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1718 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1719 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1720 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1721 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1725 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1728 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1730 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1731 * ClientHello will not change
1733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1738 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1739 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1741 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1747 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1748 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1749 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1752 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1753 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1754 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1758 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1760 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1761 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1764 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1765 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1767 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1769 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1771 unsigned int context = 0;
1773 if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1778 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1780 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1781 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1782 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1786 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1787 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1788 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1793 certstart = certbytes;
1794 x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
1796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1797 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1800 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1801 cert_len) == NULL) {
1802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1806 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1811 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1812 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1815 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1819 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1820 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1821 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1822 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1823 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1824 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1825 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1826 /* SSLfatal already called */
1829 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1832 if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1838 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1842 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
1843 s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
1844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1848 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1849 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1850 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1852 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1855 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1856 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1860 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
1862 s->rwstate = SSL_RETRY_VERIFY;
1866 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1867 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1868 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1869 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1870 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1871 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1872 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1873 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1874 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1875 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1876 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1877 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1879 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1880 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1881 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1884 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, i);
1891 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1892 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1894 x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
1896 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1898 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1900 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1904 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1909 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1910 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1913 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1914 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1920 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1922 s->session->peer = x;
1923 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1925 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1927 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1928 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1929 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1930 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1933 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1936 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1939 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1941 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1943 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1949 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1950 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1951 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1954 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1959 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1960 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1961 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1962 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1963 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1975 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1978 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1980 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1981 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1982 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1983 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1988 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1990 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1991 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1993 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1994 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1996 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1997 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1999 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2000 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2005 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2006 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2010 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2011 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2012 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2021 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2023 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2024 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2025 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2026 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2027 OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2028 OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2031 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2032 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2033 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2038 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2039 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2040 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2042 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2043 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2044 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2049 tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2051 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2052 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
2053 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
2055 || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
2056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2060 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2065 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
2066 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
2067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2071 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2072 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, peer_tmp, s->ctx->propq);
2075 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2076 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2077 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2078 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2080 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
2081 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
2082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2086 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2092 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2096 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2097 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2099 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2100 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2101 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2106 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2107 OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2108 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2109 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2117 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2120 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2123 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2124 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2125 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2127 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2132 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2133 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2135 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2136 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2141 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2143 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2147 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2152 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2153 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2154 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
2155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2160 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2161 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2164 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2165 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2166 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2167 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2168 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2173 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2176 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2177 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2178 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2179 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2181 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2183 save_param_start = *pkt;
2185 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2186 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2188 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2189 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2190 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2195 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2196 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2197 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2198 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2199 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2202 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2203 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2204 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2207 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2208 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2209 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2217 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2220 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2226 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2227 * equals the length of the parameters.
2229 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2230 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2231 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2236 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2237 unsigned int sigalg;
2239 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2243 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2244 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2247 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2252 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2254 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2257 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2258 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2259 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2261 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2262 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2267 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2268 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2273 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2274 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2275 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey,
2277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2280 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2281 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2282 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2283 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2288 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2289 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2295 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2296 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2302 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2305 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2306 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2307 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2308 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2309 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
2312 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2315 /* still data left over */
2316 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2322 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2324 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2325 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2328 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2332 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2333 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2334 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2336 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2337 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2338 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2340 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2342 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2343 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2346 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2349 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2350 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2351 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2352 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2353 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2354 s->pha_context = NULL;
2355 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2357 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2358 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2360 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2363 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2365 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2367 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2368 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2370 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2371 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2372 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2373 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2376 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2377 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2379 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2384 /* get the certificate types */
2385 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2387 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2390 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2392 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2395 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2398 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2400 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2404 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2405 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2407 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2409 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2410 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2412 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2414 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2418 /* get the CA RDNs */
2419 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2421 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2425 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2427 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2430 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2431 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2434 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2435 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2436 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2437 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2438 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2441 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2444 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2447 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2449 unsigned int ticklen;
2450 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2451 unsigned int sess_len;
2452 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2454 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2456 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2458 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2460 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2461 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2462 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2463 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2464 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2470 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2471 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2472 * be 0 here in that instance
2475 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2478 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2479 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2480 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2481 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2482 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2485 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2486 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2489 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2492 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2497 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2498 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2500 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2501 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2502 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2504 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2507 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2508 s->session = new_sess;
2512 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2513 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2515 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2517 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2518 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2519 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2521 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2522 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2526 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2531 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2532 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2533 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2535 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2538 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2539 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2544 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2545 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2547 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2548 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2549 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2550 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2556 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2557 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2558 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2559 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2560 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2561 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2562 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2563 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2566 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
2567 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2568 /* Error is already recorded */
2569 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2573 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2574 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2576 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2577 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2582 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2584 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2585 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2587 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2588 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2589 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2590 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2592 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2594 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2595 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2599 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2601 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2603 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2604 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2605 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2606 s->session->master_key,
2608 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2611 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2614 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2615 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2618 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2620 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2622 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2626 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2627 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2629 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2634 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2635 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2639 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2640 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2644 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2645 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2646 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2650 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2651 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2660 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2662 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2663 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2664 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2667 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2671 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2672 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2673 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2676 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2679 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2682 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2688 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2689 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2690 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2692 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2693 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2694 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2698 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2703 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2708 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2709 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2710 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2711 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2720 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2722 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2723 /* should contain no data */
2724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2725 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2728 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2729 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
2730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2731 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2736 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2737 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2738 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2741 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2744 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2749 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2750 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2753 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2754 size_t identitylen = 0;
2755 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2756 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2757 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2760 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2765 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2767 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2768 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2771 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2775 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2780 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2781 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2786 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2787 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2788 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2793 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2794 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2795 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2798 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2801 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2809 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2810 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2811 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2812 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2821 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2823 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2824 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2825 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2827 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2830 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2832 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2838 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2839 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
2840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2845 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2851 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2852 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2853 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2854 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2859 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2860 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
2866 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2867 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2871 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2872 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2876 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2879 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2880 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2885 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2886 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2887 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2891 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
2892 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2896 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2897 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2902 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2904 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2905 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2907 unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
2908 size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
2911 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2923 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2924 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2928 /* send off the data */
2930 /* Generate encoding of server key */
2931 encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
2932 if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
2933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2934 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2935 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
2939 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2940 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2943 prime_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ckey);
2944 pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
2946 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
2947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
2953 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
2954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2960 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
2961 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2965 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2967 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2968 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2969 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2972 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
2974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2978 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
2980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2984 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2985 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2989 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2990 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2992 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2997 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3005 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3009 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3012 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3013 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3016 unsigned int md_len;
3017 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3018 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3019 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3020 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3023 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3024 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3027 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3029 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3030 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3032 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3036 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3037 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3039 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3044 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3045 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3046 * certificate key for key exchange
3049 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3051 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3057 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3058 /* Generate session key
3059 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3061 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3066 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3069 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3070 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3071 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3072 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3073 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3074 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3075 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3076 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3080 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3082 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3083 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3087 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3089 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3092 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3097 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3098 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3099 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3104 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3105 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3106 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3111 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3112 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3121 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
3123 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3124 return NID_magma_ctr;
3125 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3126 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3131 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3133 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3134 unsigned int md_len;
3135 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
3140 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3141 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3142 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3143 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3144 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3145 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3146 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3150 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3151 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3156 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3159 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3160 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32], tmp[255];
3161 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3163 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3166 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3168 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3173 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3178 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3180 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3186 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3191 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3192 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3193 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3195 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3199 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3200 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3202 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3207 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
3208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3212 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3213 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3214 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3219 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3220 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3226 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3231 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3236 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3237 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3238 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3242 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3243 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3251 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3254 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3256 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3257 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3262 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3264 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3265 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3266 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3278 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3280 unsigned long alg_k;
3282 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3285 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3286 * no need to do so here.
3288 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3289 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3292 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3293 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3295 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3296 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3298 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3299 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3301 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3302 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3304 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3305 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3307 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3308 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3310 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3317 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3318 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3319 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3321 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3322 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3323 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3328 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3330 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3333 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3334 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3338 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3339 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3340 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3347 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3351 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3352 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3353 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3362 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3363 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3364 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3368 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3371 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3372 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3374 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3375 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3376 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3379 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3380 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3381 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3386 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3387 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3393 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3394 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3395 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
3400 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3401 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3402 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3404 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3406 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3407 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3410 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3411 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3413 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3414 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3419 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3422 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3425 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3426 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3427 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3428 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3430 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3437 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3439 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3440 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3441 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3443 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3446 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3450 /* We need to get a client cert */
3451 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3453 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3454 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3456 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3458 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3461 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3462 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3463 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3465 } else if (i == 1) {
3467 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3471 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3472 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3475 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3476 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3477 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3478 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3480 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3481 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3482 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3488 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3489 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3490 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3493 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3498 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3501 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3502 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3503 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3507 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3512 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3513 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3515 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3520 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3521 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3522 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3524 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3525 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3534 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3536 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3540 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3541 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3543 /* we don't have a certificate */
3544 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3547 /* This is the passed certificate */
3548 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3550 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3551 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3556 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3557 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3563 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3565 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3569 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3578 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3580 size_t len, padding_len;
3581 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3583 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3584 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3586 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3587 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3588 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3592 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3598 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3600 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3601 /* should contain no data */
3602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3603 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3606 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3607 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3608 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3612 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3613 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3614 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3615 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3616 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3621 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3623 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3626 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3629 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3631 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3632 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3637 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3638 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3640 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3641 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3646 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3647 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3650 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3651 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3654 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3658 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3659 i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
3664 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3665 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3669 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3672 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3673 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3675 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3676 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3686 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3687 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3688 # error Max cipher length too short
3691 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3692 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3695 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3696 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3699 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3702 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3704 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3707 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3708 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3710 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3711 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3712 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3715 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3720 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3722 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3723 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3724 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3727 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3728 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3736 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3737 const char *maxvertext =
3739 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3742 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
3748 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3749 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3750 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3752 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3757 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3758 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3759 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3761 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3771 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3773 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3774 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3779 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;